The end is indeed what motivates the will to choose it, but not because of its strength (those general ends don't have a strength; only particular instances of them have a strength); but rather because of its nature. E.g. pleasure is a subjective value whereas the ethical is an objective value. — Samuel Lacrampe
But the point is that the pleasure to others is still done for my sake and not theirs. — Samuel Lacrampe
The act is merely a tool for my own pleasure, and if the tool were to cease providing me pleasure, then I would drop it. — Samuel Lacrampe
Altruism is supposed to be selfless, or, at best, it is my pleasure that is the byproduct. — Samuel Lacrampe
Sounds good. So my point is that the initial choice of prioritizing the ends of pleasure or the ethical, which can be made prior to any particular instance, cannot be motivated by their strength, since as general concepts, they don't have one.Ethics and pleasure are both general/abstract concepts which in a concrete situation manifest in concrete motives, that is, in a concrete ethical concern or a concrete desire for a concrete experience of pleasure, which are both subjectively experienced and move the person toward performing an act. — litewave
But it must cause the actor some pleasure that outweighs the carnal displeasure or harm, doesn't it? If ultimately the act is determined by what is expected to cause the greatest net pleasure to oneself, then there cannot be an altruistic act that is expected to result in a net displeasure to oneself.An altruistic act can be seen as "selfless" in the sense that it is directed to benefitting others without giving the actor certain kinds of pleasure such as carnal or corrupt, or while causing the actor carnal displeasure or even harm. — litewave
So my point is that the initial choice of prioritizing the ends of pleasure or the ethical, which can be made prior to any particular instance, cannot be motivated by their strength, since as general concepts, they don't have one. — Samuel Lacrampe
If ultimately the act is determined by what is expected to cause the greatest net pleasure to oneself, then there cannot be an altruistic act that is expected to result in a net displeasure to oneself. — Samuel Lacrampe
That may indeed be the case. If a motive is like a force that pulls the will in its direction, and if the will were to be truly free in the initial choice, then that initial choice must be unmotivated. The will is however informed by the ends in order to make an informed choice; just like the archer is informed of the targets position in order to aim the arrow towards them.But we are not motivated by general concepts. We are motivated by concrete motives (which are concrete instances of general concepts) experienced in our consciousness, and these motives move us according to their strengths. — litewave
I agree that we cannot imagine general concepts (although we can understand them, since we can communicate using general terms).Can you be conscious of general triangle or general red color? [...] — litewave
I, on the other hand, claim that we can act in a way that is expected to result in a net displeasure, if we prioritize the ethical. Given the same situation and the same knowledge of it, two agents may act differently if they have prioritized different ends.Right. — litewave
If a motive is like a force that pulls the will in its direction, and if the will were to be truly free in the initial choice, then that initial choice must be unmotivated. — Samuel Lacrampe
The will is however informed by the ends in order to make an informed choice; just like the archer is informed of the targets position in order to aim the arrow towards them. — Samuel Lacrampe
I, on the other hand, claim that we can act in a way that is expected to result in a net displeasure, if we prioritize the ethical. — Samuel Lacrampe
Given the same situation and the same knowledge of it, two agents may act differently if they have prioritized different ends. — Samuel Lacrampe
E.g. "I did this, not because it is pleasurable but because it is the right thing to do". What could possibly push us to choose either the end of pleasure or the end of the ethical? — Samuel Lacrampe
I don't deny that these are all possible motives of pleasure; but I still claim that it is possible to choose the right thing simply on the basis that it is the right thing to do. — Samuel Lacrampe
I agree that both pleasure and the ethical are types of motives. But the two ends differ not in degree (i.e. strength) but in kind. As last ends, we cannot choose pleasure because it is ethical, or choose the ethical because it is pleasurable (otherwise they wouldn't be last ends but a means to another end).Even if an ethical concern or desire motivates us with something else than pleasure/satisfaction, it is still a motive in the set of motives that influence us. Every motive influences us with some strength; without strength it would not influence us at all. And the joint influence of all our motives determines our action. — litewave
So while they are both in the same set of motives, the two subsets are separate, and the influence of strength applies only to motives within the same subset. — Samuel Lacrampe
Because, as mentioned a while back, it is possible to choose what is ethical at the cost of sacrificing great pleasure, or vice versa, choose pleasure at the cost of sacrificing what is greatly ethical. This shows that the strength of the motive is not really a factor, if at all, when the competing motives are for different ends.Why would influences of strength apply only within the same subset? — litewave
Because, as mentioned a while back, it is possible to choose what is ethical at the cost of sacrificing great pleasure, or vice versa, choose pleasure at the cost of sacrificing what is greatly ethical. This shows that the strength of the motive is not really a factor, if at all, when the competing motives are for different ends. — Samuel Lacrampe
My view is that hard determinism does not make ethics irrelevant, because right and wrong are also about justification, more specifically, justification of an action, that is, ethics is also about whether an action is justified or not, and free will is irrelevant to justification, therefore we can continue asking moral questions. — Hello Human
To be clear, this claim that "strength is not a factor" only applies to the initial act of prioritizing one end over the other. After that, strength is definitely a factor, — Samuel Lacrampe
As previously mentioned, the general concepts of pleasure and the ethical don't have strengths, as they are general and not particular instances. The initial act of prioritizing pertains to the general concepts. That act is unmotivated, that is, free, and yet it is informed. — Samuel Lacrampe
Let's give an application of that idea. Suppose there existed a "happy pill": a pill that gives immense pleasure. The cost is that, as a result, you are effectively in a comma; you are no longer able to interact with the ones you love, build a family, make an impact in the world; etc. Would you take it? — Samuel Lacrampe
I'm not sure I follow your historical prelude. But you present an interesting path of objection to the claim that hard determinism "makes ethics irrelevant". I'm inclined to say it's a fair objection. But I'm not sure that someone who sincerely claims that "hard determinism makes ethics irrelevant" would agree with us.My view is that hard determinism does not make ethics irrelevant, because right and wrong are also about justification, more specifically, justification of an action, that is, ethics is also about whether an action is justified or not, and free will is irrelevant to justification, therefore we can continue asking moral questions. — Hello Human
They are an influence insofar as we have knowledge of them, although indeed they have no attraction. It is not without care if it is willed, as opposed to accidental.Things that don't have strength cannot influence us; they are inert. We can only choose between them unintentionally or without caring about the choice. If general concepts don't have strengths, they cannot influence us - they have no attractiveness for us. We cannot even be conscious of them. — litewave
It's only a thought experiment of course. Let's say the pleasure and comma are permanent, and also the pleasure from the pill is significantly greater than the pleasure lost from losing relationships. After all, if pleasure is the only ultimate end, then everything else is only a means to it; and so the particular means is irrelevant, so long as the end is reached.I don't have much expectation that such a pill exists and it also raises questions about how long the pill would work (shorter duration decreases total pleasure) and whether it is harmful physically, mentally or socially, including to my social relationships (all these harms decrease total pleasure). So if it resulted in a long-term blissful paralysis, it is safe to say that it would cause great harm to my relationships, which could decrease its attractiveness for me to such an extent that I would reject it. — litewave
They are an influence insofar as we have knowledge of them, although indeed they have no attraction. — Samuel Lacrampe
Let's say the pleasure and comma are permanent, and also the pleasure from the pill is significantly greater than the pleasure lost from losing relationships. — Samuel Lacrampe
Anyway, what do you think ? — Hello Human
If someone who commits a crime is proved --by medical examination or just opinion-- not to be able to distinguish between right or wrong, he is sent to a mental hospital instead of a prison — Alkis Piskas
Right.And when they know the difference they are judged for their responsibility. — Hello Human
This is a very sane thinking and attitude. I have met it in only very few philosophical discussions!keep objecting, it will help me see the flaws and the good in the argument. — Hello Human
My view is that in order for criminal justice to exist (as we know it) we must assume a certain level of autonomy and responsibility of individuals, called "free will". It doesn't matter that your actions from the moment you were born, to what you are going to eat for dinner are determined by the laws of nature. As long as you are a citizen who is participating in a society, it is inevitable that you will be judged by your actions which are guided by your own free will to make choices of your own volition.When libertarian free will was a widely held belief unexamined by philosophy and Plato convinced much of philosophers that you ought to do what is right by definition, moral philosophers searched to know what is right while rarely examining metaethical questions.
However, when the Enlightenment brought hard determinism into the spotlight, the question of whether or not hard determinism entails that ethics is irrelevant became increasingly important, and the fact that free will is presupposed by our justice systems only made the question more important.
Some, such as David Hume, have settled on a soft determinism to avoid the question, while others have answered by proposing that the non-existence of responsibility entails the non-existence of right and wrong.
My view is that hard determinism does not make ethics irrelevant, because right and wrong are also about justification, more specifically, justification of an action, that is, ethics is also about whether an action is justified or not, and free will is irrelevant to justification, therefore we can continue asking moral questions.
Anyway, what do you think ? — Hello Human
My view is that in order for criminal justice to exist (as we know it) we must assume a certain level of autonomy and responsibility of individuals, called "free will" — Wheatley
free will is irrelevant to just⁰ification": Justification is a way of showing that an act was right or reasonable. But not only free will is relevant, it is actually a prerequisite! If someone who commits a crime is proved --by medical examination or just opinion-- not to be able to distinguish between right or wrong, he is sent to a mental hospital instead of a prison. In that case, we cannot talk about either justification or free will — Alkis Piskas
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