If you want to quibble over the difference between 'again and again' and 'repeat' then go ahead. — Fooloso4

If you want to invent things that are not in the original text and believe in your own inventions, then go ahead. But in that case don't expect anyone to take you seriously. :grin:

According to Liddell and Scott:

2 sing as an incantation, ἃ αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ X.Mem.2.6.11; χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ Pl.Phd.114d, cf. 77e; ἐ. ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Id.R.608a; ἐ. τινί sing to one so as to charm or soothe him, Id.Phdr.267d, Lg.812c, al.:—Pass., Porph.Chr.35: abs., use charms or incantations, Pl.Tht.157c; ἐπαείδων by means of charms, A.Ag.1021 (lyr.), cf. Pl.Lg.773d, Tht.149d. — Fooloso4

Yes, "sing to one so as to soothe him". Exactly as at 77e where Socrates says:

You must sing to him every day until you drive it [the fear] away

Socrates' intention is to soothe or comfort his friends with a narrative that he believes in, not to tell them lies and also them them that he is telling them lies.

Your claims are illogical and absurd and stand refuted.

If the soul is not like those examples then the argument still fails because the cases used in the argument are not comparable. — Fooloso4

You are confused.

Of course the soul is special, being unlike anything else. The comparison is made with certain qualifications. Otherwise no comparison can be made.

However, as Sedley and Long point out, the proof is already provided at 105c - e:

[105c]“What causes the body in which it is to be alive?”

“The soul,” he replied.

[105d] “Is this always the case?”
“Yes,” said he, “of course.”

“Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Is there anything that is the opposite of life?”

“Yes,” said he.

“What?”

“Death.”

“Now the soul, as we have agreed before, will never admit the opposite of that which it brings with it.”

“Decidedly not,” said Cebes.

“Then what do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even?”

“Uneven,” said he.

“And those which do not admit justice and music?”

[105e] “Unjust,” he replied, “and unmusical.”
“Well then what do we call that which does not admit death?”

“Deathless or immortal,” he said.

“And the soul does not admit death?”

“No.”

“Then the soul is immortal.”

“Yes.”

“Very well,” said he. “Shall we say then that this is proved?”

“Yes, and very satisfactorily, Socrates.”

Yes, "sing to one so as to soothe him". — Apollodorus

What it says is:

sing to one so as to charm or soothe him — Fooloso4

There is no doubt the charms and incantations were used to soothe their fear of death. Your objection was to the terms 'incantations' and 'charms'.

Socrates' intention is to soothe or comfort his friends with a narrative that he believes in, not to tell them lies and also them them that he is telling them lies. — Apollodorus

Whether Socrates believed these stories is an open question. See what he says in the Apology about what death may have in store for us. Of course no one tells you lies and at the same time tells you that they are lies! You really are having a hard time sorting this all out.

Of course the soul is special, being unlike anything else. — Apollodorus

This is question begging. The question is whether or not the soul is immortal.

However, as Sedley and Long point out, the proof is already provided at 105c - e — Apollodorus

This is not a proof it is an assertion. The fact that Cebes is satisfied does not mean that we should be. Cebes agrees with everything Socrates says. That is something that should be taken note of.

The question is whether or not the soul is immortal. — Fooloso4

Socrates answers that question in the affirmative:

"Then the soul is immortal.”

“Yes.”

“Very well,” said he. “Shall we say then that this is proved?”

“Yes, and very satisfactorily, Socrates.”

And:

... since the soul turns out to be immortal ... these are the reasons why a man should be confident about his own soul ....

Socrates clearly states that the soul is immortal and urges his companions to have confidence in their own souls.

This is not a proof it is an assertion. — Fooloso4

It is an assertion that is accepted by Socrates and Cebes as proof. What atheists and sophists believe is not the issue.

Your objection was to the terms 'incantations' and 'charms'. — Fooloso4

Correct. "Incantations" and "charms" are not in the Greek text, and the same applies to your "over and over again". Hence you made them up for the purpose of Straussian esotericism and sophistry.

Of course no one tells you lies and at the same time tells you that they are lies! — Fooloso4

Exactly. And no one tells himself lies. Therefore Socrates is not lying either to himself or to his companions!

Socrates answers that question in the affirmative — Apollodorus

Once again you refuse to follow the argument. Claiming it is a special case is special pleading.

"Incantations" and "charms" are not in the Greek text — Apollodorus

Are you claiming that Liddell and Scott is wrong? Were they influenced by Strauss?

Hence you made them up for the purpose of Straussian esotericism and sophistry. — Apollodorus

Quoting two different translations is not making stuff up

From the IEP:

and repeat such a tale to ourselves as though it were an “incantation” (114d).

https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/

And Gallop:

-so one should repeat such things to oneself like a spell;

and Grube:

and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation

...not to tell them lies and also them them that he is telling them lies. — Apollodorus

It is your assumption that incantations and charms are lies.

Socrates clearly states that the soul is immortal and urges his companions to have confidence in their own souls.

This is not a proof it is an assertion.
— Fooloso4

It is an assertion that is accepted by Socrates and Cebes as proof. What atheists and sophists believe is not the issue. — Apollodorus

Does Socrates offer arguments in believing and asserting Soul is immortal? What are they?

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. — Fooloso4

Well, I don't think this is really true. There are principles to be followed in tuning the instrument, but the tuning itself is dependent on hearing the particular notes and judging the relation between them as the desired ones. So the tuning does not exist apart from the instrument, as it is dependent on the instrument making those tones so that they may be judged.

It is this relationship of frequencies that is used to tune a particular lyre. — Fooloso4

See, it is necessary to have those tones, in order to have tones with that the relationship between them. Just having the principle does not constitute "the tuning of a lyre" To state the principle, or relationships between frequency, or lengths of similar strings, in mathematical terms, or however you state it, does not give you "the tuning of a lyre". It gives you 'how to tune a lyre'.

Analogously, the Tuning of the body exists apart from any particular body, it is the relationship of bodily parts, but the tuning of any particular body suffers the same fate as the tuning of any particular lyre. — Fooloso4

The argument against the soul as a harmony, is not intended to say anything about the existence of the soul after death. That's why Socrates goes to the other dialectical argument (argument from the meaning of words) afterwards. The harmony argument shows that 'how to tune a lyre', the principle concerning the relationship between tones, is prior to 'the tuning of a lyre'. So the soul is prior to the body, by having that principle of how to create harmony within the parts of the body. So at 95 c-d he explains how the proof that the soul is prior to the man, does not prove that the soul is immortal. It may be the case that entering the body of a man is the decline of the soul, that this is the beginning of the end.

The harmony argument shows that 'how to tune a lyre', the principle concerning the relationship between tones, is prior to 'the tuning of a lyre'. So the soul is prior to the body, by having that principle of how to create harmony within the parts of the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

The tuning does not tune the lyre or body, the lyre or body is tuned according to the tuning. It must exist in order to be tuned.

The argument against the soul as a harmony, is not intended to say anything about the existence of the soul after death. — Metaphysician Undercover

But if the argument is accepted then the soul is not immortal. The destruction of the lyre means the destruction of its tuning, and analogously the destruction of the body would mean the destruction of its tuning. How a lyre or body is tuned according to the relationship of its part is not affected, but the tuning of this particular lyre or body certainly is when the lyre or body is destroyed,

The tuning does not tune the lyre or body, the lyre or body is tuned according to the tuning. It must exist in order to be tuned. — Fooloso4

But the harmonies, which are ratios, don't come into existence when the lyre is tuned. They are the same whether there is any lyre or not. It's those that represent 'the immortal'. (The discovery that harmonies are ratios was, I believe, one of the principle discoveries of the Pythagoreans.)

The tuning does not tune the lyre or body, the lyre or body is tuned according to the tuning. It must exist in order to be tuned. — Fooloso4

This is strangely worded. If it is true that the act of tuning is what causes the lyre to be tuned, then it contradicts this to say "The tuning does not tune the lyre or body", as you do say. I think we must admit that it is the act of tuning which causes the lyre to be tuned, so we can't accept what you say here, "the tuning does not tune the lyre or body".

But if the argument is accepted then the soul is not immortal. The destruction of the lyre means the destruction of its tuning, and analogously the destruction of the body would mean the destruction of its tuning. How a lyre or body is tuned according to the relationship of its part is not affected, but the tuning of this particular lyre or body certainly is when the lyre or body is destroyed, — Fooloso4

Socrates argues against the position that the soul is like being tuned, ( a harmony in my translation) for the reason I described, the soul is more like the cause of being tuned, which is the act of tuning. When a particular lyre is no longer tuned, the cause of it being tuned, the act of tuning, is no longer tuning that particular lyre, but it is still tuning other instruments..

The destruction of the lyre means the destruction of its tuning, and analogously the destruction of the body would mean the destruction of its tuning — Fooloso4

I really don't think you understand universals.

It is your assumption that incantations and charms are lies. — Fooloso4

This is what you are implying. Here is your statement from page 12 to refresh your memory:

“Whether or not the soul has been shown to be immortal is a basic question of my essay. I show how and why each of the arguments fail. It is because the arguments fail that he used myths to persuade, charms and incantations.” — Fooloso4

1. Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul do not fail in the dialogue. He and Cebes agree that the immortality of the soul has been proved at 105e:

“Then the soul is immortal.”
“Yes.”
“Very well,” said he. “Shall we say then that this is proved?”
“Yes, and very satisfactorily, Socrates.”

See also Phaedrus 245c.

2. You are using weasel words to imply that Socrates has failed to demonstrate the immortality of the soul and is resorting to “charms and incantations” to persuade his companions.

3. However, the Greek text does not say “charms and incantations” or “over and over again”.

The text simply says:

“There is a need to sing such things to oneself [as to soothe oneself] wherefore I myself have been prolonging my story for long [presumably, to overcome his own fear]”.

Obviously, the verb “sing” does not refer to “incantations”. It refers to “such things”, i.e. what has been said during the dialogue concerning the soul’s immortality and afterlife.

4. It follows that Socrates is not using “charms and incantations” to persuade his companions of the immortality of the soul. He has already persuaded them and is now telling them to “sing it to themselves” as in a soothing song sung to a child to drive away fear, i.e. to take courage and comfort in what he has told them and what has been agreed on.

IMHO there is a very big difference between what the text actually says and what you imply that it says.

You need to show more respect for people and not constantly try to take us for a ride with unwarranted Straussianist sophistry.

But the harmonies, which are ratios, don't come into existence when the lyre is tuned. — Wayfarer

The instrument is tuned in accord with the ratios. The particular lyre, however, is in tune only when the strings of that instrument are at the proper tension.

It's those that represent 'the immortal'. — Wayfarer

The ratio of frequencies, say 4ths or 5ths is always the same, but the question is whether that ratio exists in any particular instrument. It can only exist when the strings are at proper tension and the string cannot exist at proper tension if the lyre is destroyed.

I do not know the tuning of the lyre, but let's say the strings are tuned in 4ths or 5ths. The standard is independent of any particular lyre, but whether this particular lyre is in tune cannot be independent of the tension of the strings of this lyre, and that tension cannot be achieved when this lyre is destroyed.

I really don't think you understand universals. — Wayfarer

What is at issue is the fate of Socrates' soul. It is a question of the distinction between the particular and the universal. The immortality of universal Soul does not tell us what happens to Socrates' soul. The myths in the Phaedo are about particular souls not universal Soul.

This is what you are implying. — Apollodorus

The failure of the argument is the result of the limits of argument. No argument can determine the fate of the soul. This does not mean that myths are lies.

You are using weasel words to imply that Socrates has failed to demonstrate the immortality of the soul and is resorting to “charms and incantations” to persuade his companions — Apollodorus

These are not my words. I gave several translations with those words. In addition, you seem to be unaware that mention of charms and incantation occurs several times throughout the dialogue.

You need to show more respect for people and not constantly try to take us for a ride with unwarranted Straussianist sophistry. — Apollodorus

The translations I cited were not translated by Strauss. Strauss is not the author of Liddell and Scott lexicon. Did you just ignore all of it? Perhaps you missed it:

According to Liddell and Scott:

2 sing as an incantation, ἃ αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ X.Mem.2.6.11; χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ Pl.Phd.114d, cf. 77e; ἐ. ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Id.R.608a; ἐ. τινί sing to one so as to charm or soothe him, Id.Phdr.267d, Lg.812c, al.:—Pass., Porph.Chr.35: abs., use charms or incantations, Pl.Tht.157c; ἐπαείδων by means of charms, A.Ag.1021 (lyr.), cf. Pl.Lg.773d, Tht.149d.

From the IEP:

and repeat such a tale to ourselves as though it were an “incantation” (114d).
https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/

And Gallop:

-so one should repeat such things to oneself like a spell;

and Grube:

and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation — Fooloso4

Plato couldn't face the event. We are told he was ill, but we can guess why, and if we cannot do so we shouldn't be speculating about his meaning. The completeness of worth is that there is no extension. Any extension diminishes it. Like the homeopath, it is a toxin to reason that we make endurable by dilution. Eternity is simply the homeopathic model of dilution brought to such an extent that the original poison is no longer there at all, but is thought to be therapeutic by having been there. This is the proper relation between event and "form", particular and universal. Which is most real? The toxin of unlimited worth, or the pretense of its cure in its attenuation to oblivion? Worth is the quality of moment, or the completeness of the qualifier. The qualifier cannot be quantified. But reason is the trace of the quantifier. The trace, that is, that effaces all that extends by dilution of any trace of worth.

What if Nurse Ratched had been moved by just one word or gesture to recognize that the main character of the play was as sane as she was? All of a sudden everything he said or did would make sense to her, and not only from then on, but all that he had said or done previously. That is, the space of time and rational extension of it would not limit the transformation of meaning the moment of that recognition is. The act of the moment of that recognition is timeless, not because it extends rationally or temporally from that event, but because the navigation of that extension does not limit or determine the meaning its worth is.

The event of Socrates' death does not set any landmarks upon who he is. No, it is not eternity, but it is more unlimited, and complete, than the full extension of time can contain.

The failure of the argument is the result of the limits of argument. No argument can determine the fate of the soul. — Fooloso4

This is not said in the dialogue. On the contrary, Socrates and Cebes agree that the immortality of soul has been proved:

Then the soul is immortal.”
“Yes.”
“Very well,” said he. “Shall we say then that this is proved?”
“Yes, and very satisfactorily, Socrates (105e).

This conclusion is reaffirmed at 107c:

As it is, however, since the soul is evidently immortal ...

And reaffirmed again at 114d:

However, since the soul turns out to be immortal ...

No one is asking for your opinion on the validity of Socrates' argument. What matters is that the argument is accepted as conclusive by the characters in the dialogue.

mention of charms and incantation occurs several times throughout the dialogue. — Fooloso4

Where exactly? And what translation are you using?

Meantime, let me refresh your memory one more time:

It is because the arguments fail that he used myths to persuade, charms and incantations. — Fooloso4

But you have not demonstrated this to be the case. As already stated, 114d does not say "charms and incantations".

The verb used is ἐπαείδω epaeido “sing to someone as to soothe him” which is the same verb used at 77e in the sense of “sing someone’s fear away”.

This is your own definition: "sing to one so as to charm or soothe him". Not "charm" but "charm OR soothe" depending on the situation.

And in the situation under discussion it is "soothe" as Socrates' intention is to soothe or comfort his companions in the face of his imminent death.

Therefore, the literal translation is:

There is a need to sing such things to oneself [as to soothe oneself] wherefore I myself have been prolonging my story for long

So NO "CHARMS" AND NO "INCANTATIONS".

You could if you really wanted to, substitute "chant" for "sing", as Sedley and Long have done:

One must chant such things to oneself (no mention of "charms" or "incantations")

But even then it must be borne in mind (1) that the action described by the verb "chant" has the purpose of "soothing" and (2) that it very obviously refers to "such things" viz. the immortality of soul and afterlife which were discussed up to that point.

As the issues relating to soul such as immortality have already been settled and agreed on, it is not and cannot be about "persuading" but about soothing or comforting with thoughts of the things agreed on.

So, basically, you are mistaking a very free English translation for the Greek original and are reading far too much into it because it serves your Straussian agenda. And that is where you problem comes from. You (deliberately) see things that are not there!

Here is your own statement from page 15:

The second allows the dialogues to open up, to give a view of a complex terrain of interrelated questions and problems, or in some cases leading the reader into a labyrinth, and in all cases aporia. — Fooloso4

Your Straussianist methodology causes you to construct a labyrinth from things that are not in the text and become lost in it. Which is why you can't expect people to take you seriously.

All of these things have been discussed. You have your opinions, I have mine, and different scholars have theirs as well. Why the obsessive need to repeat your opinions? They do not become more convincing by repetition.

The immortality of universal Soul does not tell us what happens to Socrates' soul. The myths in the Phaedo are about particular souls not universal Soul. — Fooloso4

Perhaps the division is not hard and fast.

“The fact is,” said [Socrates], “in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea." — Phaedo 103e

Might want to look at Charmides. But, I suppose, there the charm is the enticement to take the cure, which may not be so charming.

The characters accept the argument? Maybe, but Socrates merely uses that assent as grist for his mill. All he really has proven is that they should continue the discipline of dialectic. Challenging each other's convictions doesn't necessarily change minds, but it does change terms, and that dynamic is the whole ball of wax. Meaning is always as retrospective as prospective. And that is where the logical positivists fall on their tokus.

As the examples show snow has the right to the name Cold and three to the name Odd.

The characters accept the argument? Maybe, but Socrates merely uses that assent as grist for his mill. All he really has proven is that they should continue the discipline of dialectic. /quote]

At the risk of providing grist for your mill, I agree. — Gary M Washburn

Might want to look at Charmides. — Gary M Washburn

Therein the lie and truth of the charm.

But not only did Socrates offer Charmides a charm that was said to be a cure, we must also consider Charmides own charm and how Socrates sublimated it. The problem of the inner and the outer, beginning with seeing inside his cloak. And related to this the question of the beautiful and the good.

All he really has proven is that they should continue the discipline of dialectic. — Gary M Washburn

I doubt that anyone would object to dialectic.

However, there is no logical or philosophical prohibition against drawing conclusions, however temporary or provisional, from dialectic.

Unless, perhaps, by "dialectic" we are to understand radical skepticism, nihilism or something else along those lines ....

I do not know the tuning of the lyre, but let's say the strings are tuned in 4ths or 5ths. The standard is independent of any particular lyre, but whether this particular lyre is in tune cannot be independent of the tension of the strings of this lyre, and that tension cannot be achieved when this lyre is destroyed. — Fooloso4

Yes, and the belief that the soul is like a particular lyre being in tune (a harmony), is the belief which Socrates dismisses as faulty. So the fact that this particular instance of being in tune (a harmony) is destroyed when the lyre is destroyed, is irrelevant to what Socrates is arguing, because he argues that the soul is not like a particular instance of being in tune (a harmony).

So the fact that this particular instance of being in tune (a harmony) is destroyed when the lyre is destroyed, is irrelevant to what Socrates is arguing, because he argues that the soul is not like a particular instance of being in tune (a harmony). — Metaphysician Undercover

I am suggesting that his argument against the body being a tuning is problematic. And that the real reason he dismisses it is because if it were accepted the soul could not be before the body or outlast the body.

The analogy with the lyre is not with a lyre that needs to be tuned but that is tuned, that is, in harmony.

The analogy with the lyre is not with a lyre that needs to be tuned but that is tuned, that is, in harmony. — Fooloso4

But a lyre does need to be tuned. It doesn't magically tune itself, and if used, it rapidly goes out of tune. So there is a very clear need to assume that there is something which tunes it. Likewise, there is a very clear need to assume that there is something which causes an organism to be organized. That's the soul.

Likewise, there is a very clear need to assume that there is something which causes an organism to be organized. That's the soul. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. The soul is that which imparts life to the body in the first place (105c - d). Without the soul there would be no body.