We choose that for which we have a stronger motive. There are various kinds of pleasure: from eating, relaxation, sex, watching an interesting movie, doing interesting work, philosophizing, praying, etc. The satisfaction from doing the right/ethical thing is a kind of pleasure too.

Would you say that for you, there is only one last end or motive, being pleasure? Thus when you say "we do what we want", does it mean "we do what pleases us"?

I say there are not one but two last ends. Yes, being ethical can be pleasurable, but that is not necessary. In fact, siding with Kant (I think), if the intent of a good act is only for the pleasure that results from it, then the act has no moral worth. A good act has moral worth only if done with the intent that it is the right thing to do. Pleasure can still result, but as a side effect.

Would you say that for you, there is only one last end or motive, being pleasure? Thus when you say "we do what we want", does it mean "we do what pleases us"? — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes but there are various kinds of pleasure (pleasant feelings) - carnal, intellectual, spiritual, ethical... Avoidance of pain is a motive too, but since pain is the opposite of pleasure, avoidance of pain is the same as seeking to increase or maintain pleasure.

Yes, being ethical can be pleasurable, but that is not necessary. — Samuel Lacrampe

If your act is not motivated by pleasure, it means that you don't care about the act. Caring about an act means that you gain some satisfaction from doing it.

Avoidance of pain is a motive too, but since pain is the opposite of pleasure, avoidance of pain is the same as seeking to increase or maintain pleasure. — litewave

Sounds good. We could say the "pleasurable" is seeking pleasure and comfort, and also avoiding pain and discomfort.

If your act is not motivated by pleasure, it means that you don't care about the act. Caring about an act means that you gain some satisfaction from doing it. — litewave

I'd argue the opposite. If you perform the good act only as a means to the end of pleasure, it means that if the pleasure were to be gone, then you wouldn't do the act, thereby showing that you don't care about the act itself. On the other hand, if you do it for the ethical, then you would always perform the ethical act even if it were not always pleasurable, thereby showing you care about the act itself.

. If you perform the good act only as a means to the end of pleasure, it means that if the pleasure were to be gone, then you wouldn't do the act, thereby showing that you don't care about the act itself. — Samuel Lacrampe

If you desire to perform an ethical act, performing it will satisfy the desire and thus bring you pleasure. It may be a different kind of pleasure than, say, carnal pleasure, but it is still a satisfaction of a desire.

If by "desire" you mean "drive for pleasure", then no, the choice to be ethical does not always come from a desire. If on the other hand you mean "intending", then the choice to be ethical is a desire, but pleasure is not always a factor.

Not everything that is ethical is pleasurable. E.g. After having committed a crime and having a change of heart about it, you decide to turn yourself in; not because it is pleasurable but because you believe it is the right thing to do.

Ok, it depends on what satisfactions (of desires or intentions) you are willing to include under pleasure. If you don't want to call all satisfactions "pleasure", then just say that all our freely willed acts are motivated by satisfactions.

all our freely willed acts are motivated by satisfactions. — litewave

My understanding is that "satisfaction" is the feeling we get from attaining an expected good. E.g. If I have good expectations for a movie and these are met, then I am satisfied.

If that description is correct, then satisfaction occurs after the attainment of any good, pleasure or ethical, and thus it cannot be what drives us to choose one good over the other.

If that description is correct, then satisfaction occurs after the attainment of any good, pleasure or ethical, and thus it cannot be what drives us to choose one good over the other. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why not? We choose the good that brings us greater satisfaction.

I quite like this deceptively simple argument:

1. The laws of nature [premise]

2. We are part of nature [premise]

Ergo,

3. No free will [conclusion]

unless...

1 is false - there are no laws of nature [try hard and you might be able to see it]

and/or

2 is false - we are not part of nature [we might not be]

Ergo,

3. No free will [conclusion] — TheMadFool

It depends on how you define free will. If you ask your friend if he wants coffee or tea and he chooses coffee, do you say: "That wasn't free will, because that was clear since the Big Bang, please choose what you really want!"?

It depends on how you define free will. If you ask your friend if he wants coffee or tea and he chooses coffee, do you say: "That wasn't free will, because that was clear since the Big Bang, please choose what you really want!"? — SolarWind

We have choices. Like it or not, as per the argument which I simply reproduced, none of the choices you make are free i.e. they're determined by forces beyond our control. That should cover all the bases, no?

Nature is not subject to its laws. It is their container. It "stands aloof".
Likewise, My True Nature stands above the laws which make it up.

Nature is not subject to its laws. It is their container. It "stands aloof".
Likewise, My True Nature stands above the laws which make it up. — Yohan

Nature is not subject to its laws. An example?

Your true nature stands above the laws... An example?

We have choices. Like it or not, as per the argument which I simply reproduced, none of the choices you make are free i.e. they're determined by forces beyond our control. That should cover all the bases, no? — TheMadFool

You can also define that free will prevails when one has the feeling to decide freely. If there is coffee and tea in my kitchen and I decide for the tea and also have the feeling to have decided freely, then I could speak of free will.

Otherwise, every thing is what you define it to be. If I define "free will" as a hotdog, then a hotdog is just free will.

Nature is not subject to its laws. An example?
Your true nature stands above the laws... An example? — TheMadFool

The container cannot be contained by its content.
Nature is the super-container of everything except itself. So how can anything in nature limit it?
I am also a container.

Nature doesn't follow the law. Nature is the law.
I don't follow the laws of my nature. I am the root principle which the various sub-principles of my nature are rooted.

Right. But the greater satisfaction comes from the greater of the two goods, which is the one we have freely chosen to prioritize. Given its definition, bringing satisfaction in the argument just makes it circular.

Why would we choose to prioritize one of the goods? Your answer is: Because we choose to prioritize one of the goods. My answer is: Because one of the goods brings us greater satisfaction. Satisfaction is a good feeling, and like any feeling it is constituted by the state of the mind. If you insist on choosing the state of the mind you get into a regress because you need a motive to choose the state of the mind and a motive to choose that motive, etc. until you get to a motive that you have not chosen, which then determines the state of the mind and thus the levels of satisfaction from goods.

My view is that hard determinism does not make ethics irrelevant, because right and wrong are also about justification, more specifically, justification of an action, that is, ethics is also about whether an action is justified or not, and free will is irrelevant to justification, therefore we can continue asking moral questions. — Hello Human

I agree that we can engage in moral deliberation, and speak about things like values, intentions, actions, justifications, and personal responsibility, without relying on a conception of free will.

On the other hand, I think your approach concedes too much to the hard determinist. I suggest the alleged conflict between determinism and freedom is a paradigm case of a philosophical pseudoproblem. There is a sort of freedom that animals like us clearly do have. I would argue that this freedom of ours is compatible with whatever degree of "causal determination" may be said to apply to things like us or to the whole cosmos. Accordingly, I see little room for hard determinism. It's not clear to me what could motivate a hard determinist to argue against the sort of compatibilist view I've indicated -- short of something like a radically reductive eliminativism, which I would reject on other grounds.

If satisfaction is a good feeling then it is a type of pleasure. And if, as you say, we choose what brings the most satisfaction, then we are back to saying that we choose what brings the most pleasure. But as previously claimed, the ethical is not necessarily what brings the most pleasure, and yet we can choose it simply on the grounds that it is the right thing to do. Refer back to the criminal with the change of heart example.

What kind of feeling is satisfaction then?

I am fine with saying that satisfaction is a type of pleasure, and also that it results from reaching a chosen goal. But it does not follow that we choose the goal based on what results in the strongest overall pleasure. Again, using the criminal example, he may get a bit of satisfaction when turning himself in, but this will not result in the highest overall pleasure, since going to jail is highly unpleasurable.

Yes, going to jail is highly unpleasurable but not turning himself in might be even more unpleasurable for him due to pangs of conscience or maybe a religious belief. Such a decision is surely highly emotional, it's not just that he plainly observes that turning himself in is the right thing to do.

If a person doesn't act in the direction of their strongest motive/pleasure/satisfaction then why would he act so? It seems that such an act would be unmotivated, at least to the extent of the difference between the person's motive (if any) for the act and his stronger counter-motive. But any machine is capable of an unmotivated act.

If a person doesn't act in the direction of their strongest motive/pleasure/satisfaction then why would he act so? It seems that such an act would be unmotivated [...] — litewave

It is not unmotivated since the act is motived by the ethical. So to reiterate: The end goal between pleasure and the ethical, i.e. black angel and white angel, is freely chosen. After that, the drive is indeed the strongest motive to that end goal, which once reached, will produce some satisfaction.

Let me try another way: If a seemingly morally good act is always motivated by pleasure or satisfaction to oneself, then it sounds like all acts are inherently selfish. But as selfishness is typically seen as immoral, it would follow that there really are no morally good acts. Doesn't this sound absurd?

It is not unmotivated since the act is motived by the ethical. So to reiterate: The end goal between pleasure and the ethical, i.e. black angel and white angel, is freely chosen. After that, the drive is indeed the strongest motive to that end goal, which once reached, will produce some satisfaction. — Samuel Lacrampe

But if a motive appears only after the choice of the goal, it means that the choice itself (the act of choosing the goal) is unmotivated.

Let me try another way: If a seemingly morally good act is always motivated by pleasure or satisfaction to oneself, then it sounds like all acts are inherently selfish. But as selfishness is typically seen as immoral, it would follow that there really are no morally good acts. Doesn't this sound absurd? — Samuel Lacrampe

Even if all acts are motivated by the actor's own pleasure or satisfaction, some acts may be directed to helping or benefitting others so these could be called altruistic. Loving acts typically bring pleasure to both the actor and the person to whom the act is directed.

But if a motive appears only after the choice of the goal, it means that the choice itself (the act of choosing the goal) is unmotivated. — litewave

As I see it, nothing prevents the choice of the end to be motivated by the end itself. Choose pleasure because the end is pleasurable, or choose the ethical because the end is righteous.

Even if all acts are motivated by the actor's own pleasure or satisfaction, some acts may be directed to helping or benefitting others so these could be called altruistic. Loving acts typically bring pleasure to both the actor and the person to whom the act is directed. — litewave

Yes, but if the drive is only the pleasure to oneself and nothing else, then the pleasure to others is merely a byproduct or an accident. Like a rock falling down a cliff which happens to hit a criminal and prevents a crime - it's a good outcome, but there is no merit to the rock.

As I see it, nothing prevents the choice of the end to be motivated by the end itself. Choose pleasure because the end is pleasurable, or choose the ethical because the end is righteous. — Samuel Lacrampe

Then the end is a motive that will make the person choose this end, unless the person has a stronger counter-motive.

Yes, but if the drive is only the pleasure to oneself and nothing else, then the pleasure to others is merely a byproduct or an accident. Like a rock falling down a cliff which happens to hit a criminal and prevents a crime - it's a good outcome, but there is no merit to the rock. — Samuel Lacrampe

The pleasure provided to others from an altruistic act is not just a byproduct of the act; it is the condition on which the pleasure of the giver depends.

ethics is also about whether an action is justified or not, and free will is irrelevant to justification, therefore we can continue asking moral questions. — Hello Human

.
There is no such thing as justification under hard determinism. Everything is determined. Justification is just an utterance made without any meaning. Everything is determined.

The real problem with hard determinism is that there really isn't any discussion in this thread. It's all been determined. Now as fantastic as is may seem, the Big Bang determined persistent discussion about all kinds of subjects. Pure Black Magic.

Hard Determinists have created a more fantastical tale than the stories in the Bible, yet they believe it. Why? Because people like to create their own religious stories that they can believe in. Religious beliefs are archetypical. Determinism is just the latest religious doctrine.

Then the end is a motive that will make the person choose this end, unless the person has a stronger counter-motive. — litewave

The end is indeed what motivates the will to choose it, but not because of its strength (those general ends don't have a strength; only particular instances of them have a strength); but rather because of its nature. E.g. pleasure is a subjective value whereas the ethical is an objective value.

The pleasure provided to others from an altruistic act is not just a byproduct of the act; it is the condition on which the pleasure of the giver depends. — litewave

That's fine. So it can be a byproduct or a means to an end. But the point is that the pleasure to others is still done for my sake and not theirs. The act is merely a tool for my own pleasure, and if the tool were to cease providing me pleasure, then I would drop it. Altruism is supposed to be selfless, or, at best, it is my pleasure that is the byproduct.