Since there is no evidence of a universal mind, then it is false.
— Philosophim

I don't think it's that simple. Most scientific evidence is partial or inconclusive or unconvincing. For the sake of argument, let's assume a universal mind that computes the universe continuously at the quantum level, and its product is the universe as it is. What sort of evidence could one have that it is convincingly so or that it is not so? Is philosophical argument ever possible to prove or disprove the assertion? — magritte

Great post! First, lets qualify that "most" scientific evidence is a biased stretch. There is some science which is inconclusive or unconvincing, but it notes this. Very rarely does actual science declare its found truth when it clearly has not. That would be called bad science.

So what type of evidence do we need to provide for your assertion to prove or disprove your proposal? None, because you haven't set a condition for it to not possibly be disproved. Its not falsifiable. Its a story. A neat story. One that would be cool if it were true, not going to lie. I enjoy the creative exploration of the fantastic. But, one shouldn't get wrapped up in the emotions of the fantastic, and start thinking the positive emotions about it give you an excuse to believe that it must be true.

There's also nothing wrong with stating, "There is no evidence for this thought experiment, but what if..." Every played the game, "if you could pick any super power, what would you pick?" Great fun. Lots of philosophical spring boards can happen from it. But if someone starts saying, "Yeah, its possible we'll be able to alter our genetics to shoot laser beams from our eyes some day," the assertion has changed the notion of the discussion. At that point, you're not having fun about a thought experiment, you're claiming the thought experiment could be reality. And when you do that, you need evidence.

So if you are going to explore the notion that non-physicalism is real, you're going to need evidence. Even if you claim, "Well we know its not real, but what if," you should at least define what something non-physical is.

Vague references and a lack of evidence will convince no one. — Philosophim

Well, clearly that's inaccurate. The world is made up of beliefs without evidence.

Vague references and a lack of evidence will convince no one.
— Philosophim

Well, clearly that's inaccurate. The world is made up of beliefs without evidence. — Tom Storm

Ha! And I almost edited that out when I initially typed. I should know better on the philosophy boards. What I should have said was vague references and lack of evidence are not convincing arguments to a rational person.

:razz: :up:

I replied that I did not expect empirical evidence against it (i.e. the existence of non-physical) — Philosophim

Hang on. Where we started was with this exchange:

What would you consider evidence for the reality of the non-physical?
— Wayfarer

A very good question. First, it needs to be something falsifiable. By that, I mean that there needs to be some way of clearly defining what the non-physical is, and testing it. — Philosophim

It was at that point that I brought up the significance of 'falsifiability'. I made the point that Popper's introduction of falsifiability was made in order to differentiate empirical claims from non-empirical claims.

It is true that this indirectly equates 'the empirical' with 'the physical', but I think that is a fair assumption. What is generally accepted as empirical evidence, is something that can be detected physically. Is that not so?

You then asked:

Give me claims of something that exists that cannot be experienced. — Philosophim

This is where I gave the examples of 'the ontological status of mathematical objects' (which is the argument about mathematical Platonism) and also 'interpretations of quantum physics' (which are arguments about the ontological status of the objects of physics.) I said that both of these arguments are not about can't be resolved by empirical evidence, insofar as no empirical evidence can decide these cases one way or the other. So, just to make it clear, I'm arguing that if mathematical Platonism is valid, then there is a large class of non-physical objects, namely numbers, that we deal with on a daily basis.

And in the SEP entry on Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics, we read:

Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects which aren’t part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences. Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate.

So, I'm providing an argument for the reality of non-physical objects, namely, numbers. But this is not an empirically falsifiable argument, as it's not an empirical argument at all. That is what I'm claming 'went by you'.

I see, the way it was presented, I thought it was an aside puzzle. That being said, an unsolved thought puzzle that might be true or false is not evidence. If I said, "It might be true that lava core is black at the center of the Earth," unless I show that is true, my supposition in no way challenges or presents evidence that the lava core at the center of the Earth is not black (currently we know it as yellow).

It is true that this indirectly equates 'the empirical' with 'the physical', but I think that is a fair assumption. What is generally accepted as empirical evidence, is something that can be detected physically. Is that not so? — Wayfarer

No, I don't think that. I've noted that physical reality is matter and energy. If you can show something beyond matter and energy as existent, than that would be evidence of of something non-physical. I suppose what is laced into the assumption, is that what is non-physical must interact with the physical. And this is not a dogmatic assertion, but a logical consequence. Regardless of your opinion on consciousness, I think we can all agree that every sense that we have is physical, and that we are made up of physical bodies. And since consciousness is contained in our bodies, and not outside of our bodies, if consciousness is non-physical, it interacts with us in particular, and not in some random location apart from our bodies.

So an example in terms of consciousness, lets say a person was thinking, and we found something that was obviously interacting with the matter/energy in the brain, but could not be classified as matter and energy. At that point, I believe it would be safe to call that non-physical. But if we cannot detect anything that can interact with the brain, when obviously our consciousness must be interacting with the brain, we're inventing something that isn't there.

I don't think that's an unfair requirement for the concept of something that is non-physical. I'm not going for a "got ya" or rigging the game to where you can't win. But if the non-physical is impossible for the physical to detect, then its an imaginary idea because then it couldn't interact with the brain. That's a lack of evidence. Its fine if you want to play a game with it, and imagine if it was true, what it would entail. But if you're going to claim it exists, you need evidence. Again, this is not unfair or overly demanding.

How can materialism ever explain I see a world in colors while it looks like a dark world in which once in a while a ray of sunlight shows itself? A darkness due to a materialialistic outlook.

For the sake of argument, let's assume a universal mind that computes the universe continuously at the quantum level — magritte

How is that computing done?

How can materialism ever explain I see a world in colors while it looks like a dark world in which once in a while a ray of sunlight shows itself? A darkness due to a materialialistic outlook. — EugeneW

Interesting point. Materialism can't decide between traditional tactile objects, the ones we can touch, and the modern physical worlds of Newton, Einstein, and QM. Just look at the SEP entry. Color is not material because it is not a thing and it cannot be touched and it does not repulse other colors. Color is also not physical because nature is in shades of wavelengths and intensities like waves on the ocean. Color always requires interpretation. What then?

How is that computing done? — EugeneW

Sorry about having to resort to links but I just don't know enough to give a simple answer.
The idea is that the world is a quantum computer constantly seeking solutions to problems of its own development. This outlandish suggestion is actually taken seriously by many experts in the field. According to ↪Wayfarer's link around 24% of quantum physicists support an informational interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is just an extreme extension of the discovery and implementation of quantum computation in physics laboratories to solve otherwise too difficult mathematical problems.

I've noted that physical reality is matter and energy. If you can show something beyond matter and energy as existent, than that would be evidence of of something non-physical. — Philosophim

You haven't addressed the argument concerning the sense in which mathematical objects, numbers, and by extension also, scientific laws and physical principles, are real, but are not material. You haven't responded to that at all. You might look at that again.

So an example in terms of consciousness, lets say a person was thinking, and we found something that was obviously interacting with the matter/energy in the brain, but could not be classified as matter and energy. At that point, I believe it would be safe to call that non-physical. — Philosophim

I really can see why you're saying this, but again, what I'm trying to point out is that you're thinking of what the non-physical must be in terms of 'non-physical things'. You're saying if 'we found something that was obviously interacting...' You're trying to imagine a non-physical or immaterial thing, or substance, that acts as a cause.

The rationale behind that is because science only considers what is measurable and objective, then in order for there to be a non-physical thing it must also fall under that criteria; it must be measurable and objective, or else, what is it?

But we need to go back and examine what the basis is for those criteria. The fact that only what is measurable and objective is to be considered by scientific analysis is an assumption - the naturalist assumption. If you can't measure it, or discover it objectively, including by way of mathematical extrapolation on the basis of observation, then it's not considered evidential.

So, you're saying, if you want to show something non-material, you have to demonstrate its existence, like it's lava core, or a bitter apple, or some other sense-able object of experience that you've referred to in this discussion. Some thing.

That's why I started with the question of the reality of numbers. They're essential to science, on the one hand, but as to whether they ought to be considered real or not, is not necessarily amenable to scientific analysis, on the other. That is what makes this a metaphysical question. Mathematical platonism claims that number is real - but not real in the same way that chairs and tables are real. Hence, real but not material - which is a defeater for materialism.

I think we can all agree that every sense that we have is physical, and that we are made up of physical bodies. — Philosophim

As we both know, if your brain is affected by alcohol or a drug, or an injury, then that will have consequences - cognitive, motor, affective, and so on. No argument there, although the physicalist will say that it demonstrates, or proves, that the mind is reducible to the physical, because it can be subject to such physical influences.

But what if your mood is affected by something said to you? Or you form an incorrect belief that your life is in danger, as paranoids sometimes do? What if you develop a mood disorder or obsessive-compulsive disorder that literally makes you ill, that has physical consequences, glandular, adrenal and so on. But the cause of these maladies is not physical but affective or emotional - you've interpreted something in a way that causes these effects. Nothing physical has been done to you, you haven't taken a substance or a drug, but your mood, affect or thought patterns nevertheless can have profound physical effects (including death, in extreme cases.) This is why there is the discipline of mind-body (or psychosomatic) medicine.

So - no, I don't agree with that - or not unqualifiedly. The sense functions - sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch - respond to physical stimuli. But as rational sentient beings, we're also constantly judging, reacting, supposing, surmising, and so on. The intellect, the seat of judgement, is constantly weighing up, judging, and reasoning. Those are the faculties that I say are not meaningfully physical. They're bound up with the physical, but they're not completely physical. And I question whether anything is completely physical, because 'the physical' is not, as yet, fully defineable.

From debating with you at some length my observation is that you're committed to the framework of physicalism or scientific materialism. Please don't take that as pejorative, I'm not saying you're in the Klu Klux Klan or anything like that. It's the description of a philosophy, an outlook on life, which is very widespread in modern culture, it might even be the majority view, even though I myself don't agree with it.

But I'm arguing that the physicalist outlook is grounded in a methodological assumption about what ought to be considered as evidence in a scientific sense. But that methodological assumption is not really a metaphysic of what is and what is not real. Furthermore, there are real metaphysical debates, such as the nature of mathematical objects, or the nature of the wavefunction, that themselves are outside the scope of scientific method, even though in other respects they're central to today's science.

Incorrect.

If A=B, then a=a is false. — Philosophim

I'm not sure how familiar you are with logic, but this is pretty evidently untrue. I'll show you a truth-table if you don't believe me.

Notice how that in cases where a=b is true, a=a is true as well, and so the conjunction of both are true.
The only falsity conditions for the conjunction are when a=b does not hold, but notice how a=a remains a tautology regardless of the truth value of a=a



Logical equivalence is a transitive and symmetric relationship, so I'm not sure how you would even reach the conclusion that a=b would falsify a=a because you can just substitute the formulae around freely if they both hold. If not, then a=b simply doesn't hold.

Another example is probably from mathematical equality (which is not the same as logical equivalence, but a=a still is unfalsifiable even if = is understood as a mathematical equality and "a" as a variable). For example, 5=5 or 6=6 are still unfalsifiable truths. You can say 2+3 is equal to 5 too, so 2+3=5, but no one in their right mind would suggest that 5=5 is false because 2+3=5 is true.

I recommend this introductory course on logic from Stanford. In supplement, I'll also link this article explaining mathematical equality. I suggest that you familiarize yourself with these on your own freetime going onward with this conversation so that we have an easier time communicating.

Falsifiability does not mean, "It is necessary that it is false." It just means there can exist a condition in which it could potentially be false. An assertion must always allow the potential of its negation. — Philosophim

I'm aware that falsifiability is not the same as impossibility, rather it is simply possible falsity. I'm not sure why you felt the need to tell me this. Clearly, some propositions like a=a or some mathematical formulae like 5=5 have no falsifiability conditions and simply cannot be impossible. Similarly, in modal logic, the necessitation rule of K says that if some proposition is a theorem then it is necessary in all possible worlds, i.e. it's negation is logical impossibility, a fact that does not align with your view.

So I think you understand now. Physicalism is falsifiable by stating it could be the case that physicalism is false. — Philosophim

In the case of my example, the opponent of physicalism does not simply falsify physicalism but allow for its logical possibility, rather find an internal contradiction in physicalism. All contradictory sets of facts are logically impossible in any consistent modal logic, i.e. they simply could not be true. There isn't a world with square circles, or vice versa.

Now that you understand what falsifiability is, do you still have an objection to it? — Philosophim

I don't object to falsifiability in the context of the empirical sciences, where I believe it may even be beneficial. I think falsifiability as a philosophical or mathematical requirement is an incoherent position because both philosophy and mathematics have some facts that are given the status of being necessarily true and also unfalsifiable, like a=a or 5+5 and what not.

You haven't addressed the argument concerning the sense in which mathematical objects, numbers, and by extension also, scientific laws and physical principles, are real, but are not material. You haven't responded to that at all. You might look at that again. — Wayfarer

I noted earlier that stating, "We don't understand this, so I get to propose whatever I want" is not viable evidence. Demonstrate to me these things are non-physical, and I will agree. You noted there are some suppositions and debates about this. This means there are people who think these things are material. That isn't evidence. That's just indicating what we don't understand.

Are there things we don't fully understand? 100%. At one time we did not understand how rain formed. Did that mean if someone stated, "Its obviously mystical power of the Earth," that this is evidence? No. Could we sit and debate it back then? Sure. But for it to be viable, for it to be considered something real, it needed evidence.

I really can see why you're saying this, but again, what I'm trying to point out is that you're thinking of what the non-physical must be in terms of 'non-physical things'. You're saying if 'we found something that was obviously interacting...' You're trying to imagine a non-physical or immaterial thing, or substance, that acts as a cause. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not. Can there be something non-physical Wayfarer? I'm not stating it has to be a thing in the sense of what's physical. I'm saying "thing" as "what exists". If you're saying something non-physical can't exist, then the conversation is over. Now, I'm not doing that to you because I want you to know I'm being charitable to your argument. I know you believe something non-physical exists. If it exists, what is it? In this case, it is consciousness. And in this case, we know it must interact with the brain. And if it can interact with the physical world, we can detect something non-physical, in the physical world.

But we need to go back and examine what the basis is for those criteria. The fact that only what is measurable and objective is to be considered by scientific analysis is an assumption - the naturalist assumption. — Wayfarer

No assumption, just logic. If the brain can interact with the non-physical, then we can detect it. It doesn't even have to be fully known. It just has to be something we detect that is not matter or energy. If you deny that the brain can interact with the non-physical, then you lose. You've just cut the non-physical from ever being experienced by the physical. It then, does not exist. No assumptions. No bias. No "the physicalists will say." Ignore that crap. Talk to me, not them.

So, you're saying, if you want to show something non-material, you have to demonstrate its existence, like it's lava core, or a bitter apple, or some other sense-able object of experience that you've referred to in this discussion. Some thing. — Wayfarer

I'll clarify again. I'm saying that to show that consciousness is non-physical, you need to show it interacting with the brain in some manner. It must not be matter or energy. You are proposing, that something that is not matter or energy exists. You state you have evidence of this as consciousness. Our current understanding, manipulation, healing, and destruction of the brain is built upon our understanding of matter and energy. Is there something that we can detect interacting with the brain that is not matter or energy? Yes or no?

But the cause of these maladies is not physical but affective or emotional - you've interpreted something in a way that causes these effects. — Wayfarer

But we already know that's not true. Depression is something that can be fixed with medication. Emotions are tied to brain states that can be altered by changing your physical interactions. You can watch a movie, eat good food, get good sleep, etc. These cause changes in the communication of your brain. Emotions are physical expressions. They are physical reality. Reduce a man's testosterone and you'll see him feel powerless. Increase it and he'll feel powerful and aggressive. Again, we can manipulate this physically.

But as rational sentient beings, we're also constantly judging, reacting, supposing, surmising, and so on. The intellect, the seat of judgement, is constantly weighing up, judging, and reasoning. Those are the faculties that I say are not meaningfully physical. — Wayfarer

But Wayfarer, they are. We see the brain react to stimulous. We know certain areas of the brain are needed for sight. We know that you can become brain damaged and no longer see or imagine color, even though your eyes work perfectly. Here's just one example from 2013. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/brain-researchers-can-detect-who-we-are-thinking-about/
Take a brain damaged patient Wayfarer, and their capacity to judge and reason diminishes substantially. That's a physical result from a physical change.

Now again, if there are gaps in places that we don't understand about the brain, that doesn't mean there is evidence for something we can make up. If there is a gap in understanding about how the brain works, and we can find something interacting with the brain that is not matter or energy, then we can say, "There is evidence of something non-physical in our brain, this might be consciousness." But absence of understanding, is not evidence for anything. It just means we can say, "We don't understand what is going on."

And I question whether anything is completely physical, because 'the physical' is not, as yet, fully defineable. — Wayfarer

I've clearly defined it here. Matter and energy are physical. Again, talk to me, not to "the physicalists".

From debating with you at some length my observation is that you're committed to the framework of physicalism or scientific materialism. — Wayfarer

I'm actually not. I'm committed to what is most logical. Wayfarer, I have argued against a LOT of assumed theories and questioned and changed many assumptions about myself in life. That's what being intelligent is. Those who cannot consider alternatives and are set in their ways, are not rational people. They are emotional animals who crave the satisfaction of feeling right more than the cold and sometimes emotionally devastating act of learning what is right.

But I'm arguing that the physicalist outlook is grounded in a methodological assumption about what ought to be considered as evidence in a scientific sense. But that methodological assumption is not really a metaphysic of what is and what is not real. — Wayfarer

Which is fine. But we can invent whatever we want in our heads and be emotionally attached to it. Does that make it real? No. Evidence of its existence and use in the world makes it real. And if you have no evidence when someone asks? Just say you don't have it. Nothing wrong with that either. If you feel you have to do word puzzles and jumbles to avoid saying those words, then realize you're more interested in lying about something for other to accept your idea, then telling the truth and letting them decide on their own. I haven't had to use fancy words, concepts, or complex ideas to convey my point, because I'm more concerned about clarity and seeing a correct outcome then emotional gratification.

Furthermore, there are real metaphysical debates, such as the nature of mathematical objects, or the nature of the wavefunction — Wayfarer

Meta means "self reference" Metaphysical as a word basically means self reference to the physical. Another way to view it is meta means "Talking about", so basically talking about the nature of the physical. And again, debates are fine. Ideas are wonderful! But claiming ideas are reality, when there is no evidence for it, is not.

Kuro, I think you might have missed my point. If A is not A, then it can't equal A right? So if I said, "A" exists, and someone demonstrated to me that "A" did not exist, then A would be proven false. That's all I expect. There needs to be a situation in which the proposition COULD be false. In other words, lose the logic charts, you're missing the point.

An example of a non-falsifiable argument would be, "A = A" and someone made it impossible for ~A to be a consideration. So lets put some examples instead of letters here.
"God exists and made the world" = A. If I said, "Could I attempt to show that something else created the world?" I would receive a response. If the person said, "Well yeah, I guess that's fine," I would then ask, "So what would be enough to show that God did not make the world?" Here they need to give me an answer.

If they say, "God is beyond our understanding and definition," then there's really nothing to falsify. There's no definition or understanding of God to claim, so there is nothing to refute either. In short, non-falsifiable." If they say, "Why yes, there was this fine fellow name Jesus, and he said this, and did this, and that's God," then we have something that could be false. It could be that Jesus did not exist. That he wasn't sane or trustworthy. That the book that tells his stories isn't verifiably correct. That sort of stuff.

Now it very well could be that God exists and created the world. It could be that the bible is completely accurate, Jesus did come and do some things, and that's why we know God exists. It being true does not mean it is not falsifiable. Being falsifiable does not mean it is false. It just means we have something that could potentially be refuted, because that is naturally what happens with anything that exists.

Back to your example.

For example, 5=5 or 6=6 are still unfalsifiable truths. — Kuro

No, they are very falsifiable. When would 6 not be 6? When 6=5 is one example. Basically if 6 = ~ 6, then 6=6 is false. We can test this. It turns out that ~6=6 isn't true, but a contradiction. Therefore while we have a means of falsifying, we cannot show that 6=6 is false. Therefore, it must be true.

I recommend this introductory course on logic from Stanford. In supplement, I'll also link this article explaining mathematical equality. I suggest that you familiarize yourself with these on your own freetime going onward with this conversation so that we have an easier time communicating. — Kuro

Much appreciated, but we don't need it for what we're talking about as I think you can see from my examples above.

I'm aware that falsifiability is not the same as impossibility, rather it is simply possible falsity. I'm not sure why you felt the need to tell me this. Clearly, some propositions like a=a or some mathematical formulae like 5=5 have no falsifiability conditions and simply cannot be impossible. — Kuro

I felt the need to tell you this, because I felt you did not understand falsifiability. I didn't take offense to your recommendation to read up on logic, don't take offense on me telling you things I don't think you understand either.

So I think you understand now. Physicalism is falsifiable by stating it could be the case that physicalism is false.
— Philosophim

In the case of my example, the opponent of physicalism does not simply falsify physicalism but allow for its logical possibility, rather find an internal contradiction in physicalism. All contradictory sets of facts are logically impossible in any consistent modal logic, i.e. they simply could not be true. There isn't a world with square circles, or vice versa. — Kuro

Recall you just mentioned that you understood falsifiability was not the same as "impossibility". If physicalism is contradictory, then its false. That is a clear and identifiable way it can be false. Therefore it is falsifiable. Now is it actually false? That's a different debate.

I think falsifiability as a philosophical or mathematical requirement is an incoherent position because both philosophy and mathematics have some facts that are given the status of being necessarily true and also unfalsifiable, like a=a or 5+5 and what not. — Kuro

Again, those are both falsifiable statements. But, we cannot meet the requirements to show they are false. Therefore they are proven to be true.

I noted earlier that stating, "We don't understand this, so I get to propose whatever I want" is not viable evidence. — Philosophim

Not at all what I said. If you're going to paraphrase something, you need to understand it. The statement I made was supported with a reference to the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Platonism in the Philosophy of Maths. The topic is 'the ontological status of math.' It is a debate with a long history, and you haven't shown the least evidence that you understand it.

I'm saying that to show that consciousness is non-physical, you need to show it interacting with the brain in some manner. It must not be matter or energy. You are proposing, that something that is not matter or energy exists. — Philosophim

Yes. That would be judgement.

Take a brain damaged patient Wayfarer, and their capacity to judge and reason diminishes substantially. That's a physical result from a physical change. — Philosophim

There are abundant counter examples. Man with tiny brain shocks doctors. And research into neuroplasticity shows that neural configuration can be changed by volitional activity. These demonstrate that not all causation is 'bottom-up' from the physical to the mental, but that there's a top-down effect as well.

When the scientists compared the TMS data on the two groups--those who actually tickled the ivories and those who only imagined doing so--they glimpsed a revolutionary idea about the brain: the ability of mere thought to alter the physical structure and function of our gray matter. For what the TMS revealed was that the region of motor cortex that controls the piano-playing fingers also expanded in the brains of volunteers who imagined playing the music--just as it had in those who actually played it.

Metaphysical as a word basically means self reference to the physical. — Philosophim

That's not the definition of metaphysical. You don't get to make it up.

I enjoy reading these debates. @Philosophim is like a calmer Garrett Travers.

What was it Nietzsche said - 'If you believe in grammar, you're a theist." The possibility of us making meaning and having reliable cognitive facilities may be just as 'miraculous' as the abstract, seemingly transcendental status of math.

At least someone is.

I bought a really expensive textbook on the subject, which I was just starting to absorb, but haven't been able to find it since moving house. :groan: The author, James Robert Brown, is the one who defends Platonism in the Smithsonian Institute article What is Math? I love it that one of the empiricists says in response:

Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?

Why indeed!

What was it Nietzsche said - 'If you believe in grammar, you're a theist." The possibility of us making meaning and having reliable cognitive facilities may be just as 'miraculous' as the abstract, seemingly transcendental status of math. — Tom Storm

Indeed. Math is arguably a less impressive product of abstraction from a far richer linguistic ability, like bony driftwood next to a living tree. It's poetry just the same but stuffed in a alluring straitjacket .

The evidence is high enough to bury a mountain. What does anyone have who believes we are somehow more than our brain and body? What? The silence of nothing is deafening. It is just our desire that we are more, nothing more; nothing less. — Philosophim

First, for context, I'm a moderate on this issue.

Language is a huge part of human reality. We live together in something like a historically and symbolically structured lifeworld. We bury or burn the corpses of the same loved ones we nurture when alive, so clearly the fine details or the structure of brains/bodies is important to us. The structure the sound waves we bark at one another is also crucial. I suppose it's plausible to stop at these patterns and say (speculatively or economically) that we are only such patterns. And perhaps you include all this implicitly in your 'we are only bodies and brains' position.

But your opening post doesn't emphasize what encourages the hopes for something more that you go on to criticize. I do agree that, naturally enough, people want to go to heaven, or a piece of the Absolute, etc. But there are also philosophical reasons to argue for 'something more' that do not include any such comforts and only seek a more comprehensive and consistent account.

The silence of nothing is deafening. — Philosophim

'Those who have ears, let them hear'

I enjoy reading these debates. Philosophim is like a calmer Garrett Travers. — Tom Storm

How is that possible? If you remove the anxiety from Garrett, there is nothing left.

I think you might have missed my point. If A is not A, then it can't equal A right? — Philosophim

Have you heard of the phrase "when pigs fly?" It is a adynaton, namely in that when it postulates a subjunction believed to take on a highly implausible (or impossible) premise to ridicule on whatever follows. A is A in any valuation of A, so A is not A is simply never true. But entertaining A is not A simply entails trivialism in classical FOL, where any proposition you want to follow follows. (This is well known as the principle of explosion).

You don't find some empirical evidence for why things aren't themselves. You're just forcing a proposition that's already taken to have no truth-conditions in FOL to somehow be true. It's incoherent.

"A" exists, and someone demonstrated to me that "A" did not exist, then A would be proven false. — Philosophim

A is just a placeholder. A unicorn is a unicorn. It doesn't matter if it exists or not. It's not an existential claim, it's an identity claim.

"A = A" and someone made it impossible for ~A to be a consideration — Philosophim

~A is considered in A=A. But A=A returns true even granting ~A. ~A is literally just a negative truth valuation for A. So in both cases if A is false then the other A is also false, and so on. Like I've shown you earlier in the truth table, you can value A with any combination of truth and false and it'll always be equivalent to itself. There's no way out of it.

"God exists and made the world" = A. If I said, "Could I attempt to show that something else created the world?" I would receive a response. If the person said, "Well yeah, I guess that's fine," I would then ask, "So what would be enough to show that God did not make the world? — Philosophim

It would be a counterexample to the proposition "God exists and made the world" because that proposition is not a tautology. But "God is God" or "Making the world is making the world" is a tautology that is always true regardless of whether God existed or not. In the same fashion that "Santa is Santa" is a tautology with no falsity conditions.

If they say, "God is beyond our understanding and definition," then there's really nothing to falsify. There's no definition or understanding of God to claim, so there is nothing to refute either. In short, non-falsifiable." — Philosophim

While this may be a claim you can't empirically falsify, it's not a tautology in logic. This is just beating a strawman.

No, they are very falsifiable. When would 6 not be 6? When 6=5 is one example. — Philosophim

"When" 6=5? There is no time where 6 is equal to 5. I'm actually appalled that we're debating such a simple notion. Simply asserting falsities with no truth conditions is not an argument. There are no conditions where 6=5 holds, so there isn't a time that you can reference where you say "when 6=5" because it's simply never the case. On the converse, 5=5 will always be true. You can literally manually check this if you don't believe me: that's what I gave you in my earlier response, which seems insufficient for your purposes

. It turns out that ~6=6 isn't true, but a contradiction. Therefore while we have a means of falsifying, we cannot show that 6=6 is false. Therefore, it must be true. — Philosophim

Conceding on trivialism still wouldn't falsify 6=6, it'd just make everything (including negations) trivially true.

Much appreciated, but we don't need it for what we're talking about as I think you can see from my examples above. — Philosophim

I'm fairly certain we do. You make very bold assertions with regards to the fields of logic and mathematics, but do not seem to grasp explanations of why these assertions are quite literally incoherent. I'm sure that further familiarity would not work against you and perhaps will lead you to the same conclusions I'm trying to communicate to you in this interaction.

I felt the need to tell you this, because I felt you did not understand falsifiability. I didn't take offense to your recommendation to read up on logic, don't take offense on me telling you things I don't think you understand either. — Philosophim

I'm sorry if you felt this way, but I want to be clear I was simply inquiring for the reason why you did so, i.e. what lead you to the impression I did not understand falsifiability. This is not the same as me taking offense. Generally, assume that I take no offense unless I indicate otherwise :).

Recall you just mentioned that you understood falsifiability was not the same as "impossibility" — Philosophim

If a proposition is impossible, it is necessarily false, whereas if a proposition is false it is not necessarily impossible.

All impossible propositions are false, but not all false propositions are impossible.

Again, those are both falsifiable statements. But, we cannot meet the requirements to show they are false. Therefore they are proven to be true. — Philosophim

You can't meet the requirements to show they are false because there are no such requirements. Propositional calculus is truth-functional, meaning the truth-value of a formula is a function of the semantics of the operators and the truth value of the propositions contained within it. All you're doing is exhausting all possible truth values. So tautologies return true having exhausted all possible truth values of false or true to all the propositions embedded within it. So there are no conditions where they're false.

Not at all what I said. If you're going to paraphrase something, you need to understand it. The statement I made was supported with a reference to the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Platonism in the Philosophy of Maths. The topic is 'the ontological status of math.' It is a debate with a long history, and you haven't shown the least evidence that you understand it. — Wayfarer

My point is a debate is not evidence to understand. The conclusion of a debate is evidence to understand. I see evidence that there is a debate. And if there is a debate, the outcome is not known. Stating, "We don't know the outcome on something" again, is not evidence.

My job is not to understand a debate. I am not going to read a long storied history to prove your point for you. Your supposed to convince me right? Your job is to clearly present evidence of the non-physical as a cause of consciousness that is something you and I could debate. To show that I am holding the same standard towards you, I'm not saying, "Well there are debates that show there is no non-physical. There's a long storied debate of only the physical being true. You haven't demonstrated to me you've understood the entire history of this, go read it, you're ignoring, etc."

We're making clear points with each other. If I want to cite evidence in neuroscience, I will show evidence of things which are conclusive, not under debate. I will also cite specific outcomes, and not debates themselves as evidence. I ask the same in return.

I'm saying that to show that consciousness is non-physical, you need to show it interacting with the brain in some manner. It must not be matter or energy. You are proposing, that something that is not matter or energy exists.
— Philosophim

Yes. That would be judgement. — Wayfarer

No, that would be an opinion. If you want to say you've judged your opinion to be true, then you need to supply some evidence. Otherwise, I could come back with my opinion without evidence that there is no non-physical with the same response, "Yes. That would be judgement". No, that would be silly.

This is evidence! Its falsifiable with clear claims. Lets examine your evidence to see if it demonstrates there is clearly something non-physical going on.

So, if the brains reduction was not correlated with the reduction of consciousness, we would find that the man was just as intelligent as a person with an average brain. Except in the article we see, "Intelligence tests showed the man had an IQ of 75, below the average score of 100 but not considered mentally retarded or disabled."

Further, the article notes, "The findings reveal “the brain is very plastic and can adapt to some brain damage occurring in the pre- and postnatal period when treated appropriately,” he says.

“What I find amazing to this day is how the brain can deal with something which you think should not be compatible with life,” comments Max Muenke, a paediatric brain defect specialist at the National Human Genome Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, US.

“If something happens very slowly over quite some time, maybe over decades, the different parts of the brain take up functions that would normally be done by the part that is pushed to the side,” adds Muenke, who was not involved in the case."

So it doesn't appear that researchers and scientists are seeing something at odds with matter and energy in the brain. Everything still seems explainable with a matter and energy model. And again, if they didn't understand why this was possible, that just opens it up to debate. An opinion of a solution to a debate, is not evidence that the solution exists, even if it is a satisfying opinion or "seems perfect".

Your second reference notes that thought can rewire the brain.

"When the scientists compared the TMS data on the two groups--those who actually tickled the ivories and those who only imagined doing so--they glimpsed a revolutionary idea about the brain: the ability of mere thought to alter the physical structure and function of our gray matter. For what the TMS revealed was that the region of motor cortex that controls the piano-playing fingers also expanded in the brains of volunteers who imagined playing the music--just as it had in those who actually played it."

But this is not evidence of the non-physical. We already know thoughts are composed of matter and energy. Just like when you use your muscles, the brain rewires itself to compensate. The brain itself is adapting based on what is happening up there. Nowhere in the article does it claim that there is something outside of the brain, or outside of matter and energy causing the brain to change. I suppose Wayfarer you must find it odd that thoughts are essentially a combination of matter and energy. But that is what the current physical model of the brain presents. Thoughts are physical. its your job to give evidence that they are not.

Metaphysical as a word basically means self reference to the physical.
— Philosophim

That's not the definition of metaphysical. You don't get to make it up. — Wayfarer

You are correct. I noted a branch of metaphysics, and applied that to all metaphysics. I want you to see I can admit freely when I am wrong. Its very important that both of us take this mindset, or emotional and personal feelings get in the way. My real point again is that debates are not evidence. Now, if you would like to explain to me why debates are evidence, we can consider this. But so far, you have not.

The silence of nothing is deafening.
— Philosophim

'Those who have ears, let them hear' — Wayfarer

Lets keep it to debating the claims eh? Otherwise I would come back with something like "Remove the plank from your own eye before pointing out the splinter in your neighbors," That back and forth gets us nowhere.

You don't find some empirical evidence for why things aren't themselves. You're just forcing a proposition that's already taken to have no truth-conditions in FOL to somehow be true. It's incoherent. — Kuro

When did I say empirical evidence? All I'm noting for the condition of falsification, is that we have a clear postulate we can put forward that would show when the proposition was false. If A=~A, then A=A would be false right? Take the simple note above and try to explain to me why A=~A is not a negation of A=A.

~A is considered in A=A. But A=A returns true even granting ~A. ~A is literally just a negative truth valuation for A. — Kuro

Then you agree with me. The potential for something to be proven false, does not mean it can be proven false. Falsification does not mean, "It is false". It means there is a condition we can propose in which our claim would be false. If A=~A was true, then A=A would be false. If you agree with this, then you understand. If you don't, please explain how if A=~A were true, then A=A would not be false.

Like I've shown you earlier in the truth table, you can value A with any combination of truth and false and it'll always be equivalent to itself. There's no way out of it. — Kuro

And again, if something is provably true, it doesn't mean we can't invent a scenario in which it would not be true. The invention of the scenario in which it is not true, also does not mean it can be concluded that it is not true. You seem to be under the impression that falsification means "likelihood or chance" that it can be proven false. That's not what it is. Its just the presentation of the condition in which a claim would be false. And A=~A is that falsification presentation. It is of course, NOT true, which means that A=A is not false. But it can still be falsified. Does that clear it up?

"When" 6=5? There is no time where 6 is equal to 5. I'm actually appalled that we're debating such a simple notion. — Kuro

That is because you are not understanding what I am saying. I am not saying 6=5. I'm just noting a case that IF 6=5 was true, then 5=5 would be false. Thus 5=5 can be falsified. It doesn't mean that 5=5 is false.

This is not the same as me taking offense. Generally, assume that I take no offense unless I indicate otherwise :). — Kuro

Same here! Without non-verbal, it can be difficult to understand what another person is feeling, thanks for clearing that up.

If a proposition is impossible, it is necessarily false, whereas if a proposition is false it is not necessarily impossible. — Kuro

Correct. But in both cases, there is a possible negation to consider. We may conclude that negation is impossible, but we can conceive of its negation, and what it would entail.

So tautologies return true having exhausted all possible truth values of false or true to all the propositions embedded within it. So there are no conditions where they're false. — Kuro

Correct, there are no conditions in which they are found to be false. This does not mean there is not a potential condition in which we could consider it being false.

Can you address the point in which I provided an example of God vs. Jesus when it was not possible for there to be falsification? In the God example, there is not a consideration of anything which could be considered falsifiable. Let us not forget this debate is about providing evidence that is falsifiable for or against consciousness being physical vs non-physical.

We bury or burn the corpses of the same loved ones we nurture when alive, so clearly the fine details or the structure of brains/bodies is important to us. The structure the sound waves we bark at one another is also crucial. I suppose it's plausible to stop at these patterns and say (speculatively or economically) that we are only such patterns. And perhaps you include all this implicitly in your 'we are only bodies and brains' position. — lll

Yes. This doesn't make human interactions any less meaningful. How we function does not change the reality of our function.

But there are also philosophical reasons to argue for 'something more' that do not include any such comforts and only seek a more comprehensive and consistent account. — lll

I agree. I was just answering why in particular this topic tends to pop up more than others. In my discussions on this topic over time I simply find a pattern that you find a lot more people of a religious and spiritual nature in the camp of the non-physical, then you do in the camp of the physical. Further, generally these arguments are ill-defined, and will not actually provide what they mean by non-physical. You can find genuine people who are willing to engage the subject rationally, but I would say a lot of the motivation is not rational curiosity, but a desire for a particular emotional outcome. This is of course an opinion, and should not be taken as fact.

We're making clear points with each other. — Philosophim

You're not showing any sign of understanding any of the points that I've made, even in principle.

We already know thoughts are composed of matter and energy. — Philosophim

Your commitment to that falsehood colors everything you say about it. Thoughts are composed of the relationship between ideas, and ideas are not physical. A logical proof is not dependent on anything physical, neither is pure mathematics. I'm done talking to you.

We're making clear points with each other.
— Philosophim

You're not showing any sign of understanding any of the points that I've made, even in principle. — Wayfarer

Upon reviewing, I have. Maybe you haven't understood mine?

We already know thoughts are composed of matter and energy.
— Philosophim

Your commitment to that falsehood colors everything you say about it. Thoughts are composed of the relationship between ideas, and ideas are not physical. — Wayfarer

I've been asking you repeatedly to show me evidence of what non-physical is, and you haven't. If thoughts aren't composed of matter and energy, what are they composed of Wayfarer? We have evidence through physical manipulation of the brain that thoughts can be triggered and changed. Give me evidence that thoughts are composed of something besides matter and energy, or I'm right, and not holding a falsehood. You want to demonstrate that what I hold is a falsehood, prove it.

As a philosophical naturalist, I'm all for whatever works better, more probatively and reliably, than methodological physicalism.

Idealism is (often) a continuation of religion through increased abstraction. The visceral stories of yesteryear become esoteric ciphertexts. Instead of demons and angels, one learns to be satisfied with the ghost in the machine and its wonderful qualities. — lll

:100:

Upon reviewing, I have — Philosophim

You said nothing about mathematical platonism.

You simply dismiss the idea of psychosomatic effects on the basis that thoughts are physical. The point of that 'piano practice' experiment, was that subjects who simply thought about doing piano exercises, showed measurable neural changes to the subjects who had a physical piano. But of course, you will say that, as thought is already physical, this shows nothing. You're in essence claiming there's no difference between an imagined piano and a physical one, because an imagined piano is also physical.

If thoughts aren't composed of matter and energy, what are they composed of Wayfarer? — Philosophim

They're composed of ideas. Your dogma is that ideas are brain-functions. That is called neurological reductionism. There are volumes of books that critique neurological reductionism, but there's no point referring to them, because you already know - and it's the only claim you make - 'everything is physical'.

You said nothing about mathematical platonism. — Wayfarer

I said plenty. And I said why it wasn't evidence. And you didn't refute this.

You simply dismiss the idea of psychosomatic effects on the basis that thoughts are physical. — Wayfarer

Lets define "psychosomatic effects". Any result pertaining to the influence of the mind or higher functions of the brain upon the operations of the body, particularly bodily disorders or diseases.

I didn't deny that. What I said was that this doesn't show that thoughts aren't matter and energy. No, I am not saying there is a difference between an imagined piano and a physical one in terms of thoughts. Wayfarer, your mind doesn't touch a real piano. Your nerves interpret that touch, then travel to the brain where the brain makes some sense out of it. Your brain doesn't need nerves, or a piano, to have thoughts about a piano, and practice strengthening neural pathways. Nothing in that article claims that consciousness isn't physical, or that the brain and thoughts are not physical.

If thoughts aren't composed of matter and energy, what are they composed of Wayfarer?
— Philosophim

They're composed of ideas. Your dogma is that ideas are brain-functions. — Wayfarer

What are ideas composed of Wayfarer? Its not dogma for me to claim that thoughts and ideas are composed of matter and energy, its a conclusion based on the evidence I know.

[quote="Wayfarer;668534"it's the only claim you make - 'everything is physical'.[/quote]

Don't be dishonest now. I clearly stated that what is physical, is matter and energy. If you find something that isn't matter and energy, you've found something non-physical. I've asked you to provide me an example of something that is not matter and energy. You claim ideas aren't made of matter and energy, give me evidence. If its not matter and energy, what is it? If you don't answer in the next reply, then you and I will both have clearly determined that you don't know. Be honest and address the request.

I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar. — Twilight of the Idols

You said nothing about mathematical platonism.
— Wayfarer

I said plenty. — Philosophim

You haven't addressed it.

When I brought up the idea, and linked to an article on What is Math, you said only this:

If numbers are real independent of people, then what is a number? Does it mean the symbol, "1"? Does it meant the concept of "an" identity versus "multiple identities? Can we demonstrate that numbers exist in a setting devoid of anything conscious but an observer? — Philosophim

At least that was a start - but it doesn't develop. The expression 'a setting devoid of anything conscious but an observer' is very confusing, indicating you hadn't really come to terms with the basic problem.

I then tried again in this post to which your response was

I noted earlier that stating, "We don't understand this, so I get to propose whatever I want" is not viable evidence. Demonstrate to me these things are non-physical, and I will agree. You noted there are some suppositions and debates about this. This means there are people who think these things are material. That isn't evidence. That's just indicating what we don't understand. — Philosophim

Again indicating you have no grasp of the philosophical issue. So, no, you haven't addressed 'the issue of mathematical platonism' and why it is relevant to the question as to whether all that exists is matter and energy.

Its not dogma for me to claim that thoughts and ideas are composed of matter and energy, its a conclusion based on the evidence I know. — Philosophim

It's a metaphysical stance, namely, philosophical materialism. Again - what are numbers composed of? What are the rules of logic composed of? All of these are ideas that can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. That is why platonism is rejected by materialists.