also, from one of those sources apokrisis keeps insisting I don't read.

The Kremlin conducted a campaign against radical nationalists in the 2010s, and as a result, many of them are currently imprisoned, according to a Russian political scientist and a senior visiting fellow at the George Washington University Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies Maria Lipman.[32]

Sociologist Marcel Van Herpen wrote that United Russia increasingly relied on Russian nationalism for support following the 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine.[33] Nationalist political party Rodina cultivated ties with Eurosceptic, far-right and far-left political movements, supporting them financially and inviting them to Eurasian conferences in Crimea and Saint Petersburg.[34]

However, the Kremlin scaled nationalism down out of fears that prominent figures such as Igor Girkin began to act independently, following a brief period of stirring activism that resulted in Russian men volunteering to fight in Donbas in 2014 and 2015, according to Lipman. In Lipman's view, the Kremlin's aim is to prevent emotions that "might get out of control and motivate people to act independently".[32] — Wiki

Great. You will have no problem providing expert sources arguing the opposite then. Look forward to it. — apokrisis

I've provided plenty of sources throughout my contributions, but on this particular issue (the motivation behind Russian foreign policy) there's academics like Daniel Treisman, experts such as Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrei Tsygankov, Richard Sawka, Marie Mendras...

But I'm not getting into this ridiculous shifting of the burden of proof here. If you're seriously making the claim that all academics believe imperialist ambitions drive Russian foreign policy, then you are making by far the more extraordinary claim for which you've yet to provide a single source.

So, in return. I look forward to hearing your sources to back up your claim...

we're not talking about Putin, we're talking about "Russian identity". I'm resisting that idiotic sweeping generalisation. — Benkei

Well, do notice that I have emphasized, many times now, that I am talking about the identity that official Russia has, and what Putin and his followers cherish. It is an imperial identity, if you think of it for a moment. Fortress Russia. A Zapadnik might hold other views, but Zapadniks are not in power in Russia.

The Kremlin conducted a campaign against radical nationalists in the 2010s, and as a result, many of them are currently imprisoned - However, the Kremlin scaled nationalism down out of fears that prominent figures such as Igor Girkin began to act independently, following a brief period of stirring activism that resulted in Russian men volunteering to fight in Donbas in 2014 and 2015, according to Lipman. In Lipman's view, the Kremlin's aim is to prevent emotions that "might get out of control and motivate people to act independently — Wiki

Yes, Putin is a politician. I assume that Ernst Röhm was a devoted Nazi and totally in line with the ideology of the party, yet for 'some reason' Hitler killed him.

Nationalism, or basically jingoism, works for Putin. Yet if the Soviet Union would be still around, I guess KGB officer Vladimir Putin would be devoted still to that cause. Again, there's no contradiction.

there's no contradiction. — ssu

Of course there is. If Putin is an opportunistic politician who uses imperialist rhetoric when it suits his ambitions, then all your speeches prove is that at the time of the speech the political landscape was such that imperialist language would help cement Putin's position (or at least, he thought as much). So any analysis of the motivations behind the recent invasion can't be assessed on the basis of past speeches as if they were indicators of a consistent motive, having just established that they were most likely reactionary and Machiavellian.

You can't, on the one had, claim his speeches give us a window into his foundational motives then on the other admit that he just says whatever he thinks is going to work best at the time.

simply because I don't agree with you. — Benkei

Simply because even when Putin says it himself, you still can’t admit being wrong. :cool:

Putin has been struggling against nationalists for at least ten years. In the Russian context he’s centre-right, and wants to neutralise opposition from the left and the right, either by direct repression or appeasement.

This doesn’t contradict his use of nationalist rhetoric, but note that his variety of nationalism is opposed to the extreme ethnic nationalism that characterises his right-wing opponents. He’s always been careful to prevent anything that risks a breakup along ethnic lines.

But right now, extreme nationalist opposition to Putin is quite vocal in Russia, and is tolerated perhaps partly because it currently serves the aggressive aims of the regime, but maybe also because the regime will seem reasonable and moderate to the bulk of the population, who are not extreme nationalists.

Stating the obvious: Putin’s allergy to extreme nationalism does not imply that he and his regime are not imperialist or do not reject Ukrainian nationhood. Even more obvious: I am not defending Putin. The main point is that Benkei’s quote about nationalism doesn’t contradict apokrisis or ssu.

even when Putin says it himself, you still can’t admit being wrong. — apokrisis

Ahh, so now Putin's actual words are indicators of motive. Great, then we have our answer. Here's why he chose to invade Ukraine.

...[NATO] moving its military infrastructure ever closer to the Russian border.

...these past days NATO leadership has been blunt in its statements that they need to accelerate and step up efforts to bring the alliance’s infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders.

Any further expansion of the North Atlantic alliance’s infrastructure or the ongoing efforts to gain a military foothold of the Ukrainian territory are unacceptable for us.

Focused on their own goals, the leading NATO countries are supporting the far-right nationalists and neo-Nazis in Ukraine

First a bloody military operation was waged against Belgrade, without the UN Security Council’s sanction but with combat aircraft and missiles used in the heart of Europe. The bombing of peaceful cities and vital infrastructure went on for several weeks. I have to recall these facts, because some Western colleagues prefer to forget them, and when we mentioned the event, they prefer to avoid speaking about international law, instead emphasising the circumstances which they interpret as they think necessary.

Then came the turn of Iraq, Libya and Syria.

They [The Western powers] will undoubtedly try to bring war to Crimea just as they have done in Donbass — Putin's speech marking the initiation of the invasion

Or is it just some of the things he says that matter now. The things you pick.

It wasn't my point. I was pointed there as support for a Russian identity of imperialism, which I didn't find particularly if nationalism is just a political tool. It doesn't contradict indeed but it doesn't support it either.

So what I actually said was…

the geopolitically reality is that Russia has always needed to have its effective borders fixed way beyond even Ukraine or - in its own eyes - perish as an identity. — apokrisis

…which means that my point was about how Russia is expansionist as a geographic necessity. And that then has become an enduring identity because of the way history keeps repeating. Invasions keep happening.

Russia must form some kind of multiethnic federation of client states all the way across the steppes to have defensible borders and ocean access. That is the perennial geopolitical context and it generates the justifications needed to pursue the goal. It breeds an enduring mindset.

Putin has been struggling against nationalists for at least ten years. In the Russian context he’s centre-right, and wants to neutralise opposition from the left and the right, either by direct repression or appeasement. — Jamal

Yes. We would hope Putin is still the calculating spook figuring out some workable arrangement to achieve natural security and economic goals. And that he either bangs on about neonazis or imperial Russia depending on what works best with a particular audience.

But a lot of the commentary is that he seems to actually believe in Eurasianism and suchlike these days. He takes things personally and acts erratically. That makes it much harder to figure out accomodating deals and is making Europe pretty certain Putin will continue in reckless fashion.

there's academics like Daniel Treisman — Isaac

Can you cite some actual argument he makes that makes your point explicit? Both you and Beckie are remarkably coy on quoting sources or indeed detailing a counter position in any way.

What article by Treisman do you have in mind?

But a lot of the commentary is that he seems to actually believe in Eurasianism and suchlike these days — apokrisis

I’ve found it difficult to tell. Vlad Vexler—who you linked to above and whose videos I think are pretty good—plausibly says no, Putin has no ideological commitment to that stuff; he just wants more territory (that he genuinely believes that acquiring Ukrainian territory is in some sense defensive is beside the point here, incidentally).

Are you chaps having a big disagreement about the real character of "Russian identity"? Is it some kind of Jungian archetype? Is there anything remotely factual about it, apart from what people say from time to time it is? I don't get it.

National identity is nothing more than propaganda, surely. 'We' 'Brits' are 'very sad' because 'our' 'beloved Queen' has died. For fuck's sake! I've been told this 24/7 for 10 days so it must be true, and has become true because anyone can cry over a sentimental film.

https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/09/22/prepare-to-stand-up-for-your-convictions

A significant sentence in that article comes after it says that the authorities, according to law, cannot just round people up in airports, train stations, or on the streets, and send them to the front:

"Still, what’s unlawful is not always impossible"

"Still, what’s unlawful is not always impossible" — Jamal

Can also just be made legal tomorrow.

However, in discussing Russian draft dodgers relevant to the situation, should be kept in mind there are draft dodgers on the Ukrainian side and also USA had plenty draft dodgers last time they drafted people.

There's few historical instances of draft dodging actually affecting a war much.

People leaving Russia is perhaps more relevant economically speaking, but so much intellectual work is done via computer and at a distance these days. Large bulk of Russians are simply unable to leave economically speaking, and many that do may continue the same economic contribution as before, managing their business or app development or engineering consultancy at a distance. Generally speaking, "brain drain" has never actually collapsed an economy.

Apparently, when asked Putin simply said "let them leave" basically, so otherwise-trouble makers leaving could be a net benefit in the circumstances.

Although maybe you have different opinion on the affects of professional class people leaving Russia.

we're not talking about Putin, we're talking about "Russian identity". I'm resisting that idiotic sweeping generalisation. — Benkei

Then add to it "Russian national identity", if it's so puzzling to you what I'm talking about.

Because we aren't talking about Russian cuisine, which I love btw, which also has a part in the Russian Identity.

To continue my analysis of the military situation.

At the moment seems Ukrainians are trying to make a breakthrough into Luhansk region, where they are currently occupied a small portion around the edge, and, while this is going, on Russians are trying to take Bakhmut and have advanced to the river there.

We will see today and coming days if Bakmut falls and Luhansk line is defended, or then vice versa (or nothing changes much).

Of course, the most significant thing happening today is the referendum votes to join Russia.

This is (presumably) a legal point of no return for the Russians where they must after the votes (assuming the result we're all assuming) be fully committed to not only defend the current territory but also take the rest of these regions.

Up until now the Russians have been threatening to do this if Ukraine refuses the offered peace terms of accepting annexation of Russia, autonomy in some sense of Donbas within Ukraine (they declared some sort of independence, but could still rejoin Ukraine presumably; certainly much easier than if they formally join Russia).

It's difficult to imagine the Russians doing these votes without the military confidence to defend the territory, that the failed attempts to take Kherson may have provided, at least in the short term.

However, NATO can always provide whatever support is needed to win battles (in my opinion) and likely the Russians as well. NATO could provide f-16 (or even f-35 if it wanted to), missiles of all kinds and more HIMARS trucks, western tanks and other armoured vehicles, more artillery etc. Training is always a concern but that's just a matter of time.

Which could explain the conversation immediately transitioning into nuclear weapons.

If Russia is committed to defend this territory then nuclear weapons maybe the only means to do so if NATO provides enough military assistance to Ukraine.

Diplomatic resolution of the conflict seems remote at this point (due to NATO's policy to undermine and scuttle all diplomatic efforts), leaving NATO with the options of frozen conflict (support Ukrainians enough to defend, eventually lose all the regions that have been annexed and then a front stabilises) or then go on the offence.

However, after these votes escalating the conflict with more weapons and more weapons systems really does seem now will be met with nuclear weapons at some point.

It's possible NATO wants that to happen for long term reasons (make the world a more dangerous place and thus US more relevant to the West as top dog), but it's unclear how NATO would be able to respond to the use of nuclear weapons. NATO may see the long term benefit to the arms industry of the use of nuclear weapons, basically a forever wet dream, but an impossible short term situation to navigate militarily or diplomatically. I honestly don't see any other option other than do nothing. Therefore, I find it likely US / NATO will not escalate even if US they would really, really want Russia to use nuclear weapons (other members of the alliance may simply not be willing to go along with it if there's no coherent military or diplomatic plan to deal with the scenario).

If there is no significant escalation now from NATO, it seems likely to me that autumn will slow the front down and Russians will conduct their offensives in the winter. We'd then see in the spring EU's appetite for further escalation.

Let's hear Putin himself:

“First and foremost it is worth acknowledging that the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” Putin said. “As for the Russian people, it became a genuine tragedy. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory.

“The epidemic of collapse has spilled over to Russia itself,” he said, referring to separatist movements such as those in Chechnya.

There is no contradiction, if you read the above. It's not a wavering opportunist speaking, this comment from 2005 (I think) shows clearly the way how Putin has thought all his reign.

Of course, the most significant thing happening today is the referendum votes to join Russia. — boethius

Which, of course, is absolute nonsense and should be remarked as it.

I've heard that the voting will be done "online". So no reason even to stage people for this theater. The Crimean elections, and then there was genuine support for the annexation, had to be orchestrated as likely free and fair voting wouldn't have got the results needed (even if there was a substantial amount of yes-votes).

Which, of course, is absolute nonsense and should be remarked as it. — ssu

Nonsense?

Obviously these votes will basically exclude the possibility of any negotiated settlement with Ukraine.

Doesn't matter if you think the votes are legitimate, or fraudulent, or whatever; it's the most significant thing happening today (in the war in Ukraine) and, presumably if the votes conclude as basically everyone expects, results in a dramatic shift in Russian policy.

Again you can disagree with this change in Russian policy, or argue it's counter productive, and obviously you can argue you don't accept the annexation, but it's obviously a significant fact that it is (presumably) changing along with partial mobilisation.

Whether you lend these regions any legitimate power of self determination (such as Kiev demands for itself, and "right to join NATO!" was a rallying cry to reject the offered peace terms for weeks) or then you do lend them that but claim the votes are fixed, or then have some nuanced approach to self determination and democracy that mean some votes matter but not others, doesn't change the fact that these votes are currently happening and have a dramatic impact on Russian policy and the military and diplomatic situation.

Obviously these votes will basically exclude the possibility of any negotiated settlement with Ukraine. — boethius

In the short term at least. NATO would need to essentially abandon entirely Ukraine for there to be a negotiate peace now, barring some super diplomatic surprise no one expects.

However, it's difficult to imagine NATO entirely abandoning Ukraine so the only likely options seems to be frozen conflict or then escalation to nuclear conflict (limited or large scale).

I suppose there's a third option that NATO truly believes Russian state will simply disintegrate and that would be a manageable thing. But this claim is made repeatedly since the very beginning of the conflict and does not seem any more evidence for it now; of course could happen, but seems to me will result in use of nuclear weapons, but if limited and doesn't prevent Russian state disintegrating maybe US / NATO views that as a good process to be welcomed, no matter how many nuclear weapons are used on Ukrainians on the way down.

Naturally, if the hypothesis about Russian "identity" is correct, it seems exceedingly implausible there would be some large scale revolt enough to destabilise the Russian state. Far weaker states have seen far greater disruption and protest and revolt and not collapsed. The only recent examples are caused by direct intervention (like bombing everything in Libya that could potentially support something that could potentially support something that could fly) or then entirely running out of money as with Sri Lanka. Even massive support to proxy forces (without direct bombing) was not enough to collapse the Syrian government. So, this idea of Russian state collapse seems remote to me.

Can you cite some actual argument he makes that makes your point explicit? Both you and Beckie are remarkably coy on quoting sources or indeed detailing a counter position in any way. — apokrisis

I'm referring to his 2016 Essay in Foreign Affairs on why Putin took Crimea, but that's not relevant. If I make the claim "all men over 50 have grey hair" it's not acceptable proof for me to provide a couple of grey-haired men and say "find me one that doesn't then". That is proof that some men over 50 have grey hair, not proof that all men over 50 have grey hair.

You made a claim about the motivation behind Russia's foreign policy that it was universally held to be imperialist, or motivated by a desire to secure soviet borderlines. You made that claim so boldly as to suggest anyone thinking otherwise was not even to be taken seriously, a lunatic, motivated by deep psychological issues. Such a claim would be supported (short of you providing the works of every academic in the field), by either some kind of statistically significant sample, or by citation from someone expert in the matter making such a claim themselves. You've provided neither, you've just made a wildly unsupported claim about the prevalence among foreign affairs analysts of a particular interpretation with absolutely no support given at all, and then you attempt to shift the burden of proof on anyone who disagrees with you.

If you want to claim that such a position is universal, then provide us with some evidence that such a position is universal.

Oh, and I can't believe I'm having to say this, but given @ssu's latest offerring...the fact that it seems to you that such opinions are universal is not evidence that such opinions are in fact universal.

if you read the above. It's not a wavering opportunist speaking — ssu

I've read the above. It sounds like a wavering opportunist speaking. Now what? I'm consigned to the looney bin because I disagree with your interpretation?

I don't know how to break it to you any more gently than this, but the way things seem to you to be is not always the way things actually are.

Additionally, there's been a lot made of Putin's remark that "all weapons systems" would be used to protect Russian territorial integrity (something the US says all the time with "all options on the table" to signal the same thing vis-a-vis Iran or whomever).

However, what is getting less attention is nuclear sabre rattling from Western leaders:



This interview is just insanely bizarre.

I paraphrase, but basically:

Question: You've been ordered to annihilate the earth how do you feel? (As framing of the question is she has no other choice than to launch nuclear weapons for some reason, and the result is definitely world annihilation ... caused by her next actions, not some ongoing process that, why not, let's go out with a bang)

Liz Truss: I feel great, I launch, it's an important duty of the Prime Minister (... to annihilate the world when ordered to do so?!?!).

The whole interaction makes zero sense, and the crowd goes wild!

Are you not entertained!!

But props to the British for managing to find someone even more of a loose cannon than Boris.

But props to the British for managing to find someone even more of a loose cannon than Boris. — boethius

Well thanks, but it wasn't us, and it wasn't even grassroots Conservatives, who were given the choice of madwoman of no fixed opinion, or millionaire bloody foreigner, and chose the homegrown disaster because they are majority racist.

Liz Truss: I feel great, I launch, it's an important duty of the Prime Minister (... to annihilate the world when ordered to do so?!?!). — boethius

She doesn't say how she feels about it though.

Well thanks, but it wasn't us, and it wasn't even grassroots Conservatives, who were given the choice of madwoman of no fixed opinion, or millionaire bloody foreigner, and chose the homegrown disaster because they are majority racist. — unenlightened

Oh, I understand, but, still, the leader of the country is certainly in some sense a collective effort over several generations.

It is honestly surprising to me that she's even more extreme in her rhetoric that Boris, but it's often said this is an overcompensating feminine perceived weakness, so we'll see what her policies actually are.

She doesn't say how she feels about it though. — Benkei

That part I lift from her general demeanour of smiling and upbeat "nuclear-woke", get-things-done, courageous keep-calm-and-carry-on attitude.

She doesn't even say a preamble that the nuclear strategy is a pretty big state secret, very serious, that she'd of course do everything possible to avoid nuclear war, but if for some reason it was the only option available etc. ... and she would feel "something" before killing hundreds of millions of people.

Just so weird.

She doesn't say how she feels about it though. — Benkei

Why are they doing an emotion inquisition? And why was she given orders to do it? Isn't she the commander in chief?

Just so weird. — boethius

You tried narcissist - why not upgrade to psychopath?

Unfortunately for Russia, the front has not remained still. There was a large break through across the Oskil, and the flow of liberation announcements and geolocated abandoned vehicles is reminiscent of the recent breakthrough on the other side of the river.

Time will tell how serious it is. Another serious breakthrough and encirclement would suggest the poor morale that lead to the prior rout remains a serious issue, and newly mobilized forces are unlikely to change that (particularly those BTGs made from criminals or those arrested for protesting mobilization). You might see something akin to the disintegration of the Third Corps, who were worse than useless, essentially just handing over hardware to the enemy.



This area needs to hold at some point because further south you run into a series if rail hubs that serve as the main ground lines of communications for the Russian front. If these are severed the war is effectively over.

It is sort of mind boggling that they continue to use their limited resources on an offensive effort that has stalled for months now instead of reallocating combat forces north to avoid disaster. My guess is that this is a consequence of the split command and infighting that has been ruinous for Russian decision-making from the begining.

And things don't seem to be going well in the south either. The increasing volume of Ukrainian air strikes suggests Ukrainian SEAD efforts have been successful in degrading Russian AA capacities. CAS is probably the thing Ukraine would most benefit from given the nature of the fighting there, and they now seem able to provide it. I would have called the prospect of Ukrainian air strikes to support an advance very doubtful just a month ago, but the AGM-88s somehow jerry-rigged to work on MiGs actually seem to be working. I think this just goes to show that in a modern context AA without effective missile defense is not going to cut it.

The combat there is less about some major breakthrough, and more about if Russia can deny Ukraine key firing positions that will totally cripple their already flagging ability to supply forces there. Either the forces around Kherson will hold the critical ground, or I expect it will fall apart all at once. Potentially a Dunkirk type situation since there are not many ways to pull back either.

I'd say poor leadership, poor coordination, and morale is their biggest issue. If I was them I'd be focusing on unifying the command and boosting morale through rotations. Better leadership alone would help morale. If you have bad leadership and this (https://nitter.it/visegrad24/status/1573303078685753344#m) is what your meetings for mobilized men look like, you'll just have larger routs. Also, two weeks training is wholly inadequate.

Unfortunately for Russia, the front has not remained still. There was a large break through across the Oskil, and the flow of liberation announcements and geolocated abandoned vehicles is reminiscent of the recent breakthrough on the other side of the river. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I literally say this:

To continue my analysis of the military situation.

At the moment seems Ukrainians are trying to make a breakthrough into Luhansk region, where they are currently occupied a small portion around the edge, and, while this is going, on Russians are trying to take Bakhmut and have advanced to the river there. — boethius

So I completely agree that:

Time will tell how serious it is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I also mention, while the Ukrainians are trying to make a major breakthrough into Luhansk, Russians are trying to take Bakhmut, and literally state:

We will see today and coming days if Bakmut falls and Luhansk line is defended, or then vice versa (or nothing changes much). — boethius

So we agree.

Definitely Russia is under military pressure or they would not have withdrawn from Kharkiv, not shutoff the grid for the first time, and not called up 300 000 reserves in a partial mobilisation.

And before anyone interjects, yes, they clearly had a contingency plan in place to withdraw from Kharkiv, shutoff the grid, and also bomb the damn in Kherson river, doesn't mean they "wanted those offensives to happen" just means they clearly had a plan in place as otherwise their response would not be immediate.

Another serious breakthrough and encirclement would suggest the poor morale that lead to the prior rout remains a serious issue, and newly mobilized forces are unlikely to change that (particularly those BTGs made from criminals or those arrested for protesting mobilization). You might see something akin to the disintegration of the Third Corps, who were worse than useless, essentially just handing over hardware to the enemy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not so convinced of the morale argument. There's morale issues in every army and general mood never stays constantly high. There has been serious morale issues on the Ukrainian side as well.

As for the current battle in Luhansk, I don't think it's really possible to tell what's likely to happen at a distance.

Definitely time will tell if the Ukrainians can continue their offensive deeper into Luhansk.

What I can say is that reports seem pretty consistent that Ukrainians are suffering heavy casualties in these offensives, so it could be that Russian operations are in disarray or they are simply letting these offensives exhaust themselves to inflict maximum casualties.

Anyone interested in the military analysis part, an important footnote is that Russian doctrine is literally to tactically retreat as much as possible, hit the advancing army with artillery and other long range munitions, make them go through mine fields, and stretch their supply lines, so this is what they train to do. Russian military trains this way because Russian territory is pretty big so their basic idea is to run around and exhaust any invading force and not risk armies in decisive battles.

So, except for strategic locations where we are sure Russians are committed to defending (such as Kherson, Crimea, Donbas) it's extremely difficult to tell the difference between a tactical retreat and just being straight-up defeated. To evaluate these non-critical changes in the front we'd need to know the statistics of losses. Anecdotes don't tell us very much as we'd need to know the whole circumstances and result of the battle to evaluate things.

And when I point this out it is because I genuinely don't know. I do not know the current state of neither the Ukrainian army nor the Russians. Things could be a lot better or worse than they seem on both sides, or then suffering from exactly the same problems.