Just a reminder that the OP specifies:

the discussion will take place from a materialist/physicalist/realist point of view — Clarky

we live before 1905, when the universe was still classical and quantum mechanics was unthinkable. — Clarky

I would like to do two things in this discussion 1) Add to this list if it makes sense and 2) Discuss the various proposed assumptions and decide if they belong on the list. — Clarky

Only content that shows respect for these specifications/is reasonably necessary to make an argument relevant to them should be posted.

I am entering late as I wanted to read the philosophical heavyweight contributors first. Not read every post in this thread yet but I am enjoying the exchanges so far.
What about:
9. The universe is expanding in 3D but it is not expanding into anything.

[2] There does not seem to be any other serious candidate for basic substance, — Janus

What about ‘spacial extent?’ Is space itself made of a substance? I have always envisaged the Big Bang singularity to be an ‘incredibly small concentration of energy,’ mass or matter came later.
@Clarky, @Wayfarer
So is the fundamental substance in the physicalist universe not ‘energy?’ And is there not also a ‘container?’ An extent, we call ‘space?.’

For the purposes of this discussion, we're talking about classical physics before quantum mechanics and relativity. Before knowledge of an expanding universe. — Clarky

I just read this one. Ok, so my number 9 suggestion (which I think should have been 11, (I am at p3 in reading through the thread)) is moot. I am about 15 years out based on your 1905 in the OP. I made a ‘Hubble slip.’
I seem to be too impatient to not post a response until I had read all 5 pages of responses! :roll: :halo: Aw well, back to p3!

How about:
11. Time exists and is linear.

Based on :

From:scholarpedia.org
The term entropy was coined in 1865 [Cl] by the German physicist Rudolf Clausius from Greek en- = in + trope = a turning (point). The word reveals an analogy to energy and etymologists believe that it was designed to denote the form of energy that any energy eventually and inevitably turns into -- a useless heat. The idea was inspired by an earlier formulation by Sadi Carnot [Ca] of what is now known as the second law of thermodynamics.

How about:
12. On the largest scale, the universe moves from a low to a high entropy.

PS__Why do you limit this discussion to Classical Physics? Do you have an [unstated] agenda? Just asking. — Gnomon
Have you read the OP? Have you read the rest of the posts on this thread? If you don't want to play by the terms of discussion I set down, you should go to another thread or start your own. — Clarky

Sorry! I didn't mean to offend you. Although long threads tend to inevitably stray off-topic, that was not my intention. The OP didn't explain why the discussion was supposed to be limited to Classical Physics. Yet it seemed to me that you had an implicit goal for this thread --- beyond simply juxtaposing Materialism and Metaphysics, which are usually deemed to be exclusive (either/or) topics. Collingswood's list is the explicit agenda, but all the presuppositions are expressed in terms of Classical Absolutes, as contrasted with a 20th century world of Arbitrary Relativity. Perhaps my gaffe was to point at the invisible elephant in the room.

Now, after skimming the posts, I found the quote below that seems to point to a future expansion of the OP into a more contentious arena of Science & Philosophy. With a few exceptions (e.g. gravity as spooky action at a distance), Newton's Classical Physics was mostly amenable to human intuition about the logical & predictable way-of-the-world. But Quantum Physics threw a monkey wrench into the gears of classical mechanics. Quantum Logic seems to be Fuzzy and Indeterminate.

So, I just inferred that the "terms of discussion" were perhaps deliberately incomplete. Now, I see that you may be implying that reconciling Quantum Quirkiness with Classical Normality may require an updated 21st century worldview. And that is exactly what I have concluded myself : the world is not simply Either/Or (1/0), but complexly BothAnd (yin/yang). All parts of this world are inter-related (entangled) into a Whole System that we sometimes refer to holistically as "Nature". :smile:

Second focus - For the purposes of this discussion, we live before 1905, when the universe was still classical and quantum mechanics was unthinkable. I see the ideas we come up with in this discussion as a baseline we can use in a later discussion to figure out how things change when we consider quantum mechanics. — Clarky

Agenda : 1. a list of items to be discussed at a formal meeting.

Absolute : Pure & perfect ; a value or principle which is regarded as universally valid or which may be viewed without relation to other things.

Arbitrary : based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system.

Relativity : relationships viewed through special Frames of Reference

What about ‘spacial extent?’ Is space itself made of a substance? I have always envisaged the Big Bang singularity to be an ‘incredibly small concentration of energy,’ mass or matter came later.
@Clarky, Wayfarer
So is the fundamental substance in the physicalist universe not ‘energy?’ And is there not also a ‘container?’ An extent, we call ‘space?.’ — universeness

I don't have an opinion about such things.

So there is an infinite number of points between any two points?
— baker
It depends if you're talking about a line segment or a line that has both ends expanding. And I don't know why you asked this question. — L'éléphant

Because proposition no. 8 and its implications don't seem to be in line with a materialist/physicalist/realist point of view.

So is the fundamental substance in the physicalist universe not ‘energy?’ — universeness

It used to be thought of as matter, but then e=mc² was discovered, along with electromagnetic fields (not to mention "the observer problem"). But that all happened after 1905 so it's out-of-bounds for this thread.

Because proposition no. 8 and its implications don't seem to be in line with a materialist/physicalist/realist point of view. — baker

It's not my problem. I wasn't answering that issue. I was naming no. 8 for easy reference as to its relevance to the OP -- also given that the period is before 1905.

This thread is not for discussion of the validity of materialism. You guys all know that but you’re doing it anyway. — Clarky

Not I. I’m still waiting on some rendition of the metaphysics of it.

I don’t think “underlying basic assumptions”, being merely suppositions, count as metaphysics.

I’ll wait for something to actually qualify as an absolute pre-supposition, which a metaphysics of anything, would surely demand.

It used to be thought of as matter, but then e=mc2 was discovered, along with electromagnetic fields (not to mention "the observer problem"). But that all happened after 1905 so it's out-of-bounds for this thread. — Wayfarer

Not necessarily.

“In Einstein's first 1905 paper on E = mc2, he treated m as what would now be called the rest mass,[5] and it has been noted that in his later years he did not like the idea of "relativistic mass".”(wiki )

I’ll wait for something to actually qualify as an absolute pre-supposition, which a metaphysics of anything, would surely demand. — Mww

The only thing that would be required given the constraints of the thread would be the pre-supposition that everything that is, is made of matter.

In other words, given the limitations of the thread, there cannot be something which is not matter, in any possible experience (dammit, I wonder were I got that phrase from?).

Nevertheless, this as an absolute pre-supposition, does not say a lot. Because even back then, they still did not know what does not count as "matter", aside from stipulations (mind is not matter, etc.).

Hey, Banno, could you elucidate? [/quote]

Well, if @Baden doesn't mind. Seems the thread has moved on anyway.

First you say

… the error of dividing the world into the internal and the external.

An appeal to some form of monism? Not physicalism, I presume. — Real Gone Cat

More of a rejection of dualism. Mind isn't a substance, but something that substance does. Dualism is fraught.
— Real Gone Cat

But then we see

… one cannot get an “ought” from an “is”

Is that not dualism? You are conceding that both “ought” and “is” exist, but that a gulf lies between them that can never be bridged. Two modes of being in the same universe? — Real Gone Cat

It's the difference between looking around to see what is there and reaching out and changing what is there. That's a change in direction of fit, not a change in the nature of substance.

(I'm using "substance" here just for the stuff that makes up the world, energy, fields, and what have you, a catch-all phrase with no implications apart from brevity...)

I often agree with your viewpoints. Saw this though, and scratched my head. Just to let you know, I’ve always been a physicalist. But then I never went to school for philosophy, so I never learned that was bad. — Real Gone Cat

Thanks.

Physicalism is true, in that physics sets out how things are in the world. What would be problematic would be supposing that physics is therefore the only way, or even the best way, to talk about anything. That is, reductionism isn't helpful. But further, it does not tell us the most important part - what we ought to do. Hence:

The issue is that knowing what is the case does not tell us what to do about it. — Banno

Hope that makes my comment clearer.

Not necessarily. — Joshs

Fair point but what I was trying to illustrate that the discovery of the apparent convertability between matter and energy sort of undercuts classical materialism, in that in the classical materialist view, it was still feasible to envisage the atom as the kind of fundamental unit of matter. Once it became 'matter-energy' then it's much more difficult to conceive of it in those terms.

Physicalism is true, in that physics sets out how things are in the world. — Banno

However as a matter of definition it never includes the observer, which is the hallmark realisation that occured within physics after 1905.

Physicalism is true, in that physics sets out how things are in the world.
— Banno

However as a matter of definition it never includes the observer, which is the hallmark realisation that occured within physics after 1905. — Wayfarer

Prima facie, that looks contradictory. "It never includes the observer", when post-1905, both relativistic physics and QM explicitly make use of the observer.

The only thing that would be required given the constraints of the thread would be the pre-supposition that everything that is, is made of matter. — Manuel

Agreed. Still, the thread title stipulates the metaphysics of materialism, and as you say, given the constraints, I think your space and time are the only permissible absolute presuppositions. The possibility of matter absolutely presupposes space and time, and perhaps more importantly, is consistent with both the scientific pre-1905 constraints in the OP, and RGC’s doctrine used to qualify the metaphysical conditions in the title.
———-

.....possible experience..... — Manuel

Yeah, I’ve occassioned on the phrase a time or two myself. Loaded with subtleties, I must say.

The possibility of matter absolutely presupposes space and time, — Mww

Matter is what maintains its spatial presence as time passes. That's why its principal properties are inertia and mass. Density is another can of worms altogether.

I anticipate a lot of interesting exchanges, though this may be my imagination going rampant. I agree, pre 1905, space and time were absolute presuppositions. But then I wonder, in manifest experience, would we be able to isolate space and time absent stuff (matter, substance, etc.)?

We need space and time to access matter, but without matter, I don't see how space and time, innate as they are, could be exhibited. Perhaps matter, alongside being presupposed by space and time, allows us to discover that space and time are a priori.

For if we had no empirical world to use these faculties, I don't see how anything could become manifest as a priori or as being formed by our experience.

Yeah, I’ve occassioned on the phrase a time or two myself. Loaded with subtleties, I must say. — Mww

Indeed. I wonder if modern physics and also astronomy, might play an important role in reconceptualizing what possible experiences could be conceived as.

Very soon, I could start a thread on these things. Or, we can keep it private.

I'll leave the option open to you.

Prima facie, that looks contradictory. "It never includes the observer", when post-1905, both relativistic physics and QM explicitly make use of the observer. — Banno

Right. That was the big change between classical and quantum physics. That's why a lot of people - not just myself - say that quantum physics and the discovery of the uncertainty principle torpedoed physicalism.

The mysterious Quantum Observer. Source of more hokum than India. :wink:

Doubtless that's why @Clarky expelled it from this thread, by definition.

Anyone seen @Clarky?

But then I wonder, in manifest experience, would we be able to isolate space and time absent stuff (matter, substance, etc.)? — Manuel

In manifest experience? Not a chance, metaphysically speaking, considering that experience is of stuff, and considering that for humans at least, space and time are the necessary conditions for stuff. Experience presupposes stuff, and stuff presupposes space and time, so I would venture we cannot isolate either from the other. Space and time can be isolated absent stuff, but not with respect to manifest experience.

.....without matter, I don't see how space and time, innate as they are, could be exhibited. — Manuel

Pre-1905, or certainly pre-quantum cosmology, space without matter could be easily proved: just hold out your hand, palm up, with nothing in it. Actually, I suppose you’d have to go with pre-Faraday/Maxwell/Ampère science for exhibition of empty space, but still, space empty of matter is not the same as space empty of fields.

.....reconceptualizing what possible experiences could be conceived as. — Manuel

Exactly what that guy did, ol’ whatzizname......you know, the guy who never met a hairbrush he couldn’t do without.....somewhere around 1907, wondering what it would be like, long before the possibility of experiencing it, to descend in measurably extended free fall, contained in a closed box, such that you couldn’t tell if you were falling down or accelerating up. Now known as the “local position invariance”, which of course, he never thought of calling it at the time, insofar as he never had the actual experience of it, but recognized the non-contradictory logic in the conception of its possibility nonetheless. I like to think he quietly thanked Sir Issac for the ground of the idea, taken from the latter’s mathematical expressions of exactly what he was reconceptualizing.

I anticipate a lot of interesting exchanges, though this may be my imagination going rampant. I agree, pre 1905, space and time were absolute presuppositions. But then I wonder, in manifest experience, would we be able to isolate space and time absent stuff (matter, substance, etc.)?

We need space and time to access matter, but without matter, I don't see how space and time, innate as they are, could be exhibited. Perhaps matter, alongside being presupposed by space and time, allows us to discover that space and time are a priori.

For if we had no empirical world to use these faculties, I don't see how anything could become manifest as a priori or as being formed by our experience. — Manuel

I think you need to separate "matter" from "stuff". Experientially, stuff is prior, as what we experience. Then we understand that the concepts space and time are the necessary conditions for the behaviour of stuff, activity (or that the intuitions of space and time are the necessary conditions for even sensing activity). Then "matter" is posited to account for the substance of the stuff, which is active. So matter is purely conceptual.

The issue which Berkeley pointed out, and process philosophy continued with, is that the concept of "matter" is not logically necessary for the existence of stuff, as activity. If all is change, flux (Heraclitus), then there is no matter, because "matter" is the concept used to explain how something remains the same over an extended duration of time. If there really is nothing which stays the same over a duration of time (as with relativity theory), then there really is no matter.

That's why its principal properties are inertia and mass. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think to reduce further: the principle property of matter, is simple extension, the one thing impossible to abstract from matter, and still have matter identifiable as such. In the case of inertia or mass, to maintain a state in the first, or to obtain a state in the second, presupposes that to which they both belong, those properties being impossible to even conceive, without first conceiving the occupation of a self-determined limit.

I suppose it remains whether or not extension is technically a property, per se, but if it can be so thought, inertia and mass become secondary, and if extension is subsequently defined by a certain shape, they become tertiary. Inertia implies change and mass implies mere quantity, both of which are consequential, not antecedent to extension, so....there is that.

I used those terms in that post broadly, attempting to point out that without something in the world to contrast with out experience, it would not be evident that we could tell that space and time were a-priori.

Strictly speaking yes, "stuff" and "matter" are different things. But to signify something that is independent of us, these terms can be used loosely to point out this general idea.

Perhaps matter, alongside being presupposed by space and time, allows us to discover that space and time are a priori. — Manuel

Do you see....or is it just me seeing.... a problem with logical efficacy in saying matter is presupposed by space and time, in juxtaposition to matter presupposes space and time?

It appears to me that “presupposed by” implicates space and time as ontological causalities, insofar as if there is space and time then there is necessarily matter, which is not logically justifiable.

Or is it? You tell me.....you’re the one with letters after his name, which I thoroughly respect.

Yes, that was not the correct phrasing. I'm talking about actual real life, everyday affairs. How could we tell that space and time are a priori without something else that allows us to put them to use?

A rough analogy would be, we have eyes, which allow us to see colours. Nevertheless, if we are in a locked room (since birth) so dark we cannot even make out anything at all, we can't well say that we see colours until we get out of the room.

The potential for colours is there, but not triggered unless there is appropriate stimulus.

Perhaps something akin to this would happen in the case of space and time being a priori, absent an environment that allows us to put these into use.

How could we tell that space and time are a priori without something else that allows us to put them to use? — Manuel

I don’t think we could say anything at all about space and time, a priori or otherwise, without the relation of which they are part. It has been said that these conceptions are meaningless unless they can be the condition of something; if not for being the condition of something there isn’t any reason for their conception.

Thing to bear in mind, as you probably already know, is that the conception and the employment of them, is quite different. You would be correct, with respect to your analogy, if taken as intuitions, for then they are, as you say, put to use. As conceptions, on the other hand, they are not put to use, which actually corresponds to the notion of absolute presuppositions rather well, insofar, as according to Collingwood, they are not for the use of answering questions, which is precisely what they do as intuitions, re: in human cognitive system, are there that present in it, such that its non-presence makes the experience of objects impossible. Just as, physiologically, does the absence of light make the perception of color impossible.

So....yes, the potential of objects (colors) is there, but not for us without a means to represent them as phenomena (appropriate stimulus).

That's fair enough.

I think that by now, intentionality in general should also be such a presupposition as well.