No, I don't think that is so. I think the forms are understood to be real, in the sense that principles are real. Where do you see principles? They can only be grasped by reason. — Wayfarer

I don't want to turn this into a second discussion of the Phaedo, so I will only say a couple of things. Further discussion I hope will occur in the Phaedo thread.

The Forms are hypothetical entities posited as real.

So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.” (99d-100a)

I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.” (100c-e)

Socrates is unable to say what the relationship between Forms and things of that kind is. He later calls this safe answer an ignorant one (105b-c) and introduces physical causes such as fire and fever. Things that cannot be known without the senses.

When it comes to philosophy, the subject was always been seeking out the imperishable, changeless, the first principle — Wayfarer

That is mistakenly seeking an idea as though it had substance; committing Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". I don't believe such a thing can ever be found in any determinate sense. It may be alluded to via art or poetry, or meditated upon; but that wouldn't constitute determinate rational knowledge. The fact that past philosophers have mistakenly taken "the imperishable, changeless, first principle" to possess substantive existence is no reason to follow them in their (understandable) error.

That is mistakenly seeking an idea as though it had substance; committing Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". — Janus

It would be, if I were mistaking ideas for empirical objects. I am advocating the view that ideas (in the sense I have explained) are of a different order of reality to empirical objects. I say that the world that you assume has 'substantial reality' actually doesn't possess that and that this is borne out by the massive conundrums that now exist in theoretical physics.

The Forms are hypothetical entities posited as real. — Fooloso4

From the analogy of the divided line:

There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves (510b).

Plato describes CD, the "lower" of these, as involving mathematical reasoning (διάνοια dianoia) where abstract mathematical objects such as geometric lines are discussed. Such objects are outside the physical world (and are not to be confused with the drawings of those lines, which fall within the physical world BC). However, they are less important to Plato than the subjects of philosophical understanding (νόησις noesis), the "higher" of these two subdivisions (DE):

"And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses – that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole (511b)."

So, what do you make of the division between 'lower' and 'higher'? Do you think the image of the soul ('she') 'soaring beyond' hypothesis to symbolise an account of 'opinion'?

It would be, if I were mistaking ideas for empirical objects. I am advocating the view that ideas (in the sense I have explained) are of a different order of reality to empirical objects. I say that the world that you assume has 'substantial reality' actually doesn't possess that and that this is borne out by the massive conundrums that now exist in theoretical physics. — Wayfarer

Physical objects and processes do have substantial reality, though; as they act on us in substantial ways. To my way of thinking that's all it means to say that the physical is substantive, and the so-called "massive conundrums" of theoretical physics have no bearing on that lived reality.

So, what do you make of the division between 'lower' and 'higher'? Do you think the image of the soul ('she') 'soaring beyond' hypothesis to symbolise an account of 'opinion'?

I think the whole thing is an image and is identified as such. I don't think we transcend opinion when it comes to matters of the just, the beautiful, and the good. I think Plato instills the opinion that they are things that can be known because otherwise some type of relativism prevails. He thinks that such truths are best kept from those who are not suited to deal with them.

To be substantial is, to my way of thinking, to be an object of the five senses and their augmentations. — Janus

Assuming you are self-conscious, you can sense what you are thinking and thus you should consider your thoughts substantive, in your way of thinking.

Very simple. Senses are for info gathering, reasoning is for info processing. — Olivier5

What use is the brain without senses and what use are senses without a brain? What use is reasoning without anything to reason with or about?

No. Burning your fingers is a sensation. Two plus two is not a sensation. The most elementary steps of linguistic reasoning are not sensations. This doesn't mean that reason and sensable impressions are entirely separate. But as said previously many animals have far greater sensory abilities than humans, but they don't reason. (I know this is not a fashionable opinion.) — Wayfarer

But what is it like for you to add two plus two? How do you know you are adding two plus two? Do you see numbers in your head, or hear sounds, "two plus two equals four"? Again, what form does your reasoning take, and isn't your reasoning always about things?

Linguistic reasoning involves the manipulation of words or numbers, but words and numbers are visual scribbles on a page, or sounds you hear from your professor. So I don't see how any steps of linguistic reasoning does not involve the manipulation of memorized sensations.

You are asserting that animals can't reason without properly defining reason. Are animals conscious? Well, we'd need a definition of consciousness, too. Definitions, please.

What use is the brain without senses and what use are senses without a brain? What use is reasoning without anything to reason with or about? — Harry Hindu

That'd be why we have both senses and reason, no?

Assuming you are self-conscious, you can sense what you are thinking and thus you should consider your thoughts substantive, in your way of thinking. — Olivier5

No, I said that what I consider to be substantive is what can be an object of the five senses. I might add to that the proprioceptive sense, and sensations and bodily feelings, but to speak of sensing thoughts is a step too far. In my own experience I directly am aware of thinking only in the act of thinking itself, which is a kind of internal speaking and listening. Most of thinking seems to be more of the internal speaking kind, absent the self-conscious listening.

Thoughts are elusive and are not determinate objects of attention as bodily sensations, sounds, smells, visual and tactile objects are. Perhaps that should not be surprising, given that we have no sense of neural processes, as we do have a sense of for example digetsive processes.So, if thoughts are not internally linguistically intoned they are like faint traces of cloud, or dimly sensed movements or visualizations; they seem to be anything but substantive.

The similarity is striking.

There are a number of Zhuangzi passages where artisans are connected to how results appear. Plato works with that kind of "knowing" as leverage in different dialogues.

In both traditions, the connection is different from what has been established as "scientific" since then.

So, if thoughts are not internally linguistically intoned they are like faint traces of cloud, or dimly sensed movements or visualizations; they seem to be anything but substantive. — Janus

I feel differently. For me, my thoughts and sensations are a first layer of reality. Then other people and things are a second layer of reality, slightly less obvious.

For me, philosophy begins with epistemology. Subjectivism and metaphysics are sophistry, not philosophy.

@Harry Hindu

Reasoning is a sensation, no?
— Harry Hindu

No. Burning your fingers is a sensation. Two plus two is not a sensation. — Wayfarer

I'm not so sure. This has been bothering me for a while and I'd like to pick your brains regarding the issue of mind as a sensory organ. My reasoning is rather simple: just as the eyes sense light, just as the ears sense sound, and so on, the mind senses patterns (numbers are patterns, ethics too, truth is all humans think about are patterns). Put simply the mind is a sensory organ like the eyes, nose, ears, tongue, and skin are; it's a pattern sensor

One might object by saying,

Very simple. Senses are for info gathering, reasoning is for info processing. — Olivier5

How different is mental info processing from that which takes place in the eyes when it sees something? No difference, in my humble opinion.

he mind senses patterns — TheMadFool

figuratively speaking.

How different is mental info processing from that which takes place in the eyes when it sees something? — TheMadFool

Completely different. I've been through with others, why mathematical reasoning is more than pattern recognition - for example with respect to the sequence of prime numbers. They don't form a pattern but are grasped by reasoning, by understanding the concept of 'divisible' - which is also not a pattern.

Read up on concepts of rationalism and empiricism.

figuratively speaking. — Wayfarer

I'm somehow not convinced. Pattern detection (sensing) is what the brain/mind literally does - the laws of nature (science) are patterns in the behavior of matter & energy, consequentialism is an ethical pattern (greatest happiness principle), I could go on but you get the idea.

Completely different. I've been through with others, why mathematical reasoning is more than pattern recognition - for example with respect to the sequence of prime numbers. They don't form a pattern but are grasped by reasoning, by understanding the concept of 'divisible' - which is also not a pattern. — Wayfarer

Prime numbers are a pattern: numbers that have exactly two factors, 1 and itself. There maybe no patterns in a list of all prime numbers and that squares perfectly what I said - our brains/minds being pattern sensors can't accept that, it's like switching off the lights for the eyes, or putting earplugs in our ears, so on. Thus prime numbers are of great interest to mathematicians, they want to uncover a pattern in it.

*

Prime numbers are a pattern: numbers that have exactly two factors, 1 and itself. — TheMadFool

That is not a pattern - it’s a concept.

OK, with such different starting assumptions I guess there's not much to be discussed. :smile:

It's more of a pattern or algorithm given that, unless I am mistaken, you can program computers to generate novel prime numbers; and computers cannot understand concepts.

Algorithms are also not patterns.

This sentence is not a pattern.

I read a lot of people trying to ‘explain’ reason in terms of pattern recognition on Internet forums. I think it’s nonsense. Nothing further to add.

Prime numbers are a pattern: numbers that have exactly two factors, 1 and itself.
— TheMadFool

That is not a pattern - it’s a concept. — Wayfarer

A concept is a pattern. For e.g. the concept of love, I chose a hard one, is, on the whole, a positive attitude - that's a pattern of emotions/feelings that can be found in those who love. Essences, the meat and potatoes of concepts, are nothing more than patterns.

pattern recognition — Wayfarer

For an object the properties of which are perceived as arranged in a certain way, reason describes, e.g., the conception of a sphere. For the exact same object the properties of which are arranged in the exact same way, but perceived from a different perspective, reason constructs the conception of a circle.

Just as the pattern of the Fibonacci sequence, or of primes, can never be inferred from the conceptions of numbers alone, the conception of a circle can never be inferred from the perception of a sphere alone.

The patterns perceived are termed assertorial conceptions, in that we name the pattern determined by the object given to us, a logical inference. The patterns reason constructs of its own accord, are termed mathematical conceptions, in that we name the pattern as it is determined by us, a logical deduction.

I don’t think it nonsense to describe reason in terms of pattern recognition, but I might be inclined to claim it is metaphysically lazy not to consider the mode from which patterns arise. If, in the metaphysical estimation of human cognition, the notion of synthesis is granted, then either patterns fall out of such operation logically, or, patterns are necessary for the operation to logically manifest in the first place.

My two rhetorical thalers-worth.......

There are a number of Zhuangzi passages where artisans are connected to how results appear. Plato works with that kind of "knowing" as leverage in different dialogues. — Valentinus

Good point. The artisans are one of only a few groups that Socrates allows knowns anything.

How different is mental info processing from that which takes place in the eyes when it sees something? No difference, in my humble opinion. — TheMadFool

By this reasoning, eagles are smarter than us because they have better eyes.

Indeed. Especially if you are right that ideas do not really exist.

By this reasoning, eagles are smarter than us because they have better eyes. — Olivier5

Non sequitur. Nothing I said would imply that. All that needs to be borne in mind is that both vision and thought are information processing - the eyes process visual data and the brain pattern data.

I don’t think it nonsense to describe reason in terms of pattern recognition, but I might be inclined to claim it is metaphysically lazy not to consider the mode from which patterns arise. — Mww

Remember the Rosetta stone? It was a breakthrough because it contained a Greek tranlation of Egyptian hyroglyphs, which up until then had defied any attempt to decipher. The Mohenjo-Daro script from pre-Vedic India remains untranslated to this day. So, what is the pattern behind Egyptian hyroglyphs? Is there one?Or behind any language, for that matter? This sentence? Language, generally? They're irregular forms. There's no pattern in the alphabet or in regular speech. Poetry uses patterns of sound to create rythmic cadence, but poetry is much more than simply patterns or pattern recognition.

Remember, the source of this particular contention was questioning the difference between reason and sensation. I am somewhat flabbergasted that this is something that has to be argued for. When I did undergraduate philosophy, one of the first subjects that was dealt with was 'rationalism versus empiricism'. At the time I found it quite hard to appreciate the distinction, but over time I realised it was fundamental in Western philosophy. But modern culture is so thoroughly (and often unknowingly) conditioned by empiricist philosophies that it can't see the forest for the trees. That is why I frequently refer to Jacques Maritain's essay, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism.

As a philosophical conception, Empiricism means a theory according to which there is no distinction of nature, but only of degree, between the senses and the intellect.

Indeed. Especially if you are right that ideas do not really exist. — Olivier5

I didn't say that ideas don't really exist; I said that they don't have substantive existence, and that they don't exist apart from the thinking of them.

Algorithms are also not patterns. — Wayfarer

"Algorithm design refers to a method or a mathematical process for problem-solving and engineering algorithms. The design of algorithms is part of many solution theories of operation research, such as dynamic programming and divide-and-conquer. Techniques for designing and implementing algorithm designs are also called algorithm design patterns,[42] with examples including the template method pattern and the decorator pattern."

From here

This sentence is not a pattern. — Wayfarer

It is most certainly a specific, recognizable. arrangement of letters: a pattern.

So, what is the pattern behind Egyptian hyroglyphs? Is there one?Or behind any language, for that matter? This sentence? Language, generally? — Wayfarer

The letters themselves are patterns, the alphabetic sequential arrangement is a pattern, and unless words were arranged in recognizable patterns, comprehension of language would be impossible.