Ok, I think our conversation is going to dead end since you can’t seem to keep your claims straight. Did you not say just a few posts back that we can't have third person knowledge of experience? I believe your exact words were:

What I said was that experience 'can't be known in the third person' — Wayfarer

Seemed pretty clear, but maybe I misunderstood.

In regards the difference between experience and projectiles - sure it's true that you can throw me a ball but you can't throw me an experience. You also can't throw me the ideal gas law, but I think you'll have a hard time convincing folks that the ideal gas law can't be an object of cognition.

As for the Blackwell entry, this comes down to an exegetical dispute. I would argue that to identify the thinking self with the noumenal self renders Kant's philosophy blatantly self-contradictory. As such, I think such an identification should be avoided on the basis of the principle of charity. There's multiple places where Kant explicitly claims that that his transcendental psychology counts as knowledge and that transcendental arguments count as cognitions. Insofar as transcendental psychology gives a positive account of the faculties of the knowing subject, and insofar as we want to maintain that the knowing subject just is the transcendental subject, then the transcendental subject simply cannot be identified with the noumenal subject of metaphysical speculation, on pain of contradiction

As for the tie in with functionalism: you said that you disagree with that assessment because Kant was concerned with establishing the limits of knowledge, but these aren't mutually exclusive so there's no problem here. If you want to argue that Kant's account is not functional then you'll need to try to show that the various faculties and operations that he posits don't amount to functional transformations. That's going to be pretty hard considering that pretty much every operation that Kant describes takes the form of a function (i.e. they operate on well-defined inputs in order to produce well-defined outputs). Philosophers have been noting the functional nature of Kant's transcendental psychology for decades and to my knowledge, it's not really a controversial claim at this point. Consider this quote from the SEP article Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of the Self:

Three ideas define the basic shape (‘cognitive architecture’) of Kant's model and one its dominant method. They have all become part of the foundation of cognitive science.

1. The mind is complex set of abilities (functions). (As Meerbote 1989 and many others have observed, Kant held a functionalist view of the mind almost 200 years before functionalism was officially articulated in the 1960s by Hilary Putnam and others.)

2. The functions crucial for mental, knowledge-generating activity are spatio-temporal processing of, and application of concepts to, sensory inputs. Cognition requires concepts as well as percepts.

3. These functions are forms of what Kant called synthesis. Synthesis (and the unity in consciousness required for synthesis) are central to cognition.

These three ideas are fundamental to most thinking about cognition now. Kant's most important method, the transcendental method, is also at the heart of contemporary cognitive science. — SEP

But I don't think you really want to try to understand any of this, because it doesn't square with your notion that Kant's philosophy is a decisive ally in your holy war against naturalism. So I’ll leave it here.

The problem is that argument is it doesn't, itself, respect the primacy of consciousness. Instead of treating each conscious subject as its own experiencer, it speaks if being an experiencer is a generality, passed down generations, such that I am of the same "mind" as my parents, and their parents, and so on and so-- as if my mind belong to others and theirs mine!

Concerned about justifying "mind," it misses actually the distinction of the experiencing subject. It fails to recognise each experiencer is primary themselves. My consciousness is not given by matter. Nor is it given by any other preceding mind. It is only itself-- Willow the experiencer-- and that's all that can define it.

I said was that experience 'can't be known in the third person' but I didn't say that this means 'knowledge of experience is impossible' which is what you seem to think I am saying. I'm saying that knowledge of experience is not objective in the way that knowledge of objects is objective (physics being the paradigmatic 'science of objects'), because it has an ineluctably first-person aspect. (It seems obvious to me that this is exactly the same argument as the 'hard problem of consciousness' argument.)

Remember, the essay I quoted states:

According to panpsychism, the smallest bits of matter – things such as electrons and quarks – have very basic kinds of experience; an electron has an inner life.

So even if that were true, how would you know that? Is that 'inner life of an electron' going to an object of perception to you? Will it leave a bubble trail?

You also can't throw me the ideal gas law, but I think you'll have a hard time convincing folks that the ideal gas law can't be an object of cognition. — Aaron R

What is the 'ontological status of natural law'? That's a whole other topic.

Insofar as transcendental psychology gives a positive account of the faculties of the knowing subject, and insofar as we want to maintain that the knowing subject just is the transcendental subject, then the transcendental subject simply cannot be identified with the noumenal subject of metaphysical speculation, on pain of contradiction. — Aaron R

An example often given from experience is that the eye can see another, but not itself, a knife can cut another, but not itself. The nature of the transcendental ego is exactly to that - it is the 'unseen seer, the unthought thinker'.

But I don't think you really want to try to understand any of this, because it doesn't square with your notion that Kant's philosophy is a decisive ally in your holy war against naturalism. — Aaron R

I don't think for one minute that Kant was on a jihad against naturalism. After all he was also a scientist and his theory of nebular formation still stands, and I have no objection to any of the quoted points above. But his critique of reason is relevant, as it is about limits of knowledge, in the sense of the issues fundamental to the nature of knowledge which determine the kinds of things that it can validly judge, or not.

I'm arguing that panpsychism is an attempt to extend naturalism past the point where it can properly proceed, but that's not an argument against naturalism, generally. What you're reacting against, I think, is the suggestion that there are perspectives other than the naturalist, from which this criticism can be made.

If you don't agree with panpsychism then I think you ought to be able to explain how intentionality and thought floated into the world from nowhere.

Isn't it simpler to suppose that these are properties are all actual or potential properties of matter. Perhaps 'human exceptionalism' is not nature's radical departure, but rather part of nature's natural progression.

Not sure I agree with electron's inner life, but an electron as well as all other matter must have a history, and perhaps history is all that matter as such can relate to us.

You also can't throw me the ideal gas law, but I think you'll have a hard time convincing folks that the ideal gas law can't be an object of cognition. — Aaron R

This is a subject of knowledge, not an object of cognition. We need to be careful to keep this distinction. There are pure ideals, such as mathematical principles, which if we follow Platonic realism would be known as objects, intelligible objects. But the intelligible object is purely ideal, and a law is an application of the ideal toward the physical world. From the application of ideals we derive subjects of knowledge, but we must maintain a separation between the law, as a subject of knowledge, and the aspect of the physical world, (the object) which the law represents.

Isn't it simpler to suppose that these are properties are all actual or potential properties of matter. — Cavacava

To assume that these are actual properties of matter, and to assume that they are potential properties of matter, is two distinct things. This is the difference between panpsychism and substance dualism, which I referred to earlier. Panpsychism would assume that they are actual properties of all matter. Substance dualism apprehends a necessity for a separate actuality, the soul, which is required to actualize these potential properties of matter. With substance dualism, there is a separate immaterial substance, soul.

If you don't agree with panpsychism then I think you ought to be able to explain how intentionality and thought floated into the world from nowhere.

Isn't it simpler to suppose that these are properties are all actual or potential properties of matter. Perhaps 'human exceptionalism' is not nature's radical departure, but rather part of nature's natural progression. — Cavacava

It's more that intentionality and thought are impossible to accomodate within standard scientific materialism, which after all wants to eliminate just those things from its accounts. For a long time, they were simply dismissed on those grounds (and still are, by the likes of Daniel Dennett.) The panpsychist approach seems to be that they're ubiquitous, they're attributes of all matter, but only manifest through the processes that give rise to intelligent life.

Nagel's approach in Mind and Cosmos is different again - although not that different. He proposes that

It makes sense to seek an expanded form of understanding [of nature] that includes the mental but that is still scientific — i.e. still a theory of the immanent order of nature.

That seems to me the most likely solution. Even though the theistic outlook, in some versions, is consistent with the available scientific evidence, I don’t believe it, and am drawn instead to a naturalistic, though non-materialist, alternative. Mind, I suspect, is not an inexplicable accident or a divine and anomalous gift but a basic aspect of nature that we will not understand until we transcend the built-in limits of contemporary scientific orthodoxy.

From here.

However,

[Nagel] plays with panpsychism – the theory that mind is somehow in everything – but does not find this kind of metaphysical theory very useful. His preferred tentative solution is what he calls ‘teleological naturalism’, meaning the theory that the natural order is biased in some way towards the emergence of life and consciousness, as more-than-likely directions or potentials of development. He does not develop this theory but merely indicates that it might at least be along the right lines.

here.

That chimes with me. I have long been drawn to the mystical dictum (and not only mystical, it has been expressed by at least some evolutionary biologists) that we are 'life made conscious', that the human form is in some way the Universe discovering itself. (Neils Bohr said, only half-jokingly, 'A physicist is just an atom's way of looking at itself'.)

But what is potentially fruitful about that approach is that the idea found in esoteric philosophies of 'realising a higher self' maps against this kind of understanding. There is, for example, a principle in Hermetic (and Stoic) philosophy, 'as above, so below', according to which man is a kind of replica or epitome of the Cosmos.

If you don't agree with panpsychism then I think you ought to be able to explain how intentionality and thought floated into the world from nowhere. — Cavacava

Panpsychics have no clue how the subjectivity imputed to individual fundamental particles might combine to form the unified subjectivity of a person. I'm also slightly concerned that they might be forced to declare SuperStrings are conscious in the near future.

So, to demand something from say physicalists, that you don't demand from panpsychics, seems a bit unfair. Panpsychics have no more idea how an individual person's consciousness "floats into the world" than anyone else.

Isn't it simpler to suppose that these are properties are all actual or potential properties of matter. Perhaps 'human exceptionalism' is not nature's radical departure, but rather part of nature's natural progression. — Cavacava

It's certainly simpler minded, and similar moves have been tried before e.g Vitalism. What could be easier - simply declare that matter has just the right hidden, untestable property that accounts for a feature of the human brain you can't explain. We'll be attributing a range of emotions to photons next. Maybe the blue ones really are a bit sad?

Not sure I agree with electron's inner life, but an electron as well as all other matter must have a history, and perhaps history is all that matter as such can relate to us. — Cavacava

Here's the thing, fundamental particles don't have a history. Electrons are not even distinguishable in principle.

Panpsychics have no clue how the subjectivity imputed to individual fundamental particles might combine to form the unified subjectivity of a person. — tom

It's certainly a good question. I do think there are possible answers though. I do not agree with the IIT theory of consciousness, but it might be a very good theory of what determines the complexity of a conscious individual, and also determines what separates one individual from another. A theory of mental identity, I guess. So the answer would be that there is only one consciousness, as there is only one substance (and one version of panpsychism is that substance is conscious) but mental individuals are distinguished by what they are aware of, and this is determined by the local differences in how much information is integrated in different parts of the universe. I probably haven't explained that very well, I'm in a hurry.

I don't agree with panpsychism. Inanimate objects don't have consciousness, it would even be a leap to say that they have self-awareness. Of course one could always compromise and say that there is different degrees of consciousness-but I feel that's too messy. As far as the components of matter are concerned, I still have a difficult time agreeing that they have consciousness- for example, electrons that surround an atom stay a certain distance away from one another- should we attribute this to consciousness? I don't think so. Because since (according to physics) matter is neither created nor destroyed, it would imply that these atoms have eternal consciousness, which I don't think is possible.

Panpsychics have no clue how the subjectivity imputed to individual fundamental particles might combine to form the unified subjectivity of a person.

I think the intentionality that all life and some animals demonstrate was not around 5 billion years ago. So how could it have arisen? My guess is that matter is capable of sustaining life and is capable of evolving into what we current experience. I don't believe in creation ex nihilo.

If that is the case, then unless you think god came down and did his thing, the properties of intentionality and thought evolved out of matter, so matter has the potential to evolve in this manner. That's just the way it is, I think. I think this approach might be better than dualism, and there are several philosophers (Brassier, Grant, Harmon, Meillassoux, et al) working along these lines.

Here's the thing, fundamental particles don't have a history. Electrons are not even distinguishable in principle.

It's hard to believe that any matter can stand outside of time, but I don't know much about these particles, I do know there are a lot of scientists working on it. I always thought those graphic images we see generated by machines such as particle accelerators, track particles such as electrons, protons and so on, each particle leaving kind of a quick history.

Hey Bert....yea, I didn't get it...maybe you can explain it some more. Like "one substance", what is meant by that.

I wonder whether there's a conflation here of different senses of 'subjective'. Experiences are 'subjective' in the sense that they're attributes of a subject. But facts about experiences are still perfectly objective facts about reality. — Philip Goff

I went to a philosophical talk about historiography yesterday which brought me back to this topic. In writing history, people of many different backgrounds - conservative, feminist, monarchist, Marxist, believer-in-objective-history, whoever - can agree on good historical practice, which will include a pool of what some people might call 'objective facts about reality'. Facts of some kind, anyway.

Nevertheless any historical narrative is irredeemably the writer's own perspective, their standpoint. Their sense of self, their I-ness is bound up with their own sense of their own history. And some of their material is going to be testimony: individuals' accounts of their experiences put in language as best they can, testimony that only has itself for justification. So there can't be scientific writing of history, but there can be good and bad practice in writing history.

I think the same about 'consciousness', or whatever better word there might yet be found for the unifying sense that the experiencing self has. There's a limit to what third-person scientific talk, evidence and reasoning can tell us about consciousness. Some of the material involved is first-person testimony, or it won't be true to what it's trying to explain. And any account is by a conscious person, whose own consciousness is entangled in how they tell the story they're telling.

Right! That is similar to the point I was labouring to make about 'objectification' and the futility of trying to 'objectify' the mind (although you put it much more eloquently.)

The (Greek) naturalist impulse is always to ask 'what is it made of? How does it work?' Which obviously has been a very fruitful impulse in respect of the objective sciences. But the question at issue in this topic, is of a different order. That is where alternative philosophical perspectives, including non-dualist perspectives, are invaluable.

I see an influence of that perspective here:

So the answer would be that there is only one consciousness, as there is only one substance (and one version of panpsychism is that substance is conscious) but mental individuals are distinguished by what they are aware of, and this is determined by the local differences in how much information is integrated in different parts of the universe. I — bert1

Panpsychics have no clue how the subjectivity imputed to individual fundamental particles might combine to form the unified subjectivity of a person. I'm also slightly concerned that they might be forced to declare SuperStrings are conscious in the near future. — tom

In the form of panpsychism where each state has it own subjectivity, they don't. The subjectivity of a person is another unique subject. A state which exists in terms of itself, rather than being formed by the consciousness of fundamental particles. The "combination problem" misses the entire point of what constitutes a conscious subject-- it's just a repetition of the "hard problem," the outright rejection that consciousness itself emerges from states which are not consciousness.

This panpsychist position is actually more or less identical to the non-reducative emergence of consciousness, only instead of only particular systems generating consciousness (e.g. human bodies, animal bodies, etc.,etc. ) every state does so-- in this respect, they aren't forced to declare SuperStrings conscious, it an outright defining claim they make. As with any state, a conscious states emerge form SuperStrings, making them a conscious subject.

The only objection to panpsychism that one needs is that there's no good reason to believe it. There's zero evidence for it. Making shit up to solve something that's seen as a theoretical problem isn't a good reason to believe anything.

The only objection to panpsychism that one needs is that there's no good reason to believe it. — Terrapin Station

Those who say there is a reason to believe it, will argue that materialism can't or won't acknowledge the fundamental issue at stake, which is the explanatory gap.

There are good arguments for panpsychism, one of them being that since humans have consciousness and humans evolved from non-human animals, these non-human animals should also have had some form of consciousness, albeit perhaps more rudimentary. The ancestors of these animals presumably also had consciousness. At what point can you say that a life form has no consciousness? Does it begin with the formation of a central nervous system? If so, there are many forms of central nervous system, so which one of these originated consciousness? At some point, consciousness presumably emerges from an organism, and this consciousness is an emergent property - it is greater than the sum of its parts. But if this is true, then that which is conscious is literally unaccountable, since it is not present in the parts that made up the whole.

A similar argument underpins the definition of life. A cell is living since it has the behaviors associated with living things, whereas amino acids and proteins do not. The seven commonly agreed upon criteria for life are:

It should maintain some balanced conditions in its inner structure. This is called Homeostasis
Its structure is highly organized.
It should be able to break down or build up nutrients to release or store energy based on need. This is called Metabolism
It should grow, which means its structure changes as time goes by in an advantageous manner.
It should show adaptation to the environment.
It should be able to respond to environmental stimuli on demand (as opposed to adaptation, which occurs over time).
It should be able to reproduce itself.
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Cell_Biology/Introduction/What_is_living

Now, life doesn't always have these 7 criteria at all times. For example, a life form at the end of its life cycle does not change in an advantageous manner, rather it begins to break down. Similarly, a life form may never reproduce itself, yet we would consider an infertile human to be just as alive as the parent of seven children. In short, the behaviors considered necessary for biological life are not always present in life forms, but this does not mean that since one behavior is missing, the life form does not live. There is a difference between biological life and life itself.

To return to panpsychism - to have consciousness is to be conscious of something, aware of something. To have self-awareness is to be aware of oneself, and humans view this as the gold standard of consciousness. But if consciousness only requires awareness of something, then cells are aware of their environment, and plants are aware of the location of the sun, and so forth. Their behaviors are quite predictable, even if there is some difficulty in predicting their actions. However, the only reason that life forms are aware of their environment is because of the interactions of atoms and molecules between the environment and the life form. The behavior of the life form is probabilistic based on quantum mechanics. At the smallest scales, the behavior of subatomic particles is also probabilistic, albeit on a different level than the life form. But it is a question only of scale, not of kind. The probabilities of the subatomic particles inform the probability of a behavior arising from a complex life form, and it is known that this life form's consciousness is the result of behaviors between the particles of the environment and the particles of the life form.

So just as life may exist without some of the key criteria of biological life, consciousness may exist without some of its emergent behaviors. At some level, there is no difference in kind between a life form colliding with an object and changing course with an atom colliding with another atom and changing course. Both behaviors are probabilistic, even if one is more predictable than the other. One may make the argument that the life form has far greater mind than the atom, but it is incorrect to say that the atom has no mind at all, unless mind is defined to have specific characteristics such as the criteria for biological life. There is a difference between a biological mind (brain) and mind itself. Those that say 'obviously an atom cannot think' are missing the point. The atom obviously has no biological brain, but it still has behavior and awareness, and as such has some aspect of mind.

Very nicely written post.

non-human animals should also have had some form of consciousness, — Nerevar

I don't think anyone here disputes that. The point about panpsychism is that it says electrons have some form of consciousness.

f consciousness only requires awareness of something, then cells are aware of their environment, and plants are aware of the location of the sun, and so forth. — Nerevar

I agree the single-celled organisms demonstrate some traits of awareness but I don't know if it is generally agreed that members of the plant kingdom exhibits awareness. Besides 'stimulus and response' might not equate to 'awareness' although it's probably a tricky distinction.

At some level, there is no difference in kind between a life form colliding with an object and changing course with an atom colliding with another atom and changing course. — Nerevar

There's an awful lot hanging on 'some' here. That line of reasoning could just as easily be used to justify old-school materialism. And as for 'behaviour', I don't know if there is an equivalence between 'the behaviour of mass' and 'the behaviour of organisms', as the latter does reflect at least some, and usually all, of the seven points given above. In fact, I think a number of the conclusions in the last paragraph don't really follow from what precedes them. But, food for thought.

At some level, there is no difference in kind between a life form colliding with an object and changing course with an atom colliding with another atom and changing course. Both behaviors are probabilistic, even if one is more predictable than the other. One may make the argument that the life form has far greater mind than the atom, but it is incorrect to say that the atom has no mind at all, unless mind is defined to have specific characteristics such as the criteria for biological life. — Nerevar

Is this really the case though? Is the outcome of an atom colliding with another atom really probabilistic, or is it deterministic? And are the actions of living matter simply probabilistic, or are they intentional? It appears to me, like your whole claim, that there is no "difference in kind" between the actions of inanimate matter, and living beings, is based in the assumption that physicists and biologists have not been able to determine that difference. On both sides though, there is an inability to understand actions at the fundamental level, so you describe both of these types of activities as "probabilistic". That is the basis of your claim of similarity. But the human being's inability to determine the exact nature of a specific difference, is not proper proof that the difference is not there.

I don't think anyone here disputes that. The point about panpsychism is that it says electrons have some form of consciousness. — Wayfarer

There is no evidence, nor reason to suppose animals have consciousness.

If animals could create "what-it-is-like-to-see-red" knowledge, then what is to stop them creating knowledge of any kind? They don't create knowledge of any kind.

I agree the single-celled organisms demonstrate some traits of awareness but I don't know if it is generally agreed that members of the plant kingdom exhibits awareness. Besides 'stimulus and response' might not equate to 'awareness' although it's probably a tricky distinction. — Wayfarer

Single celled organisms? Awareness?

There are good arguments for panpsychism, one of them being that since humans have consciousness and humans evolved from non-human animals, these non-human animals should also have had some form of consciousness, albeit perhaps more rudimentary. — Nerevar

And since humans know about the big bang and quantum mechanics, it's certain that fish know that the earth orbits the sun. Pretty sure that's how evolution works!

There is no evidence, nor reason to suppose animals have consciousness. — tom

I usually attribute some kind of feeling akin to excitement or pleasure to a dog when it wags its tail and jumps around in circles. Do you think that is unreasonable?

Single celled organisms? Awareness? — tom

What is your explanation of the behaviour of, say, an amoeba?

I usually attribute some kind of feeling akin to excitement or pleasure to a dog when it wags its tail and jumps around in circles. Do you think that is unreasonable? — bert1

Sure, and right now the flowers are full of the joys of spring.

Whatever state a dog happens to be in, it cannot know it is in that state. If it could know it is in a particular state, then what stops it knowing anything? A conscious being - i.e. a person - knows what state it is in.

A dog is an expression of its genetic code.

If it could know it is in a particular state, then what stops it knowing anything? — tom

I don't know. It's not necessary to know one is having an experience in order to have an experience is it?

Do dogs experience hunger do you think?

If animals could create "what-it-is-like-to-see-red" knowledge, then what is to stop them creating knowledge of any kind? They don't create knowledge of any kind. — tom

I am inclined to regard corvids' memory of where they have stashed their food - the most able can remember up to 500 locations - as 'knowledge'. Just as a for instance. Wouldn't you call that knowledge?

hose who say there is a reason to believe it, will argue that materialism can't or won't acknowledge the fundamental issue at stake, which is the explanatory gap. — Wayfarer

That was my second sentence: "Making shit up to solve something that's seen as a theoretical problem isn't a good reason to believe anything. "

Well, 'completelly failing to understand something' is not an argument against it.

Single celled organisms? Awareness? — tom

Bacteria can exhibit learning behaviour.

There is no evidence, nor reason to suppose animals have consciousness. — tom

There's an observable difference between an animal that is ocnscious, and one that is not. It is reasonable to infer that this difference has a cause.

Whatever state a dog happens to be in, it cannot know it is in that state. If it could know it is in a particular state, then what stops it knowing anything? A conscious being - i.e. a person - knows what state it is in. — tom

I think you're mixing up conscious with self-conscious.

I am inclined to regard corvids' memory of where they have stashed their food - the most able can remember up to 500 locations - as 'knowledge'. Just as a for instance. Wouldn't you call that knowledge? — mcdoodle

Crows are among the handful of animals whose behaviours seem to refute the idea that animals are not conscious beings - i.e. they lack subjectivity. Not only can some species of crow remember 500 locations where they have stashed food, but they exhibit remarkable tool use and problem solving abilities. My claim that animals can't create knowledge is clearly refuted by the fact that corvids can remember where they stashed food.

I'm going to take this refutation a little further and remind myself that the corvid genome has encoded, via billions of years of evolution, the knowledge of how to replicate itself in its niche.

Partly through laziness, and partly in an attempt to provoke, I admit to being imprecise in my use of the word "knowledge", particularly when I claim that animals (and genes) can't create it, when they obviously can.

The type of knowledge that only humans can create, which includes "what-it-is-like" knowledge, is "explanatory knowledge".

I don't know. It's not necessary to know one is having an experience in order to have an experience is it?

Do dogs experience hunger do you think? — bert1

You may have experienced the situation where you become aware that you are in a particular state, when you were previously unaware. This can happen to people under extreme stress. For example, a person might become aware that they are in a state of panic, or even become aware that they are running.

Perhaps even the famous Libet experiment might indicate the same phenomenon. The action potential to make a decision exists significantly before the subjects become consciously aware they are making a decision.

I really cannot see any way of separating experience from awareness, or what-it-is-like knowledge. Robots, animals, and humans under stress may be in a particular state, but none is having a subjective experience.

Dogs can be in a state of hunger, just like a robot can be in a state of requiring its batteries charged, but neither experiences hunger.

I don't understand why animal-lovers don't see this as a blessing.

Your statement that animals lack consciousness is a simple falsehood.