I think I have read this article once when Wayfarer had posted the link. This "blind spot", however, isn't a blind spot; the many limits of theoretical explanation are quite conspicuous. The mind-projection fallacy amounts to woo-of-the-gaps used in denial of the theoretical limits – gaps – of quantum mechanics (Bohr) & cosmology (Wheeler). Wayfarer derives way too much (e.g. significance of human consciousness) from way too little (e.g. observer-effect / participatory universe). It's always seemed incoherent, at the very least, to me to try to use physical theories to "justify" idealist / spiritualist fantasies. Notice how he cannot rebut the substantial issues with his 'worldview' raised in my post and yet dogmatically he persists in regurgitating well-documented New Age fairtytales. :sparkle: :eyes:

It's a reference to the idea that living beings are intrinsic to the Universe, and not simply the 'accidental outcome of the collocation of atoms' (Bertrand Russell's words.) — Wayfarer

Thanks. Sure, but I find it hard to see what difference this makes to a life lived. Speaking personally, it would make no difference to who I am and what I choose to do in life. Knowledge of this might change the values of a rapacious capitalist, but I doubt it. I've known a lot of tough criminals over time and visited a number of jails and it has always struck me as interesting how many people involved in criminal justice are robust theists. Didn't stop them committing egregious crimes, however.

Got ya.

I've known a lot of tough criminals over time and visited a number of jails and it has always struck me as interesting how many people involved in criminal justice are robust theists. Didn't stop them committing egregious crimes, however. — Tom Storm

:fire:

... the idea that living beings are intrinsic to the Universe, and not simply the 'accidental outcome of the collocation of atoms ...' — Wayfarer

As if "accidental outcomes" (pace Einstein) are not intrinsic to the universe. :smirk:

Read Lucretius' De rerum natura or Spinoza's Ethica (part 1 "Of God" re: modes). Apparently you didn't understand Dawkins & Monod (or Heisenberg).

Read Lucretius' De rerum natura — 180 Proof

Did a term paper on it, as part of Keith Campbell's Philosophy of Matter course.

I find it hard to see what difference this makes to a life lived. — Tom Storm

Something about it must interest you, otherwise why would you keep asking questions about it?

Psychologist George Kelly said what matters is not whether the universe exists, but what we can make of it.
— Joshs

Yes, but it's a basic fact that postmodernism rejects meta-narratives, so that tends to consign a great deal of what has been made of it in the past to the wastepaper basket. — Wayfarer

A meta narrative is a claim to universal truth. Personally constructed narratives draw from our own history with others. They are pragmatic and oriented toward predictive sense-making in changeable conditions. Whatever has been made of the world in the past , to the extent that we are aware of it , can be made use of if it proves to be relevant and predictive for our circumstances. Past cultural history( sciences. philosophy , art) is made use of in a transformed way.

Something about it must interest you, otherwise why would you keep asking questions about it? — Wayfarer

I'm interested in a lot of things. Doesn't mean I have a clear use for them. And I am really fascinated by what others believe and why.

This is "true" mostly for perennialists, platonists, theists, idealists & naive realists. — 180 Proof

:up: Important inclusion of the naive realists, since the presumption that things should be just as they seem or are imagined to be is held in common with all those worldviews.

Past cultural history( sciences. philosophy , art) is made use of in a transformed way. — Joshs

Fair enough. I guess that is where hermeneutics is important.

People kill, torture, punish and condemn
others based on such embedded assumptions that they don’t think matter to their daily choices — Joshs

I'm not so sure this is true. I mean, you're talking most specifically here about whether people subscribe to determinism or free will, I'm guessing. If you think people are radically free agents then they are radically responsible for all of their actions. If you think that their family circumstances and childhood conditioning are determining factors, that might soften your desire to punish or it might not. I think it's fair to say that many people are motivated simply by emotion; if you do something that hurts them they will wish to punish you, and their wishes do not depend at all on worldviews they might hold, rationally or otherwise.

I'm interested in a lot of things. — Tom Storm

I guess what I’m asking is, do you think the difference between a philosophy that makes a place for the significance of life, and one that doesn’t, is significant? I mean, as far as philosophies go, there can't be a much greater degree of difference.

A meta narrative is a claim to universal truth. — Joshs

I'm interested in the possibility of a cosmic philosophy. Maybe that's what cosmology is supposed to be. In any case, our culture doesn't have one. All we have is the remnants of passed ones.

I guess what I’m asking is, do you think the difference between a philosophy that makes a place for the significance of life, and one that doesn’t, is significant? — Wayfarer

Interesting. I can't think of a philosophy in which life is not significant in some way :chin:

I'm interested in the possibility of a cosmic philosophy.

How about ...
• M-string theory?
• Cosmicism?
• Meillassoux's hyper-chaos?
• Spinoza's (acosmist) natura naturans?
• Democritean / Lucretian atomism?
• Daojia
• The Many-Worlds Interpretation of QM
etc

I guess what I’m asking is, do you think the difference between a philosophy that makes a place for the significance of life, and one that doesn’t, is significant? — Wayfarer

I doubt it and have asked this question for many years. Humans are meaning making creatures who love and collaborate peaceably, no matter how antisocial faith traditions, politics, capitalism or sundry outliers might conspire to make us. Belief in meta-narratives have never stopped the jails from filling, or prevented the bodycount from piling up on the battlefields or in the dungeons. So my guess is that what you do matters, not what you believe.

What I mean by cosmic philosophy, is a philosophy in which life is integral to the Cosmos, not an accidental byproduct of a meaningless process. (Although it's arguable that the term 'cosmos' insofar as it refers to 'a unified whole' is no longer meaningful.)

So my guess is that what you do matters, not what you believe — Tom Storm

:up: More precisely: 'how you think and do what you think and do matters' ...

What I mean by cosmic philosophy, is a philosophy in which life is integral to the Cosmos, not an accidental byproduct of a meaningless process. (Although it's arguable that the term 'cosmos' insofar as it refers to 'a unified whole' is no longer meaningful.) — Wayfarer

The science tells us that life first appeared on the Earth about 3.8 billion years ago. But since it is believed most of the stars were formed billions of years prior to our Sun life may have appeared well before that. Or there may be no other life in the Universe than Earth's, however unlikely that might sound.

However the life on Earth up until about 1.5 billion years ago is believed to have been only single cell organisms. And simple forms of sentient life are believed to have appeared about half a billion years ago. The problem is we don't (and arguably can't) know whether life is inevitable in all universes, or whether it was inevitable in this one.

All that said, since these questions are most likely unanswerable, it would seem to have no bearing on how we choose to live our lives and what values we choose to enact.

Nice work.

All that said, since these questions are most likely unanswerable, it would seem to have no bearing on how we choose to live our lives and what values we choose to enact. — Janus

:fire:

:fire: Keepin' the flame alive...

This is very different from the naive realist view in which the unknown is comparable to 'unseen planets', because there is an ontological distinction in play between what is potentially real and what has been actualised (i.e. is determinate). — Wayfarer

By the "naive realist view" you mean modal realism? There is a modal realist interpretation of quantum mechanics where all quantum possibilities are regarded as real/determinate - the many worlds interpretation, which currently seems to be the favorite interpretation with physicists.

What would be the ontological difference between a potentially real object and an actually real object? The idea of a potentially real object seems to conflate epistemic uncertainty with ontological uncertainty, something I would call a "naive idealist view". I don't think there is any ontological uncertainty, because it seems that any object can be structurally defined as a pure set, which is a determinate structure. Pure set theory can define all mathematical structures as pure sets, including the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics.

Doesn't the Sorites Paradox call into question "determinateness" as a property or condition of "what exists"? Both sand-grains and sand dunes exist yet the difference between them (i.e. phase-transition) is indeterminate. — 180 Proof

The only thing that is indeterminate is what you choose to call a "dune". If instead of baggage words like "dune" you use the mathematically precise word "set" (or collection), this pseudo-problem of ontological indeterminacy disappears. There are just grains and sets of grains.

:up:
Even when philosophers say that things are fuzzy around the edges, it seems that they have determined what edges are and what is fuzzy.

Non sequitur, IMO. "Sets" subsist, they do not "exist" (as per the OP).

Non sequitur, IMO. "Sets" subsist, they do not "exist" (as per the OP). — 180 Proof

Sets are collections. An apple is a collection of atoms. So apples "subsist"?

What would be the ontological difference between a potentially real object and an actually real object? The idea of a potentially real object seems to conflate epistemic uncertainty with ontological uncertainty, something I would call a "naive idealist view". I don't think there is any ontological uncertainty, because it seems that any object can be structurally defined as a pure set, which is a determinate structure. Pure set theory can define all mathematical structures as pure sets, including the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. — litewave

What is the relation between language and real, nameable objects? This is the question of the basis of the concept of an object or category of objects. Doesn’t the mathematical determination follow upon the linguistic-semantic determination? Are you assuming that language is referential: we assign a semantic meaning and then associate it with a linguistic token? How do I know that my token means the same thing as your token? Is there a fact of the matter that will settle such disputes of meaning and sense? Do the empirical facts of the world ( or dictionary definitions) intervene to settle these matters?

Very well said Joshs. :up:

It's not an issue of naming, it's a conceptual issue, no small thing. To argue otherwise is to confuse an ontology for what are in fact epistemological matters.

Are you saying that there are maybe no collections in reality or that it is not clear what a collection is?

There is a modal realist interpretation of quantum mechanics where all quantum possibilities are regarded as real/determinate - the many worlds interpretation, which currently seems to be the favorite interpretation with physicists. — litewave

While I'm not a physicist, I feel the MWI is posited purely as a means to avoid the anti-realist implications of the 'Copenhagen interpretation'. The problem it sets out to solve is the so-called 'wave function collapse', by declaring that it is not necessary, but at the cost of introducing infinite branching universes. To me it seems blatantly obvious that in this case, the solution is infinitely worse than the problem. (See Sean Carroll's 'most embarrasing graph in modern physics'.)

What would be the ontological difference between a potentially real object and an actually real object? — litewave

Actual existence, I would think. If it's only potentially real, then it doesn't exist. In is in that sense that electrons and the like can be said to only have a tendency to exist. The wave function is a distribution of possibilities, but it's not as if the object is in a definite but undisclosed location, it has no definite location until it is measured. (Different type of answer to joshs, mine is drawn mainly from Nature Loves to Hide, Shimon Malin.)

So one of the key things about the 'potentia' view is the idea that there can be degrees of reality. That, I think, is something that has been lost.

Sets are collections. An apple is a collection of atoms. So apples "subsist"? — litewave

No. The concept "collection" subsists.