:up: Thanks! Really got to stop f***ing around now and get it done.

Just one more germane quote from an essay I’ve been reading:

For Aristotle, there was no demarcation between physics and metaphysics. That changed with modern science. Whereas metaphysics explains the big picture, modern science is restricted to mathematical models and a notion of truth grounded in the predictive capacity of those models. This is a demarcation, not a negative criticism of either metaphysics or science. — Edward Dougherty, The Real War on Science

"Germane" in what way? Summarize the point (of your last two posts addressed to me) in your own words. Thanks.

It’s related to the point I was trying to make about differentiating methodological naturalism with metaphysical naturalism. Methodological naturalism is basic to natural science - it requires ruling out factors that aren’t within scope for the natural sciences, such as belief in God or other supernatural agencies.

In that essay I linked to Dougherty writes:

Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century with two fundamental ideas: planned experiments (Francis Bacon) and the mathematical representation of relations among phenomena (Galileo). This basic experimental-mathematical epistemology evolved until, in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a stringent form involving (1) a mathematical theory constituting scientific knowledge, (2) a formal operational correspondence between the theory and quantitative empirical measurements, and (3) predictions of future measurements based on the theory. The “truth” (validity) of the theory is judged based on the concordance between the predictions and the observations. While the epistemological details are subtle and require expertise relating to experimental protocol, mathematical modeling, and statistical analysis, the general notion of scientific knowledge is expressed in these three requirements.

Science is neither rationalism nor empiricism. It includes both in a particular way. In demanding quantitative predictions of future experience, science requires formulation of mathematical models whose relations can be tested against future observations. Prediction is a product of reason, but reason grounded in the empirical. Hans Reichenbach summarizes the connection: “Observation informs us about the past and the present, reason foretells the future.”

The demand for quantitative prediction places a burden on the scientist. Mathematical theories must be formulated and be precisely tied to empirical measurements.

It strikes me as an accurate summary.

Metaphysical naturalism goes further than methodological naturalism in saying that not only should such beliefs be ruled out for the purposes of science, but that they can’t be considered to concern anything real at all, because they can’t be validated scientifically. It is close to the kind of positivism that is associated with the Vienna Circle that was mentioned in the other thread on logical positivism.

diagnoses materialism as self-contradictory. — Wayfarer

That would be because materialism is logically and objectively self-contradictory, as we all know. Reason for which there's no need for aggravation: why get angry at an irrational idea? It's like getting angry at a brocken clock.

I mostly agree, of course, as we have – surprise surprise – clashed over this distinction in the past when you've conveniently neglected or denied it by conflating 'methodological' with 'philosophical' (or metaphysical) and I challenged your conflation. You stereotyping me as some 'reductive, scientistic, atheistic, anti-supernaturalist' in the face of my stated position espousing this distinction, which apparently you have no answer for when I challenge your pseudo-scientific assertions (speculations-as-subjective-truth-claims?), I've too often found you to be tendentiously evasive, even disingenuous.

(from a two year old post)
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/327744

(from a recent reply to another member)
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/538893

(also a recent reply to another member)

In my own terms, following on what you wrote and contra Wayfarer's anti-modern polemical definition: naturalism, since antiquity, denotes describing or explaining some aspect of nature only in terms of (an)other aspect(s) of nature. Questions like 'Is nature all that is real?' or 'Are supernaturalia real?' are speculations which are simply outside of naturalism's remit. Chinese daojia and Greek atomism, as examples, have always had this naturalistic approach, or stance, in common. A naturalist can be agnostic about 'the supernatural', methodologically not relying on it to build explanatory models, though, of course, many have become dogmatic to the point of scientism perhaps as a vestigial (institutionalized?) overreaction to Scholasticism, Romanticism and the Counter-Enlightenment. — 180 Proof

A naturalist can be agnostic about 'the supernatural', methodologically not relying on it to build explanatory models, though, of course, many have become dogmatic to the point of scientism — 180 Proof

Well, that is just impossible to square with:

The epistemic preeminence of science is not because "science assumed the cloak of authority" but rather simply due the fact that science is metaphysics which works and is reliably objective — 180 Proof

And now, challenged by me, you're trying to say that you agree that science is not, in fact, a metaphysic.

You stereotyping me as some 'reductive, scientistic, atheistic, anti-supernaturalist' — 180 Proof

No stereotyping required. Do a forum search on expression: woo-of-the-gaps poster: 180 Proof. What is returned conforms pretty closely to those tags.

And now, challenged by me, you're trying to say that you agree that science is not, in fact, a metaphysic. — Wayfarer

Had I instead quipped 'science is magic that works', you'd now be trying to mischaracterize my position as 'science is magic'. Read in the full context of that post, what you allege is patently false and you know it. And certainly in the context of the three of my posts I quoted to you previously. The only thing you're "challenging", Wayfarer, is another one of your strawmen.

The cultural context we’re all in is that ‘neo-Darwinian materialism’ is the ‘official doctrine’ of the mainstream academy; that we’re products of an evolutionary process that is wholly natural and presumably governed by physical laws without reference to anything beyond that. — Wayfarer

It is significant that you start this statement with "cultural context" because a cultural context is not a product of an evolutionary process. Although it would not be possible without evolution, it is not wholly natural, in so far as it is the result of human activities. This is not to say that it is thereby metaphysical or supernatural but rather that the divisions natural/supernatural and physical/metaphysical fail to account for the cultural histories of human beings.

another one of your strawmen. — 180 Proof

Oh, please. You can't un-say what you obviously said, and often say.

It is significant that you start this statement with "cultural context" — Fooloso4

Significant, and deliberate. Evolutionary theory has become the de facto rationale for how secular culture understands itself as if it is a philosophy, or a social theory, which it isn't. A couple of the essays on my profile page address that, Anything But Human, and It Ain't Necessarily So.

See Nietzsche's On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, how second natures become first natures. Existentialism does not fall on one side or the other of natural/supernatural, physical/metaphysical. In general, contemporary philosophers who see history and culture as fundamental to human being do not fall on one side or the other.

Nietzsche's On the Use and Abuse of History for Life — Fooloso4

I detest don't read Nietszche.

Existentialism does not fall on one side or the other of natural/supernatural, physical/metaphysical. In general, contemporary philosophers who see history and culture as fundamental to human being do not fall on one side or the other. — Fooloso4

The thread title is specifically about metaphysics, so it introduces that terminology. I think this definition given early in the thread is perfectly clear:

"Metaphysics in its classic sense has always been understood to be the rational investigation of the eternal order. Central to that investigation is the distinction between that which is eternal and that which is perishable, and though metaphysics addresses itself to both of those grades of being, its primary concern lies with the eternal, so that if there is nothing eternal, or if nothing eternal can be known, then metaphysics is an impossibility. The distinction between the eternal and the perishable may be said to be a cosmological one, in that the concept of time is cardinal to it."

I think the reason that contemporary philosophers elide the distinction is because secular culture no longer has the vocabulary or conceptual categories to discuss it. But it lives on in the works of Catholic and/or neo-thomist philosophers through their absorption of Aquinas who in turn captured elements of the Western 'philosophia perennis'. There is the view that the abandonment of metaphysics in the Western tradition is an intellectual calamity, although of course that is regarded as reactionary in today's culture, but I think it is likely true.

Like Macbeth, Western man made an evil decision, which has become the efficient and final cause of other evil decisions. Have we forgotten our encounter with the witches on the heath? It occurred in the late fourteenth century, and what the witches said to the protagonist of this drama was that man could realize himself more fully if he would only abandon his belief in the existence of transcendentals. The powers of darkness were working subtly, as always, and they couched this proposition in the seemingly innocent form of an attack upon universals. The defeat of logical realism in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence. — Richard Weaver, Ideas have Consequences

There is the view that the abandonment of metaphysics in the Western tradition is an intellectual calamity, although of course that is regarded as reactionary in today's culture, but I think it is likely true. — Wayfarer

I consider String Theory to be metaphysics. And Leibniz's infinitesimals. But I'm probably in error.

The Metaphysics Research Lab at Stanford delves into abstract objects arising from axiomatic fundamentals. An example:Computational Metaphysics

consider String Theory to be metaphysics — jgill

I think that is true, unfortunately.

What fundamental physical theory isn't, on some definition, "metaphysics"? Is QFT not "metaphysics" in a similar sense? GR? What would such a theory have to be like NOT to qualify as metaphysics on such a broad definition?

Scientific naturalism excludes - or brackets out - metaphysics as a matter of principle.

See the quoted passage above.

'String theory' is regarded as metaphysical, because it's not subject to observational or experimental validation, therefore defying Popper's principle of 'testability'. See String theory vs the Popperazi, Massimo Piggliuci.

Its not actually that simple- again, its probably impossible for a fundamental physical theory to be totally bereft of metaphysics- and whether or not string theory is testable, either in practice or in principle, remains a controversial and ongoing debate. Same for the more general question of what counts as a testable prediction in the first place (e.g. does an indirect prediction count?)

Though I realize this doesn't quite fit your shtick about the evils of naturalism and many-worlds/multiverse models and yadda yadda, so feel free to disregard as necessary (or convenient)

Though I realize this doesn't quite fit your shtick about the evils of naturalism and many-worlds/multiverse models and yadda yadda, so feel free to disregard as necessary (or convenient) — Seppo

sure thing, S.

you'll have to forgive me for being somewhat incredulous that you haven't gotten bored, if nothing else, of posting the same shtick over and over for so many years

Well, same could be said for you. Your intelligent but juvenile cynicism is just the same now as when you were posting as Sapientia.

Although, that said, I am actually taking September out to work on other writing, rather than boring the regulars with more of the same.

Lol, huh? I'm definitely not Sapientia. I think Sapientia actually has an account here, no? Nice try though, I guess.

yeah Sapientia has an account, as "S". I see that he's banned though, that's a shame.

(note to mods: hopefully you can see by my IP/location that this suggestion that I'm a banned member sock puppet is not accurate.. and nothing against Sapientia- I always had a soft spot for the guy- but the suggestion that there's any similarity between our posts is just sort of ridiculous and mildly insulting)

Very similar style but if you say I'm wrong, then I won't argue. But I have never used that username 'jeeprs' which you referred to, on this forum, and stopped using it on the old forum about 8 years ago.

As I'm taking a break for a month, and possibly longer, a quick recap of the story so far. The article which triggered my interest in internet forums was Terry Eagleton's ascerbic review of Dawkin's The God Delusion. Registered on the then Dawkins forum, which was characterised by a hatred of anything religious that verged on the hysterical. Dawkins said in the preface to that book that he hoped any Christians that read it would put it down atheist. I thought it was so atrociously misconcieved that it had rather the opposite effect on me.

The first post I posted on the old Forum is below, I think in 2009. I think it's a good note to sign out on. Note the distinction between what is real and what exists. I think that's the key to understanding metaphysics.

I have studied metaphysics and philosophy informally, although did undergraduate philosophy at Uni, so any guidance, further readings, on this question welcome.

Here I want to consider whether there is a difference between what is real and what exists.

'Exist' is derived from a root meaning to 'be apart', where 'ex' = apart from or outside, and 'ist' = be. Ex-ist then means to be a seperable object, to be 'this thing' as distinct from 'that thing'. This applies to all the existing objects of perception - chairs, tables, stars, planets, and so on - everything which we would normally call 'a thing'. So we could say that 'things exist'. No surprises there, and I don't think anyone would disagree with that proposition.

Now to introduce a metaphysical concern. I was thinking about 'God', in the sense understood by classical metaphysics and theology. Whereas the things of perception are composed of parts and have a beginning and an end in time, 'God' is, according to classical theology, 'simple' - that is, not composed of parts- and 'eternal', that is, not beginning or ending in time.

Therefore, 'God' does not 'exist', being of a different nature to anything we normally perceive. Theologians would say 'God' was superior to or beyond existence (for example, Pseudo-Dionysius; Eckhardt; Tillich.) I don't think this is a controversial statement either, when the terms are defined this way (and leaving aside whether you believe in God or not, although if you don't the discussion might be irrelevant or meaningless.)

But this made me wonder whether 'what exists' and 'what is real' might, in fact, be different. For example, consider number. Obviously we all concur on what a number is, and mathematics is lawful; in other words, we can't just make up our own laws of numbers. But numbers don't 'exist' in the same sense that objects of perception do; there is no object called 'seven'. You might point at the numeral, 7, but that is just a symbol. What we concur on is a number of objects, but the number cannot be said to exist independent of its apprehension - at least, not in the same way objects apparently do. In what realm or sphere do numbers exist? 'Where' are numbers? Surely in the intellectual realm, of which perception is an irreducible part. So numbers are not 'objective' in the same way that 'things' are.

However this line of argument might indicate that what is real might be different to what exists.

I started wondering, this is perhaps related to the Platonic distinction between 'intelligible objects' and 'objects of perception'. Objects of perception - ordinary things - only exist, in the Platonic view, because they conform to, and are instances of, laws. Particular things are simply ephemeral instances of the eternal forms, but in themselves, they have no actual being. Their actual being is conferred by the fact that they conform to laws (logos?). So 'existence' in this sense, and I think this is the sense it was intended by the Platonic and neo-Platonic schools, is illusory. Earthly objects of perception exist, but only in a transitory and imperfect way. They are 'mortal' - perishable, never perfect, and always transient. Whereas the archetypal forms exist in the One Mind and are apprehended by Nous: while they do not exist they provide the basis for all existing things by creating the pattern, the ratio, whereby things are formed. They are real, above and beyond the existence of wordly things; but they don't actually exist. They don't need to exist; things do the hard work of existence.

So the ordinary worldly person is caught up in 'his or her particular things', and thus is ensnared in illusory and ephemeral concerns. Whereas the Philosopher, by realising the transitory nature of ordinary objects of perception, learns to contemplate within him or herself, the eternal Law whereby things become manifest according to their ratio, and by being Disinterested, in the original sense of that word.

Do you think this is a valid interpretation of neo-platonism? Do you think it makes the case that what is real, and what exists, might be different? And if this is so, is this a restatement of the main theme of classical metaphysics? Or is it a novel idea? — Jeeprs

The first, and best, response, was actually from 180 Proof - I still have that somewhere too - generally affirmative, but warning against 'the transcendental temptation' - which I obviously ignored.

Also discovered in the Cambridge Companion to Augustine on the nature of intelligible objects. Still can't find fault with the reasoning of that passage.

And, bye for now. :flower:

I detest don't read Nietszche. — Wayfarer

Well, that ain't working for you. :meh:

See Nietzsche's On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, how second natures become first natures. Existentialism does not fall on one side or the other of natural/supernatural, physical/metaphysical. . — Fooloso4

I'm a bit like @Wayfarer in not reading Nietzsche.
However, I don't dismiss him because I find him not to my liking.
I have tried and failed to read him, so many times.

However, given your recommendation, I searched and found this pdf file:
http://la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/330T/350kPEENietzscheAbuseTableAll.pdf

It's a short read at only 46 pages. Will look at it later...
He immediately got my attention with his Goethe quote. I love Goethe.

The Foreword
“Incidentally, I despise everything which merely instructs me without
increasing or immediately enlivening my activity.” These are Goethe's words.
With them, as with a heartfelt expression of Ceterum censeo [I judge
otherwise], our consideration of the worth and the worthlessness of history
may begin. For this work is to set down why, in the spirit of Goethe's saying,
we must seriously despise instruction without vitality, knowledge which
enervates activity, and history as an expensive surplus of knowledge and a
luxury, because we lack what is still most essential to us and because what is
superfluous is hostile to what is essential. To be sure, we need history. But we
need it in a manner different from the way in which the spoilt idler in the
garden of knowledge uses it, no matter how elegantly he may look down on
our coarse and graceless needs and distresses. That is, we need it for life and
action, not for a comfortable turning away from life and action or merely for
glossing over the egotistical life and the cowardly bad act. We wish to use
history only insofar as it serves living. But there is a degree of doing history
and a valuing of it through which life atrophies and degenerates. To bring this
phenomenon to light as a remarkable symptom of our time is every bit as
necessary as it may be painful. — Nietzsche - On the Use and Abuse of History for Life

I detest don't read Nietszche. — Wayfarer

Why wouldn't you want to read something recommended which might 'increase or enliven' activity as well as instruct ?
You must have read, or tried to read, some Nietzsche before deciding he wasn't 'for you'...

No need to reply @Wayfarer, I know you're elsewhere.
The question is not only for you, anyway...but for myself and others who might shy away even at the mention of Nietzsche.

@Fooloso4's words would seem most relevant to the discussion:
'Existentialism does not fall on one side or the other of natural/supernatural, physical/metaphysical.'

Does the Nietzsche pdf show this, I wonder...

"Metaphysics in its classic sense has always been understood to be the rational investigation of the eternal order. — Wayfarer

The rejection of an eternal order and the claim that:

'neo-Darwinian materialism’ is the ‘official doctrine’ of the mainstream academy; that we’re products of an evolutionary process that is wholly natural and presumably governed by physical laws without reference to anything beyond that. — Wayfarer

are two very different things. That there is an eternal order is an assumption that should be questioned. That we can know that the order we observe is eternal should be questioned.

Very similar style

Lol, please- hardly. A similar view, maybe, on this particular topic at least, but no one who's read both our posts can say its a "similar style" (I suspected you weren't actually reading my posts already, so I suppose I shouldn't be surprised to have it confirmed).

But you're right, I included the name "Jeeprs" so you knew I knew just how long you've been parroting the same dogmatic views without alteration (8 years, yikes!)

Whose sock puppet are you?

Well, 13 pages later and still no consensus on what metaphysics is or what it should be.

But then you notice that debates of this kind has been going on for thousands of years.

Oh well... — Manuel

Isn't it just the alternative to "shut up and calculate?"

Honestly. I don't know. I've devoted significant time trying to figure this out. Of course I could be way wrong. The only conclusion I've been able to draw out of this is that metaphysics need be recast under a epistemological framework. Therefore I think we shouldn't speak about the grounds of the world, but instead of how the world appears to us.

Then we need to do some "starmaking". Or something like an analysis of the given.

But again, I'm hardly confident. And no, we should not shut up and calculate, I agree.