Explain to me how. — T Clark

For one thing, Schopenhauer's argument for morals cites suffering as a condition of humanity. I'd say, he is using a fact that there is suffering. (Those who would argue against suffering as a fact of life need only to look at illness, death, and disappearance statistics (all facts).

Not a problem.

For one thing, Schopenhauer's argument for morals cites suffering as a condition of humanity. I'd say, he is using a fact that there is suffering. — Caldwell

There's a valid example. Now explain how it is relevant to my claim. As I've noted, I never claimed that ethics and morals didn't involve facts, only that ethical and moral statements, positions, are not facts. Those are completely different things. Let's lay this out:

Agreed - human life involves suffering. It's even one of the fundamental facts of Buddhism. Where does that lead? Does it follow that humans have a responsibility to help our fellows deal with suffering? Is "Humans have a responsibility to help our fellows deal with suffering" a true statement. If so, is it a true statement in the same sense as "1 + 1 = 2" is?

…question made complicated because “science” or “philosophy” means different things to different people/contexts. With the shifting and inconsistent definitions it could lead to misunderstanding.
I think it was Wittgenstein, somewhere, who said that one of the problems with philosophy is the lack of consensus of what philosophy should entail, conflicting language games.

My initial thoughts, and I stand to be corrected or further elaborated by those with more expertise, is the relevance of methodology.
Hard science (as opposed to soft descriptive science) is more in the business of doing actual experiments, confirming/rejecting measurable hypotheses, ultimately, at least provisionally to establish casual connections, leading to more predictive power etc.
Otoh, philosophy is not usually lab work, but more to question or to clarity these presuppositions, it could for example examine the latent cultural structures in which these operate, or it could be a non-scientific (not anti-science) endeavour putting the emphasis on “being” back to some kind of primordial, non-dualistic thinking.

Now explain how it is relevant to my claim. As I've noted, I never claimed that ethics and morals didn't involve facts, only that ethical and moral statements, positions, are not facts. — T Clark

Oh cause you said morals deal with values not fact. So, I countered it with a response.

I don't think you read my OP very carefully. — T Clark

Metaphysical claims can't be true or false, you say.

Scientific antirealism is the view that science should refrain from making metaphysical claims, it being possible that metaphysical claims are true or false.

I know there's a difference between your claim and scientific antirealism but look at the similarity - you reject metaphysical claims and scientific antirealism holds that truth is not what science is about. An analogy will clarify the matter further. What's so different between saying "God exists" is neither true nor false and believing "God exists" isn't what's important?

Oh cause you said morals deal with values not fact. So, I countered it with a response. — Caldwell

As I've said in several posts in this thread, my claim is that ethical questions don't have true or false answers, i.e. that ethical statements are not facts. I never said that ethical arguments don't involve facts. That would mean that ethics has no relation to the world we live in, which would be silly.

Metaphysical claims can't be true or false, you say. — TheMadFool

Yes, I said that.

Scientific antirealism is the view that science should refrain from making metaphysical claims, it being possible that metaphysical claims are true or false. — TheMadFool

I don't understand. I just said that metaphysical statements are not true or false. This is why I thought you hadn't read the OP.

you reject metaphysical claims — TheMadFool

I do not reject metaphysical claims. This whole thread is based on me making a metaphysical claim.

scientific antirealism holds that truth is not what science is about. — TheMadFool

This is outside the scope of this discussion.

What's so different between saying "God exists" is neither true nor false and believing "God exists" isn't what's important? — TheMadFool

As I noted in the OP, "Religion is a bit ambiguous, since some think the existence of God is a matter of fact." For the purposes of this discussion, I don't have any further position on that matter. It's been argued many times on the forum. This is not the place to fight the battle again.

Metaphysical claims can't be true or false, you say.
— TheMadFool

Yes, I said that. — T Clark

I do not reject metaphysical claims. — T Clark

:chin:

So, in what sense do you accept metaphysical claims. I have some idea of what that would look like :point:

metaphysical propositions are not true or false, only more or less useful. — T Clark

You'll have to explain what you mean by "useful".

:flower:

@T Clark

Why are metaphysics and epistemology grouped together?

Okay, so I see you do accept that Ethics uses facts in later posts on this thread, so I'll stick to responding to this:

I didn't say philosophy doesn't deal with facts and truth. I said philosophy does not deal with questions that have true or false answers. For example, from Wikipedia entry for Coherence Theory of Truth - "Truth is a property of whole systems of propositions and can be ascribed to individual propositions only derivatively according to their coherence with the whole." This statement is about "truth," but, I claim at least, it is neither true nor false — T Clark

Let's just go back to absolute basics for a second:

Metaphysics and Epistemology ask, do I exist and how can I know I exist?

Descartes answers, I think, therefore I am.

What, if anything, is not dealing with true or false answers to you?

P.s. As for the coherence theory of truth... well, I give you the correspondence theory of truth:
The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are not (in general) propositions, but rather objective features of the world. (From the Stanford Philosophy Encyclopedia)

Science deals with facts. Philosophers often question what facts are based on ... but scientists don't care and continue with facts.

Basic point being Science is that done by scientists and Philosophy is that done by philosophers. Some people can, amazingly (sarcasm), do both at different times.

In more common terms philosophy is more concerned with the validity of questions and science is more concerned with answering questions. Needless to say they can at times make the other look rather stupid.

As far as I can discern them, the basic difference between philosophy and science is the latter concerns defeasible reasoning towards the best explanations / predictive models (cognitivity re: theorems, theories ~ propositions) whereas the former concerns reflective reasoning towards better, more probative, questions / conceptual interpretations (noncognitivity re: ideas ~ suppositions). In other words, scientists strive to know nature (presence) and philosophers seek to understand reality (absence).

So, in what sense do you accept metaphysical claims. I have some idea of what that would look like — TheMadFool

This just feels like we're going around in circles.

I think, therefore I am. — Artemis

Is this true? Is it false? If it's true, is it true in the same sense that "1 + 1 = 2" is true?

P.s. As for the coherence theory of truth... well, I give you the correspondence theory of truth:
The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are not (in general) propositions, but rather objective features of the world. (From the Stanford Philosophy Encyclopedia) — Artemis

I was using the statement about the coherence theory of truth to give an example of a statement about truth which is not true or false. It was not my intent to endorse a particular definition of truth. It works just as well for your correspondence theory:

Is "The truth conditions of propositions are not (in general) propositions, but rather objective features of the world," a true statement? If so, is it true in the same sense that "Paris is the capital of France" is true?

In more common terms philosophy is more concerned with the validity of questions and science is more concerned with answering questions. — I like sushi

Is this different from what I said? Is it inconsistent with what I said?

As far as I can discern them, the basic difference between philosophy and science is the latter concerns defeasible reasoning towards the best explanations / predictive models (cognitivity re: theorems, theories ~ propositions) whereas the former concerns reflective reasoning towards better, more probitive, questions / conceptual interpretations (noncognitivity re: ideas ~ suppositions). In other words, scientists strive to know nature (presence) and philosophers seek to understand reality (absence). — 180 Proof

I'm not sure if this is different from what I wrote or not. A question and a comment. 1) When you say "conceptual interpretations" do you mean like the various interpretations of quantum theory? Or maybe the big bang theory as an interpretation of the meaning of cosmological data collected by scientists? 2) In my experience, "nature" and "reality" are often used as synonyms.

Don't know and don't really care.

Is this true? Is it false? If it's true, is it true in the same sense that "1 + 1 = 2" is true? — T Clark

The cogito is, as far as I am aware, the most indisputable truth there is. That was Descartes whole point.

Is "The truth conditions of propositions are not (in general) propositions, but rather objective features of the world," a true statement? If so, is it true in the same sense that "Paris is the capital of France" is true? — T Clark

They're both true. But one is a definitional truth of a human construct: the Paris is the capital of France because humans invented both Paris and France and the idea of a capital.

The other is trying to make sense of objective, non-constructed reality and ourselves (not as constructs, but as objectively existing observers) therein.

This just feels like we're going around in circles. — T Clark

Gravity is dangerous. It makes us go round in circles.

By the way, people seem to enjoy merry-go-rounds! Odd that! :chin:

The cogito is, as far as I am aware, the most indisputable truth there is. That was Descartes whole point. — Artemis

There are many philosophies and psychologies which do not recognize the existence of the self - me, myself, I.

The other is trying to make sense of objective, non-constructed reality and ourselves (not as constructs, but as objectively existing observers) therein. — Artemis

Just because "The truth conditions of propositions are not (in general) propositions, but rather objective features of the world," is a useful way of "trying to make sense of objective, non-constructed reality and ourselves," doesn't mean it's true.

Are the correspondence and coherence theories of truth both true? My answer - No, neither is true.

There are many philosophies and psychologies which do not recognize the existence of the self - me, myself, I. — T Clark

Never heard of one that actually disputes the cogito. They dispute the Western concept of a whole self, but not that something exists which is thinking/observing.

But still: it's a truth claim. It's either true or false. The objections from others don't change that the cogito is either true or not true.

[quote="T Clark;616799"

Are the correspondence and coherence theories of truth both true? My answer - No, neither is true.[/quote]

Philosophical hypotheses don't have to turn out to be true to be considered truth claims anymore than hypotheses about gravity.

The cogito is, as far as I am aware, the most indisputable truth there is. — Artemis

More "indisputable" than A=A? I doubt it. Anyway, tell me what Descartes actually proves with his "Cogito".

I'm not sure if this is different from what I wrote or not. A question and a comment. 1) When you say "conceptual interpretations" do you mean like the various interpretations of quantum theory? Or maybe the big bang theory as an interpretation of the meaning of cosmological data collected by scientists? — T Clark

No. I think of interpretations of "QT" & "cosmological data" as theoretical, not just conceptual.

2) In my experience, "nature" and "reality" are often used as synonyms.

In "experience", I agree; philosophically, however, reality delineates (some of) the conceptual limits (i.e. ontological incompleteness) of nature.

Metaphysical propositions have no truth value, they are only more or less useful in particular situations. I — T Clark

In other words:
Philosophy and science both make metaphysical claims. They differ in focus, but not in kind.

"The earth circles around the sun."
And "I think therefore I am" are both truth claims and the status of "truth claim" doesn't change even when something is indeed proven false.

Never heard of one that actually disputes the cogito. — Artemis

I'm sure many people have questioned it. Here's an answer to the question "Is 'cogito ergo sum' true or false?" from Quora.

Nietzsche had an interesting counter-point to this idea. Namely, he asserted that it would be more correct to say "something thinks, therefore something exists." To assert that "you" exist, you have to presuppose the existence of a unified "you" (which means that you are already assuming "I am"), which is non-trivial. After all, are we so certain that the mind is a single, unified entity? If that is so, then how can the mind be at odds with itself (an experience that I am sure that most everyone is familiar with)? So, perhaps, we should view not as the mind being aware of its own thought, but as a two-body system, where one entity thinks, and another entity perceives this thought. (I seem to recall that fMRI suggested that first the brain has an insight, and only afterward does the forebrain become aware of this fact, but I am not a neurobiologist and am not qualified to assert such a thing.)

Personally, I am of the mind (no pun intended) that "cogito ergo sum" is an axiom. It is something that we assume to be true, mostly because if it is not true, then there is no possible discourse that we could have, and that doesn't seem particularly useful.

Here's a link:

https://www.quora.com/Is-cogito-ergo-sum-true-or-false?share=1

I think "cogito ergo sum" is more a definition of existence than a statement about it.

it's a truth claim. It's either true or false. — Artemis

If my self doesn't exist, if there is no "I," "I think, therefore I am," is not a "truth claim," it's meaningless.

Philosophy and science both make metaphysical claims. They differ in focus, but not in kind. — Artemis

Can you give a example of a scientific metaphysical claim.

... the status of "truth claim" doesn't change even when something is indeed proven false. — Artemis

A truth-claims' "status" changes from undecided to positive truth-value when demonstrated and then to negative truth-value when refuted. "Earth is flat" is a refuted truth-claim aka a falsehood rather than a true statement, no?

Let's just go back to absolute basics for a second: — Artemis

OK

Metaphysics and Epistemology ask, do I exist and how can I know I exist?

...and you can ask these questions only because you are embedded in a world that includes a language, other people, and a culture in which to employ that language.

The myth of a scientific method pervades these comments.

What separates science from non-science? Scientific method.

What's scientific method? Whenever someone sets a method out explicitly, it is found wanting. And that should not be surprising, since if scientific method were following a bunch of rules it would be not all that interesting. The most interesting science is the unexpected stuff, of course. If there were an algorithmic method that asymptotically approximated truth, Scientists would be no more than factory workers, grinding through a process. And if you think that's what they are, then we're paying them too much.

Understanding science as a culture rather than a method gives a much better account of what actually happens amongst scientists as well as explaining the historical improvements of scientific accounts.


That culture is one of open communication and critique, of readiness to be corrected, of collegiality. And such a culture is at home in sociology, history, and even philosophy. Not always, but mostly.

So what differentiates science from philosophy is more content than method.

So what differentiates science from philosophy is more content than method. — Banno

:up: