Do you find the account I set out in the first three posts of the debate to be a complete one? — creativesoul

To me, they are enough to seriously challenge Banno's account as he presented it so far. But as I said, we can determine our views on beliefs better by clarifying other related notions, like proposition, concept, reference, perception, sentence, etc. That’s why I’m interested now to explore your understanding of the relation between beliefs and concepts.

On my view, all concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not all beliefs are. All concepts are existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

On what grounds do you believe that all concepts are linguistic constructs? What are the features you ascribe to concepts that essentially require language?

What kind if attitudes?
— Harry Hindu

The attitude that the proposition is true. That's been on the boards since day one.

True, not certain. — Banno

What is the difference between knowledge and belief?

What is the difference between, "the attitude that some proposition is true", and "certain that some proposition is true"?

What is certainty if not the attitude that some proposition is true?

I think I've mentioned this before. That's as good as it gets for truth. "how one determines some proposition is true" depends on the proposition; something else I've said many times. It's absurd to suppose that there could be one way to determine if a proposition is true.

You seem to have changed topics. — Banno

True is a type of proposition, as opposed to false propositions. Certain would be a type of attitude of some proposition.

Is it also possible to have an attitude that some proposition is false that is also a belief?

It's not changing topics. It's integrating what you are saying with the rest of what we know.

Banno is excellent at engaging others
— creativesoul
My attitude toward this proposition: :rofl:
— Harry Hindu

And yet here you are. — Banno

Proposition 1: Banno is excellent at engaging others
Proposition 2: Banno is not excellent at engaging others
Proposition 3: And yet you are here.

If propositions are true depending on the proposition, then what use is your proposition (#3) in determining the truth of creativesoul's proposition (#1) and my proposition (#2)?

It seems to me that you are implying that P1 is true depending on if P3 true. If a proposition can only be true depending on some other proposition, then we get an infinite regress of needing an infinite amount of propositions for just one to be true.

If propositions are true depending only on the proposition itself, then P3 has no bearing on P1 or P2 being true, which means that your response is an example of us talking past each other. It would also mean that P1 and P2 have no implications on the other being true (which would mean that the LNC is false).

To resolve the infinite regress and abide by the LNC, we must theorize that propositions are true depending on some state-of-affairs that isn't just another proposition, or that propositions refer to some state-of-affairs that is not another proposition.

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief.
— creativesoul

Again?

So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diprotodon? — Banno

Propositions are composed of the structured sensations of visual scribbles and sounds, or touch (braille). Humans first started with using sounds to create propositions, then visual scribbles, and eventually braille for the blind. Since different sensations can be co-opted to create propositions with, why can't any animal that has sensations form propositions, like this smell means that wolves are in the area and that sound means that they are to my left, which also means I should run to my right? The only difference would be the degree of complexity with which some proposition could be made and the state-of-affairs that it can refer to.

Does it matter what form some proposition takes (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc.) as long as the sensation means (refers to, or has a causal relation with) something that isn't another sensation?

What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"? — Banno

The question makes no sense on my view. — creativesoul

I disagree. The referent of the word "belief" is a cognitive intentional state/event (depending on the dispositional or actual meaning we attribute to the word "belief").

Beliefs are complex things composed of other things. They are a result of cognitive processes. All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things. — creativesoul

My impression is that here you are confusing the content of the belief, with the belief. I think your formulation would sound better if you stated "All belief consists of drawing correlations" instead of "All belief consists of correlations drawn". Yet I wouldn't find it satisfactory: we draw correlations even when we imagine or associate ideas, but imagination is not belief. Besides what is "correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things" supposed to mean when one believes that 3 + 2 = 5 or God is omniscient?

On my view, all concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not all beliefs are. All concepts are existentially dependent upon language.
— creativesoul

On what grounds do you believe that all concepts are linguistic constructs? What are the features you ascribe to concepts that essentially require language? — neomac

Short on time.

Name some things that you count as a concept, and it will help this along better. As before, I do not use the notion, finding different ways of talking to be more practical.

The concept of belief and belief...

Do you draw a distinction?

Dennet has at least one intuition pump that does much the same thing in "Quining Qualia", except he's arguing against the notion of private sensations or some such and using something like the private language argument to make the point of how socially constructed the notions actually are.

I highly recommend reading that to anyone who has not. — creativesoul

I love that article. I think Dennett does a great job of demolishing g Strawson’s argument for panpsychism. I just wish he had gone a little further in Rorty’s
direction.

What is the difference between knowledge and belief? — Harry Hindu

roughly:

• Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P
• Belief is a relation between an actor and a statement, such that the actor takes the statement to be true.
• Knowledge might variously be understood as a justified true belief or a capacity to perform some action.

Is it also possible to have an attitude that some proposition is false that is also a belief? — Harry Hindu

Yep. Believing that P is false is just believing ~P.

It seems to me that you are implying that P1 is true depending on if P3 true — Harry Hindu

Your use of "dependent" is misleading. Implication is not dependency. Support for Creative's contention that Banno is good an engaging others is found in the fact that you continue to be engaged.

Propositions are composed of the structured sensations of visual scribbles and sounds, or touch (braille). — Harry Hindu

No, they re not They are composed of predicates and subjects.

What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"? — Banno

The question makes no sense on my view.
— creativesoul

I disagree. The referent of the word "belief" is a cognitive intentional state/event (depending on the dispositional or actual meaning we attribute to the word "belief"). — neomac

Note he asked the referent of the belief, not the word "belief". Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do.

My impression is that here you are confusing the content of the belief, with the belief. I think your formulation would sound better if you stated "All belief consists of drawing correlations" instead of "All belief consists of correlations drawn". Yet I wouldn't find it satisfactory: we draw correlations even when we imagine or associate ideas, but imagination is not belief. — neomac

The content of a belief amounts to what a belief consists of. The content of the belief that a mouse is behind a tree is the mouse, the tree, the spatiotemporal relationship between the two, and the correlations drawn between all these by the creature capable of doing so.

Indeed, we do draw correlations when imagining, remembering, creating, envisioning, dreaming, etc. I fail to see how that presents any issue for the position I'm putting forth here. I mean, I've not claimed that all correlations are belief, nor would I.

Besides what is "correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things" supposed to mean when one believes that 3 + 2 = 5 or God is omniscient? — neomac

Are those meaningful marks imperceptible? When one believes that 3 + 2 = 5, they've done nothing more than accept the rules of arithmetic. It may be worth noting here that numbers are nothing more than the names of quantities. When one believes that God is omniscient, they've done nothing more than learn to use language to talk about the supernatural beliefs of the community, and believe that what they are saying is true. Believing that God is omniscient is to believe that there is a God, such that God exists, and that God knows everything.

Yes. Indeed! That article was very impressive to me as well! I'm not a physicalist either, strictly speaking.

You may find it interesting to search the site by typing the title into the search bar. Banno created a great thread about it. Good stuff in there, between the typical yahoos.

creativesoul must think something like this, to explain why he is perplexed that a cat might have a belief while not being able to use language. For him, if a belief is an attitude towards a proposition, there must be propositions in minds, and so language. — Banno

No, that's not it at all. My problem with that notion of belief is well known. How to square that with the idea that language less animals are capable of belief. Hence, the need to posit the notion of a language less proposition.

If all belief is an attitude towards a proposition, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language use, then language less animals have no belief. That's the argument. The conclusion follows from the premisses. You have argued for both premisses. You cannot admit the conclusion, because you know better. I'm offering a way to make amends.

Nothing to do with Dennett's "Quining Qualia"

:wink:

I was just perusing that thread yesterday.

Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic. — javra

If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to
refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense. — Joshs

While acknowledging other’s rather complex interpretations of Wittgenstein, here’s what the guy actually said in his own words:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293 by L. Wittgenstein

Note that the most primordial beetle of all beetles, so to speak, is conscious awareness itself. The question is asked, “Does conscious awareness occur in myself, in humans at large, in other lifeforms?” To which Witt replies, “It would be a beetle in a box, so who knows and who cares? It’s irrelevant.”

As always before, I, personally, am not satisfied by Wittgenstein's answer to this and like issues. This when reading Witt verbatim. Felt like mentioning that.

Note he asked the referent of the belief, not the word "belief". Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do. — creativesoul

It wasn’t clear to me since "the cat believes the bowl is empty” could be taken as mentioning a sentence not as using it to describe whatever is supposed to be the case. However your reply is misleading as well in this respect, because I would grant that the question doesn’t make sense if the question presupposes a categorisation of belief as a word with some referent instead of an intentional state. And this would be a categorial mistake: beliefs are not words (but is there anybody here who would believe otherwise? If not, then what's the interest in asking this question wrt to the topic under discussion?). Yet as long as beliefs are taken to be representational, then for me “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to” (so the referent of a belief) are interchangeable expressions. Is it not the case for you? If it is case for you too, then your previous claim was wrong, indeed it does make sense to ask what the reference of a belief is and the plausible answer would be a description of whatever a specific belief is concretely about. On the other side if you disagree, how else do you understand the different meaning of “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to”?

Indeed, we do draw correlations when imagining, remembering, creating, envisioning, dreaming, etc. I fail to see how that presents any issue for the position I'm putting forth here. I mean, I've not claimed that all correlations are belief, nor would I. — creativesoul

Let’s focus. You wrote: “All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”. First of all, to me beliefs do not consist of correlations drawn, but at best of drawing correlations. The second point is that I’m not satisfied with the latter formulation either, not because it's utterly wrong but because at best it provides a necessary condition, it certainly is not necessary and sufficient for belief ascription.
Another potential source of contention could come also from clarifying what kind of ability the expression “drawing correlations” is supposed to mean. But pls let’s ignore this last point for now.
I'm just fine if you agree on the first 2 points I made.

Are those meaningful marks imperceptible? When one believes that 3 + 2 = 5, they've done nothing more than accept the rules of arithmetic. It may be worth noting here that numbers are nothing more than the names of quantities. When one believes that God is omniscient, they've done nothing more than learn to use language to talk about the supernatural beliefs of the community, and believe that what they are saying is true. Believing that God is omniscient is to believe that there is a God, such that God exists, and that God knows everything. — creativesoul

It seems to me here you are confusing the perceptual nature of our representations with what they are about. The belief that God is omniscient or that 3 + 2 = 5 [1] are about something that doesn’t look to be perceptible in nature even if those beliefs can be rendered through perceptible statements. So the correlation of meaningful perceptible marks doesn’t imply that what it represents is a correlation between perceptible things. Unless you can clarify how.


[1] I'm not sure that arithmetic beliefs are best understood as beliefs about something to be the case. But for now I pretend to be they are.

Name some things that you count as a concept, and it will help this along better. — creativesoul

I take the word “concept” as referring to some cognitive abilities presupposed by belief ascription. For now all I’m inclined to add is that concepts essentially involve classificatory intentional abilities (i.e. they can not be reduced to causal explanations) of some kind. What kind? I do not have a clear and straightforward answer to that, I’m still thinking about it. However I leave it open the question if concepts require linguistic abilities (surely linguistic concepts do). Yet I’m inclined to think this is not the case: i.e. what I would take to be conceptual consists in what classificatory features linguistic and non-linguistic concepts share. Related to this, I think there can be non-propositional beliefs, while there can not be non-conceptual beliefs.
To not get lost in uninteresting terminological controversies, I would like to stress that the substantial issue is if, what and how classificatory intentional abilities “guide” behavior and make it intelligible in linguistic and non-linguistic creatures.

I do not use the notion, finding different ways of talking to be more practical. — creativesoul

What other ways did you find? Could you provide examples?

The concept of belief and belief...

Do you draw a distinction? — creativesoul

I do. Who doesn’t?

Propositions are composed of the structured sensations of visual scribbles and sounds, or touch (braille).
— Harry Hindu

No, they re not They are composed of predicates and subjects. — Banno

Which are composed of scribbles and sounds.

Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do. — creativesoul

Yet names are part of the belief. If your beliefs don't refer to anything in the world, then your beliefs aren't useful to anyone else. A false belief and a belief without a reference are one and the same. There is a difference between some proposition being understandable and being useful. We can put words together in such a way that follows the rules of some language, but if it doesn't agree with the facts, or state what is the case, then it is useless. Take for instance, "Joe Biden is the first president of the United States." The proposition follows the rules of English, but doesn't agree with the facts. So in what way is the proposition useful?

Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P — Banno

Right, so "P" is the proposition, and P is what the proposition points to. If what "P" points to is not the case, then "P" is false. If P is the case, then "P" is true.

If you're saying "P" and P are the same thing, as in both are propositions, then you would be begging the question.

It seems to me that in saying "P" if P is somehow projecting the very words we are using out into the world, as if names exist independent of minds. The names are mental things that refer to things that are not names, and not mental.

Belief is a relation between an actor and a statement, such that the actor takes the statement to be true.
Knowledge might variously be understood as a justified true belief or a capacity to perform some action. — Banno

Then both beliefs and knowledge can be acted on. The only difference is that knowledge is justified. But then what attitude does one have of some proposition that is true if not justification, which leads to certainty given more justification (successful uses)? Seems to me that one needs a reason to believe in anything. The amount of reasons is what is the difference between beliefs and knowledge.

A justification would be a stored memory of some past event which warrants the belief. The memory of the past event coupled with the belief in causation - that similar causes lead to similar effects - is what makes a belief a belief. Beliefs would be useless if causation wasn't the case. There would be no beliefs without causation.

Joe looks at a broken clock which indicates the time is 3 o'clock.

Joe believes that the time is 3 o'clock, because he believes that a broken clock was working. Joe does not know that the clock is broken, so he does not believe the statement/proposition "a broken clock is working" is true. The content of the belief includes a broken clock, but Joe's belief is not about broken clocks.

The question is asked, “Does conscious awareness occur in myself, in humans at large, in other lifeforms?” To which Witt replies, “It would be a beetle in a box, so who knows and who cares? It’s irrelevant.”

As always before, I, personally, am not satisfied by Wittgenstein's answer to this and like issues — javra

Phenomenologists like Husserl doesn’t think such questions are irrelevant , but his method of answering of them I think has much in common with Wittgenstein’s. That is, consciousness would not be an object but a relational, synthetic activity organized by pragmatic use.

Phenomenologists like Husserl doesn’t think such questions are irrelevant , but his method of answering of them I think has much in common with Wittgenstein’s. That is, consciousness would not be an object but a relational, synthetic activity organized by pragmatic use. — Joshs

Yes to Husserl and cohort not finding such questions irrelevant.

In this context, “object” can have numerous equivocations. One’s own consciousness can be deemed an object of one’s own awareness (not to be confused with “object” in the sense of a physical entity), for it can be that of which one is aware of; i.e., that which one’s awareness is about. Yet, in so being the object of one’s awareness, it likewise need not be deemed to ontically be an object (here, “object” in the sense of an existent entity) - but, this object of one’s awareness (what one’s awareness is about) can well be appraised to be a process: a be-ing. If it needs saying, I of course reject the notion that consciousness is an entity rather than a process. Either way, however, it remains a beetle in a box in terms of Witt’s philosophy.

Edit: In case one is unfamiliar with the terminology, please check out definition #2 in the APA dictionary for "object of consciousness". Namely: "2. anything of which the mind is conscious, including perceptions, mental images, emotions, and so forth, as well as the observing ego, or “I,” of subjective experience. Compare subject of consciousness."

Note that the most primordial beetle of all beetles, so to speak, is conscious awareness itself. The question is asked, “Does conscious awareness occur in myself, in humans at large, in other lifeforms?” To which Witt replies, “It would be a beetle in a box, so who knows and who cares? It’s irrelevant.” — javra

The point of the Beetle box analogy was only to dispel the idea that there could be a meaningful inter-subjective notion of sensations in the form of Fregean referents. Yet recall that Witt likened the sense of the word "pain" to a picture of a boiling pot containing real boiling water - in other words, one understands so-called "other people's" pains directly; partly through observing a person's behaviour and partly by drawing upon one's own experiences of pains. Therefore the concept of objective sensation referents is redundant in that it isn't needed for understanding or justifying the existence of so-called 'other minds' (the word 'other' being responsible for most of the grammatical confusion).

I've embarked on Wittgenstein discussions before. While what you say makes sense, it to me runs counter to Wittgenstein's own words which I'll re-post, boldface mine:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293 by L. Wittgenstein

... not redundant, but irrelevant. To generalize from the one case of one's own being to other people is to be irresponsible. And so forth.

he believes that a broken clock was working — creativesoul

That doesn’t sound a correct report of Jack’s belief. Indeed it would make Jack’s belief contradictory. A better report would be: Jack believes that clock is working. But that belief is false.
Anyway what you mean is that the difference between “content of belief” and “what belief is about” is related to the distinction between how things are and how things appear to Jack?
If so, before commenting on this further, I would like to know how your distinction works when Jack, in a dream, believes that he’s talking about his dog (which he really never had) with a kid (which he never met or saw in his real life) in a place (which doesn’t resemble any places he remembers to have seen so far). In this case, what is the content of the belief?

If it needs saying, I of course reject the notion that consciousness is an entity rather than a process. Either way, however, it remains a beetle in a box in terms of Witt’s philosophy. — javra

Anthony Nickles grappled with the question of whether for Wittgenstein there is relevant sense in private experience. I believe he concluded that it not the case that everything must be thrown out except what is communicated between people. Rather, when talking to ourselves we cannot expect the sort of language that was designed to be shared with others to be meaningful in private reflection, at least not in the same way. But that does not preclude a different form of usefulness.

The names are mental things that refer to things that are not names, and not mental. — Harry Hindu

Almost. Names are social. They work because of their use amongst a group of people, not one. Describing them as mental cannot work because it misses the collective use.

If you're saying "P" and P are the same thing, as in both are propositions... — Harry Hindu

"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with.

Which are composed of scribbles and sounds. — Harry Hindu

Might have to leave it there. After all, your posts are no more than scribbles.

Phenomenologists like Husserl doesn’t think such questions are irrelevant — Joshs

Wittgenstein did not think such questions unimportant. Indeed, for him they had the utmost import.

He was simply honest, acknowledging that they are unanswerable.

Hence the problem with phenomenology is the vain attempt to answer unanswerable questions. But that's a different discussion.

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? — creativesoul

Banno isn't saying a languageless creature can have an attitude toward a proposition. He's saying that the languageless beliefs of languageless creatures can be put into the form of a propositional attitude.

Non-controversial.

If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object? — Banno

Lots of confusion followed from the above simple misunderstanding, including a Skinnerian-sounding analysis of a languageless creature's belief strictly in terms of its behavior, to the expense of the social aspect (mentalism, Skinner would say, and frown) of our access to the beliefs languageless creatures.

My contention is that the content of beliefs are propositional. — Banno

Here you say something broader. Easily interpreted to mean languageless creatures (who have no clue what a proposition is) are unable to hold beliefs.

Is your position: The contents of belief are propositional?

Or: "Belief" applies only to those things that can be put into a propositional attitude?

If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object? — Banno

Two different things and another source of the confusion and "disagreement" here.

he believes that a broken clock was working
— creativesoul

That doesn’t sound a correct report of Jack’s belief. Indeed it would make Jack’s belief contradictory. A better report would be: Jack believes that clock is working. But that belief is false. — neomac

Evidently, we've very different standards regarding what counts as a "better report" of Jack's belief.

This is a matter of great contention between our views. It seems clear to me that Jack can and does believe both, without any issue at all.

Jack looked at a broken clock because he wanted to know the time. He carefully noted the time indicated on the face of the clock by looking at the clock's hands; i.e., by already knowing how to read a clock. The clock on the wall indicated 3 o'clock. Jack - in that very moment - believed that it was three o'clock because he believed that that particular clock was working. That particular clock was broken.

Anyway what you mean...

I mean what I write. Let's focus there.

The content of Jack's belief included that particular broken clock, despite the fact that it was about what time it was. Jack's belief was not about broken clocks, it included them.

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs?
— creativesoul

Banno isn't saying a languageless creature can have an attitude toward a proposition. He's saying that the languageless beliefs of languageless creatures can be put in the form of a propositional attitude.

Non-controversial.

If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object?
— Banno — ZzzoneiroCosm

Is it non-controversial though? At first blush, it may seem innocuous enough, but when placed under scrutiny, it reveals itself to be inherently incapable of taking proper account of language less belief. If all belief is an attitude towards some proposition or another then all language less creatures' beliefs are attitudes towards some proposition.

That's patently absurd on it's face.