The passage in question says this:

Well then, is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonized?”
“I do not understand,” said Simmias.
“Would it not,” said Socrates, “be more completely a harmony and a greater harmony if it were harmonized more fully and to a greater extent, assuming that to be possible, and less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony if less completely harmonized and to a less extent?”
“Certainly.”
“Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?”
“Not in the least,” said he. (93a – b)

1. A harmony is by nature a harmony according to the degree to which it is harmonized.

2. If it is harmonized more fully and to a greater extent, it is more completely a harmony and a greater harmony, and if it is harmonized less fully and to a lesser extent, it is less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony.

3. But a soul cannot even in the slightest degree be either more or less completely, or to a greater or lesser extent, a soul than another.

4. It follows that a soul cannot be said to be like a harmony.

The other distinction is that whereas in the case of the harmony, the lyre precedes the harmony, in the case of the soul, the soul precedes the body.

In fact, the body cannot exist without the soul as the soul is said to be that which imparts life to the body:

“Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?”
“Certainly,” he said. (105d)

The harmony theory is refuted whereas the recollection theory implying the pre-existence and immortality of the soul, stands, i.e., it is accepted as valid in the dialogue.

It follows that the soul is immortal.

Every part of that argument is wrong

Organization and matter are simultaneous and reflect each other. A thing is determined (a one) and undetermined (flux) at once

The soul is the harmony among parts. There were Homo Denisovan, Homo Erectus, Homo Neanderthal, and many others

Every part of that argument is wrong — Gregory

Well, you can always email Plato and suggest he write another dialogue. Ideally in 21st-century English or in Mandarin, as the case may be.

Perhaps he can also explain that there is no "shift from ‘soul’ to ‘one soul’ and 'a soul'" :smile:

It's interesting that you know some Greek. But Plato is part of the Aristotelean and Thomistic tradition which tries to prove there is a God and that souls are transcendent and this is contrary to the modern philosophy I'm into. I'm not saying I can prove my beliefs but Plato never has a strong argument for his positions in our eyes and so we point out the flaws and show the alternatives. If you have an infallible argument the soul is separate from the body, do present it and I'll comment

But Plato is part of the Aristotelean and Thomistic tradition — Gregory

He is part of that tradition is the sense that he influenced their thinking, but this does not mean he would agree with them, especially not with Aquinas.

Plato never has a strong argument — Gregory

This is true, but perhaps this is because he did not hold the beliefs that some ascribe to him. The same may be the case with Aristotle, but that is a discussion for another time.

I don't have an infallible argument at all. In fact, it makes no difference to me either way.

I just think that when reading a dialogue we should try to understand its propositions, arguments, and conclusions within Plato's own framework.

Of course, dialogues may have several layers of meaning in which case it would seem indicated to start with the prima facie meaning and then look into other possibilities.

Presumably, Plato is trying to convey a message. If so, a working hypothesis assuming that everything he writes is just "myths" and "lies," would seem to undermine all efforts to extract anything meaningful from the text.

It's worth while to read Plato but when he says the soul is immaterial and that something immaterial like this doesn't come in more or less, he is talking about something he can't know anything about imo

Sure. That is where opinions diverge.

I agree that Plato's arguments are not particularly strong. However, according to scholars, his dialogues are simply dramatized discussions addressing certain philosophical issues that were addressed within the Academy. In which case, the arguments need not be watertight as their main function is to point to the issues discussed as a basis for further inquiry and discussion. Hence the impression of "aporia" one may get when reading the dialogues.

For example, in the Phaedo, Plato wishes to discuss or test his theories of Forms and Recollection and the arguments (and sub-arguments) and conclusions in the dialogue may not be final if the discussion of those topics within the Academy is intended to be ongoing.

It is for this reason that I believe we should not read too much into the dialogues. But nor should we ignore the Platonist tradition whose interpretation of the corpus does not seem to be entirely unfounded.

Wayfarer's point explains why we must conclude that the immaterial soul is prior to the material body.

And when we proceed further down this route, we see that to account for the real order which inheres within inanimate things, we need to assume an immaterial existence (God) , as prior to the material things of the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem for moderns, is that 'prior to' must always be interpreted temporally - in terms of temporal sequence. However, I think for the Ancients, 'prior to' means logically, not temporally prior. 'The soul' is eternal, not in the sense of eternal duration, but of being of an order outside of time, of timeless being, of which the individual is an instance. I think that comes through more clearly in neo-Platonism but the idea is there from the outset.

[Plato] is part of that tradition is the sense that he influenced their thinking, but this does not mean he would agree with them, especially not with Aquinas. — Fooloso4

I agree it is a mistake to think of Plato as 'a person of faith'. But I think this reflects on the role of belief in Christianity, in particular. Because of Christianity's constitution as a universal religion, it must provide the hope of salvation to all who believe, and believing is central to it. Whereas, according to Katja Vogt, Plato says that 'in believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.”'

This sentiment is also echoed in an essay on Schopenhauer's philosophy of religion:

Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system.

Both philosophers and theologians claim the authority to evaluate metaphysical principles, but the standards by which they conduct those evaluations are very different. Schopenhauer concludes that philosophers are ultimately in the position to critique principles that are advanced by theologians, not vice versa. He nonetheless recognizes that the metaphysical need of most people is satisfied by their religion. — Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Religion

Thomas Nagel says of Plato's metaphysics that

Plato was clearly concerned not only with the state of his soul, but also with his relation to the universe at the deepest level. Plato’s metaphysics was not intended to produce merely a detached understanding of reality. His motivation in philosophy was in part to achieve a kind of understanding that would connect him (and therefore every human being) to the whole of reality – intelligibly and if possible satisfyingly. — Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament

But because of the massive influence of Christianity on Western culture, the distinction between believing and knowing in respect of metaphysics has been blurred or even obliterated. And post-enlightenment culture will naturally understand Plato's metaphysics through that lens - positively for those favourable to Christian Platonism (e.g, Thomists, often Catholic), negatively to those who are sceptical about anything they deem religious (for example, philosophical naturalists). I think that's a powerful undercurrent in all of these debates, unstated but implicit.

//basically, because belief begets unbelief, as broad and deep as the belief that begat it.//

It is not insignificant that all the arguments for the immortality of the soul fail.The reason is simple. No one knows what happens when we die.

But that is not the end of it. Not knowing and positing an immortal soul are two very different things. Of course, myths of the soul were well known and Socrates borrows from them to tell his own. The myths take over where the arguments fail.

“I reflected that a poet should, if he were really going to be a poet, make stories rather than arguments ... ”(61b)

In the Republic he says that:

“there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (607b)

He says the poets are inspired and therefore do not speak from knowledge. Myths can be persuasive in a way that arguments, especially weak arguments, cannot.

There are two reasons why I think Socrates wants to persuade people that the soul is immortal. First, to charm away childish fears of death. Second, through images of death he can improve souls. If one believes that there are rewards and punishment one might lead his life accordingly. In addition, he secures the belief in notions of truth, knowledge, and wisdom. Even if they cannot be found in life they will be found in Hades, and, with the myth of recollection, these are things we already know and so can be found in life.

The philosopher sees the myths for what they are. Her life is guided not by myths and promises but by phronesis.

Plato says that 'in believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.”' — Wayfarer

I think that to label all beliefs "shameful" is an unwarranted exaggeration. Surely, not all beliefs are equal in terms of objective validity, moral and practical value, etc.

Also, there is a very large number of things about which we know very little and about which we hold beliefs or opinions until we learn more about them.

In other words, holding beliefs is an unavoidable fact of life. Unexamined, irrational or morally questionable beliefs may indeed be "shameful", but certainly not beliefs in general?

And the other thing is that Socrates himself mentions the word "belief" quite a few times, and not always in a negative sense. So, clearly, not all beliefs are "shameful".

Unexamined, irrational or morally questionable beliefs may indeed be "shameful", but certainly not beliefs in general? — Apollodorus

She says, further to that quote:

it involves a notion of 'belief' that is rather different from contemporary notions. Today, it is a widespread assumption that true beliefs are better than false beliefs, and that some true beliefs (perhaps those that come with justifications) qualify as knowledge. Socratic epistemology offers a genuinely different picture. In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Knowledge does not entail belief. Belief and knowledge differ in such important ways that they cannot both count as kinds of belief. As long as one does not have knowledge, one should reserve judgment and investigate by thinking through possible ways of seeing things.

This rings true to me.

Katja Vogt is Professor of Classics at Colombia, and the author of the SEP article on ancient skepticism. (I bought the book that the quotes are an abstract from, Belief and Truth, although haven't made a lot of headway with it.)

But to get to the point, here I think she's talking about 'doxai', about the whole mechanism of belief as a cognitive mode. I think 'ancient scepticism' comes from an very different background culture to our own - not only a different culture, but a different period of history, and a different way of being.

I think it is natural to assume many beliefs, and we bring them to everything we look at, whether consciously or not. But I also think this is precisely what is being questioned in these dialogues. However I don't necessarily think this entails unbelief, which is different to scepticism (even though modern scepticism usually means unbelief). It is closer to 'suspension of judgement', epoché - a real sense of not knowing and of not coming to a conclusion based on belief. I think it is based on contemplative insight.

Well, that's right. Belief or doxa can certainly have different meanings. To begin with, there is ordinary belief or opinion and right belief or opinion. The latter is what we hold to be true or is true on the basis of what we know from others, for example. What we know through reason is episteme and what we know through personal experience is gnosis. Higher forms of knowledge include noesis and sophia, intuitive knowledge and wisdom.

Contemplative insight is an interesting concept. Some accounts of Socrates in the dialogue seem to lend themselves to the interpretation that Socrates was something of a contemplative. Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing what exactly it was that he was contemplating. Perhaps the Forms or some other metaphysical realities? In any case it does not sound as if he was simply pondering something, though he must have done quite a bit of thinking to come up with all those ideas of his.

Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.”' — Wayfarer

I think Vogt is right in saying that there is a difference between true belief and knowledge. I don't know the context in which belief is said to be shameful, but I suspect it has something to do with the philosopher, one who desires knowledge and wisdom. To be content with belief or opinion would be shameful. But the importance of belief in the dialogues should not be overlooked.

The problem is brought into focus by Simmias:

“It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps to you too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account.” (85c-d)

It is not just in the dialogue that arguments are to be exhaustively tested, and in the timeframe of a dialogue it cannot be done. We too much test the arguments. We should never accept what is agreed on as the final word or truth of the matter. To not do so "shows a very feeble spirit".

In addition to finding the best accounts Socrates calculates the risk of holding a belief:

“ For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death.” (91b)

But it is not only his own beliefs he is concerned with. To the extent that myths are persuasive they are so without an argument or account. With regard to accounts he gives some odd advice:

“Then would you not avoid saying that when one is added to one it is the addition and when it is divided it is the division that is the cause of two? And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness, and you would dismiss these additions and divisions and other such subtleties, and leave them to those wiser than yourself to answer. But you, afraid, as they say, of your own shadow and your inexperience, would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that answer. If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one another.” (101c-d)

At the same time as he exhorts the would be philosopher to not settle for opinions he is an opinion maker and leads some to believe that his mythologies are truths of the world outside the cave, that is, a world freed of opinion.

But what if participation is by departure? Harmony is inarticulate. it is a ping-pong game that goes on forever without anyone ever scoring. It is endless empty space with no matter. But matter, life, and reason, is a dynamic of complementary dissonance. Matter is most dynamically emergent out of 'interference'. Cell differentiation is more the engine of life than replication, and if every cell differentiates, if even in the least degree, every time it divides, then this is more likely the regulating or determining factor of life than DNA. Reason is the disciplined analysis of terms, but whereof these terms? And does that source influence the meaning of the laws of that analysis? To paraphrase Laws: is it a god or some man that is the author of your terms? If a god, is that god on your side, but not mine? If a man, which one? But no god, only a living person can divest him- or herself of that expropriation. That is, by seeking to be a complement in dissent to it. I always suspect an irrational fear of being departed in discussions like this. A fear that corrupts. As if another voice lurks somewhere, not permitted to be heard by all. Fear of death is fear of being real, for it is death through which we are most completely real. Speculation about an afterlife would cheat us of that realness. Socrates proves this by demonstrating so articulately that he is unafraid. And that is far more eloquently put than any occasional assertion of faith in some beyond. You see, if change occurs to our terms through the most disciplined effort to conserve them, then the least change is universal. If the very rigidity of the causal nexus shatters its original condition, then that change, however small, is more completely what realness is than all the continuity of changeless extension. The least term of time is all the differing it is. And if rigor in conserving terms generates that moment, then it can hardly be less rigorous than that conservation that otherwise seems law. No god can save us, of course (from our dread of being real), because no god can be most real by the act of its departure, and so cannot be complementary to the community in contrariety that is the engine of everything real.

But what if participation is by departure? — Gary M Washburn

Well, if things exist by virtue of their participating in their distinctive being or Form (Phaedo 101c), then the soul becomes more real after death than in life by virtue of departing the world of sensibles and returning to the world of intelligibles where it is closer to its own being which is the Form of Life and thus more real than ever before.

This is why philosophical life according to Socrates is a preparation for death and the philosopher must aim to detach his soul from the body as far as possible in anticipation of his departure to the realm of higher realities which is the only place where true knowledge and wisdom may be attained (66e - 67a).

Yeah yeah yeah, sure. Socrates does indeed speak of something like "soul", but, for goodness sake, don't confuse this with the Christian era notion. Whatever he calls it, it should probably be rendered in the usual term "shade", something that even at the time was conceived, even by its most fervent believers, as barely a toehold of being real at all, like the smell left by a fart. The more pertinent matter is how ideas arise in discourse, and how that source gets its energy from a rational process of convincing ourselves ideas are eternal and unchanging. Many contributors to these remarks seem to think set theory applies. But when a Greek said a thing is predicated of a trait something more was implied. Ideas were personal. Embodied by human character identified in their gods. But this was just a rough-and-ready way of spanning the abyss between the moment of unlimited differing of all terms and the epochal structure of limiting reason that entails that moment as its only real ends. Where everything changes of a moment there is no epochal duration within which to name (identity which one) or number (enumerate the duration between beginning and end). That is, subject is predicate does not mean it is of the set and can be isolated from what is not of that set. It means means each needs the other to clarify or articulate itself. But the character of that participation is neither one thing nor the other. It is, rather, the personal discipline and drama by which each is recognizably not the other. The act of being that drama is the articulation of the person of that discipline. The personal character each of us brings to the recognition of terms separates subject and predicate from each other in the person of that discipline. Reason is personal, not an impersonal mechanics.

The human body is composed of a plethora of autonomic systems, but each of these is more finely attuned to the individual differences and condition of each cell. Every heart beat is slightly adjusted to the current needs of the body in ways that makes the term rhythm or pulse a dangerous misunderstanding. The subtle adjustments that regulate and supersede all theses autonomic systems are the clues and the area in which we need to look for agency and consciousness. But this is a phenomenon very much immanent to the cruder workings of the physical body. Without it,,,, well, meat.

But the character of that participation is neither one thing nor the other. It is, rather, the personal discipline and drama by which each is recognizably not the other. The act of being that drama is the articulation of the person of that discipline. The personal character each of us brings to the recognition of terms separates subject and predicate from each other in the person of that discipline. Reason is personal, not an impersonal mechanics. — Gary M Washburn

I see the interaction of terms playing a part in the way we talk about things but it seems to me that the remark: "The personal character each of us brings to the recognition of terms separates subject and predicate from each other in the person of that discipline" is a psychological observation that translates all arguments into another register.

That does not help me.

Socrates does not make the proper distinction between a tuning and what is tuned. It is not more or less a tuning, it is more or less in tune. — Fooloso4

It appears to me, like you're totally missing Socrates' argument. There is no such thing as "more or less in tune". Either the waves are in sync or they are not. Either it's in tune or not, this is not a matter of degrees. The point Socrates makes,93d- 94a, is that a group of notes is either in harmony or not, and there is not a matter of degrees here. But a soul has degrees of wickedness and goodness. So that is one reason why the soul is not a harmony. Either the parts are in harmony or not, and there is no matter of degrees in this situation. But, there is a matter of degrees of goodness with the way that the soul rules the body. That is why the soul is not a harmony.

The main point though, is made at 93a, "One must therefore suppose that a harmony does not direct its components, but is directed by them". This point is built upon at 94b: "Further, of all the parts of a man, can you mention any other part that rules him than his soul, especially if it is a wise soul?" He then explains how the soul rules by opposing what the body wants, and if the soul were a harmony of parts such an opposition would not be possible.

Well, does it now appear to do quite the opposite, ruling over all the elements of which one says it is composed, opposing nearly all of them throughout life, directing all their ways, inflicting harsh and painful punishment on them, at times in physical culture and medicine, at other times more gently by threats and exhortations, holding converse with desires and passion and fears as if it were one thing talking to a different one... — 94c-d

The proper analogy to good and bad souls would be good and bad tunings. — Fooloso4

The point is that there is no such thing as good or bad tunings. Being in tune is an objective fact of the wave synchronization, and if it is out of tune, it is simply not in tune, not a matter of a bad tuning, but not in tune at all. But the soul is not like this, it has degrees of goodness and badness.

The problem for moderns, is that 'prior to' must always be interpreted temporally - in terms of temporal sequence. However, I think for the Ancients, 'prior to' means logically, not temporally prior. 'The soul' is eternal, not in the sense of eternal duration, but of being of an order outside of time, of timeless being, of which the individual is an instance. I think that comes through more clearly in neo-Platonism but the idea is there from the outset. — Wayfarer

Yes, I believe this understanding of the two distinct senses of "eternal" is very important in metaphysics. What we have now, in our modern conception of "eternal", is a notion of infinite time, time extended eternally. This is because with materialism and physicalism, the idea of anything outside of time, (which is the classical theological conception of "eternal"), is incomprehensible.

I believe Aristotle's cosmological argument actually demonstrates that the idea of infinite time is what is incomprehensible, and this forces the need for something outside of time ("eternal" in the theological sense). So it's a matter of how one apprehends the boundaries. Is all of reality bounded by time (physicalism), or is time itself bounded?

There is no such thing as "more or less in tune". Either the waves are in sync or they are not. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't want to get too far off topic but there is 'just temperament or intonation', 'equal temperament or intonation'. With fretted instruments such as the guitar all tunings are a compromise so that most chords with sound good wherever they are played on the neck. Some electronic guitar tuners allow for 'sweetened tunings'. There is an old joke when tuning: "close enough for rock and roll".

See this article on ancient tuning methods: https://ancientlyre.com/blogs/blogs1-f324d18b-4152-49e5-aa3c-6539ac974916/posts/ancient-tuning-methods

The problem is that while the intervals of perfect 4th and perfect 5th sound in tune other intervals such as the major 3rd do not. The Wiki article on Pythagorean tuning:

"The Pythagorean system would appear to be ideal because of the purity of the fifths, but some consider other intervals, particularly the major third, to be so badly out of tune that major chords [may be considered] a dissonance."

Either the waves are in sync or they are not. Either it's in tune or not, — Metaphysician Undercover

"One must therefore suppose that a harmony does not direct its components, but is directed by them". — Metaphysician Undercover

The first is true independent of any instrument. The second is true of a particular instrument. The first is about the ratio of frequencies. The second about whether those relations are achieved on a particular instrument.

of all the parts of a man, can you mention any other part that rules him than his soul — Metaphysician Undercover

In the Republic the problem is not between the parts of the body and the soul but which part of the soul. The answer is reason. In addition, appetites are treated as a part of the soul and not the body. The conflict is within the soul, not between soul and body. Also the soul in the Republic has parts but in the Phaedo it is denied that it has parts.

Socrates does indeed speak of something like "soul", but, for goodness sake, don't confuse this with the Christian era notion. Whatever he calls it, it should probably be rendered in the usual term "shade", something that even at the time was conceived, even by its most fervent believers, as barely a toehold of being real at all, — Gary M Washburn

The term psyche or "soul" was initially used by Homer in the sense of “departed soul, ghost. But it was also used with reference to “conscious self”, “various aspects of the self”, “moral and intellectual self”, “primary substance and source of life”, “spirit of the universe”, etc.:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0058:entry=yuxh/

The soul may have been a "shade" at the time of Homer. However, this changed with the development of the concept of paradise-like locations like the Elysian Fields and the Isles of the Blessed whose inhabitants engage in leisure activities such as playing games, holding friendly contests, and playing music. Of course, this was reserved for the select few, the vast majority would be destined for a shadowy existence in the underworld.

What Socrates describes certainly sounds like much more than a "shade".

See also:

By the end of the fifth century — the time of Socrates' death — soul is standardly thought and spoken of, for instance, as the distinguishing mark of living things, as something that is the subject of emotional states and that is responsible for planning and practical thinking, and also as the bearer of such virtues as courage and justice. Coming to philosophical theory, we first trace a development towards comprehensive articulation of a very broad conception of soul, according to which the soul is not only responsible for mental or psychological functions like thought, perception and desire, and is the bearer of moral qualities, but in some way or other accounts for all the vital functions that any living organism performs. This broad conception, which is clearly in close contact with ordinary Greek usage by that time, finds its fullest articulation in Aristotle's theory.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/

Convincing, on the face of it. But seems to confuse two significations. Life, animus, can hardly be rigorously meant as the paradigm of spirit. Soul, surely, is in-animate! I admit to lacking patience with the clerical side. But according to my Liddell and Scott, psyche is breath. Seeing spirit in it seems 'vaporous'. But Plato and Socrates both were not above exploiting such ambiguities, so it seems a bit vapid to insist on the singular sense that suits. In any case, taking psyche to mean soul, as opposed to 'life-force', as eternal as opposed to caught-up in its time, seems question-begging. It is, before after all, the issue Socrates is moderating. And it is not really settled, though only Socrates' equanimity is.

I did check the quote cited above at 94 B, and it is indeed 'psyche' that appears there, though I am not about to reread the whole dialogue to check all other appearances of the notion. Socrates, though, was a fan of Homer, and other oral traditions, and is far more likely to use a term in the archaic sense than as, say, to speak as Aristotle would.

The dialogue opens:

You yourself

And in response:

I myself

The dialogue is about what happens to oneself, or, more narrowly, Socrates himself. The question “what counts as oneself?” is never asked. Rather than Socrates being treated as ‘one’ he is immediately divided into two, body and soul. Socrates is neither a body or a soul, but it would be wrong to regard him as some third thing. By division one becomes two, and by addition two becomes three. Either 1 (body) + 1 (soul) = 1 (self) or 1 +1 = 3 (some third thing which is a combination). There is something wrong with this arithmetic (arithmos). There can be no proper count or account without identification of the unit of the count.

The concern is that the unity that is Socrates will be destroyed. In order to address this Socrates divides his unity into a duality, body and soul. It is by this division of one into two that he attempts to demonstrate his unity in death, but in doing so Socrates can no longer be found.

That Socrates should be identified with the soul alone rather than the whole of him is shown to be problematic.

The supposedly immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)

The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul. But Socrates does not stop there. The soul of the philosopher may enter the class of the gods (82c)

Either the soul of ants and donkeys are immortal and so it is not Socrates’ soul but a soul that is now Socrates’ and previously and latter not Socrates’ that endures; or Socrates is at various times an ant or donkey or some other animal. Or a god. Only in that case it is no longer immortality that distinguishes mortals from the immortals.

The consequence of the attempt to save Socrates by dividing him into soul and body is the destruction of the unity that is Socrates. No coherent account can be given because of the failure to properly identify the unit of the count, that is, Socrates himself.

I'd like to make it helpful, but I'm afraid of what commitments you might have to convention that might interfere with the effort. What is a proposition, really? Feed it into set theory and there is no room for modification. But what if a predicate is is a modifier, rather than a fixed designation? In fact, it's a modified modifier. Achilles may be courageous, but his courage is problematical. He wants to the paradigm of courage, but he's a pretty sorry-ass 'courage'. But this only means we need to recognize how he is not 'courage' to understand the idea, at least from how he embodies it. Such personalities became less of a religion than a language of ideas for the Greeks. Personal character was the engine of ideas, and Socrates found in this participation the engine of reality itself. But if each proposition is a modifier, not a rigid designation, if 'A' is recognizable in its way of being 'B', and being 'B' is recognizable in the way 'a' is being it, then 'B' is 'C' in a way that may not be similar at all. And even if the variation is slight, if we try to make a machine out of it that machine will ultimately grind to a halt. We can try to redesign and manipulate the machine so it runs smoothly, but at the expense of losing the meaning of the whole system. It is not how we speak or think or understand each other.

Autos (alpha, mu, tau, omicron, sigma) does indeed open the dialogue, but only to permit the list of persons present, and to note Plato's absence. Claiming this to suggest self-hood as the theme of the dialogue hangs on a pretty slender thread.

Was Soc. a Hindu? He does bring up reincarnation, in the myth of Er, isn't it? But that story has an explicit moral: ambition is dangerous to its owner. It is a dangerous matter, too, to assume Socrates is ever serious about drawing conclusions, other than to discourage them.

It is not how we speak or think or understand each other.↪Fooloso4 — Gary M Washburn

I am not sure if this is intended as a criticism of what I said or if what I said is being pointed to in support of your claim about how we speak or think or understand each other. There is an irony here.

How we speak includes those who say that we are a soul, and those who say we are physical bodies, and those who say the self is a social construct, and so on.

All of which is fraught with often hidden baggage. I'm afraid I do worry I might be up against something of the sort. But convention has it that holding firm to convictions, or ultimately achieving convictions resistant to critique is a virtue and goal. The notion that the characterology of changing convictions is the engine of meaning and language feels like it's a hard sell in such a milieu. I suppose it may seem an irony that I may seem convinced of this.