And the anti-realist will say that this is how our everyday conversions work. The anti-realist's position is an accurate representation of truth and statements as we ordinarily use them and the world as we ordinarily understand it. — Michael

There is a belief among ultra-religious Jews that the name of a person defines the person in a particular way. I suppose this comes from the fact that within the Bible certain characters have their names changed when major events occur in their lives. Jacob, for example, became Israel when he wrestled with an angel. So in current day ultra-orthodoxy a treatment for the dying is to change their name as that will change the person.

Anyway, was Jacob the same person after he was named Israel or the sick person the same person after he was renamed if the community of meshuggenehs all think he's changed identities.

You're going to have to explain the relevance of this response, because I'm not seeing it.

Understanding.
— Banno

To what end? — baker

As an end in itself.

Not all of us have an "end in itself". :wink:

...dichotic lens... — I like sushi

A what now?

There’s certainly a sense in which I’m not the same person I was 20 years ago. I’ve grown and changed as a person - new behaviours and attitudes, likes and dislikes, experiences and memories, and so on. And my material body is not the same that I had 20 years ago, with almost every cell dying and being replaced over time.

But then there is also a sense of continuity, and a linguistic practice of referring to my old self as being my old self. Unless you want to argue for something like a persistent immaterial soul, you can’t make sense of the truth of this by referring to some alleged mind-independent state-of-affairs that such considerations and claims correspond to. It can only be understood according to an anti-realist account (of meaning and truth).

So to answer your question, Jacob both was and wasn’t the same person he was before being named Israel. There are different senses that we understand being the same person, and some of these (excluding the case of the impermanent material body) don’t have mind-independent truth conditions, and so can’t be understood according to realism (which as I’ve mentioned before doesn’t have anything useful to say about identity).

Do cars, houses and trees exist mind-independently? No. But it doesn't follow that they're not real, unless you define the use of the word "real" to mean something mind-independent.

I mean, I'm going to say that this laptop isn't real or that the tree outside my window isn't real? This is crazy talk.

But then if you say is this laptop I see or the tree outside my window mind-independent, I'd say no and we'd agree. Which makes talk of "realism" a matter of semantics and not substantive.

Unless you want to talk about ghosts, then we have to clarify a little. :wink:

I'm just addressing your accusation that it leads to omniscience. — Michael

A conclusion, rather than an accusation.

What you haven't done is provided an account of truth; rather you are advocating a change in the way we use the word in order to avoid the difficulties found in Fitch.

And that's entirely reasonable.

But what I want is an account of truth. That is, your reply is unhelpful.

We split up the world into so-called objects, on such a view, and thus all statements that presuppose there being multiple objects are strictly false, just a manner of speaking. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't see how that follows.

"the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" isn't made true by objective features of the world but by our own perceptions/conceptions/attitudes/whatever. — Michael

Is that so?

The ship leaves port. The mast is replaced, then the keel; the various planks of the hull are replaced. At each step something is taken and something replaced. Take out the word "objective" and it's clear that the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" is made true by features of the world.

A rope consisting of innumerable threads, none of which run from end to end, is nevertheless a rope.

It's not about whether or not we call the ship "Theseus". It's about whether or not "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" is true, and what makes it true. — Michael

These are the very same question, expressed differently.

That's a rather important lesson that came from linguistic philosophy. It needs to be understood, if the problem is to be dealt with.

You have us

choose to grab an arbitrary bunch of that stuff and call it X
— Hanover

and then assign X to categories (which aren't things in the world) based on some criteria, and we

choose those criteria for whatever purposes we have
— Hanover

So truth is only --- not even "also" but "only" --- a matter of our choices. — Srap Tasmaner

Again, this does not seem to follow.

It's as much dependent on what happens to that stuff as what we say about it.

Which is the main point I'm making on this thread: that realism vs anti-realism is the same issue as direction of fit; and that consequently it's a question of monitoring direction of fit rather than ontology.

What is the uninterpreted? That's a very old question that has no rational answer. — frank

Nope. Everything is always interpreted. The question has been answered.

"Interpreted" implies the act of interpretation. The object of that action is assumed to be something not yet interpreted.

It's a logical consequence of the use of "interpreted" unless you stipulate some other meaning for the word.

Maybe my point was missed or not well stated — Hanover

Yep. Thanks for clarifying.

How does the noumenal affect the phenomenal? — Hanover

The division between noumenal and phenomenal implies an uninterpreted world. There isn't an uninterpreted world. Or if you prefer, it's clearer if you adopt a grammar that does not rely on an uninterpreted world.

So the question of how the noumenal effects the phenomenal is dissipated by adopting an alternative picture. The world is all that is the case; what is the case can be stated, and hence is already part of our calculus of cause and effect.

This is a much better approach than asking questions of the noumenal - a something about which we can know nothing, and hence about which we can say nothing.

Drop that nonsense and things start to make sense.

The object of that action is assumed to be something not yet interpreted. — frank

There's your mistake.

T-sentences again, of course. But I might not go over that again here.

I don't see how that follows. — Banno

There's actually a proxy for The One Thing to hand: the unceasing flow of sensory data. And sure enough, people who start there, who in some sense consider that the realest of reals, are inclined to say that what you take to be an individual object is a fiction, that sentences like "My coffee cup is on the nightstand" aren't literally about coffee cups and nightstands but about artifacts of the model we build based on the flow of sensory data, and thus not literally true. Maybe it makes a difference that something is theorized to be "out there" causing the flow of data, but maybe it doesn't.

The object of that action is assumed to be something not yet interpreted.
— frank

There's your mistake. — Banno

No mistake. Ask anyone competent in English.

The realist defines the ship as the specific matter that was there originally because he's offering a metaphysical definition within the context of that conversation. That is, the ship is exactly what it is. — Hanover

Nuh. A realist is at liberty to use reference in any way they see fit. It's clear that the ship can be treated as the same, or as different, and that the distinction is of no consequence so long as one keeps track of which one is making use of. If you had contracted to buy the ship on it's return, then take up the discussion in the courts; but the issue is semantic, since the history of the ship is clear to all.

There is no argument as to the facts, only as to the suitability of an expression.

No mistake. Ask anyone competent in English. — frank

Then show me the supporting documentation.

Then show me the supporting documentation. — Banno

Well we've established you aren't fluent in English. What language do you want it in?

Ah, I see - a view expounded, not defended. My error.

Well we've established you aren't fluent in English. What language do you want it in? — frank

Back to ad homs already.

Your thesis is that interpretation implies something uninterpreted. My contention is that everything is already interpreted. On my account there is only reinterpretation.

My argument would be that providing an interpretation is giving a meaning to something - that's the commones definition; but things already have a meaning, and hence an interpretation.

There's a good chance that we are talking at cross purposes, so if you want to proceed we might go into the common uses of the related terms.

Or if you prefer the ad hom approach, we can just cut the good bits and I'll tell you to fuck off.

Up to you.

You seem to want to deny that there is or are private experiences (but I'm not sure). — Sam26

This is perplexing, since I have the greatest respect for your understanding of the topic.

I do not deny that we have experiences. But I think the distinction between private and public experiences has been shown to be muddled. So I would deny that it is helpful to call an experience private.

There's actually a proxy for The One Thing to hand: the unceasing flow of sensory data. And sure enough, people who start there, who in some sense consider that the realest of reals, are inclined to say that what you take to be an individual object is a fiction, that sentences like "My coffee cup is on the nightstand" aren't literally about coffee cups and nightstands but about artifacts of the model we build based on the flow of sensory data, and thus not literally true. Maybe it makes a difference that something is theorized to be "out there" causing the flow of data, but maybe it doesn't. — Srap Tasmaner

If there is "something out there" that reliably results in every person who has adequate eyesight seeing a coffee cup on a nightstand, then there must be some independently real (of individual human minds, at least) existence or reality, no? Whether we call that (for parsimony's sake) "the coffee cup on the nightstand" or less parsimoniously "the unknowable X that reliably produces our perception of the coffee cup on the nightstand" wouldn't seem to make any significant difference to what we can claim to know (provided we are sophisticated and mindful enough not to fall into naive, as opposed to relational, realism).

Either way I think it seems obvious that there is something out there (meaning something independent of the individual mind) because it could not plausibly be thought to be a collective hallucination unless there is something different out than a substantial world ot there: a collective mind, or a connection between all minds that we don't know about. Even then it would not be definable as an hallucination because that is when one person sees something others don't. So it seems we are stuck with believing that something is out there and the issue just boils down to whether it makes a difference as to how we refer to that something.

Ya, I agree, how we refer to these experiences can be a bit muddled. However, I won't resort to saying your English is poor. :wink:

Well we've established you aren't fluent in English. What language do you want it in?
— frank

Back to ad homs already. — Banno

That's actually not an ad hom. If you pretend not to understand a common English word, expect some joking.

My argument would be that providing an interpretation is giving a meaning to something - that's the common definition; but things already have a meaning, and hence an interpretation. — Banno

So things are interpreted, but no one ever did any interpreting because it was already interpreted.

As I mentioned, the problem is ancient and unsolved. There's a reason for that.

Have a good day.

So things are interpreted, but no one ever did any interpreting because it was already interpreted. — frank

Re-read that with care. Have a little think about it.

You might be interested in Brandom's and McDowell's (somewhat different) takes on the idea that everything is always already interpreted. To put it simply McDowell says the world is always already conceptually shaped. Both Brandom and McDowell build on the work of Sellars and Davidson.

https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674576100

Cheers.

My suspicion is that there would be little disagreement between us here.