From the article you linked:

The problem is that such metaphysical inference is untenable on several grounds. For starters, there is nothing about the parameters of material arrangements—say, the position and momentum of the atoms constituting our brain—in terms of which we could deduce, at least in principle, how it feels to fall in love, to taste wine, or to listen to a Vivaldi sonata.

This is old news; it is just stating what I think should be obvious to any thinking person; that explanations given in subjective, qualitative terms are not commensurable with, or translatable into, explanations given in objective quantitative terms. Why should we expect them to be? They are different dimensions of human experience and understanding. How it feels to be in love cannot be explained or "deduced"; that is a silly idea. It may be described or evoked in literature, but it will obviously never be a part of physics. Who would ever imagine that it could be? It would simply be a category error. Spinoza understood this point nearly 400 years ago.

It doesn't matter how well-known Thomas Nagel is. He's just another human like you and I. There is little point making appeals to authority; we need to use our own reasoning. If he misunderstands (whether willfully or not) he misunderstands.

I've explained why I think it is a misunderstanding; it seems plain to me. If you think I'm wrong then you could provide another explanation of the text that aims to show it to be saying what you claimed it does. I'm prepared to listen and give a fair hearing.

I'll put it another way: in that quoted passage Dennett says that molecular machinery is the basis of agency, meaning and consciousness in the universe; he doesn't say that agency, meaning and consciousness don't exist, because if they didn't exist they wouldn't be anything that molecular machinery could be a basis of.

in that quoted passage Dennett says that molecular machinery is the basis of agency, meaning and consciousness in the universe; he doesn't say that agency, meaning and consciousness don't exist — Janus

You know what 'reductionism' means, right? This is the definition of reductionism.

I'm done mate. From my side, it's like beating my head against wall.

I don't deny that Dennett is a reductionist, so we can at least agree on that. :smile:

Some folks confuse 'reductionism' with 'eliminativism'; however, as you no doubt know, the latter denotes identifying and excluding objects or concepts which do not contribute to a scientific explanation whereas the former denotes analyzing the micro-constitutents of a macro-system in order to describe the mechanisms by which they synergetically contribute to the emergence of macro properties / behavior of that system. These 'theoretical techniques' are neither mutually exclusive nor mutually entailed nor required by scientific inquiry per se. Some folks ideologically? dogmatically? scientistically? mistakenly? conflate them with science itself, however, and are, for whatever woo-woo they fancy, deeply incorrigible on this point, Janus, as you've found.

How it feels to be in love cannot be explained or "deduced"; that is a silly idea. It may be described or evoked in literature, but it will obviously never be a part of physics. Who would ever imagine that it could be? It would simply be a category error. Spinoza understood this point nearly 400 years ago. — Janus

:up: :100:

t seems surprising that Nagel would misunderstand him; which makes me think it is perhaps a wilful misunderstanding that affords Nagel a good sensationalist target that he can then seek to refute in a (he might hope) best-selling book. — Janus

Don't you think that's rather a low blow, in a discussion such as this? Basically an ad hominem? That Nagel, who is, in my view, really a serious and worthwhile philosopher, with a long history of excellent titles, many of which I've read, is basically criticizing Dennett for a buck? Seriously?

When Nagel's Mind and Cosmos came out in 2012, he was almost universally scorned and reviled by the mainstream academic establishment. So who do you think he was trying to impress with that? Do you think his 'commercial judgement' deserted him on that occasion?

I did say that perhaps he is doing that. I really don't know, but if he claims that for Dennett consciousness (or agency or free will) don't exist then he is mistaken. For example there was a well-known debate some years ago between Dennett and Sam Harris, with the latter arguing that free will does not exist and Dennett arguing that it does exist, but is compatible with determinism; that is he argues that free will, like consciousness, is not what we intuitively think it is.

I really don't know, — Janus

Plainly! So stop telling me that I don't understand what I'm talking about. Thomas Nagel is a serious philosopher, with a long publishing history. Daniel Dennett is a one-trick pony with only a single string in his bow.

Dennett arguing that [free will] does exist, but is compatible with determinism; — Janus

This is one of the blatant contradictions in Dennett - that he claims we have to act as of we have free will, as if we're actual human subjects with the ability to make moral decisions, even though everything he writes undercuts those very things. Dennett is a Darwinian materialist in his cosmology and metaphysics while also strongly affirming human dignity as well as a progressive brand of liberalism in his ethics and politics. Herein lies the massive contradiction of his system of thought. He boldly proclaims that we live in an accidental universe without divine and natural support for the special dignity of man as a species or as individuals; yet he retains a sentimental attachment to liberal-democratic values that lead him to affirm a humane society that respects the rights of persons and protects the weak from exploitation by the strong and from other injustices.

There are many reviewers and critics who have pointed out these obvious contradictions and inconsistencies in Dennett, but, being a philosophical zombie, or, perhaps just a moist robot, he just keeps going, like Teminator.

Anyway, that's it for today, I've hit my quota. See you later.

:up: :up:

I really don't know, — Janus


Plainly! So stop telling me that I don't understand what I'm talking about. Thomas Nagel is a serious philosopher, with a long publishing history. Daniel Dennett is a one-trick pony with only a single string in his bow. — Wayfarer

Who is dispensing ad homs now? I said I don't know whether Nagel genuinely or willfully misunderstands Dennett. That is not an ad hom; it is just me being honest: I don't know the man. I read The View From Nowhere about 25 years ago; it's still on my shelves somewhere. I wasn't that impressed with it because I think it misunderstands the idea of objectivity. For me what is objective just is what can be corroborated inter-subjectively, so it's not a view from nowhere, but from nowhere in particular. To be objective is to be free from bias and wishful thinking.

For me what is objective just is what can be corroborated inter-subjectively, so it's not a view from nowhere, but from nowhere in particular. To be objective is to be free from bias and wishful thinking. — Janus

I've been telling him that – less well said – for over a decade. Some woo-folks just seem to "feel" objectivity is a bug rather than a feature of modern science (or naturalism).

↪jgill
I had the understanding that quantum physics had obliged science to allow for the role of the observer in the conducting of experiments - the 'observer problem' — Wayfarer

I think QM has pushed physics to circumnavigate speculating about a conscious observer and stick to the math, which seems highly predictive. Unfortunately, the math itself needs manipulating to make sense. Oh well, can't have it all.

Despite the "observer effect" in the double-slit experiment being caused by the presence of an electronic detector, the experiment's results have unfortunately been misinterpreted by some to suggest that a conscious mind can directly affect reality.

(Wikipedia)

I said I don't know whether Nagel genuinely or willfully misunderstands Dennett. — Janus

It was the suggestion that his negative review was motivated by financial gain that I said was ad hom, which it plainly was.

To be objective is to be free from bias and wishful thinking. — Janus

No kidding.

I think QM has pushed physics to circumnavigate speculating about a conscious observer and stick to the math, which seems highly predictive — jgill

An approach known as ‘shut up and calculate’.

often — 180 Proof

Why do you use the word babble? In Dutch "babbelen" means chatting cheerfully. Im not sure this is what you mean. Does it mean you dont agree?

In English "babble" means making incoherent noises, like babytalk.

that — Wayfarer

"To be objective is to be free from bias and wishful thinking"

The one never can be objective.

the — jgill

An approach known as ‘shut up and calculate’.

Obviously the wrong approach. What if you dont wanna calculate and shout out?

Dennett arguing that it does exist, but is compatible with determinism; — Janus

Compatibilism is self-deception. It's usually composed of a false representation of "free will", which makes free will an illusion, but it can also be composed of a false representation of determinism, like soft determinism, or its composed of both false representations. Any way, it does not get to the real reason why free will and determinism are incompatible, because of the misunderstand presented by these misrepresentations.

Compatibilism is self-deception. It's usually composed of a false representation of "free will", which makes free will an illusion, but it can also be composed of a false representation of determinism, like soft determinism, or its composed of both false representations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Compatibilism is perfectly fine and logical. There's nothing obviously false about it that I can see. In fact I see it as more logically coherent than the rather absurd idea that our minds are some useless dead end of causality.

This said, I don't believe in full determinism for a number of reasons. So I am an indeterminist compatibilist: I believe that free will is compatible with a non-fully-predetermined world (it would also be compatible with a fully predetermined world).

↪Gnomon
In my understanding, explaining some physical transformation manifested as a testable mathematical model is indispensible for doing science whereas interpreting such explanatory models and what the outcomes of testing them 'imply' about some aspect of the world (and, perhaps, the human condition) is doing philosophy. — 180 Proof

Yes. That distinction is relevant, in that technical "explanations" tell us How something works mechanically. But an "interpretation" of the same observation is an attempt to make sense of the How, in terms that are meaningful to non-specialists, including academic philosophers without laboratories. It always helps understanding to know something about Why it works like that. "How" is narrow & specific, while "Why" is broader & more general.

For example, I am currently reading a dense 700 page book written by a mathematical Astronomer and a Physicist. The first part of the book is a general history of the topic, written in layman's language. So, you could call it an "interpretation" of how, over centuries of observation, scientists and philosophers were led to the notion of a universal Principle of the Universe. Then, the middle part is written in complex mathematical notation, which is a foreign language for me. So, I must take their word for it, that those equations "explain" the Hows of astronomy and physics. But, I hope the third part will return to more colloquial language, in order to "interpret" those technical findings for the non-expert. Parts 1 and 3 are philosophical in nature, while part 2 is more scientific. Although I am not an expert in these fields, I still try to skim the technical "explanations", then move-on to the more meaningful (to me) "interpretations".

Of course other scientists may not agree with their philosophical "interpretation". Some even call it "Woo". But the authors include enough of the gobbledygook, that anyone so inclined can check to see if it's based on "hard science". It's like the Copenhagen Interpretation of the mind-boggling implications of Quantum Theory, except that their canonical version was intended to explain its absurdities & anomalies for the experts, not the general public. For the layman, they must resort to metaphorical philosophical language : ocean waves and solid particles are easier to imagine than purely mathematical waves and virtual fields. :nerd:

I believe that free will is compatible with a non-fully-predetermined world (it would also be compatible with a fully predetermined world). — Olivier5

A "non-fully predetermined" world is not compatible with a "fully predetermined world", so how could "free will" be compatible with both of these?

It's like the Copenhagen Interpretation of the mind-boggling implications of Quantum Theory, except that their canonical version was intended to explain its absurdities & anomalies for the experts, not the general public. — Gnomon

The point I make is that, since the Enlightenment, science has assumed the cloak of authority with respect to arbitration of what should be considered real. So long as science was able to stick to the story that the so-called material ultimates were real, then well and good, as far as they're concerned; but that was exactly what was undermined by quantum physics. All of the 'spooky action at a distance' and 'God playing dice' and the rest. But of course, if you so much as refer to any of that, then you're 'peddling woo'.

But of course, if you so much as refer to any of that, then you're 'peddling woo'. — Wayfarer

You shouldn't take "woo" so negatively. Wooing is an art form which needs to be mastered. When mastered, the audience won't even notice the woo. But some will automatically dismiss all forms of rhetoric as "woo", except of course, their own.

Nice fairytale but, as usual, wrong on the facts. The epistemic preeminence of science is not because "science assumed the cloak of authority" but rather simply due the fact that science is metaphysics which works and is reliably objective (i.e. independent of whether it is believed or not, or subject/pov/language-invariant) in contrast to ... auto/theocratic politics or religious practices (e.g. "thoughts & prayers", conspiracy thinking, etc) or woo-nonsense (e.g. astrology, homeopathy, divination, manifesting, ESP, ... "quantum consciousness" :roll:, etc) which are far more promissory than effective at improving most social conditions for most people. The facts are that alternatives to science-based policies and practices have dismally failed most of mankind in most heavily populated places for most of the last tens of millennia; only scientific illiterates blame natural science itself for technocratic mis/ab-uses by the greedy or militaristic in order to sex-up their supernatural apologetics.

:rofl:

Science is metaphysics which works and is reliably objective — 180 Proof

Aren't you the person who was lecturing me on my supposed inability to distinguish 'methodological' from 'metaphysical' naturalism? Would you like to take this opportunity to refresh us on what that distinction is, and why it matters?

In my understanding, science is *not* metaphysics at all - there might be a metaphysic implied by it, but if there is, then that is not necessarily something which can be validated scientifically. And furthemore, insofar as there is a scientifically-validated metaphysics, this is moving inexorably away from philosophical materialism, and towards idealism, as the video interview with Bernardo Kastrup and his ever-growing list of publications attest to.

The fact that you categorise philosophical interpretations of physics with homeopathy speaks volumes.

In my [mis]understanding ... — Wayfarer

Uh huh. That says it all. :lol:

you refuse to address what your interlocators actually say when they disagree with or criticize you — 180 Proof

Repeatedly.

A "non-fully predetermined" world is not compatible with a "fully predetermined world", so how could "free will" be compatible with both of these? — Metaphysician Undercover

It means that determinism is neither here nor there. It makes no difference to the issue of free will. It doesn't matter.

It means that determinism is neither here nor there. It makes no difference to the issue of free will. It doesn't matter. — Olivier5

That doesn't jibe with:

Compatibilism is perfectly fine and logical. — Olivier5

Sure, there's nothing obviously false about compatibilism if you say determinism is unrelated. But then you've just misrepresented "compatibilism".