I'm not disputing the facts of evolution, but h. sapiens realises horizons of meaning which are completely unavailable to other creatures. In fact I don't really understand why this is something that has to be argued for, when the differences between h. sapiens and other species seems to blindingly obvious. — Wayfarer

I'm not arguing that we aren't the best brained animal out there. I'm not arguing that we cannot do amazing things. But we're still animals, and brains and bodys at the end of the day. Its not beyond reality, its part of reality. And yet there is a desire in us that insists that we are somehow separate from our brain and body, with no evidence but a wish.

While the counter point to Darwin is fine, its old. Darwin's theory has come a long way since then, and we've discovered DNA. Want a human? Make the proper DNA sequence. Want a sheep? Proper DNA sequence. Our DNA is 99% similar to chimps. There is no evidence of anything "beyond" what we know of reality.

Its not a debate either. We are clearly physical beings with physical brains. Ever been drunk or buzzed? That was the physical alcohol affecting your body and brain to change your consciousness. There's nothing beyond or separate from that. Brain damage changes people's personalities. Drugs can help people become normal who have psychosis and see voices. Sleep is found to be restorative to the mind and aid in memory formation.

The evidence is high enough to bury a mountain. What does anyone have who believes we are somehow more than our brain and body? What? The silence of nothing is deafening. It is just our desire that we are more, nothing more; nothing less.

There is no evidence of anything "beyond" what we know of reality. — Philosophim

I can't be bothered arguing against that kind of complacency.

We put chips in monkeys' brains and they died. That's how far along neuroscience is. Barbarism. — theRiddler

:lol: :up:

Is it that the focus given to physicalism is due because it is truly central to philosophical discourse, or is it just an accident that occurred by coincidence due to the interests of the forum's userbase? — Kuro

Physicalism was probably not a major intellectual issue for the Greeks & Romans & Jews. Because, except for a few unorthodox philosophers, they typically took Spiritualism for granted.

I'm not sure how far back the current physical vs non-physical contention can be traced. But a match was probably struck to the fuse when Enlightenment Science began to challenge the then-dominant Metaphysics of the Catholic Church. The subsequent separation of church & state may have cooled the flames for a while. But the resurgence of Creationism versus Evolutionism in the 20th century, stoked the latent fires of diametrically opposed worldviews : Spiritual vs Material. Around the turn of the 21st century, the Four Horsemen of Atheism began a concerted counter-attack. And the resultant polarization & politicization of worldviews is still reflected in debates on forums such as Quora and TPF.

Most of us on this forum seem to be open to polite exchanges of views. Unfortunately, those with black vs white attitudes have turned some philosophical dialogues into political diatribes. :sad:

Meta-Physical versus Anti-Metaphysical Agendas
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12649/meta-physical-versus-anti-metaphysical

Physicalism was probably not a major intellectual issue for the Greeks & Romans & Jews. Because, except for a few unorthodox philosophers, they typically took Spiritualism for granted. — Gnomon

Not at all. The Stoics, Epicureans and Atomists were materialists. Materialism has always existed as part of philosophy - even in ancient India.

I can't be bothered arguing against that kind of complacency. — Wayfarer

Complacency? If I accepted something without evidence for my emotional gratification, that would be complacent.

Don't you think I would love it if we had immortality, or there was some viable evidence of our consciousness continuing to exist? Wouldn't it just be easy for me to pretend with a smile that I'm going to live forever? Of course it would. But there's no viable evidence Wayfarer, there's none.

The Stoics...were materialists. — Wayfarer

"The Stoic system of physics was materialism with an infusion of pantheism. In contradiction to Plato's view that the Ideas, or Prototypes, of phenomena alone really exist, the Stoics held that material objects alone existed; but immanent in the material universe was a spiritual force which acted through them, manifesting itself under many forms, as fire, æther, spirit, soul, reason, the ruling principle.

The universe, then, is God, of whom the popular gods are manifestations; while legends and myths are allegorical. The soul of man is thus an emanation from the godhead, into whom it will eventually be re-absorbed. The divine ruling principle makes all things work together for good, but for the good of the whole. The highest good of man is consciously to work with God for the common good, and this is the sense in which the Stoic tried to live in accord with nature. In the individual it is virtue alone which enables him to do this; as Providence rules the universe, so virtue in the soul must rule man."

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2680/2680-h/2680-h.htm

From the gods I received that I had good grandfathers, and parents, a good sister, good masters, good domestics, loving kinsmen, almost all that I have. — Marcus Aurelius

And when I did first apply myself to philosophy, that I did not fall into the hands of some sophists, or spent my time either in reading the manifold volumes of ordinary philosophers, nor in practising myself in the solution of arguments and fallacies, nor dwelt upon the studies of the meteors, and other natural curiosities. All these things without the assistance of the gods, and fortune, could not have been. — Marcus Aurelius

Remember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how often thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not use it. Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thou art a part, and of what administrator of the universe thy existence is an efflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go and thou wilt go, and it will never return. — Marcus Aurelius

...thou mayest answer This, and That, freely and boldly, that so by thy thoughts it may presently appear that in all thee is sincere, and peaceable; as becometh one that is made for society, and regards not pleasures, nor gives way to any voluptuous imaginations at all: free from all contentiousness, envy, and suspicion, and from whatsoever else thou wouldest blush to confess thy thoughts were set upon. He that is such, is he surely that doth not put off to lay hold on that which is best indeed, a very priest and minister of the gods, well acquainted and in good correspondence with him especially that is seated and placed within himself, as in a temple and sacrary. — Marcus Aurelius

Some skepticism here:

Live a good life. If there are gods and they are just, then they will not care how devout you have been, but will welcome you based on the virtues you have lived by. If there are gods, but unjust, then you should not want to worship them. If there are no gods, then you will be gone, but will have lived a noble life that will live on in the memories of your loved ones. — Marcus Aurelius

:up: Very much respond to the Stoic idea of the Logos.

If I accepted something without evidence for my emotional gratification, that would be complacent. — Philosophim

What would you consider evidence for the reality of the non-physical?

What would you consider evidence for the reality of the non-physical? — Wayfarer

A very good question. First, it needs to be something falsifiable. By that, I mean that there needs to be some way of clearly defining what the non-physical is, and testing it. A common example is if I say, "All apples are sweet" if I find a sour apple, then the claim could be wrong. If I found a sour apple and the evidence tried to say, "Well sour is a kind of sweet," Or that really all variations of flavor, including bitter and salty were some kind of sweet, then there's an issue.

Second, it must have greater evidence and logic than alternative ideas. If we have two ideas for why rain happens, one being Zeus, the other being the 5 stages of the rain cycle, the second, even if there are still unanswered questions in the 5 stages of the rain cycle, it is a more viable claim than the first.

Finally, not understanding something does not mean we can propose an explanation for it as evidence. If we don't understand something, than the reality is, we don't understand something. History is filled with people doing this, and its always wrong.

A very good question. First, it needs to be something falsifiable. — Philosophim

While falsifiability can definitely be proper of scientific discourse, for good reason even, I think it is seldom at all a good condition of philosophical or mathematical discourse which includes philosophical evidence that is sometimes given in the form of proofs. This is because some of the truths that philosophers and mathematicians deal with genuinely have no falsity conditions, i.e. all tautologies, like a=a or (p∨(q∧r))→((p∨q)∧(p∨r)), simply cannot be falsified but are undoubtedly true.

In a similar manner, contradictions are falsums, and in classical logic or other logics that uphold noncontradiction, if we have a contradictory formula like p∧¬p, then this always returns false whereas its negation ¬(p∧¬p) will be a tautology: i.e. will always return true and cannot be false, thus is unfalsifiable.

How does this relate to materialism or to philosophical discourse in general? Well, a common objection in philosophical argumentation is a self defeat objection. If an opponent of a position finds a contradiction in its doctrine, then if that contradiction is genuine, the doctrine will be always false. And so the negation of the doctrine will be always true with no falsity conditions.

In the context of the materialism/physicalism, the thesis that there exists only the physical, then if an opponent of the doctrine found it to be contradictory and was hypothetically successful, his proof of the negation of physicalism will be unfalsifiable by definition due to the logic outlined earlier. And this trivially entails the existence of at least one non-physical entity granting physicalism as false.

But it seems very unreasonable to dismiss a self defeat objection, which warrants at least one non-physical entity in the context of physicalism/materialism, in virtue of the fact that it's unfalsifiable. In philosophy, your opponents may think that your position is not just wrong, but literally could not be correct, so a well-motivated objection is oft unfalsifiable when successful (i.e. objections to the Christian Trinity as incoherent, if successful, are unfalsifiable, but are still nonetheless sound objections in these instances where they succeed).

For these purposes, I think falsifiability is a terrible criterion in the context of philosophy, but may be more fit for other uses like science or other empirical inquiry, and therefore also urge that you reconsider it.

While falsifiability can definitely be proper of scientific discourse, for good reason even, I think it is seldom at all a good condition of philosophical or mathematical discourse which includes philosophical evidence that is sometimes given in the form of proofs. This is because some of the truths that philosophers and mathematicians deal with genuinely have no falsity conditions, i.e. all tautologies, like a=a or (p∨(q∧r))→((p∨q)∧(p∨r)), simply cannot be falsified but are undoubtedly true. — Kuro

Incorrect.

If A=B, then a=a is false.
If P and it turns out that there is no p, q, or r, then the second statement is false. Logic is clearly falsifiable. Falsifiability does not mean, "It is necessary that it is false." It just means there can exist a condition in which it could potentially be false. An assertion must always allow the potential of its negation.

In a similar manner, contradictions are falsums, and in classical logic or other logics that uphold noncontradiction, if we have a contradictory formula like p∧¬p, then this always returns false whereas its negation ¬(p∧¬p) will be a tautology: i.e. will always return true and cannot be false, thus is unfalsifiable. — Kuro

Similarly, if something IS false, then it of course isn't true. That does not mean they are not falsifiable. For ¬(p∧¬p), the falsifiable condition is if (p∧¬p) existed. Again, the possibility of the condition for it being false, does not mean it IS false. Back to the original example, if there does not exist a single apple in the world that is not sweet, even though I can propose a condition where it could be false (an apple could be bitter), we cannot find that false condition. Therefore it is true that all apples are sweet, its just that it is falsifiable in the fact that there is a potential negation state to consider (an apple could not be sweet).

Well, a common objection in philosophical argumentation is a self defeat objection. If an opponent of a position finds a contradiction in its doctrine, then if that contradiction is genuine, the doctrine will be always false. And so the negation of the doctrine will be always true with no falsity conditions. — Kuro

So to be clear, if someone demonstrates that the negation of an assertion cannot be true, that makes the assertion true, but falsifiable. IE, there is a potential condition in which it could be false, but it if found that condition simply cannot exist.

In the context of the materialism/physicalism, the thesis that there exists only the physical, then if an opponent of the doctrine found it to be contradictory and was hypothetically successful, his proof of the negation of physicalism will be unfalsifiable by definition due to the logic outlined earlier. And this trivially entails the existence of at least one non-physical entity granting physicalism as false. — Kuro

So I think you understand now. Physicalism is falsifiable by stating it could be the case that physicalism is false. For example, I could state, "Everything is all in the mind, there is no physical world." Of course, just because I can propose something that would potentially show it to be false, it does not mean it IS false. As it is clear that everything is not in the mind, and there is a world outside of our thoughts, this claim against physicalism which could show it to be false, is false itself.

For these purposes, I think falsifiability is a terrible criterion in the context of philosophy, but may be more fit for other uses like science or other empirical inquiry, and therefore also urge that you reconsider it. — Kuro

Now that you understand what falsifiability is, do you still have an objection to it?

s it that the focus given to physicalism is due because it is truly central to philosophical discourse, or is it just an accident that occurred by coincidence due to the interests of the forum's userbase? — Kuro

Half the time it seems to be about religion and anti-religion. The other half of the time it seems to be about either taking a side in a venerable if tired game or trying to dissolve that game in a vat of semantic acid (itself an old hoarse).

Even elementary particles need other particles to gain identity. Add to this the bare fact that the internal identity of those basic structures of nature can never be known apart from assimilating them to our own internal reality, and it becomes clear, like a shape in the fog rising above it in the bright blue moonlight, that both the ideal and the material, through interaction, are mutually shape-shifting. — EugeneW

Affirmative. Ten four. And also our words and various well-worn, inherited dichotomies are both semantically interdependent and mobile, a fog of the blob of our blab.

Idealism is the hope for something Transcedental. — dimosthenis9

I think you are correct and that your capitalization is appropriate. Idealism is (often) a continuation of religion through increased abstraction. The visceral stories of yesteryear become esoteric ciphertexts. Instead of demons and angels, one learns to be satisfied with the ghost in the machine and its wonderful qualities.

Materialism on the other hand, is merely based on facts,and that's why has an "advantage" on that fight. — dimosthenis9

The materialist is the guy who doesn't think he will win the lottery just because he bought a ticket. To the materialist, the (religious) idealist is often just rationalizing a hope with which it is easy to empathize but more difficult to share.

A very good question. First, it needs to be something falsifiable. By that, I mean that there needs to be some way of clearly defining what the non-physical is, and testing it. — Philosophim

But the issue there is that the 'criterion of falsifiability' was devised by Karl Popper specifically to differentiate an empirical from a non-empirical claim (I notice @Kuro has made a similar point.)

You're assuming an empiricist position, and then demanding empirical evidence against it! In other words, you assume the sole criterion of truth is the demonstration of an empirical causal relationship. But objections to that may be made on logical, rather than empirical, grounds. (By the way, if you're familiar with the history of philosophy, a very similar issue was the central point about David Hume's criticism of the inductive method, and Kant's 'answer to Hume'. A very difficult topic in philosophy but relevant in this context.)

But anyway, to illustrate my point, consider the argument about the reality of numbers (see What is Math?). The argument is, on the one side, that numbers are real, independently of anyone who is aware of them - which is generally known as mathematical realism or mathematical platonism. It grants mathematical objects reality, albeit of a different order to empirical objects.

A counter argument might be that numbers are the artefacts of human thought and that they're only real in that context. They're effective for our ends, but they don't correspond with anything real beyond that. The reason this side of the argument is generally defended by empiricists, is because empiricists can't admit the reality of purely intelligible objects such as numbers, so they can only conceive of them as operations of thought.

Regardless of which side of the argument you take, the question is, how would you provide empirical proof of either case? I submit that it can't be done, because it's a philosophical, not an empirical, question. And there's a difference.

If we don't understand something, than the reality is, we don't understand something. History is filled with people doing this, and its always wrong. — Philosophim

That's what I mean by 'complacency' - here's a wild generalisation, with the declaration that 'it's always wrong'. That is a quintessentially dogmatic statement. Case in point are the enormous conundums in current physics and cosmology. I'm not going to go into huge detail other than to say that in respect of fundamental physics, there are enormous divergences in the interpretation of what physics means - all the debates between many worlds interpretations, the Copenhagen interpretation, and so on (see The Most Embarrasing Graph in Modern Physics). All of the proponents of those arguments are possessed of the same set of facts, yet there are enormous divergences in what these are said to mean. And none of those have been settled empirically, nor is it easy to see how they will be.

I recommend you read more philosophy of science.

But the issue there is that the 'criterion of falsifiability' was devised by Karl Popper specifically to differentiate an empirical from a non-empirical claim (I notice Kuro has made a similar point.) — Wayfarer

I see, so your definition of what non-physical is, is that it is not empirical. Meaning that there is no evidence of its existence or evidence of experience. I'm having to glean what you mean by non-physical, as no one has provided a definition of what it means so far. Give me claims of something that exists that cannot be experienced. Its falsification is that it can be experienced. If you can provide me an example of something that cannot be experienced, and I am unable to show that it can be experienced, then you've given valid evidence of something non-physical.

You're assuming an empiricist position, and then demanding empirical evidence against it! — Wayfarer

I am not. I am asking you to provide evidence of something that is not empirical. Why is that so hard? To argue against it, I would need to demonstrate that the non-physical existence is indeed empirical. If I could not, then you have something.

But anyway, to illustrate my point, consider the argument about the reality of numbers (see What is Math?). The argument is, on the one side, that numbers are real, independently of anyone who is aware of them - which is generally known as mathematical realism or mathematical platonism. It grants mathematical objects reality, albeit of a different order to empirical objects.

A counter argument might be that numbers are the artefacts of human thought and that they're only real in that context. — Wayfarer

Again, we can falsify both of these positions. If numbers are real independent of people, then what is a number? Does it mean the symbol, "1"? Does it meant the concept of "an" identity versus "multiple identities? Can we demonstrate that numbers exist in a setting devoid of anything conscious but an observer?

The counter argument of course has its own falsification. That being of course that they could exist independently of human thought. I have no take on the matter, its an interesting topic I would need to think on. But first lets address this topic. The point is, I'm not a dogmatist. I'm open to other possibilities, no matter how wild and crazy. But, it needs to be logical. If you're going to claim something exists, please present evidence of its existence, and demonstrate that there is the possibility of its negation. The possibility of its negation does not mean it is negated, it means it is something we can test against to see if it exists.

I have no take on the matter, its an interesting topic I would need to think on. — Philosophim

I suggest you do that before reflexively reeling off an answer.

I have no take on the matter, its an interesting topic I would need to think on.
— Philosophim

I suggest you do that before reflexively reeling off an answer. — Wayfarer

I did not reflexively reel off an answer. And that is not the topic. The topic is I provided what I would need as evidence of something non-physical that produced our consciousness. Now, are you able to do so, or can you not?

"Everything is all in the mind, there is no physical world." Of course, just because I can propose something that would potentially show it to be false, it does not mean it IS false. As it is clear that everything is not in the mind, and there is a world outside of our thoughts, this claim against physicalism which could show it to be false, is false itself. — Philosophim

Not really. Many forms of idealism argue for a universal mind (essentially a primitive instinctive consciousness) which holds object permanence and provides us a shared reality independent of our minds. Humans are dissociated alters of the Great Mind - that kind of thing.

Now, are you able to do so, or can you not? — Philosophim

I did, and it went straight past you.

Not really. Many forms of idealism argue for a universal mind (essentially a primitive instinctive consciousness) which holds object permanence and provides us a shared reality independent of our minds. Humans are dissociated alters of the Great Mind - that kind of thing. — Tom Storm

If it is backed by evidence, then there's something there. If there is no evidence, its just a made up wish. The falsification of the idea, is that there is no universal mind. Since there is no evidence of a universal mind, then it is false.

You're assuming an empiricist position, and then demanding empirical evidence against it! — Wayfarer

After that, nothing further to add.

Since there is no evidence of a universal mind, then it is false. — Philosophim

As @Wayfarer will tell you, there are philosophers and scientists who would say there is no evidence of physicalism. I suspect both world views in the end come down to a kind of faith.

Idealism is (often) a continuation of religion through increased abstraction. — lll

Not that an idealist should be also religious,but that transcedental thirst is common to both of them. You are right about that.
At the end some people can't except that there is nothing more than matter and what our senses tell us. I consider myself one of them.Not sure if there is that "more" indeed though, but i can't give up my lust for it.

Since there is no evidence of a universal mind, then it is false. — Philosophim

I don't think it's that simple. Most scientific evidence is partial or inconclusive or unconvincing. For the sake of argument, let's assume a universal mind that computes the universe continuously at the quantum level, and its product is the universe as it is. What sort of evidence could one have that it is convincingly so or that it is not so? Is philosophical argument ever possible to prove or disprove the assertion?

At the end some people can't except that there is nothing more than matter and what our senses tell us. I consider myself one of them.Not sure if there is that "more" indeed though, but i can't give up my lust for it. — dimosthenis9

I try and these days mostly succeed at finding the sacred in the dear dirty daily details. If we can't have (or deny ourselves the pleasure of having imaginary) 'skyhooks,' we can at least build 'cranes.' Personally I also deny 'matter,' at least when conceived as some sort of ultimate stuff. It's turtles all the way down (and all the way up), or might as well be for creatures like us.

As Wayfarer will tell you, there are philosophers and scientists who would say there is no evidence of physicalism. I suspect both world views in the end come down to a kind of faith. — Tom Storm

Except there is evidence of physicalism. If Wayfarer would provide evidence of some type of non-physicalism, or provide evidence why physicalism is false, then there would be a discussion. Vague references and a lack of evidence will convince no one.

I did, and it went straight past you. — Wayfarer

You're assuming an empiricist position, and then demanding empirical evidence against it!
— Wayfarer

After that, nothing further to add. — Wayfarer

Anyone who is serious in an argument would repeat it if that was the case, concerned that the other person has missed it or misunderstood. I spent a lot of time taking your requests seriously and laying out the groundwork. I replied that I did not expect empirical evidence against it. I told you to give me some evidence that the non-physical exists. Surely if you believe the non-empirical exists, then you can present evidence of it right? You did not return this, and give me evidence. And if you don't want to, that's fine. But don't tell me you did, when you didn't.