The end is indeed what motivates the will to choose it, but not because of its strength (those general ends don't have a strength; only particular instances of them have a strength); but rather because of its nature. E.g. pleasure is a subjective value whereas the ethical is an objective value. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ethics and pleasure are both general/abstract concepts which in a concrete situation manifest in concrete motives, that is, in a concrete ethical concern or a concrete desire for a concrete experience of pleasure, which are both subjectively experienced and move the person toward performing an act.

But the point is that the pleasure to others is still done for my sake and not theirs. — Samuel Lacrampe

These two pleasures are inseparable.

The act is merely a tool for my own pleasure, and if the tool were to cease providing me pleasure, then I would drop it. — Samuel Lacrampe

Which means you would stop desiring to perform the ethical act.

Altruism is supposed to be selfless, or, at best, it is my pleasure that is the byproduct. — Samuel Lacrampe

An altruistic act can be seen as "selfless" in the sense that it is directed to benefitting others without giving the actor certain kinds of pleasure such as carnal or corrupt, or while causing the actor carnal displeasure or even harm.

Ethics and pleasure are both general/abstract concepts which in a concrete situation manifest in concrete motives, that is, in a concrete ethical concern or a concrete desire for a concrete experience of pleasure, which are both subjectively experienced and move the person toward performing an act. — litewave

Sounds good. So my point is that the initial choice of prioritizing the ends of pleasure or the ethical, which can be made prior to any particular instance, cannot be motivated by their strength, since as general concepts, they don't have one.

My bigger point is that, while the initial choice is not motivated by something other than the ends themselves, it is neither random nor a guess. It is not random since it is willed, and it is not a guess since the choice is informed by what the ends are.

An altruistic act can be seen as "selfless" in the sense that it is directed to benefitting others without giving the actor certain kinds of pleasure such as carnal or corrupt, or while causing the actor carnal displeasure or even harm. — litewave

But it must cause the actor some pleasure that outweighs the carnal displeasure or harm, doesn't it? If ultimately the act is determined by what is expected to cause the greatest net pleasure to oneself, then there cannot be an altruistic act that is expected to result in a net displeasure to oneself.

So my point is that the initial choice of prioritizing the ends of pleasure or the ethical, which can be made prior to any particular instance, cannot be motivated by their strength, since as general concepts, they don't have one. — Samuel Lacrampe

But we are not motivated by general concepts. We are motivated by concrete motives (which are concrete instances of general concepts) experienced in our consciousness, and these motives move us according to their strengths. Entities without strengths cannot move us and so they cannot be motives. I can't even imagine how something without a strength could motivate me; I choose according to attraction or appeal of different motives, and attraction or appeal are just other words for the strength with which the motives influence me.

I don't even think we can be conscious of general concepts. Can you be conscious of general triangle or general red color? General triangle doesn't even look like a triangle and general red color doesn't even look like something red. They don't look like anything because while a concrete triangle or a concrete instance of red color are spatial objects, general concepts are not. When we imagine a general concept we actually imagine a concrete instance (example) of it or a concrete object that represents/symbolizes the concept (word as heard or seen, graphical symbol...).

If ultimately the act is determined by what is expected to cause the greatest net pleasure to oneself, then there cannot be an altruistic act that is expected to result in a net displeasure to oneself. — Samuel Lacrampe

Right.

But we are not motivated by general concepts. We are motivated by concrete motives (which are concrete instances of general concepts) experienced in our consciousness, and these motives move us according to their strengths. — litewave

That may indeed be the case. If a motive is like a force that pulls the will in its direction, and if the will were to be truly free in the initial choice, then that initial choice must be unmotivated. The will is however informed by the ends in order to make an informed choice; just like the archer is informed of the targets position in order to aim the arrow towards them.

Can you be conscious of general triangle or general red color? [...] — litewave

I agree that we cannot imagine general concepts (although we can understand them, since we can communicate using general terms).

Right. — litewave

I, on the other hand, claim that we can act in a way that is expected to result in a net displeasure, if we prioritize the ethical. Given the same situation and the same knowledge of it, two agents may act differently if they have prioritized different ends.

If a motive is like a force that pulls the will in its direction, and if the will were to be truly free in the initial choice, then that initial choice must be unmotivated. — Samuel Lacrampe

But an unmotivated choice is not freely willed - it is made without care, desire or sometimes even without intention.

The will is however informed by the ends in order to make an informed choice; just like the archer is informed of the targets position in order to aim the arrow towards them. — Samuel Lacrampe

These ends and information are the motives that influence the agent to act in a certain way. Even the information about the targets position steers and pushes the agent's action, together with his motive to hit the targets.

I, on the other hand, claim that we can act in a way that is expected to result in a net displeasure, if we prioritize the ethical. — Samuel Lacrampe

If the agent expects an act to give him a net displeasure (net dissatisfaction), it means that the act would be against his strongest motive and thus would be unmotivated to the extent of the difference between his strongest motive and any weaker motive he may have for the act.

Given the same situation and the same knowledge of it, two agents may act differently if they have prioritized different ends. — Samuel Lacrampe

But the differences in their acts may be caused by differences in their bodies and in the structures of their minds.

Most of the concerns above may be cleared up if we can clarify what constitutes "motivation".
If motivation is nothing but "what we expect to bring us pleasure", then being informed of a target and its position is not motivation, because not all targets bring pleasure. If on the other hand motivation includes "anything that influences our choices", then being informed of a target and its position is part of motivation, but then what motivates us is not just what brings us pleasure.

All of our motives influence our choices toward what we expect to bring us pleasure (satisfaction). If we didn't have a motive to hit the targets, information about the targets position would not motivate us to shoot at them. On the other hand, if we had a motive to hit the targets but didn't have information about the targets position we wouldn't be motivated to shoot at the targets either (because we wouldn't know where to shoot). So in this case we need both motives/influences to shoot at the targets.

We may not call the information about the targets position a "motive" but it is still a force that pushes us, together with the motive to hit the targets, toward shooting at the targets. This just means that in order for our motives to work we may also need other conditions, including a spacetime and laws of physics, but we can't choose those conditions just as we can't choose our motives.

Alright. So the end of pleasure is the motive, and information is an influence. This clarifies things.

Now, for the sake of argument, let's buy into the following premise: that there is another possible motive, the ethical, which is not necessarily compatible with pleasure. E.g. "I did this, not because it is pleasurable but because it is the right thing to do". What could possibly push us to choose either the end of pleasure or the end of the ethical? It cannot be either pleasure or the ethical, since these are the ends we are choosing from. We must therefore posit another "force" which we call free will. It is influenced by things like information, but not motivated when it comes to choosing between these two ends. Thus it is free.

E.g. "I did this, not because it is pleasurable but because it is the right thing to do". What could possibly push us to choose either the end of pleasure or the end of the ethical? — Samuel Lacrampe

We are pushed toward the ethical by motives such as compassion, pangs of conscience, desire for rewards in afterlife, fear of hell in afterlife, desire for order, fairness, balance, harmony in society... What else? But satisfaction of all these motives is a kind of pleasure, a kind of satisfaction.

I don't deny that these are all possible motives of pleasure; but I still claim that it is possible to choose the right thing simply on the basis that it is the right thing to do. Sure, satisfaction may result from it as well, but that would be merely a byproduct. This means that even if satisfaction did not result from doing the right thing, we could still choose to do it.

For many religious people, the reward called heaven does not necessarily mean pleasure, but being good.

I don't deny that these are all possible motives of pleasure; but I still claim that it is possible to choose the right thing simply on the basis that it is the right thing to do. — Samuel Lacrampe

Even if an ethical concern or desire motivates us with something else than pleasure/satisfaction, it is still a motive in the set of motives that influence us. Every motive influences us with some strength; without strength it would not influence us at all. And the joint influence of all our motives determines our action. Thus our choice of action can be free in the sense that we can act according to our motives (do what we want to), but it is determined by our motives, which we cannot choose (and by other conditions which we cannot choose either).

Even if an ethical concern or desire motivates us with something else than pleasure/satisfaction, it is still a motive in the set of motives that influence us. Every motive influences us with some strength; without strength it would not influence us at all. And the joint influence of all our motives determines our action. — litewave

I agree that both pleasure and the ethical are types of motives. But the two ends differ not in degree (i.e. strength) but in kind. As last ends, we cannot choose pleasure because it is ethical, or choose the ethical because it is pleasurable (otherwise they wouldn't be last ends but a means to another end).

So while they are both in the same set of motives, the two subsets are separate, and the influence of strength applies only to motives within the same subset.

What does hard determinism entail for ethics?

Ethics/Morality/Good & Bad

Ethics stops making sense without free will.

So while they are both in the same set of motives, the two subsets are separate, and the influence of strength applies only to motives within the same subset. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why would influences of strength apply only within the same subset? Many objects in our world are under the influence of different kinds of forces and the object's motion is determined by the joint influence of these forces.

Why would influences of strength apply only within the same subset? — litewave

Because, as mentioned a while back, it is possible to choose what is ethical at the cost of sacrificing great pleasure, or vice versa, choose pleasure at the cost of sacrificing what is greatly ethical. This shows that the strength of the motive is not really a factor, if at all, when the competing motives are for different ends.

So it appears that we can choose to prioritize pleasure over the ethical or vice versa, no matter their strengths, and this act cannot itself be motivated the strength of those ends.

Because, as mentioned a while back, it is possible to choose what is ethical at the cost of sacrificing great pleasure, or vice versa, choose pleasure at the cost of sacrificing what is greatly ethical. This shows that the strength of the motive is not really a factor, if at all, when the competing motives are for different ends. — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes, it is possible to choose against our strongest motive but to me that is an unmotivated choice, namely a choice without intention. Or if I have no strongest motive I can choose without caring about the choice. When I am choosing according to my motives (intentionally and with care), I am considering the attractiveness (= strength) of these motives. Whether the motives motivate me by some kind of classical pleasure or by intellectual, spiritual or ethical satisfaction, it is always according to the attractiveness of the motives.

My view is that hard determinism does not make ethics irrelevant, because right and wrong are also about justification, more specifically, justification of an action, that is, ethics is also about whether an action is justified or not, and free will is irrelevant to justification, therefore we can continue asking moral questions. — Hello Human

Re "hard determinism does not make ethics irrelevant": "hard determinism", by definition, is incompatible with free will. Changing that, tying to "sweeten" it, "adding water to the wine", etc. doesn't change it. Better talk directly about "soft determinism" and other "-isms". Using such terms, however, are only good for academic discussions. The essence follows ...

Re "right and wrong are also about justification": Of course. One must always judge whether an act was justified or not before condemning the person who committed it.

Re "free will is irrelevant to justification": Justification is a way of showing that an act was right or reasonable. But not only free will is relevant, it is actually a prerequisite! If someone who commits a crime is proved --by medical examination or just opinion-- not to be able to distinguish between right or wrong, he is sent to a mental hospital instead of a prison. In that case, we cannot talk about either justification or free will. Justification and free will are inseparable. Free will is a prerequisite for ethics, responsibility and control.

Take free will out of the human equation and you get criminality, insanity, anarchy and chaos.

To be clear, this claim that "strength is not a factor" only applies to the initial act of prioritizing one end over the other. After that, strength is definitely a factor, and so much so that I claim it is not possible to choose against the strongest motive that meets the end we have initially prioritized. Free will only chooses which end to target. After that, all acts are determined by the strongest motive, that is, the most effective means to the end, and any additional choice becomes superfluous.

To be clear, this claim that "strength is not a factor" only applies to the initial act of prioritizing one end over the other. After that, strength is definitely a factor, — Samuel Lacrampe

But why would you prioritize one end over the other? Because one seems more attractive to you than the other. So strength of motives is a factor in any intentional choice. A motive can motivate you only through its strength (attractiveness). You may sacrifice great carnal pleasure but this sacrifice is more than compensated by satisfaction from fulfilling an ethical desire or need.

As previously mentioned, the general concepts of pleasure and the ethical don't have strengths, as they are general and not particular instances. The initial act of prioritizing pertains to the general concepts. That act is unmotivated, that is, free, and yet it is informed.

Let's give an application of that idea. Suppose there existed a "happy pill": a pill that gives immense pleasure. The cost is that, as a result, you are effectively in a comma; you are no longer able to interact with the ones you love, build a family, make an impact in the world; etc. Would you take it?

As previously mentioned, the general concepts of pleasure and the ethical don't have strengths, as they are general and not particular instances. The initial act of prioritizing pertains to the general concepts. That act is unmotivated, that is, free, and yet it is informed. — Samuel Lacrampe

Things that don't have strength cannot influence us; they are inert. We can only choose between them unintentionally or without caring about the choice. If general concepts don't have strengths, they cannot influence us - they have no attractiveness for us. We cannot even be conscious of them. However, we can be influenced by concrete examples or concrete symbols (for example heard or seen words) of general concepts, and we can also be conscious of these concrete things.

Let's give an application of that idea. Suppose there existed a "happy pill": a pill that gives immense pleasure. The cost is that, as a result, you are effectively in a comma; you are no longer able to interact with the ones you love, build a family, make an impact in the world; etc. Would you take it? — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't have much expectation that such a pill exists and it also raises questions about how long the pill would work (shorter duration decreases total pleasure) and whether it is harmful physically, mentally or socially, including to my social relationships (all these harms decrease total pleasure). So if it resulted in a long-term blissful paralysis, it is safe to say that it would cause great harm to my relationships, which could decrease its attractiveness for me to such an extent that I would reject it.

My view is that hard determinism does not make ethics irrelevant, because right and wrong are also about justification, more specifically, justification of an action, that is, ethics is also about whether an action is justified or not, and free will is irrelevant to justification, therefore we can continue asking moral questions. — Hello Human

I'm not sure I follow your historical prelude. But you present an interesting path of objection to the claim that hard determinism "makes ethics irrelevant". I'm inclined to say it's a fair objection. But I'm not sure that someone who sincerely claims that "hard determinism makes ethics irrelevant" would agree with us.

I expect the people who claim that hard determinism undermines morality would likewise claim that hard determinism undermines moral justification. If it's just an illusion that we're free, I can hear them saying, then it's just an illusion that our actions can be morally justified or morally unjustified.

I'd prefer to give less ground to the hard determinist than you have here, and pull this thing out by its roots. From my point of view, incompatibilist determinism is as arbitrary and unwarranted as incompatibilist libertarianism. Has anyone definitively established that the cosmos is (or isn't) completely deterministic? No matter how determined it is -- even down to the last jot of human action -- clearly there is a sort of freedom that agents like us really do possess. On what grounds would the hard determinist insist that we refrain from using the word freedom to characterize this aspect of human life? Only on the grounds that some people have overburdened and inflated the term with fanciful metaphysical hopes and wishes. Ditch the metaphysics, keep the ordinary concept of freedom -- with indifference to the degree of determinism in the cosmos and in human action.

Along these lines, I suggest that "soft-determinism" and "compatibilism" are unhappy names for the sort of approach to this topic I've indicated, as they leave too much room for the impression that this time-honored debate is anything more than a boondoggle and a pseudoproblem.

Things that don't have strength cannot influence us; they are inert. We can only choose between them unintentionally or without caring about the choice. If general concepts don't have strengths, they cannot influence us - they have no attractiveness for us. We cannot even be conscious of them. — litewave

They are an influence insofar as we have knowledge of them, although indeed they have no attraction. It is not without care if it is willed, as opposed to accidental.

I don't have much expectation that such a pill exists and it also raises questions about how long the pill would work (shorter duration decreases total pleasure) and whether it is harmful physically, mentally or socially, including to my social relationships (all these harms decrease total pleasure). So if it resulted in a long-term blissful paralysis, it is safe to say that it would cause great harm to my relationships, which could decrease its attractiveness for me to such an extent that I would reject it. — litewave

It's only a thought experiment of course. Let's say the pleasure and comma are permanent, and also the pleasure from the pill is significantly greater than the pleasure lost from losing relationships. After all, if pleasure is the only ultimate end, then everything else is only a means to it; and so the particular means is irrelevant, so long as the end is reached.

They are an influence insofar as we have knowledge of them, although indeed they have no attraction. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ok, tell me one motive without attraction. I can't imagine that such a motive exists.

Let's say the pleasure and comma are permanent, and also the pleasure from the pill is significantly greater than the pleasure lost from losing relationships. — Samuel Lacrampe

My doubt and worries about the properties of such a pill already greatly reduce my expected pleasure from it. It is as if someone tried to coax me into comitting suicide with the promise of a blissful afterlife. But if the coma was not permanent and I saw someone try the pill and testify to its blissful effect without harm to their health, I might try it too.

Anyway, what do you think ? — Hello Human

Why do you ask, if you are not responding to replies?
I have sent you my reply almost a week ago ... (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/607088)

If someone who commits a crime is proved --by medical examination or just opinion-- not to be able to distinguish between right or wrong, he is sent to a mental hospital instead of a prison — Alkis Piskas

And when they know the difference they are judged for their responsibility.

Sorry for not answering. Thanks for pointing it out, I wouldn't have responded if you hadn't.

Now, I 'd like to point out that I don't really think my argument was convincing anymore. I!m not sure what to believe now. But still, keep objecting, it will help me see the flaws and the good in the argument.

Thank you for repsonding.

And when they know the difference they are judged for their responsibility. — Hello Human

Right.

keep objecting, it will help me see the flaws and the good in the argument. — Hello Human

This is a very sane thinking and attitude. I have met it in only very few philosophical discussions!

When libertarian free will was a widely held belief unexamined by philosophy and Plato convinced much of philosophers that you ought to do what is right by definition, moral philosophers searched to know what is right while rarely examining metaethical questions.

However, when the Enlightenment brought hard determinism into the spotlight, the question of whether or not hard determinism entails that ethics is irrelevant became increasingly important, and the fact that free will is presupposed by our justice systems only made the question more important.

Some, such as David Hume, have settled on a soft determinism to avoid the question, while others have answered by proposing that the non-existence of responsibility entails the non-existence of right and wrong.

My view is that hard determinism does not make ethics irrelevant, because right and wrong are also about justification, more specifically, justification of an action, that is, ethics is also about whether an action is justified or not, and free will is irrelevant to justification, therefore we can continue asking moral questions.

Anyway, what do you think ? — Hello Human

My view is that in order for criminal justice to exist (as we know it) we must assume a certain level of autonomy and responsibility of individuals, called "free will". It doesn't matter that your actions from the moment you were born, to what you are going to eat for dinner are determined by the laws of nature. As long as you are a citizen who is participating in a society, it is inevitable that you will be judged by your actions which are guided by your own free will to make choices of your own volition.

My view is that in order for criminal justice to exist (as we know it) we must assume a certain level of autonomy and responsibility of individuals, called "free will" — Wheatley

I don't think that is the case because whether or not a killer has free will does not change the fact that we must do what we can to prevent him from killing again.

free will is irrelevant to just⁰ification": Justification is a way of showing that an act was right or reasonable. But not only free will is relevant, it is actually a prerequisite! If someone who commits a crime is proved --by medical examination or just opinion-- not to be able to distinguish between right or wrong, he is sent to a mental hospital instead of a prison. In that case, we cannot talk about either justification or free will — Alkis Piskas

Imagine this scenario: a person unable to distinguish between right or wrong has a voice in his head that tells him to, let's say, give all of his fortune to charity. Can we evaluate his actions ? If he was a billionaire, and his money allowed to save 1 million lives from war and disease, can we say that he acted morally?

My view is that to answer the question we must first make a distinction between a good action and commendable action. I think that the former entails that the action was done with benevolent intent and was compatible with the laws of morality while the latter entails the action was merely compatible with the laws of morality regardless of intent.