Your statement that animals lack consciousness is a simple falsehood. — Wayfarer

Strictly it's subjectivity, which they (and fundamental particles) lack.

Your statement that animals lack consciousness is a simple falsehood.

The only objection to panpsychism that one needs is that there's no good reason to believe it. There's zero evidence for it. Making shit up to solve something that's seen as a theoretical problem isn't a good reason to believe anything. — Terrapin Station

It's worth noting that there is zero evidence for a number of beliefs, some of which include beliefs about what counts as evidence for which we surely do not have evidence for.

In addition, successful scientific arguments have been theoretical before. When there's some issue with a theory people 'make shit up' all the time to try and resolve said issue and create arguments, some of which are philosophical, about which is a better solution. So at least with how scientists have gone about their business before and now it just doesn't make sense to reject creative theorizing.


I'd say that if someone were to say "There is no good reason to believe it", then I'd at first ask about their stance on consciousness, in the sense of the hard problem of consciousness. From there, if they agree that said problem is a problem, then it would seem they'd have to offer a solution themselves, or simply claim ignorance at least. Even if there is no good solution, the arguments are more abductive than anything, so there could still be a best solution (after all -- good solutions usually only come after having developed an already accepted theory). So if one were to claim ignorance then it would just be a statement of where they are in the debate, rather than something which we should adopt ourselves. Then we'd come to the various proposed solutions to the hard problem of consciousness, of which pan-psychism is at least a contender worth considering. If you believe otherwise, then my suspicion, initially at least, is that you are just incredulous at what sounds like a ridiculous idea on its face -- but that is no argument against adopting a belief.

So it seems to me that the only path to -- rationally at least -- shrugging off pan-psychism is through rejection of the hard problem of consciousness in the first place (insofar that said rejection is based on reason, too, rather than simple frustration with what sounds like some ridiculous ideas).

Tom is trying to backtrack, and tone down that rhetoric, now saying that animals lack a certain "type" of knowledge. But that's a rather meaningless statement. The type of knowledge which dogs have is different from the type which cats have, and this is different from the type that beavers have, which is different from the type that crows have, and so forth. In fact, that's pretty much what distinguishes one species from another, that each one has a different kind of knowledge.

What Tom appears to be saying, is that since human beings have language, and the ability to communicate, this gives them the capacity to say "what is", and this is a special sort of knowledge. So perhaps we could put all the other "types" of knowledge into one category, and keep this type of knowledge as separate, as special. But I don't think that's justified, because this type of knowledge, the capacity to say "what is", is just one of the many types, and nothing has been demonstrated to give it particular distinction, such that the others might be classed together, and this one separated out to have its own class.

So it seems to me that the only path to -- rationally at least -- shrugging off pan-psychism is through rejection of the hard problem of consciousness in the first place (insofar that said rejection is based on reason, too, rather than simple frustration with what sounds like some ridiculous ideas). — Moliere

There is another option: it is not the brain that is conscious, but the abstraction instantiated on the brain. i.e. consciousness is a software feature rather than a hardware epiphenomenon.

Actually, I mentioned earlier in the thread that I considered panpsychism "not crazy enough" and even "boring". The idea that abstractions can be conscious seems to be the crazy idea that solves all the problems and is fully compatible with other knowledge i.e science, while avoiding dualism.

Well, there's many options, but I would just say that you can't simply shrug off pan-psychism, is all. That "there is no good reason to believe it" -- you may find other solutions to the problem more convincing for x, y, or z reasons, or you may find the problem to be not a problem in the first place, but pan-psychism isn't just proposed for the hell of it, I'd say.

Well, there's many options, but I would just say that you can't simply shrug off pan-psychism, is all. That "there is no good reason to believe it" -- you may find other solutions to the problem more convincing for x, y, or z reasons, or you may find the problem to be not a problem in the first place, but pan-psychism isn't just proposed for the hell of it, I'd say. — Moliere

Panpsychism is refuted by the knowledge argument.

Let's just grant that.

You still have an argument, unlike the statement "there is no good reason to believe it" -- that is all I'm arguing against.

There is no such thing as a good reason. Belief is counterproductive.

I have outlined arguments that panpsychism is wrong. These arguments highlight a problem, that I argue, is deeper than the Hard Problem.

The Fundamental Problem is the problem of the creation of (explanatory) knowledge.

Well, 'completelly failing to understand something' is not an argument against it. — Wayfarer

Sure. But what does that have to do with anything anyone has said?

I'm not arguing that making shit up simply to plug something thought of as a theoretical problem isn't common. In fact, I'm saying something rather iconoclastic because it's so common. You seem, on the other hand, to be suggesting that the fact that it's common justifies it. I don't agree with that.

Re consciousness, I don't agree that there is a "hard problem." The only hard problem is folks' inability to reconcile their not very well grounded, often religious-based views with reality.

Panpsychism is refuted by the knowledge argument. — tom

Your definition of "knowledge" is tailored for the purpose, so this argument is only begging the question.

The Fundamental Problem is the problem of the creation of (explanatory) knowledge. — tom

Explanatory knowledge, (knowing-that), is just another form of knowing-how, involving knowing how to communicate. When you recognize this, you'll realize that all living things know how to do various different things. The fundamental problem therefore, is not the creation of explanatory knowledge, which is just an extension of know-how, it is the creation of knowledge in general, in the sense of knowing how to do anything at all.

The reason why panpsychism is a valid ontological position is that we notice in our studies of the physical universe, that matter "knows how" to follow the laws of nature. There are two ways that we can account for the fact that matter follows laws. We can assume a transcendent God type of thing, which created matter intentionally, to follow laws, or we can assume that the tendency to follow laws is some sort of habituation within the matter itself. The latter involves panpsychism. We cannot assume that the capacity to follow laws is just some random occurrence, because following laws is directly opposite to random occurrence.

The only hard problem is folks' inability to reconcile their not very well grounded, often religious-based views with [my view]. — Terrapin Station

that matter "knows how" to follow the laws of nature — Metaphysician Undercover

Balls don't know how to roll downhill. If there's a hill, balls will roll down it. It's not as if they can do anything else. Your comment more or less reinforces the notion that panpsychism is anthropomorphic, or attributes intention to inanimate objects. One can well explain the motions of objects without any reference to intention; the problem that panpsychism is trying to solve, is how some 'configurations of matter', like the brain, 'produces' consciousness.

I wonder if Panpsychism, in board terms, doesn't entail teleology as an inherent characteristic in nature. The dilemma between nature's steady progression towards (?*) versus the theory of emergent phenomena. All of nature chugging along, with thought as just it latest manifestation, versus life and the mental or thought as abrupt emergence out of raw nature (but isn't this spookier than a natural progression.) Mustn't reality be a-conceptual in some regard (as pre subject/object, pre correlationism), as it must have been prior to man.

If it's natural progression, then some sort of panpsychism should apply, if pure emergence is possible, then no panpsychism, rather a kind of divine command theory (IMHO).

* if mind/life is a possible end for matter and life and mind seem to have taken a tenacious hold on matter, then perhaps nature aims at an ultimate mix of matter/life/mind

mmm... a few thoughts....

Since all of our ordinary-language criteria for attributing mental states to other people are behavioural criteria, it surely follows that Panpsychism is redundant if framed as a substantial metaphysical thesis. None of us use a non-behavioural theory of mind to understand other people (how on earth would that even work???), so why do we need a non-behavioural theory of mind to account for everything else?

On the other hand, if panspsychism is merely the rejection of the anthropocentric metaphysics of mind that is implicit throughout human culture, then pansychism wouldn't be to propose anything additional to the current physical picture. But in this case panpsychism is at best "Pan-behaviourism".

Pan-behaviourism however, is surely ethically dubious and linguistically nonsensical. For we can only consistently attribute purposeful behaviours to other people because as a species our natural and conditioned responses to stimuli are similar - the condition that allows us to form a community of speakers that share a common language in which we can inter-relate via sharing our agreed-upon definitions for our shared behaviours. I therefore don't therefore see any merit even to a belief in "Panbehaviourism" -for it overlooks the necessity of community customs when attributing purposeful behaviour to an agent of that community.

Balls don't know how to roll downhill. If there's a hill, balls will roll down it. It's not as if they can do anything else. Your comment more or less reinforces the notion that panpsychism is anthropomorphic, or attributes intention to inanimate objects. One can well explain the motions of objects without any reference to intention; the problem that panpsychism is trying to solve, is how some 'configurations of matter', like the brain, 'produces' consciousness. — Wayfarer

Describing the motions of things, and explaining the motions of things, are two distinct things. So, you can describe the situation, the ball is set on the hill, and it rolls, just like you can describe the water placed in the sun evaporates, and these are descriptions of those activities. However, the descriptions don't ever completely answer the question of "why?", so they never provide a complete explanation.

That is why I think we need to maintain the distinction between a description and an explanation. We can produce a description, "the ball rolls down the hill", and ask "why?". Then we create an explanation, gravity. But if the explanation is itself just a description "gravity acted on the ball", we will never have a complete explanation because there will always be a further "how" or "why" question. The description represents what is the case, and does not provide us with an explanation for this.

When these why questions are all answered without reference to intention, then we have a complete explanation without reference to intention. But until we can answer all the why questions without referring to intention, then it is false to say that we can explain motion without referring to intention. All you can really do is describe motion, and this is not the same as explaining motion. I believe that some forms of panpsychism may be offering us a potential explanation without referring to intention. Then again, the relationship between consciousness and intention is what is really at stake here.

You seem, on the other hand, to be suggesting that the fact that it's common justifies it. I don't agree with that. — Terrapin Station

Not that it is common, period, but rather that is a necessary part of the scientific project. Insofar that one accepts the findings of science then one must also accept some amount of creative theorizing and beliefs or thoughts 'on the limb of reason', and ask why it is they are either right or wrong.

But if the explanation is itself just a description "gravity acted on the ball", we will never have a complete explanation because there will always be a further "how" or "why" question. The description represents what is the case, and does not provide us with an explanation for this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, perhaps that's why science is not omniscient! But I think you've made a valid point, and one often forgotten. Maybe that is why Aristotelean physics, though obviously incorrect in fundamental ways, wished to arrive at a more holistic understanding which includes the reason that things happen - in a teleological sense, rather than just because of a chain of efficient causation. In leaving that out, perhaps much else is left out besides. (Check out this book.)

That's reasoning is catergoy error. It treats a holistic approach as if it were a singular part of the world. It always fails because no account of a part gives the whole. No matter how many parts are known, there is always another one, another moment which has yet to happen or has not been grasped.

Under arguments like final cause, people make the mistake of thinking of the whole as a part. They try to understand it as a distinct state that can be named, that sets efficient causation in motion. People don't take the time to realise the whole must be more than this, something which cannot be grasped in terms of a part at all, extending beyond any point (including "final" ) of causation or state.

Well, perhaps that's why science is not omniscient! But I think you've made a valid point, and one often forgotten. Maybe that is why Aristotelean physics, though obviously incorrect in fundamental ways, wished to arrive at a more holistic understanding which includes the reason that things happen - in a teleological sense, rather than just because of a chain of efficient causation. In leaving that out, perhaps much else is left out besides. (Check out this book.) — Wayfarer

When we concentrate on descriptions of what is, we tend to take for granted the "what is" part, and proceed in an attempt to describe it. But as Aristotle explained, the fundamental ontological question is why is there what there is rather than something else. So if we look around us at plants and animals, rocks and hills, the earth and the sun, we can wonder, why do these things exist as the things which they are, and not as some other things.

The chain of efficient causation doesn't answer this question because it just gives an infinite regress, so that no matter how far back we go in the chain, we will always wonder why was there that instead of something else, ad infinitum. So the chain of efficient causation, being infinite according to its own requirements, cannot provide us with a complete explanation for any existence. That's why the Neo-Platonists turned to Forms, and the Christians turned to the will of God, as final cause, because this adds the necessary element to "complete" the explanation.

The book looks interesting, I like the topic of how science separated off from the Church. I kind of look at modern science as the child of the catholic church. It's pretty well grown up now and gone in its separate way, but it still learned a lot from the parents.

Under arguments like final cause, people make the mistake of thinking of the whole as a part. They try to understand it as a distinct state that can be named, that sets efficient causation in motion. People don't take the time to realise the whole must be more than this, something which cannot be grasped in terms of a part at all, extending beyond any point (including "final" ) of causation or state. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't think you understand final cause too well Willow. Final causation is the only thing which could cause the existence of a whole. When a whole is defined as all the parts existing in particular relationships, such that each has a particular function, or purpose with respect to the whole, then it is self-evident that final cause is the only thing which could cause such an existence.

Modern process philosophers will sometimes deny the real existence of wholes, negating the need for final cause in the classical sense. But they still apprehend the need to account for the observed relationships between particles, and this pushes many of them toward panpsychism.

Undoubtedly one of the most poorly argued articles I've seen from Aeon

Behavioral theories of mind are supposed to explain behavior. Panpsychism is supposed to explain something else - "the hard problem of consciousness," as alluded to by Moliere.

To my mind, there are two open questions here (that are probably related to each other): one is whether there is anything to explain (i.e. whether "the hard problem" is really a problem), and the other whether panpsychism constitutes an explanation (not just good or best explanation, but any explanation at all) - might it not be a kind of dormitive virtue.

sorry , I perhaps should have been more specific. I was alluding to logical behaviourism, i.e that the mental predicates we assign to the third person is the very assignment of behavioural predicates to the third person. Regardless of one's metaphysics this is a fact. For when we judge a person's mental state we are judging nothing more than their behaviour. We aren't peering into their private psychic realm.

in other words as I understand it,

panpsychism conceptualises meaningful behaviour as the symptom of a separate internal mental state according to either a dualism of metaphysically independent physical and mental properties, or according to a generalised form of brain-world duality.

Logical behaviourism directly identifies third-person mental predicates as third-person behavioural predicates, whose assertability criteria I would suggest are generally holistic and involve brain-body-world interactions.

I stress the third-person here, because although I believe logical behaviourism dissolves the hard problem in the third-person (how can it not???) I don't see how logical behaviourism alone can be used to dissolve the hard-problem of the first-person. After all, first-person predicates and third-person predicates are generally non-interchangeable and have entirely separate uses.

although I believe logical behaviourism dissolves the hard problem in the third-person (how can it not???) I don't see how logical behaviourism alone can be used to dissolve the hard-problem of the first-person. — sime

It doesn't dissolve it so much as ignore it or bypass it.

I can't resist re-telling the old joke about two behaviourists after making love: 'That was wonderful for you, dear. How was it for me?'

lol. As for how to dissolve the first-person hard problem, it is presumably a simple matter of deflating "second order" talk of first-person experience, that includes an alleged subject of experience, to "first order" observation sentences that refer only to the contents of experience. (Presumably if the concept of "experience" is restricted to the first person, it can only mean something similar to "attention" or "intention" that refers to a perceptual act rather than a substance).

As for how to dissolve the first-person hard problem, it is presumably a simple matter of deflating "second order" talk of first-person experience, that includes an alleged subject of experience, to "first order" observation sentences that refer only to the contents of experience. — sime

But the point is, and one that was matter of intense debate earlier in this thread, is that 'all experience implies a subject of experience'; and my contention is that 'the subject of experience is never the object of cognition'. The claim that there is no subject and therefore no problem, is exactly what is proposed by Daniel Dennett, and why his philosophy is basically untenable in the opinion of his many critics (hence his book 'Consciousness Explained' being dubbed 'Consciousness Ignored' by them 1).

"All experience implies a subject of experience" sounds a bit like

"I am able to see objects, therefore I must have eyeballs"

Suppose Robinson Crusoe lived from birth on an unpopulated island and failed to notice his blinking and reflection. How could he deduce purely from observing the objects around him, that his ability to see was dependent on a sensing capacity of some sort?

And if he later lost his sight, touch and hearing, what difference would it make for him to believe he had lost sensing capacity versus believing that the world itself disappeared?

Rather than a deductive conclusion, Peirce's take was that the initial recognition of one's own existence as a subject of experience is a retroductive conjecture prompted primarily by the unpleasant surprise of being (repeatedly) mistaken:

In short, error appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self which is fallible ... At the age at which we know children to be self-conscious, we know that they have been made aware of ignorance and error; and we know them to possess at that age powers of understanding sufficient to enable them to infer from ignorance and error their own existence. — CP 5.234-236, 1868

Generally speaking, pain is the consequence of error. So are you saying that from one's feeling of pain, an individual infers one's existence? If this is the case, pain goes much deeper than error. A lack of food is painful, and the lack of food which a baby feels cannot be said to be its "error". So why focus on error as the source of self-consciousness? Are you looking for the original sin?

Rather than a deductive conclusion, Peirce's take was that the initial recognition of one's own existence as a subject of experience is a retroductive conjecture prompted primarily by the unpleasant surprise of being (repeatedly) mistaken:
In short, error appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self which is fallible ... At the age at which we know children to be self-conscious, we know that they have been made aware of ignorance and error; and we know them to possess at that age powers of understanding sufficient to enable them to infer from ignorance and error their own existence.
— CP 5.234-236, 1868 — aletheist

Right. I assume here that in kantian terminology pierce is referring to the empirical ego of reflective consciousness, i.e how each of us privately understands our own empirical lives by thinking of ourselves in terms of a hypothetical third-person whose qualities are inductively inferred.

Any ideas on what Pierce thought concerning the idea of the Transcendental Ego?