In what sense is "The earth revolves around the sun" a metaphysical statement.
— T Clark

It's a statement about the state or nature of an aspect of reality. — Artemis

By that standard "My tummy hurts." is a metaphysical statement.

Yes.

But that leads us to what Banno and I were addressing earlier: where something veers into science versus philosophy versus literal and figurative belly-aching is more content-specific than anything else, and even there more overlap exists than one might initially assume.

That's a tough one. That would be the case if the self "T Clark" is a metaphysical entity.

It seems to me that selves are epistemological entities related to how we think about ourselves and not necessarily an aspect of the world.

However, we are part of the world too. So it's nebulous. There is a sense in which, narrowly defined, you can use metaphysics to refer to the world and epistemology to people. But, complex.

↪Banno Science consists in empirical observations, hypotheses and theories. Empirical observations are either true or false, hypotheses and theories are testable.

Philosophy does not deal with empirical observations. and its hypotheses and theories (if philosophical speculations are to be counted as such) are not testable, so it is, in both these respects, different from science. — Janus

Precisely what I said, and you said it more succinctly and clearly. I think I said that philosophy does use empirical observations, but the interpretations it draws from observations is not meant to be tested, or is in a form that defies testing (because the particular philosopher does not know how to design a test). Case in point is my theory on ethics; so far many (or some) criticized it for its English, for using examples the critics did not like, for not saying what the critic had been thinking some time before the reading. But nobody has actually given it a critical reading and any valid criticism. The theory is described in two places on this forum, one short form, one long form.

The short form can be found here (I published it in response to criticism that the long form was too long):

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10903/shortened-version-of-theory-of-morality-some-objected-to-the-conversational-style-of-my-paper

And the long form, here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10744/ethics-explained-to-smooth-out-all-wrinkles-in-current-debates-neo-darwinist-approach

In what sense is "The earth revolves around the sun" a metaphysical statement. — T Clark

Aren't the presuppositions of science (which go into making such a statement) comprised of metaphysical positions - e.g., that reality is a state of affairs which can be understood and accurately described? And wouldn't physicalism be the metaphysical foundation of science?

Aren't the presuppositions of science (which go into making such a statement) comprised of metaphysical positions - e.g., that reality is a state of affairs which can be understood and accurately described? And wouldn't physicalism be the metaphysical foundation of science? — Tom Storm

I think science can just study and speculate about nature as it presents itself to us, make predictions and see what works, without presupposing or concluding anything, other than provisionally to serve the abductive process; a kind of pragmatic phenomenology.

But that leads us to what Banno and I were addressing earlier: where something veers into science versus philosophy versus literal and figurative belly-aching is more content-specific than anything else, and even there more overlap exists than one might initially assume. — Artemis

I don't agree with this. I see a relatively definitive delineation between metaphysical and scientific issues, statements, and questions. I call it "scientific" because that's the term we've been using, but it's more than that. It includes all of our regular daily interactions with the world.

I had a bunch written up, but then I realized, we're more or less quibbling over semantics. You said before that a claim about a non-existent thing is meaningless, I say it's false. Tomayto, tomahto, because false simply means not true, and meaningless would mean not true as well. Same dif. — Artemis

I don't think it's that simple. "Not true" is not the same as "false." In this case, they live in different universes. I think this is an important issue, but I'm not sure I've been addressing it right in the past. I need to think about it some more.

That's a tough one. That would be the case if the self "T Clark" is a metaphysical entity. — Manuel

Under some metaphysical schemes, my self is an illusion. I don't think that would make me a metaphysical entity, I think it would just mean I don't exist in that metaphysical universe. Click a switch, turn on a realist metaphysic, and T Clark, philosophical hero to the benighted masses flashes back into existence.

It seems to me that selves are epistemological entities related to how we think about ourselves and not necessarily an aspect of the world. — Manuel

Sorry, I'm going to be cute again - The world is related to how we think about ourselves and not necessarily an aspect of the world independent of us.

Aren't the presuppositions of science (which go into making such a statement) comprised of metaphysical positions - e.g., that reality is a state of affairs which can be understood and accurately described? And wouldn't physicalism be the metaphysical foundation of science? — Tom Storm

You've brought up "presuppositions," which is Collingwood's term for the content of metaphysics. Actually, he says "absolute presuppositions." I've shied away from using his terms because I was afraid it would send us off in a direction different from where I wanted to head. I'm glad you did though and I have no problem with using them more if it will help.

I think the way you've described it is consistent with my understanding of how metaphysics works. I think you're example - "Reality is a state of affairs which can be understood and accurately described" - is a good example of an absolute presupposition. As for science, I've thought that it's metaphysical foundation is related to physicalism, realism, and materialism at least. I'm not sure the implications of applying any of those three, or something else, to science.

This is fun.

Is F=ma true? — Banno

I feel like you're setting me up for something, but I'll bite. "F = ma" is a scientific statement, and thus has a truth value. Yes, it is true.

The philosophy of science is simple. Science tries to capture the natural world. By means of gaining knowledge about it. By examining the stuff that constitutes it. By breaking her op into elements. By examining these elements and trying to fit all other stuff within its power of being. By putting elements to the test. By uniting seemingly different stuff under the flag of particular elements or unifying power of math, which claims formal similarities prevail over plain differences. By proposing abstract elements out of which nature can be built or builds herself. By inventing laws, called natural laws, according to which nature should behave in certain situations and to which nature is said to be subjected.

The philosophy of science is to gain knowledge about the creatures, organisms, the heavens above, the deep of the oceans, the behavior of stuff in different circumstances, in the light of theories based on earlier knowledge, in the process sometimes annihilating previous theories, changing the ontology, or extending the old one. Science counts, slices, tears apart, smashes, heats up, drills, shakes, mixes, pulls, pushes, measures, observes, on the smallest as well as biggest scales, incorporating even the distant heavens to the urge and hunger for knowledge.

The philosophy of science is trying to unify. and reduce while natural reality is reshaped, trying to mold it such to be in agreement with the paradigm in fashion, or the mathematically exactly solvable. At the same time the limits of the paradims are pushed, in order to know what lies behind the limits, and more often than not unexpected new observations makes one cross a border to arrive at knew stages of knowledge, claiming that a breakthrough has been made. Experimental practice changes accordingly planning for new in the context of a new emerging paradigm.

The philosophy of science encourages the dissection and close investigation of plants, animals, and people (adequately named Homo Sapiens, the knowing man), gain knowledge of their workings and to try to frame them in some overarching vision, regardless cultures.

The philosophy of science stimulates the creation of a virtually endless succession of new means to create new forms of knowledge. Ad nauseam. It brings into play the concept of an objective, consciousness-detached reality (quantum mechanics trying in vain to bring it into play by means of an observer, after the damage has already been done), only to be known or approximated by science. In this process, man places himself outside nature and all beauty it contains (like people).

And on and on. The philosophy of science includes the scientific methodology, which is just a quasi-scientific attempt to frame the whole scientific enterprise in the quasi-scientific language of The Methodology. As if the human enterprise, erratically, non-rationally, non-programmed, or even maybe randomly, evolves. Scientists try crazingly to stick to this method, but that's merely empty verbiage.

Modern science is embedded in the market economy. Giving rise to new products growing on the scientific tree, and trying to convince the public of the wonders of technology, and making statements that a far-enough developed technology can't be distinguished from magic, overlooking the magic that can be found in nature. The formal language of math is used to quantify knowledge and it's even said that math is the language of nature, emphasizing its objectivity.

Once science and philosophy were not separated. Knowledge and talking about it were one and the same. In our time, I think philosophy should be more than just talking about science.

Once science and philosophy were not separated. Knowledge and talking about it were one and the same. In our time, I think philosophy should be more than just talking about science. — Verdi

Interesting and well written. Welcome to the forum.

Not to quibble, but I don't see how this is relevant to the subject of this thread, specified in the opening post (OP).

Well, to be honest, I didn't read the OP. Only the title. It asked about the difference between science and philosophy. I gave a direct answer: science is knowledge, philosophy is talking about it.

Science: a system of study the ends of which are determinable;
Philosophy: the organon by which systems of study are determinable.

Science is an object protocol(process), philosophy is a subject matter(command).

Philosophy means that, science means this, both science and philosophy are adverbs.

I produced a philosophical thesis, i.e. I did that.

I conducted a scientific experiment, i.e. I did this.

I'd argue then when a scientific experiment reaches the theorum phase it is philosophy, for this and that together create 'it'(pronoun).

I don't think it's that simple. "Not true" is not the same as "false." In this case, they live in different universes. I think this is an important issue, but I'm not sure I've been addressing it right in the past. I need to think about it some more. — T Clark

I think I should be clear: this is how we deal with it in basic logic. There's a time and a place to get more into the details of the umbrella terms that are "true" and "false" in the context of logic.... but I don't think it's worth wading into at this particular juncture. Another avenue for a good thread perhaps?

I don't agree with this. I see a relatively definitive delineation between metaphysical and scientific issues, statements, and questions. I call it "scientific" because that's the term we've been using, but it's more than that. It includes all of our regular daily interactions with the world — T Clark

Ok. So what do you think that definitive delineation is?

I'd argue then when a scientific experiment reaches the theorum phase it is philosophy, for this and that together create 'it'(pronoun). — Varde

I'm not sure if an experiment can reach a theorem phase, as the theorem phase comes mostly before the experiment phase. When quarks were first thought of (theorem phase) it took another ten years to experimentally confirm them, molding reality to make their existence explicit and almost tangible. A good accout of this process (sending the scientific method home at the same time) s given by Pickering,:

https://philpapers.org/rec/PICCQA

Recently, in one of the most complicated, extensive, and expensive experiments ever, designed to measure a simple quantity of one of the smallest particles, the muonic g2 factor, a miniscule deviation from a standard value was registered. And there are a variety of theorems to explain it, apart from the standard reaction of re-calculating the value in the standard model, which oddly enough is called the standard model. But the standard is under attack. Future experiments must decide. Strangely enough, in the spectrum of new theories, composite quarks and leptons are not present, or just thrown from the table.

yes, perhaps I was too hasty, but nonetheless, a small edict on my point, a similar argument.

I think roughly speaking the aims are different.
Philosophy seeks wisdom. Science (as it is popularly conceived or practiced today) seeks to understand the natural world.

The world is related to how we think about ourselves and not necessarily an aspect of the world independent of us. — T Clark

I'm not sure I understand. If you were to say the world is related to how we think about it, then that's fine. If we are thinking about ourselves the world is of secondary importance at best.

Well, to be honest, I didn't read the OP. Only the title. It asked about the difference between science and philosophy. I gave a direct answer: science is knowledge, philosophy is talking about it. — Verdi

I've been thinking about what I wrote since last night. I think I was wrong and I feel bad, especially since it was your first day. I guess it was that you were writing about philosophy of science instead of philosophy in general, but that's silly.

As I wrote earlier, your post is interesting and well written.

There's a time and a place to get more into the details of the umbrella terms that are "true" and "false" in the context of logic.... but I don't think it's worth wading into at this particular juncture. Another avenue for a good thread perhaps? — Artemis

Yes. We agree.

Ok. So what do you think that definitive delineation is? — Artemis

This is what I wrote in a post to @Tom Storm earlier in this thread:

You've brought up "presuppositions," which is Collingwood's term for the content of metaphysics. Actually, he says "absolute presuppositions." I've shied away from using his terms because I was afraid it would send us off in a direction different from where I wanted to head. I'm glad you did though and I have no problem with using them more if it will help.

I think the way you've described it is consistent with my understanding of how metaphysics works. I think you're example - "Reality is a state of affairs which can be understood and accurately described" - is a good example of an absolute presupposition. As for science, I've thought that it's metaphysical foundation is related to physicalism, realism, and materialism at least. I'm not sure the implications of applying any of those three, or something else, to science. — T Clark

As I noted, I was afraid to bring all this into this discussion because it deserves one of it's own. There have been many over the years, including one by me. I will start a "What is Metaphysics" thread. Unless you want to.

The philosophy of science is simple. Science tries to capture the natural world. By means of gaining knowledge about it. By examining the stuff that constitutes it. — Verdi

Most of what you write about the philosophy of science is about the goals of science. That's fine, but I don't think it's the most interesting or important part.

Once science and philosophy were not separated. Knowledge and talking about it were one and the same. In our time, I think philosophy should be more than just talking about science. — Verdi

You talk about the philosophy of science, but you don't really deal with the difference between that and science itself. This is one place you do:

And on and on. The philosophy of science includes the scientific methodology, which is just a quasi-scientific attempt to frame the whole scientific enterprise in the quasi-scientific language of The Methodology. As if the human enterprise, erratically, non-rationally, non-programmed, or even maybe randomly, evolves. Scientists try crazingly to stick to this method, but that's merely empty verbiage. — Verdi

I don't agree with this, especially the cynical tone. Epistemology, which the philosophy of science is part of, is not "quasi-scientific." It's pre-scientific, that's the point. Based on what you've written, it doesn't seem like you think the philosophy of science is very important.

Maybe a separate thread on the philosophy of science would be a good idea. In almost any discussion about science here on the forum, science and the philosophy of science end up being all tangled together as if they are the same thing. Which, importantly, they are not.

yes, perhaps I was too hasty, but nonetheless, a small edict on my point, a similar argument. — Varde

@Verdi

[joke]One of the two of you will have to change your name. It's hard to keep you straight. [/joke]

Haha! Similar thought passed my mind!

I'd argue then when a scientific experiment reaches the theorum phase it is philosophy, for this and that together create 'it'(pronoun). — Varde

This distinction between scientific theorizing - the generalization of models and theories from scientific data - and philosophy has come up several times in this thread. I think they are different. Theorizing and model building are part of science, not philosophy. Maybe this sounds nitpicky, but I think it's important.

I'm not sure I understand. If you were to say the world is related to how we think about it, then that's fine. If we are thinking about ourselves the world is of secondary importance at best. — Manuel

I was getting a bit poetic, metaphoric, in my previous post. That can be confusing, but sometimes I can't help myself. I want to play.

As for your question - If I don't see my self as existing, that takes the support framework from around the world. Suddenly I don't know where I am. At what scale. Am I looking at galaxies or quarks? The whole subject/object distinction depends on me being at the heart of things.

I don't know about Eastern Traditions to be able to say much about that, if that's what you have in mind when speaking of having no self. Though galaxies and/or quarks still are representations, that can't be done away with. And we have good reasons for thinking these things belong to the world.

I think you are both a subject and on object. You are a subject so long as you have experience and are an object so far as you have a body.

In any case, both are required to do science as we now do it and philosophy too.

In any case, both are required to do science as we now do it and philosophy too. — Manuel

I agree that subject/object duality is needed for science, but not necessarily for philosophy. I don't think this is the place to go into that any deeper.