That’s kind of why I was drawn to Husserl’s ideas. Just deal with the phenomenon and if something is revealed that way then something is revealed. The phenomenon will not dissolve either way.

That said, we cannot help viewing the world through a dichotic lens. Distinctions like these seem necessary to map out experience to some degree.

A person committed to exploring idealist views has a lot to contend with, going against the flow of society. Sadly, this can sometimes end very badly for them. — baker

I'm fine, thanks all the same.

Start new threads, as the above is off-topic here. See you there. — baker

What an extraordinary reply!

Good for you!

But you can't have your cake and eat it. If you say that verification and truth are the same, then you are also saying that all truths have been verified. — Banno

Yes, and? That's a tautology as I've said.

That is not how the rest of us use the word "truth". That's fine. — Banno

Maybe not. I'm just addressing your accusation that it leads to omniscience. That all truths have been verified is that all verified propositions have been verified, but that isn't that all propositions (or their negation) have been verified, and so isn't omniscience.

A mathematical anti-realist can claim to not know the square root of 123 without contradicting himself.

Start new threads, as the above is off-topic here. See you there. — baker

You asked, and I answered. In fact, the instant conversation was entirely in response to a question that you yourself asked:

I asked you whether you knew better than than the Buddha. Do you? — baker

...to which I, being in fact stringently anti-messianist in general (a certain result of my having been raised Christian), felt compelled to respond. I agree that it has strayed from @Banno's intent, though, so you are certainly right in suggesting that we drop it.

I'd say there are things and there are categories. Pluto was a planet, then it was not, but it was always there. All sorts of criteria must be met for us to call Pluto a planet and we can choose those criteria for whatever purposes we have, but Pluto remains regardless of what we call it and regardless of what category we assign it. That I take to be the fundamental tenant of realism. There is an independent substance sustaining the thing; otherwise the thing exists as a pure construct of our imagination. — Hanover

I think there is a concern remaining, even for so minimal a realism as this, that we are not justified in assuming that there are many things to classify. If we impose individuation just as we impose categories, then Pluto is not a thing at all, but part of a thing, the one thing. We split up the world into so-called objects, on such a view, and thus all statements that presuppose there being multiple objects are strictly false, just a manner of speaking.

I'd say there are things and there are categories. Pluto was a planet, then it was not, but it was always there. All sorts of criteria must be met for us to call Pluto a planet and we can choose those criteria for whatever purposes we have, but Pluto remains regardless of what we call it and regardless of what category we assign it. That I take to be the fundamental tenant of realism. There is an independent substance sustaining the thing; otherwise the thing exists as a pure construct of our imagination. — Hanover

What makes Pluto one thing, and not trillions of different things? What we call "Pluto" is "really" a mass of particles in close proximity. Which of those particles are part of Pluto, which are part of some separated rock, which are a passing photon from the Sun?

Perhaps those particles have an independent substance, but I don't think Pluto is reducible to those particles. Names/words aren't just pointers to mind-independent entities. Think of the Ship of Theseus.

What makes Pluto one thing, and not trillions of different things? What we call "Pluto" is "really" a mass of particles in close proximity. Which of those particles are part of Pluto, which are part of some separated rock, which are a passing photon from the Sun? — Michael

Existence is not an attribute or property of an object.

To say an object exists is different from saying an object has certain properties. Pluto exists as a random allotment of particles (and the particles in themselves are also a random allotment of smaller particles, thus an infinite regress). Whether Pluto is a planet is a question about what specific properties we assign to the term "planet" and whether the object of Pluto has them.

Pluto exists as a random allotment of particles — Hanover

Does it? As I brought up the Ship of Theseus then let's consider that. The ship that leaves is the ship that returns but the material that leaves isn't the material that returns, therefore the ship isn't the material.

Or would you commit to saying that the ship that leaves isn't the ship that returns, which it would appear the realist must? If so then how much of the material is the "true" substance of the thing? If only half the parts are replaced does it remain the same ship? A quarter? A tenth?

We split up the world into so-called objects, on such a view, and thus all statements that presuppose there being multiple objects are strictly false, just a manner of speaking. — Srap Tasmaner

That we split the world into arbitrarily assigned objects doesn't challenge the fact that there is external existence. Any object and any particle theoretically can be subdivided and grouped with other objects, but there is something in existence and we can choose to grab an arbitrary bunch of that stuff and call it X.

X designates what is in existence, but assigns no particular property to that existnece.

Does it? As I brought up the Ship of Theseus then let's consider that. The ship that leaves is the ship that returns but the material that leaves isn't the material that returns, therefore the ship isn't the material. — Michael

Or to bring it back to the topic of truth conditions, "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" isn't made true by objective features of the world but by our own perceptions/conceptions/attitudes/whatever. We're anti-realists about the Ship of Theseus (assuming you agree that the ship that leaves is the ship that returns).

Of course, that's not to say that there isn't also mind-independent material stuff. It's just that that stuff has nothing to do with whether or not the ship that leaves is the ship that returns.

Does it? As I brought up the Ship of Theseus then let's consider that. The ship that leaves is the ship that returns but the material that leaves isn't the material that returns, therefore the ship isn't the material.

Or would you commit to saying that the ship that leaves isn't the ship that returns, which it would appear the realist must. If so, then how much of the material is the "true" substance of the thing? If only half the parts are replaced does it remain the same ship? A quarter? A tenth? — Michael

Whatever of the same returns is what returns. If a single atom of the old boat returns, then we have a single atom of the old boat.

Whether you wish to call the boat Theseus isn't a metaphysical question. If I have a jar of 100 marbles that I call "Tommy" and I replace 99 of them with new marbles, whether I still have Tommy is a definitional question, not a metaphysical one. What I can say is that I have one original marble. If we decide I no longer have Tommy, we haven't defined that single marble out of existence to where we can now say since Tommy is dead there's nothing left of him.

Whether those marbles are Tommy isn't the question. Which marbles might exist is the question, and if you want to call them Tommy or not isn't part of that question.

It's not about whether or not we call the ship "Theseus". It's about whether or not "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" is true, and what makes it true. There's the vacuous answer that "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" is true iff the ship that leaves is the ship that returns, but that tells us nothing.

On the one hand we have the realist who says that statements are made true by objective features of the world, but what objective features of the world must obtain for the ship that leaves to be the ship that returns? Presumably that the mind-independent material stuff that leaves is the mind-independent material stuff that returns. Which in this case doesn't obtain, and so the realist must commit to "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" being false. However that might not be a commitment the realist is willing to make, and so they must accept an anti-realist account of "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" being true; that it's true because we think of the ship that leaves as being the ship that returns.

And what of truth? If realism is worth talking about, it's the idea that some of the things we say about some of the things in the world are true in virtue of those things being what they are. You have us

choose to grab an arbitrary bunch of that stuff and call it X — Hanover

and then assign X to categories (which aren't things in the world) based on some criteria, and we

choose those criteria for whatever purposes we have — Hanover

So truth is only --- not even "also" but "only" --- a matter of our choices.

That's not much of a realism. It looks like idealism + "Oh yeah, and there's some stuff, I guess."

Of course, that's not to say that there isn't also mind-independent material stuff. — Michael

The same problem applies to the material stuff. It's also an interpretation that implies the uninterpreted. What is the uninterpreted? That's a very old question that has no rational answer.

So truth is only --- not even "also" but "only" --- a matter of our choices.

That's not much of a realism. It looks like idealism + "Oh yeah, and there's some stuff, I guess." — Srap Tasmaner

This is consistent with my comment to @Banno, which was was:

What part of the planet do you propose is restricted by the world? — Hanover

Maybe my point was missed or not well stated, but it asks how does reality restrict anything we do, perceive, or believe? We can say it does, but exactly how? How does the noumenal affect the phenomenal? Maybe not at all, but somehow?

This is the quandary, and there isn't an adequate answer, thus leaving philosophers with plenty to talk about forever and ever.

Our choices: (1) idealism and just declare everything is just imagined, and then are left wondering what causes us to imagine in such a way, (2) direct realism and declare the world is just as we see it to be, ignoring the fact the different beings perceive in different ways, or (3) indirect realism, declaring we can interpret reality, but we have no idea how that interpretation is consistent with reality.

The other solution here is to ignore things as they are, admitting that such is an impossible inquiry and then to talk about word games, pretending that ignoring the problem resolves the problem. Or maybe pragmatism, which asks why even ask when we're going to do what we're going to do anyway.

On the one hand we have the realist who says that statements are made true by objective features of the world, but what objective features of the world must obtain for the ship that leaves to be the ship that returns? Presumably that the mind-independent material stuff that leaves is the mind-independent material stuff that returns. Which in this case doesn't obtain, and so the realist must commit to "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" being false. However that might not be a commitment the realist is willing to make, and so they must accept an anti-realist account of "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" being true; that it's true because we think of the ship that leaves as being the ship that returns. — Michael

The realist does commit as you've said they would (and as I've bolded). The realist defines the ship as the specific matter that was there originally because he's offering a metaphysical definition within the context of that conversation. That is, the ship is exactly what it is.

In the vernacular however, "the ship" is a social construct, subject to whatever definition the speakers want it to have. We call it the same boat because it maintained a sense of apparent identity through time and continued its same function. Regardless of why we keep calling it the same name has no metaphysical impact. We're just identifying something consistently because we happen not to care what its material composition is through time for our definitional purposes.

So, yes, the ship (defined as a ship of material composition X) that leaves is not the ship that returns, but the ship (defined as a boat that serves the same function through time) that leaves is the ship that returns.

As long as we know what we mean by "ship" and don't equivocate, this can remain clear.

:up:

"Our choices:" ... (4) objective realism and declare that the world consists of ineluctable, interpretation/perspective-invariant features (e.g. facts, structures, forces, events, things) which are, therefore, maladaptive to deny or ignore.

how does reality restrict anything we do, perceive, or believe? We can say it does, but exactly how? How does the noumenal affect the phenomenal? — Hanover

Reality obviously restricts what we can do. Maybe I'm misunderstanding you.

But talk is cheap, no question, and people can say anything they like.

There are two answers here: (1) it is righteous to intend that reality restrict what you say about it in just the way it restricts what you can do; (2) what we say we do not say in isolation, unconnected to what else we say and do, so if you claim your time at the gym has really been paying off and you could lift my car over your head with ease, it's natural for me to say, "Prove it." At that point, I let reality do the talking for me.

The realist does commit as you've said they would (and as I've bolded). The realist defines the ship as the specific matter that was there originally because he's offering a metaphysical definition within the context of that conversation. That is, the ship is exactly what it is. — Hanover

This "metaphysical definition" is useless then. The ship becomes a new ship every instant, atoms rubbing off in the wind or water, electrons absorbing photons from the Sun, etc. And it's still not entirely clear which material stuff is referred to when you talk about "the ship" in this metaphysical sense; there's no objective cut-off point that says that this particle is part of the ship and this particle is just passing by.

In the vernacular however, "the ship" is a social construct, subject to whatever definition the speakers want it to have. We call it the same boat because it maintained a sense of apparent identity through time and continued its same function. Regardless of why we keep calling it the same name has no metaphysical impact. We're just identifying something consistently because we happen not to care what its material composition is through time for our definitional purposes.

And the anti-realist will say that this is how our everyday conversions work. The anti-realist's position is an accurate representation of truth and statements as we ordinarily use them and the world as we ordinarily understand it.

"Hmm. Internal... you mean private? Something is amiss."

It can't be completely private. What I mean by private is that it's me having the belief, just as I can have a private sensation. However, if we are to refer to beliefs or sensations as part of language, there must be something to refer to (something the community can get a hold of, which is not the internal private thing), and these can be linguistic, or just simple non-verbal acts (opening a door, building a hut, etc). We show (linguistic or otherwise) what we believe, or that we're in pain, i.e., there are outward signs. We don't believe a stone is conscious, because there is no sign of consciousness - there just isn't anything to latch onto. You seem to want to deny that there is or are private experiences (but I'm not sure). I think we both agree that we can't talk to each other in any meaningful way if meaning is dependent upon an internal thing or object - it has to have an external component for meaning to grab hold. That's my take. I think we're close, but there may be some differences. I think we can refer to the private, as long as we don't think meaning is solely derived from the private.

@Srap Tasmaner@Michael

Do you guys think it would be possible to match your avatars even closer just to make this more confusing?

It's confusing me too. :lol:

This "metaphysical definition" is useless then. The ship becomes a new ship every instant, atoms rubbing off in the wind or water, electrons absorbing photons from the Sun, etc. And it's still not entirely clear which material stuff is referred to when you talk about "the ship" in this metaphysical sense; there's no objective cut-off point that says that this particle is part of the ship and this particle is just passing by. — Michael

If the world is in the flux you suggest, then are you asserting a lack of identity of any object without a perceiver?

if you claim your time at the gym has really been paying off and you could lift my car over your head with ease, it's natural for me to say, "Prove it." At that point, I let reality do the talking for me. — Srap Tasmaner

Lovely bit of research to muddy those waters.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1460-9568.2008.06344.x?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false

@Hanover's belief about whether the time at the gym has paid off affects his car-lifting abilities. External reality's not so strict an arbiter as you might like it to be here.

Hanover's belief about whether the time at the gym has paid off affects his car-lifting abilities. External reality's not so strict an arbiter as you might like it to be here. — Isaac

My little car weighs about 1100 kg. The current world record for a clean and jerk is 166 kg.

My little car weighs about 1100 kg. The current world record for a clean and jerk is 166 kg. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, there are limits, the point is reality still doesn't arbitrate in the way naive realists would like here. Note the current record. We know there's a limit, we don't know where it is, so we're no closer to objective reality, only the pragmatic assumption of limits so extreme that they rarely feature in any real world implication of realism/anti-realism. Hanover can't lift the moon or fly to the sun, but when people argue about objective realism they're not doing so to disabuse others of such notions. They do so to lend authority to the very mundane parameters, the concretising of which anchors their belief systems against change. To disabuse others of quite possible extensions of our current limits that conflict with their preferred narratives.

But I've made this point already, I just thought I'd do it with a citation this time.

But I've made this point already, I just thought I'd do it with a citation this time. — Isaac

I miss your point. I've not argued for naive realism. It was very far from it. I argued for reality mediated by perceptions, with an assertion there was an objective underlying reality that was dubiously knowable. To hold otherwise is anti-realism, which sounds like idealism of a sort. I also don't follow how the placebo effect disproves naive realism even if it were held. Typically the direct realists argue from a linguistic or pragmatic perspective and tend to be anti-metaphysical.

Anyway, maybe I misunderstood your post.