For me, metaphysics is the set of rules. — T Clark

Will you give me some examples of those Metaphysical rules?

I was never really interested in discussing "metaphysics" or metaphysics as such. I want to talk about, and use, Collingwood's metaphysical way of seeing things in my everyday and intellectual life. — T Clark

I was not familiar with Collingwood, so I googled and scanned the Stanford biography. I didn't see anything specifically about a list of rules. And in general, his approach seemed to be more theoretical & academic abstractions than pragmatic & everyday applications. He seems to be mostly concerned with classifications & distinctions. One distinction mentioned in the article was between Realism and Idealism, and it said "Collingwood is often referred to as a British idealist". I didn't see anything that would distinguish his definition of "Metaphysics" from any other philosophical topic. Can you summarize his "metaphysical way of seeing things"? Is it a spiritual worldview? :smile:

Is your claim that it is metaphysics all the way down itself a metaphysical or ontological, or a merely epistemological one? — Janus

Metaphysical.

I'm not sure if you're being serious, — Janus

Although I think it's funny, I am completely serious.

my retort would be that there is no fact of the matter regarding what we should call the study of the history of metaphysics, which is what Collingwood refers to as just 'metaphysics'. — Janus

Generally I agree, although I don't understand the distinction you are making by calling it the history of metaphysics.

There is, distinct from this historical study of metaphysics, the possibility of practicing metaphysical thinking which has no truck with any traditional metaphysics. — Janus

I'm not sure what you are suggesting. Please expand.

Will you give me some examples of those Metaphysical rules? — Gnomon

Here are some:

• There is an objective reality independent of human thought.
• Alternatively, existence is inseparable from human interaction.
• Physical laws that apply now have always applied and will always apply everywhere.
• There is no absolute point of view or scale.
• The universe has a living essence, a personality, which some people call God.

Here are some that I think may be metaphysical, but I'm not sure:

• We will use English as the language of this forum.
• We will use base 10 mathematics
• We will behave in a civil manner during discussions.
• We will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

This is fun, although I'm not really satisfied that my examples capture the flavor I'm looking for.

I feel very at home with Collingwood. — T Clark

Who goes by a rather precise (but perhaps restrictive) definition of metaphysics as the study of absolute presuppositions of knowledge.

This definition has a number of consequences, among which:

1. Metaphysical statements are not themselves provable. Instead, they make other statements meaningful and potentially provable. IOW they are the equivalent of axioms in mathematics. They found, frame and allow a certain form of discourse.

2. We all go with certain basic presuppositions, ergo we all sport some metaphysics or another, consciously or not, even those of us professing otherwise, whom Collingwood humorously calls the "anti-metaphysicians".

3. There is metaphysics at the heart (or rather seed) of physics and any other other science, since all sciences are built on certain absolute presuppositions.

4. The directions taken by our truth-seeking efforts (our observations of the world around us, in particular) are framed by and interpreted within our metaphysics. Therefore one rarely changes one's metaphysics, not based on empirical observation anyway.

5. People are 'ticklish' about their metaphysics. They can get angry if you challenge their absolute presuppositions (even so-called anti-metaphysicians). It is a natural reaction, as these absolute presuppositions underwrite their (our) whole world view. Hence perhaps the irksome tone of some metaphysical discussions.

6. Metaphysics as defined by Collingwood is a historical science in that absolute presuppositions are both a product and an engine of history: they are born at a certain time in a certain place, their popularity ebbs and flows, they are a bit like mental viruses. And since they can shape discourse, they can shape politics. Metaphysical ideas can have a political impact.

There is an objective reality independent of human thought. — T Clark

Objectivity is over-rated. What is seen as objective is highly dependent on many contingent factors, and whatever is ascertained to be real is obviously a matter of judgement, which is a rational process. Being able to criticize this attitude is where metaphysics begins. (This article keeps popping up in my news feed.)

The next quotations are indirect, by medium T.Clark, from Collingswood.

There is an objective reality independent of human thought. — T Clark

True. But different human thoughts can refer to different objective realities, a concept that's hard to grasp for western thought somehow.

Alternatively, existence is inseparable from human interaction. — T Clark

Obviously.

Physical laws that apply now have always applied and will always apply everywhere. — T Clark

Not true. General relativity didn't apply in Newton's time, and doesn't apply everywhere nowadays. Likewise for Newtonian mechanics. Statistical thermodynamics only applies in a specific range of experiments, same for the classical approach. Sometimes they overlap. Old-fashion hadron physics doesn't involve quarks. These were constructed within the quark model (you might say that they were always there, but that's in retrospect only). Etcetera.

There is no absolute point of view or scale. — T Clark

There is. Dependent on which theory one prefers.

The universe has a living essence, a personality, which some people call God. — T Clark

That's highly questionable and not really a metaphysical rule, except that it talks about stuff beyond the physical stuff. But there is no talk about that stuff. No metareligious chat. Metaphysics talks about physical stuff.

I'm not sure if you think this yourself, but you like the book it's written in. It looks as if you stated the stuff above yourself, but I'm aware you didn't.

There is an objective reality independent of human thought.
— T Clark

Objectivity is over-rated. What is seen as objective is highly dependent on many contingent factors, and whatever is ascertained to be real is obviously a matter of judgement, which is a rational process. Being able to criticize this attitude is where metaphysics begins. — Wayfarer

I was using the statement as an example of a metaphysical statement, not necessarily one I endorse.

It's likely that there's no non physical realm that can have any effect on the physical realm simply because it's not able to perform physically; so, I suggest that all that goes on is purely physical.

It's a fundamental and usually un-stated premise and one that is tough to critique.

The universe has a living essence, a personality, which some people call God. — T Clark

Reality itself has a fundamentally subjective aspect, which is intrinsic, but is never knowable by objective means. It's not a 'that', so doesn't exist in an objective sense, but is real as the self. But as we tend to be exclusively oriented with respect to the objective domain, then this realisation must always elude us. This understanding is much more in keeping with non-dualist philosophies than with the theistic tradition, although I've learned that it's nearly always interpreted through the lens of theism, because that is the only way we've been taught to think about it.

It's likely that there's no non physical realm that can have any effect on the physical realm simply because it's not able to perform physically; so, I suggest that all that goes on is purely physical. — PoeticUniverse

Maybe by means of hidden variables gods can communicate, though I prefer to be left alone!

Reality itself has a fundamentally subjective aspect, which is intrinsic, but is never knowable by objective means — Wayfarer

You mean stuff that resides inside matter? So that we indeed are what we eat?

Generally I agree, although I don't understand the distinction you are making by calling it the history of metaphysics. — T Clark

Originally I responded to this:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or groups of persons, on this or that occasion or groups of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking. — T Clark

Attempting to find out "what absolute presuppositions have been made..." just is the study of the history of metaphysics. Making absolute presuppositions yourself is doing metaphysics (making metaphysical claims or adopting a metaphysical standpoint); so you have a distinction between studying the history of (other people doing) metaphysics and actually doing metaphysics..

Let's not forget that Collingwood was an historian.

So this, for example

Reality itself has a fundamentally subjective aspect, which is intrinsic, but is never knowable by objective means. — Wayfarer

is not studying the history of metaphysics, but rather making a particular metaphysical claim, selected from among many other possible metaphysical views on account of personal preference.

You mean stuff that resides inside matter? So that we indeed are what we eat? — Verdi

NOT STUFF. Not an object, not a thing.

NOT STUFF — Wayfarer

All right then: the non materialistic kind of stuff residing inside matter. Can't that be stuff? To be known only from the inside? And thus not knowable from the outside by examining just the matter aspect?

No, it's not, and the fact that you can only think of it in terms of an object, thing or substance is the problem in a nutshell. That's what I mean by being oriented towards the objective domain. Thought itself is built around a presumed structure of experience comprising objects and subjects. The task of metaphysics is to deconstruct that automatic activity through being aware of it.

NOT STUFF. Not an object, not a thing. — Wayfarer

It would be an event of a process.

No, it's not, and the fact that you can only think of it in terms of an object, thing or substance is the problem in a nutshell — Wayfarer

I might think about it as an object but don't feel it like an object. It's that what's inside the object, like a pain in my toe.

I don't want to hijack Clark's thread. Suffice to say the observation about the subjective nature of reality is grounded in long-term study and meditation. I'll leave it at that for now.

Sure, but that isn't accounting for the fact that others who have also studied and meditated long-term may disagree with you.

I feel very at home with Collingwood.
— T Clark

Who goes by a rather precise (but perhaps restrictive) definition of metaphysics as the study of absolute presuppositions of knowledge. — Olivier5

As I've noted several times in this thread, the problem with the word "metaphysics" is that it is not restrictive enough. It means different things to just about everyone to the point that it has become almost meaningless. As I've also noted, I don't really want to talk about metaphysics, I want to talk about metaphysics as envisioned by Collingwood. Using his understanding doesn't limit me, it gives me exactly the words I need to talk about my understanding of how human understanding of reality works.

Metaphysical statements are not themselves provable. — Olivier5

Collingwood is explicit about this. Metaphysical statements have no truth value.

2. We all go with certain basic presuppositions, ergo we all sport some metaphysics or another, consciously or not, even those of us professing otherwise, whom Collingwood humorously calls the "anti-metaphysicians". — Olivier5

Yes. Keeping in mind that the difference between relative presuppositions and absolute presuppositions is central to Collingwood's way of seeing things. Anti-metaphysics is just another kind of metaphysics.

3. There is metaphysics at the heart (or rather seed) of physics and any other other science, since all sciences are built on certain absolute presuppositions. — Olivier5

That's the reason we care about metaphysics at all.

The directions taken by our truth-seeking efforts (our observations of the world around us, in particular) are framed by and interpreted within our metaphysics. Therefore one rarely changes one's metaphysics, not based on empirical observation anyway. — Olivier5

I think people change their metaphysics all the time. You can be running two metaphysics programs at the same time if you're dealing with two situations simultaneously e.g. talking philosophy at the dinner table. I'm not sure Collingwood would agree with this.

People are 'ticklish' about their metaphysics. They can get angry if you challenge their absolute presuppositions (even so-called anti-metaphysicians). It is a natural reaction, as these absolute presuppositions underwrite their (our) whole world view. Hence perhaps the irksome tone of some metaphysical discussions. — Olivier5

That's true, but it's about psychology, not philosophy.

From my experience here on the forum, I think the irksome tone in metaphysics discussions comes from two places 1) The confusion and frustration related to different meanings attached to the ideas and 2) The fundamentally irksome natures of many of us here.

Metaphysics as defined by Collingwood is a historical science in that absolute presuppositions are both a product and an engine of history: they are born at a certain time in a certain place, their popularity ebbs and flows, they are a bit like mental viruses. And since they can shape discourse, they can shape politics. Metaphysical ideas can have a political impact. — Olivier5

I agree with this.

True. But different human thoughts can refer to different objective realities, a concept that's hard to grasp for western thought somehow. — Verdi

As I told Wayfarer, I gave this as an example of a metaphysical statement, not necessarily as one I endorse.

Obviously. — Verdi

Again, this was an example I provided, not a position I necessarily support.

Not true. — Verdi

Again, it's an example. I don't think you're paying attention. I was responding to a specific request to provide examples.

There is no absolute point of view or scale.
— T Clark

There is. Dependent on which theory one prefers. — Verdi

An example.

That's highly questionable and not really a metaphysical rule, — Verdi

Again, it's intended as an example. I disagree that it isn't a metaphysical statement.

Reality itself has a fundamentally subjective aspect, which is intrinsic, but is never knowable by objective means. — Wayfarer

I think you know this is a position I am attracted to. It's something I use all the time. In this particular situation, I was using it as an example.

Attempting to find out "what absolute presuppositions have been made..." just is the study of the history of metaphysics. Making absolute presuppositions yourself is doing metaphysics (making metaphysical claims or adopting a metaphysical standpoint); so you have a distinction between studying the history of (other people doing) metaphysics and actually doing metaphysics.. — Janus

Ok, although I'm not sure the distinction is an important one. To be clear, those are Collingwood's words. I do agree with them.

is not studying the history of metaphysics, but rather making a particular metaphysical claim, selected from among many other possible metaphysical views on account of personal preference. — Janus

Again, the distinction doesn't seem all that significant to me.

I don't want to hijack Clark's thread. Suffice to say the observation about the subjective nature of reality is grounded in long-term study and meditation. I'll leave it at that for now. — Wayfarer

This has been a really interesting and helpful discussion for me. I've gotten what I need out of it and I'm happy to see it go wherever anyone wants to take it going forward. I appreciate your restraint, but I'm all set.

I have read An Essay on Metaphysics and I knew they were Collingwood's words. When you say that the distinction between studying the history of metaphysical ideas and adopting a metaphysical standpoint is not significant are you suggesting it is "a distinction without a difference"?

If so, I would ask you whether you cannot see that you could do one without the other, and that one necessarily involves some commitment to a view or views and the other doesn't, and that the difference between human activities which involve commitment to views and those which don't, is arguably of the greatest significance.

That's all I have to add at the moment. I haven't read much into Collingwood's opus, but on the basis of what I have read, I like him a lot better than many of his peers and successors. But I've got a heap of self-assigned reading of other authors so will stick with those for now.

I think people change their metaphysics all the time. You can be running two metaphysics programs at the same time if you're dealing with two situations simultaneously e.g. talking philosophy at the dinner table. — T Clark

Not so simple. People can't really believe in, say, one unique god in the morning and believe in no god or many gods in the afternoon. Or rather, they can but they rarely admit to it and feel unsatisfied about it.

That's true, but it's about psychology, not philosophy. — T Clark

Nope. The ticklishess Collingwood talks about comes from the fundamental nature of metaphysical statements. It's a healthy reaction to try and defend one's metaphysics, according to him.

Not so simple. People can't really believe in, say, one unique god in the morning and believe in no god or many gods in the afternoon. — Olivier5

First - I have trouble including existence of a personal God in metaphysics. The statement "God exists" is, assumedly, a true or false question. Metaphysical statements are not true or false. I wonder what Collingwood would say.

Second - I didn't say someone would reject a metaphysical position often. Different metaphysical systems are useful for different purposes. A Taoist scientist might experience the Tao during meditative practice, but then have no problem dealing with the world as an objective reality at work.

I have trouble including existence of a personal God in metaphysics. — T Clark

It's a classic metaphysical question, though. Collingwood goes as far as advising to use religious language to frame absolute presuppositions, as an indicator of whether we are truly at the right foundational level. E.g. "God is a mathematician" is his way of phrasing the absolute presupposition that quantitative differences are all there really is 'out there', i.e. that qualitative differences are not fundamental but rather the expression of mere quantitative differences. He sees this presupposition as being at the heart of the scientific revolution.

A Taoist scientist might experience the Tao during meditative practice, but then have no problem dealing with the world as an objective reality at work. — T Clark

Indeed, and a Christian or Jewish scientist may believe in miracles, yet have no problem excluding them as a possible explanation of her scientific experiences. But we are talking here of methodological choices, of people saying "for the sake of the argument, let us pretend that X is true even though I don't actually believe it true."

It's a classic metaphysical question, though. Collingwood goes as far as advising to use religious language to frame absolute presuppositions, as an indicator of whether we are truly at the right foundational level. E.g. "God is a mathematician" is his way of phrasing the absolute presupposition that quantitative differences are all there really is 'out there', i.e. that qualitative differences are not fundamental but rather the expression of mere quantitative differences. He sees this presupposition as being at the heart of the scientific revolution. — Olivier5

You say it's a fundamental metaphysical question, then go on to show how it's not. What you describe is the use of God as a metaphor for "he absolute presupposition that quantitative differences are all there really is 'out there', i.e. that qualitative differences are not fundamental but rather the expression of mere quantitative differences." Albert Einstein, an atheist, said that God does not play dice. Although I am not a theist, one of the texts that means the most to me this the American Declaration of Independence "All men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator...

But we are talking here of methodological choices, of people saying "for the sake of the argument, let us pretend that X is true even though I don't actually believe it true." — Olivier5

The basic methodological choices are metaphysics.

Using different metaphysics for different applications is not "pretending for the sake of argument." It is making a choice, whether or not one is aware of it. Back to Collingwood's definition:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or groups of persons, on this or that occasion or groups of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

It says "on this or that occasion in the course of this or that piece of thinking." Metaphysics is time and use dependent. There's no reason someone can't use one metaphysical approach in the morning and another in the afternoon, depending on usefulness for a particular application. I have quite a few floating around in my mind right now. Now, I'm following (more or less) the rules of reason. Later I might want to follow the rules of intuition or poetry. One of the greatest strengths of human intelligence is the ability to hold two seemingly conflicting ideas in our minds at once and yet keep on thinking. Light is both a particle and a wave - far out man.