So then the question is what's the referent both sides are talking about? So when Dennett argues that consciousness is functional states, and Chalmers argues that consciousness is qualia not reducible to physical, behavioral or functional states, how can they be referring to the same thing? — Marchesk
If Bob argues that stars are holes in the sky and Mary argues that stars are balls of plasma, how can they be referring to the same thing? — Michael
So your answer is just that they're referring to the same thing? — Michael
If by same "thing", you mean using the same word, then sure. But words can have multiple meanings, and consciousness is one of those words. — Marchesk
Surely you accept that when Bob talks about stars being holes in the sky and Mary talks about stars being balls of plasma you accept that they're both referring to the same things — Michael
Then why is it so hard to accept that when one philosopher talks about consciousness being physical and another philosopher talks about consciousness being non-physical that they're both referring to the same thing — Michael
that they're both referring to the same thing but that one of their accounts of what that thing is is mistaken? — Michael
It's easier to see this is not the case if we avoid the word consciousness and stick with qualia and behavior.
It's clear that when speaking of qualia we are not talking about behavior, and vice versa. A behaviorist would deny the existence of qualia, not say that qualia is actually behavior, because that makes no sense. — Marchesk
In other words, a behaviorist or physicalist can affirm that consciousness is real, but deny the dualist explanation of consciousness. — Andrew M
Similarly, a behaviorist or physicalist can deny the existence of qualia, while affirming that dropping a rock on your toe hurts and that roses are red. — Andrew M
No
But what does a behaviorist mean when when they say that dropping a rock on your toe "hurts"? If they mean you hop up and down and yell, then that's not consciousness. That's simply behavior. It they mean certain nerves are firing resulting in that behavior, it is again not consciousness, it's neurological activity. — Marchesk
In any case, my argument would be that some of our concepts are subjective and not behavioral or physicalist. When I say that it hurts or the rose is red, I mean my experience of feeling pain and seeing red, not howling and jumping around, or a scientific account of optics and reflective surfaces. — Marchesk
I basically agree, though I would note that we mean roughly the same thing when we say that dropping a rock on our foot hurts or that the rose is red, or else ordinary communication would not be possible. — Andrew M
When a rock is dropped on my foot and I say that it hurts, I certainly don't mean the resulting behavior, I mean the felt pain. Similarly, when I comment on the redness of a rose, I don't mean the wavelength of light. — Marchesk
There is definitely a private, unshareable aspect to our being. — Marchesk
Yeah, a vague image. In the same way I don't need to decide on how many stripes the zebra has, I don't need to decide exactly on the triangle's shape.
I've been reading a lot of fiction lately, and I've noticed I can have a visual presence in the story while barely deciding on any visual details, if I don't want to imagine anything – so just the visual outlines of the scene appear to me. The characters might not even have any specific eye, hair, or skin color, or height.
There is plenty of other neuroscience to explain the phenomenology. It takes about half a second to generate a full strength mental image - that is how long it takes to turn a high-level inkling into a low level fully fleshed out perceptual image. But then the image fades equally fast because all the neurons involved habituate. They "tire" - because it is unnatural in the ecological setting to hold one image fixed in mind if it is not actually functioning as a perceptual expectation about something just about to happen. — apokrisis
One develops their faculties through there use, rather than gaining greater and greater access to a static capacity. — Wosret
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.