Just so weird.
— boethius

You tried narcissist - why not upgrade to psychopath? — unenlightened

Onwards and upwards I guess.

Wheel of progress never stops.

I just love how 7 months ago everybody was like "we need to make sure this doesn't escalate to nuclear war" and now at least in the UK they're entertaining just that on national television. The applause was... worrying.

Yeah, I was just referring to the fact that the major breakthrough started hours ago. It appears they are no longer trying for a break through, but have accomplished it and the encirclement of a lone BTG on the other side of the river.

The larger efforts at taking Bakhmut have been ongoing since July, and a significant advance up from the south in that direction hasn't occured since early May. That's why it seems like a poor use of resources given other priorities.

So, except for strategic locations where we are sure Russians are committed to defending (such as Kherson, Crimea, Donbas) it's extremely difficult to tell the difference between a tactical retreat and just being straight-up defeated. To evaluate these non-critical changes in the front we'd need to know the statistics of losses. Anecdotes don't tell us very much as we'd need to know the whole circumstances and result of the battle to evaluate things.

You don't abandon 10+ command vehicles, warehouses full of ammunition, extremely scarce counter battery radars and EW vehicles, and multiple years worth of your prior annual tank production for defense in depth...

Yeah, I was just referring to the fact that the major breakthrough started hours ago. It appears they are no longer trying for a break through, but have accomplished it and the encirclement of a lone BTG on the other side of the river. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Even assuming all this is true and will result in encirclement of a BTG, this is still not what I would call a major strategic victory of penetrating deep into Luhansk. Most of river is still in Kharkiv region.

There were reports of units being encircled but then rescued in Kharkiv.

That's why it seems like a poor use of resources given other priorities. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Who's to say what the priorities are. It could be poor use of resources, or then maybe Russian military is content with trading Bakhmut for some space in Luhansk. A lot of youtube analysis presents Bakhmut as some critical strategic location (though I have no idea if that's true).

Of course, maybe Ukrainians defend Bakhmut and advance into Luhansk, or maybe they trade or maybe something else happens.

However, for certain Russian commitment to defending all of Luhansk is very high, so if advances continue there beyond the edges then that is a strong signal Russian forces have a big problem.

If things stay on the edges, then it could be Russian forces simply implementing their doctrine of tactical retreats to inflict maximum casualties (of course, suffering some losses also in the process).

Russian commanders know too that it's a symbolic victory for Ukrainians to get back some of Luhansk territory, so instead of suffering high casualties to prevent that they could pull back knowing Ukrainians will then poor in troops to get that symbolic victory and then keep advancing for a real strategic victory. It very much depends on the casualties and losses on each side, until there is clear strategic locations taken.

Definitely continuing to advance in Bakhmut could be a false show of confidence, or then good strategy, or misallocation of resources as you say. I have no way to evaluate that from the information available now.

However, as I said weeks ago, taking Kherson would be a litmus test for Ukrainians offensive capabilities.

Now, knowing Russia is committed to Kherson, it's of course possible to develop some higher level thinking strategy of an offensive in Kharkiv and Luhansk instead.

My basic criticism of such a strategy is simply that Kharkiv and Luhansk are very close to the Russian border and don't threaten the land bridge. Cutting the land bridge and then blowing up the bridge to Crimea is what I would be worried about as a Russian general, and that doesn't seem to be threatened in these current offensives. So, maybe unfortunate loss of territory (that certainly no general wants to see) but does not seem pressure on critical military positions (but rather mostly political optics). Kharkiv and Luhansk are also the easiest places to re-conquer as they are so close to the Russian border.

The other data point is that certainly Russian generals were worried during the initial Kharkiv offensive (even if they ordered a withdrawal, things can still get out of hand), and so they ordered the strikes on the electricity grid.

I assume they would do that again if things are indeed falling apart and there's "irreversible momentum" as claimed by the West.

For those curious of why the words "tactical retreat" have suddenly become such hot topic, it is because it is optimum military strategy to inflict maximum casualties while minimising your own.

In order to assault a location you need to move forward and are far easier to see. So a small group of even lightly armed defenders can setup in a location and then as soon as they see you fire ATMG's at your vehicles, sniper rounds and mortars at your infantry, and call in artillery and airstrikes. Then they can burry a bunch of anti-tank-mines, just retreat 5 kilometres and repeat the process. Likewise, a camouflaged tank that isn't moving is going to have a lot easier time seeing a tank that is moving, can fire a bunch of shells, pop smoke and then run away.

So, there's a large spectrum when it comes to retreat: from being basically overrun and most of your troops being captured and the rest retreating under fire and suffering high casualties, to a very well ordered staged fallback to inflict maximum casualties with the above methods.

Of course, the disadvantage of the tactical retreat is if you keep doing it, eventually you fallback to your backs against an ocean and it's difficult to continue the tactic underwater (or some similar obstacle).

Russian military doctrine and training puts particular high emphasis on the tactical retreat because they have a particularly large amount of space to work with.

The US military, to contrast, doesn't train so much to defend a land invasion on US soil from Mexico or Canada, so if they deploy it is to capture territory oversees (so there's little use of battalion and division level tactical retreats; US deals with counter offensives by bombing the shit out of everything, which is why their doctrine is to only deploy ground troops when they achieve air superiority).

Of course, two can play this tactical retreat game, and so to deal with their enemy using this particular good idea, the Russians have developed the counter strategy of simply advancing slowly with masses of artillery. If you're a well hidden defender waiting for the enemy forces to advance into your firing line, it stands to reason "enough" artillery will eventually get you.

So, what we will see in the next days and weeks is if this whole doctrine "works" or if a sufficiently determined offensive by a foe willing to suffer high casualties simply pushes on and destabilises your entire defensive system.

It's pretty clear that Russia is losing this war. Exit strategy is what they should be thinking about. This was a disaster for Russia.

Blah, blah, blah. Wake me up when you have sources to back up your opinions.

Nonsense?

Obviously these votes will basically exclude the possibility of any negotiated settlement with Ukraine. — boethius

That's the attempt... a desperate attempt to regain justification for the annexation of Ukrainian territory and make them part of Holy Mother Russia. The elections are nonsense, a fraud, sham referendums.

Doesn't matter if you think the votes are legitimate, or fraudulent, or whatever; it's the most significant thing happening today and, presumably if the votes conclude as basically everyone expects, results in a dramatic shift in Russian policy. — boethius

Lol.

Oh really, it doesn't matter if the elections are fraudulent or not to you? Right. :rofl:

Fraudulent elections that are a scam arent in any way important. Only shows that Russia uses similar tactics as Stalin''s Soviet Union did.

Just to think of it, holding elections in a territory that is a battlefield, and not basically defined in any way just what territory and what people are part is taking the referendum. It's absolutely crazy, but if you want to make these attempts from Putin to be somehow credible, then attempt to do it, I don't care.

We already knew this from the gaffe that the Russian intelligence director made as he confused the acknowledgement of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics to them joining Russia. (Which Putin was mad about)

It's pretty clear that Russia is losing this war. Exit strategy is what they should be thinking about. This was a disaster for Russia. — Tate

How is this in anyway clear?

Lol.

Oh really, it doesn't matter if the elections are fraudulent or not to you? Right. :rofl: — ssu

You're the one that contradicted my point that these votes are significant (to the war), saying that's nonsense.

Now your outraged by the idea it doesn't matter if the elections are fraudulent or not. So, seems pretty significant events to you after all.

It does not matter to the point we were discussing, of whether these votes are significant or not.

The significance in terms of these votes, whatever you think of them, is that it is the step to formal annexation of these territories by Russia, and, again, regardless of whether other countries recognise that or not, it will become Russian territory for Russia.

I explicitly say you are free to argue the legitimacy of these votes, that's a different topic as to their significance to the war and how the military and diplomatic situation changes.

Definitely appears to me that annexing these territories makes it exceedingly unlikely Russia would agree to give them back, which makes a diplomatic settlement likewise exceedingly difficult, which is a significant change to the situation.

How is this in anyway clear? — boethius

Well, they're losing previously taken positions, they're running out of troops, they've lost face with their allies. I mean, it looks like they're losing to me. Not to you?

Land grab.

^{RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (Apr 30, 2022): Draft Document Gives New Clues To Russian Plans For Occupied Ukrainian Regions
AP News (Sep 22, 2022): EXPLAINER: What’s behind referendums in occupied Ukraine?
Reuters (Sep 23, 2022): Ukraine says residents coerced into Russian annexation vote
NPR (Sep 23, 2022): Russia begins annexation vote, illegal under international law, in occupied Ukraine
NBC News (Sep 23, 2022): Russian-occupied regions in Ukraine begin staged votes as the Kremlin denies reports of men fleeing partial mobilization
France 24 (Sep 23, 2022): Live: Ukraine pushes east into Donbas as Russia holds 'sham' annexation polls
Al Jazeera (Sep 23, 2022): Russia-Ukraine live news: Kremlin planning for quick annexations
The Guardian (Sep 23, 2022): ‘Referendums’ on joining Russia under way in occupied Ukraine}

Is this rubbish recognized anywhere outside of Russia, or perhaps even outside Putin's Kremlin?

With a(n incremental) land grab, Putin can change his rhetoric from "a special operation" to "an attack on Russia", and continue on, or at least try to. Being so transparent, why aren't more calling him out for it?

Apparently, Russia's neighbors have some busy border controls at the moment.

Being so transparent, why aren't more calling him out for it? — jorndoe

You've just posted the almost literal wall to wall international condemnation. What more exactly were you expecting?

Well, they're losing previously taken positions, they're running out of troops, they've lost face with their allies. I mean, it looks like they're losing to me. Not to you? — Tate

Looks can be deceiving.

For months Russia was gaining ground, but obviously had not "won", and now Ukraine has gained some ground back. Obviously things can swing back and forth.

Ukraine has taken heavy losses in the recent offensives from everyone I've heard talk about it (including the Washington Post). Russia has just mobilised 300 000 additional troops. Russia could also use tactical nuclear weapons, which some claim would not be effective ... but I honestly doubt anyone walked away from Hiroshima saying "wow, underwhelmed, fail, so ineffective".

What is also critical is that Ukraine is now entirely reliant on NATO, so even making a real attempt to "beat the Russians" would be a NATO decision and not really a Ukrainian one.

It could be NATO is fully committed to pushing back the Russians (using Ukrainians) and calling Russias bluff about nuclear weapons or then actually wants Russia to use nuclear weapons for some reason (there being no other possibility), or it could be that NATO wanted to have a little moral victory before they either wrap things up diplomatically (something they can do anytime) or then guide things into a frozen conflict.

I honestly don't know NATO's intentions but not every NATO member is happy with the war.

Definitely Russias strategy is to hold onto these territories and see how winter plays out, and these are still long distances, 1000km front, so I don't see Ukraine being able to get some decisive victory by winter; and, as far as I can tell, the only "big" victory feasible, perhaps not decisive but big, would be cutting the land bridge to Crimea / Kherson, which there's no reports of the Ukrainians even trying to do. Of course, if you want a moral victory you'd avoid such a critical battle and focus on the areas your opponent is the least focused on.

As for "running out of troops," the Russian population is 144 million and Ukraines population is 44 million, and the Russians could mobilise 25 million conscripts.

Of course, there's political and economic impacts to mobilisation, we're already seeing some.

There is little question that if the Russian population as a whole really wanted to crush Ukraine they could, even with conventional weapons.

The question is one of motivation, why morale always keeps coming up.

Ukraine is in a total war posture and Russia certainly meant to win with a purely professional force (and that certainly failed), but considering Ukraine has fully mobilised everything they could and gone into total war and Russia has only now announced a very partial mobilisation, that's not necessarily a good sign for Ukraine if things are as tight on the front as they seem to be.

Of course, mobilisation could unravel the Russian state somehow, but as dramatic as mobilisation seems, it seems to me less pressure and risk to the Russian state than the start of the war and the sanctions, but of course it's possible. Protests don't seem to ever stop any war the state is committed to, so I don't see why Russia would be an exception to that rule.

Obviously things can swing back and forth. — boethius

I suppose they could engineer some sort of Hundred Years War, but their main ally, quickly becoming their master, is China. It will be Xi's call whether they can wage on indefinitely or not.

Russia could also use tactical nuclear weapons, — boethius

And that would be Putin's final act as leader of Russia. I'm sure he knows that.

I suppose they could engineer some sort of Hundred Years War, but their main ally, quickly becoming their master, is China. It will be Xi's call whether they can wage on indefinitely or not. — Tate

For certain the war is only possible with Xi's blessing.

However, Russia-Chinese relationship is far more equal than Western media presents. Russia has the commodities China needs and Russia also has a large arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Definitely Russia is suffering a lot of losses, but the geopolitical game (that I'm sure few Russian actually care about) is pretty cunning. By waging an essentially war of attrition with the entirety of NATO and creating this madness in Easter Europe that then commits NATO buildup, pressure is taken off all Russia's allies and friends: China, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and anyone else that has beef, big or small, with the US, which allows the creation of an alternative global payment and economic system to that of the US to be created between all these parties.

The Western media presents the war as Ukraine standing up to the "mighty Russia", while simultaneously calling Russia incompetent and in no way a danger, but geopolitically speaking the war is Russia standing up to the "mighty NATO" and that message is not lost on any leader outside the West.

And that would be Putin's final act as leader of Russia. I'm sure he knows that. — Tate

I honestly don't know what would happen, I doubt anyone knows.

Luckily, Putin hasn't wanted to find out yet either.

This honestly "feels" to be changing, but it could all be just posturing to just make NATO hesitate to pour in more arms, or then on the way to a diplomatic resolution (hopefully).

‘The war party has won’
Kremlin plans ‘immediate’ annexation of Ukrainian territories — and mobilization at home. Here’s this new decision’s background.
9:08 pm, September 20, 2022
Source: Meduza

https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/09/20/the-war-party-has-won

However, Russia-Chinese relationship is far more equal than Western media presents. — boethius

This is not true. China is an economic powerhouse ascending to superpower status. Russia has now lost its status as regional power and its economy is medieval. Any dream of equality with China is gone now.

The Western media presents the war as Ukraine standing up to the "mighty Russia", — boethius

No, it doesn't, at least not the news sources I see. It's just a little conflict in Eastern Europe. You can see parts of it live on reddit. That's about it.

This is not true. China is an economic powerhouse ascending to superpower status. Russia has now lost its status as regional power and its economy is medieval. Any dream of equality with China is gone now. — Tate

As we've just seen with this gas thing in the EU, your factories don't run without the raw materials.

You cannot dominate a party that you are dependent on, and China depends on Russia for a lot of its raw materials. To free yourself from dependence you can go take these things you need for yourself, but in this particular situation you face the same problem NATO is facing which is nuclear weapons.

Russia also depends on China for components, but there are other potential suppliers of key components, like India.

No, it doesn't, at least not the news sources I see. It's just a little conflict in Eastern Europe. You can see parts of it live on reddit. That's about it. — Tate

It's been front page news on CNN and BBC et. al. for months at a time ... Putin just said "all weapons systems will be used to defend Russian territory" and then Blinken went and made a speech that this was "bad, bad boy talk" at the UN.

I honestly don't see anyone describing this war as a little conflict in Eastern Europe.

The highest article on reddit front page (for me) is about the Irish PM calling for Russia to be removed from the security council.

Which is honestly one of the dumbest parts of all this, the whole point of the UN was to avoid another world war, which means the big powers can veto military action. Otherwise, the UN would just be "my boyz when WWIII starts"; i.e. the mistake the League of Extraordinary Nations made and the UN was designed not to repeat.

Or as SuperGenius98K informs us:

The UN is the biggest paper tiger ever created. — reddit

You're the one that contradicted my point that these votes are significant (to the war), saying that's nonsense. — boethius

???

Now your outraged by the idea it doesn't matter if the elections are fraudulent or not. So, seems pretty significant events to you after all. — boethius

A sham referendum is a sham referendum. It's basically propaganda.

The significance in terms of these votes, whatever you think of them, is that it is the step to formal annexation of these territories by Russia, and, again, regardless of whether other countries recognise that or not, it will become Russian territory for Russia. — boethius

Oh boy.

Just stop and think what you are saying @boethius: "it is the step to formal annexation of these territories by Russia, and, again, regardless of whether other countries recognise that or not, it will become Russian territory for Russia."
This is all pure 100% Russian propaganda.

Sovereignty over any territory isn't called by the one who declares it, it is given by other sovereign states. So you saying "regardless of whether other countries recognize that or not" doesn't make sense.

Now what? I'm consigned to the looney bin because I disagree with your interpretation? — Isaac

Of course not, Isaac. If you don't get it, you don't. That doesn't make you a looney.

I’m not a big fan of boethius’s view, but I have to say, your reaction to his statements of fact is just bizarre. Whether or not the referendum results are legitimate, they will be used by the Russian regime to justify further escalation of the conflict. This seems to be what boethius was saying, and I don’t know why you’d object to it.

The other day they showed Ukrainian soldiers taking a bunch of Russian soldiers as prisoners. I was a little horrified that the Ukrainians were going to execute them on the spot on reddit, but they didn't.

whew!

I'm referring to his 2016 Essay in Foreign Affairs on why Putin took Crimea, but that's not relevant — Isaac

So Treisman says the seizing of Crimea was either to prevent loss of Black Sea fleet, or part of a more general imperialist agenda, or just an impulsive improvisation of an autocrat turned erratic.

It seems to me that all three are still in play, although with the current miscalculated invasion, there was no immediate prospect of Ukraine joining NATO or Russia being forced out of Crimea. And where once might be seen as impulsive, twice looks more like a pattern.

Again, remember my comment was not that Russians are driven by some kind of nostalgia of lost empire - although that is a sentiment. It is the practicalities of constructing a defensible Russia that drives the imperialism in the first place. Given the actual economic and demographic state of Putin’s Russia, this then explains why Putin’s efforts to Make Russia Great Again look impulsive and opportunistic because, well, he isn’t in a position to be more systematic.

So Treisman says the seizing of Crimea was either to prevent loss of Black Sea fleet, or part of a more general imperialist agenda, or just an impulsive improvisation of an autocrat turned erratic. — apokrisis

Treisman concludes by rejecting the first two possibilities. But again, this is not the point (unless we're going to go through every single opposing academic one by one). The point is that your comment...

Every analysis of Putin tells the same story. — apokrisis

...was ridiculous, but more importantly, this whole trend (of which you've merely been an example) of painting all voices opposing the mainstream Western narrative as being somehow deficient, has to stop. We've had accusations of psychological disturbance, ideological delusion, collusion... Everything from plain old stupidity to being full-on FSB agents. Everything... except just acknowledging that we simply have a legitimate difference of opinion.

The point is not what Treisman, or any of the other academics I mentioned, said. The point is that this new way of conducting discourse is toxic and erodes trust in the only means we currently have of distinguishing legitimate debate from populist diatribe.

The point is that your comment... — Isaac

As I said, it was hyperbolic in response to benkies hyperbolic accusation of imperialism being a fiction.

The fact you acknowledged this yet still continue to make a song and dance says you have no interest in a discussion. You are simply caught up in the emotional drama of it all and need someone - anyone - as a foil for your righteous opinions.

I’m not a big fan of boethius’s view, but I have to say, your reaction to his statements of fact is just bizarre. Whether or not the referendum results are legitimate, they will be used by the Russian regime to justify further escalation of the conflict. This seems to be what boethius was saying, and I don’t know why you’d object to it. — Jamal

Yes, the referendums will be used as propaganda. But that doesn't make them a real democratic referendum. And that's my point.

When it's propaganda, then say it's propaganda. It's not a question of whether or not, because it's not. Or do we think just at an instant, in a war zone that actually isn't properly defined a true democratic referendum would / could take place? Would you really think that the referendum result could be that the majority would say "No, let's not join the Russian Federation"? You really think that would happen, @Jamal? Something that only tries to be a democratic vote shouldn't be treated as a democratic vote.

Was it bizarre to call the Russian VDV paratroops what they were? Then Russia was calling them "Crimean volunteer defence forces" and the puzzled Western Media was calling them "little green men"? Can just taking off your flag sign from your crisp new uniform be so puzzling? The same way, can an invader declaring a referendum in the area it has occupied be also so puzzling for us?

Scary stuff. Russia will continue falling back to the Donbas and Crimea if need be. Putin's decision to mobilize is not a popular one in Russia, but even if half of those troops mobilize, it will help make things more compacted in those regions (almost like an NFL red zone). That's one of the best things Putin could have done strategically. It is possible that the Russian people, and his close advisors and general staff turn on him, but I don't think that is very likely (at least not in the immediate foreseeable future). I see us making moderate gains & reclaiming more land in the east as well as Kherson, possibly, before it starts getting cold in November. Pushing too hard on the Donbas in the winter will lead to high casualties. We will need more long range artillery to pummel Russia throughout the winter.

Another play would be to continue the original Kharkiv push deeper into northern Donetsk and northern/western Luhansk. This would be a gambit because it exposes our flanks and pushes tired (but enthusiastic) troops deeper against more fortified and entrenched positions. It's tempting because the defenders there have seen other Russian soldiers retreating from the west, and their morale is low.

I think the best way to proceed is to continue the push as far as it's allowed and if resistance becomes too strong, pull back, dig in, and wait for the supplies, artillery, and reinforcements to catch up. There are weak points in the defenders' defenses in Donbas, but they are most likely not large enough to exploit to the point we can induce a full-on rout. Sometimes you can remove one straw in the right place and the whole house can come tumbling down. This is what happened in Kharkiv, but then again the Donbas is not Kharkiv.

Yes, the referendums will be used as propaganda. But that doesn't make them a real democratic referendum. And that's my point. — ssu

We know that's your point. It's such an obvious and uninteresting point that I question what you're in this discussion for.

Obviously the referendums are not legitimate.

Obviously the referendums are not legitimate. — Jamal

I saw comment that military law says conscripts have to serve four months before they could get sent to fight in Ukraine. But annexing Donbas, etc, would let them be sent straight to defend the “homeland”.

If this is the reason for the referendums - to dot the i’s of domestic legalities rather than anything to do with international opinion - it is an interesting sidelight in how even autocracies must function as states with legal systems.

So the show is for home consumption - a fiction to stave off law suits from a nation of angry mothers.

As I said, it was hyperbolic in response to benkies hyperbolic accusation of imperialism being a fiction. — apokrisis

You've continued to paint all opposing views here as bafflingly delusional at every opportunity. This was not a one off rhetorical tool.

I've taken part in this discussion for several hundred pages. The main protagonists are interested in nothing but ensuring the world knows how much they think Putin is bad, that's it, so the meta-argument about public discourse, 'disinformation', and the maintenance of hard partisan lines is the only interesting matter left to interrogate. It's not as if anyone's open to actual discussion about the crisis itself is it?