I do disagree but I did so with all due courtesy and respect. I’m genuinely trying to understand and am quite willing to be corrected.

In my opinion, Plato does not want the reader to just accept the arguments, but to examine and evaluate them. Why would he give the examples of three/Odd, snow/Cold, fire/Hot, if not to draw a parallel with soul/Life?

At 106a Socrates asks whether three things would be imperishable if Odd is imperishable and whether snow would slip away unmelted rather than admit Hot. Cebes agrees that the three things and the snow would be imperishable. Should we? We know that snow melts and having three of something does not mean I will always have these three things.

He is trying to convince Cebes and Simmias of the immortality of the soul. Cebes is convinced. Simmias is not so sure. Argument has its limits. It cannot determine what happens to us when we die. This raises the problem misologic, the hatred of argument, which can occur when someone expects too much from argument. (89d)

It cannot determine what happens to us when we die. — Fooloso4

Agree. Thanks for the clarification!

I do disagree but I did so with all due courtesy and respect. I’m genuinely trying to understand and am quite willing to be corrected. — Wayfarer

Excellent. Keep up the good work.

Socrates is not trying to convince anyone of anything, except, I suppose, that his imminent death is no reason to freak out and abandon philosophy, or dialectic, as he would say.

Departure is all that is real. And nothing remains. In logical parlance, inference from a premise is an "extension". But this only means it, reason, is no real term. That is, the terms of reason are only real in the discipline that ultimately undoes them. If realness is departure then the only possible recognition of the departed is the terms rigorously effaced in the rigor of their extension.

Those engaged in the dialectic evince who they really are in the quality of their discipline dedicated to the eventuation of departure, of being departed and only known from the character of that discipline eventuating it. We talk. And we show our worth by proving how wrong every premise is that would preserve our convictions. Becoming unconvinced, through a most rigorous exercise, is who we are. The point is, then, to keep the discussion alive even as the end is most near.

One thing should be clear, to take Socrates as making certain assertions is a mug's game.

The point I was making earlier in my reply to Fooloso4 was:

I think you are using the wrong translation.

Socrates says:
“… when death attacks the human being, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, whereas the immortal part departs intact and undestroyed, and is gone, having retreated from death […] And so, more surely than anything, Cebes, soul is immortal and imperishable, and all our souls really will exist in Hades” 106e -107a

Cebes replies :
“For my part, Socrates, I’ve nothing else to say against this, nor can I doubt the arguments in any way”. 107a

Simmias agrees, but still has some doubts:
“… I’m compelled still to keep some doubt in my mind about what has been said” 107b

Socrates has the final word:
“As it is, however, since the soul is evidently immortal, it could have no means of safety or of escaping evils, other than becoming both as good and as wise as possible”

Concerning the myth he tells of Hades, Socrates says:
“… since the soul turns out to be immortal, I think that for someone who believes this to be so it is both fitting and worth the risk – for fair is the risk – to insist that either what I have said or something like it is true concerning our souls and their dwelling places” 114d

For some strange reason you keep leaving out "However, since the soul turns out to be immortal". — Apollodorus

And, as explained on the other thread, given that Socrates used his account of immortality and afterlife to comfort his friends, it makes no sense to interpret his expression "one must chant this to oneself" to mean that everything is just a myth. On the contrary, its only logical meaning is "keep saying it to yourself", i.e., "believe it and take comfort in it". This was Socrates' last instruction to his followers.

But, like everyone else here, I do my best to understand and I am, of course, willing to be corrected and instructed in the actual truth.

I am not going to go over the same things with you again and again without end. You have stated your position, why repeat it? Why quote yourself repeating it yet again?

I think you got it all wrong. As I said, I'm here to learn.

And what I've learned from your comments is that Straussian esotericism isn't always the best approach to reading Plato.

There is a limit to how much you can reasonably read into a passage or text without running the risk of leaving evidence and reason behind and going down an endless rabbit hole from where it may be difficult to retrieve a sense of reality.

Sometimes it seems more prudent to just adhere to a prima facie reading than insisting on evidence-free interpretation and wild speculation that doesn't lead anywhere.

I think you got it all wrong. As I said, I'm here to learn. — Apollodorus

What you say and what you do are obviously not the same. Or do you think learning involves repeated deliberate misrepresentation? Or is it the incessant attempt to push forward your own interpretation? Or is it the belligerent attempt to discredit someone you have not read and do not know anything about? You know nothing about what you misleadingly call "Straussian esotericism" and yet in your desire to learn you simply dismiss it.

Or perhaps when you say you are here to learn you mean ignoring Plato as well. Your prima facie is at odds with what Socrates says:

we must follow the argument wherever, like a wind, it may lead us (Republic 394d)

Several times I have traced the arguments in the text, connecting one statement with the next, but in your interest to learn you have simply ignored them. Preferring to take statements out of context as if the whole of the problem is contained in an isolated statement.

Or perhaps when you say you are here to learn you mean ignoring Plato as well. — Fooloso4

Wayfarer says it's better to just respect one another's viewpoints. You can show respect for Apo's views.

we must follow the argument wherever, like a wind, it may lead us (Republic 394d) — Fooloso4

But you are quoting that out of context, aren't you? Socrates was obviously talking about rational, evidence-based argument, not evidence-free speculation.

To say "Socrates says 'one must chant such things to oneself' (Phaedo 114d), therefore he indicates that he is telling myths or lies" is not really rational, evidence-based argument. It is evidence-free speculation just like your other claims about the immortality of soul, etc.

As you can see, your speculation is blatantly contradicted by Socrates' own statement to the effect that "this is the reason why a man should be confident about his own soul".

To say "Socrates says 'one must chant such things to oneself' (Phaedo 114d), therefore he indicates that he is telling myths or lies" is not really rational, evidence-based argument. — Apollodorus

That line of argument is wholly of your own creation. This is not the first time you have done this. You falsely accuse me of saying something then argue against it. It is dishonest and intended only to win arguments. It is antithetical to your claim that you are here to learn.

More than once you have done this and each time I challenge you to point out where I said what you claimed I said you go silent and move on to something else.

...we must follow the argument wherever, like a wind, it may lead us (Republic 394d)

There are two ways of reading the dialogues that move in opposite directions. The first attempts to limit them, to close them off, to put an end to inquiry and discussion. The first was is dogmatic, and sees the dialogues as conforming to and confirming the reader's beliefs. The second allows the dialogues to open up, to give a view of a complex terrain of interrelated questions and problems, or in some cases leading the reader into a labyrinth, and in all cases aporia.

The second allows the dialogues to open up, to give a view of a complex terrain of interrelated questions and problems, or in some cases leading the reader into a labyrinth, and in all cases aporia. — Fooloso4

Well, that's exactly where the problem lies. You are not "allowing the dialogue to open up" at all. You are reading things into it that are simply not there. You are building a Straussian labyrinth (or rabbit hole) and jump right into it and expect others to follow you.

These are your own statements from page 12, are they not?

Immediately following this story Socrates says:

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places … (114d)

Myths do not reveal the truth. And yet Socrates tells them myths. They are not a substitute for arguments, but argument has its limits. Simmias was not fully convinced by Socrates’ arguments. He was no longer distrustful of the arguments, but still has some lingering distrust within himself. (107b) Throughout the dialogue Socrates has referred to myth as a means of self-persuasion. Here again he says that one should “sing incantations to himself, over and over again”(114d)
....
Socrates seems to have persuaded himself and wants to persuade others that what is best is to be persuaded that what is is best. — Fooloso4

From what I see, your statement suggests that (1) Socrates is "telling them myths" and (2) has "persuaded himself and wants to persuade others".

But what he actually says is:

"... this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal..."

Besides, if Socrates' intention is to comfort his friends, why would he tell them at the very end "actually, all this is just a myth"?

It makes no sense whatsoever. And he does not say so.

Incidentally, Socrates does not say "one should sing incantations to himself, over and over again".

The text simply says "There is a need to sing such things to oneself (as to soothe oneself)".

This clearly indicates Socrates' intention to soothe or comfort his friends, not to tell them myths or lies.

I have already discussed Plato's use of myths. As to whether the soul has been shown to be immortal see my responses above to Wayfarer.

Socrates says 'one must chant such things to oneself' — Apollodorus

I think that's a reference to 'mantrayana', repetition of a sacred word of phrase.

@Wayfarer @Apollodorus
Yes,socrates use of mantras shows how a lot of the worlds spiritual and mystical traditions use similiar techniques to obtain union with the divine.

I think that's a reference to 'mantrayana', repetition of a sacred word of phrase — Wayfarer

The verb is ἐπαείδω epaeido “sing to someone as to soothe him” which is the same verb used at 77e in the sense of “sing someone’s fear away”:

https://lsj.gr/wiki/%E1%BC%90%CF%80%CE%B1%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B4%CF%89

If it is a "mantra", what exactly would the "sacred word or phrase" be at 114d, 77e, etc?

Socrates says:

“ 'Greece is a large country, Cebes, which has good men in it, I suppose; and there are many foreign races too. You must ransack all of them in search of such a singer, sparing neither money nor toil, because there isn’t anything more necessary on which to spend your money. And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.' “(78a)

I have already discussed Plato's use of myths. — Fooloso4

This isn't about Plato's use of myths. It is about your claim that Socrates at 114d is telling his friends that "one should “sing incantations to himself, over and over again”, which is not true.

And you can't infer from it that he is telling them myths, i.e., lies.

Yes, reading that passage again, perhaps not a reference to mantram. But the symbolic imagery of 'songs' and their restorative power is intriguing. It almost seems an aside, in the context of the overall dialogue.

It definitely isn't a reference to mantrams. It is a Greek expression similar to singing a lullaby to a child to soothe them and is perfectly consistent with 77e where it expressly refers to singing away a child's fear.

Nothing to do with "incantations" or "Socrates convincing himself" of something he believes to be a myth.

If he does believe it to be a myth, why would he try to convince himself? And why would he say "since the soul turns out to be immortal", etc.?

Rather, the fact is that Socrates simply tells the story - mythos can perfectly well mean "story" or "account" - to comfort his friends (and perhaps to overcome his own fear) as would be entirely normal in the situation. After all, he was only human.

It is about your claim that Socrates at 114d is telling his friends that "one should “sing incantations to himself, over and over again”, which is not true. — Apollodorus

It is a direct quote. Here's another translation:

... and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms ...

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Apage%3D114

mythos can perfectly well mean "story" — Apollodorus

Right. You are catching on now. It was your own incorrect assumption that for the Greeks myths meant lies.

The quote continues:

which is the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long.

It is a direct quote. Here's another translation:

... and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms ... — Fooloso4

Right. So "again and again" is not in the Greek text!

And neither is "as if they were magic charms".

The text simply says "sing to oneself". And the verb used is ἐπαείδω epaeido "sing to" which is the same verb used at 77e in the sense of “sing someone’s fear away”.

But, obviously, you can't read Greek and you always use translations that suit your Straussian agenda.

In any case, the story about "chanting incantations again and again" is your own invention.

Isn't it just as plausible to say that the soul, which is immortal, is withdrawn from the body at death, meaning that, the body is what perishes? — Wayfarer

It isn’t “just as plausible” but far more plausible (and logical) if we read the text carefully. I think that point was already settled at page 13:

In their Introduction, Sedley & Long say:

“… in this concluding moment Socrates and his companions are in no doubt as to what it amounts to: soul must leave the body and go to Hades.” — Apollodorus

The main proof now ensues at 105c - d. Another member of the same class is soul: it always imports life to what it occupies, and is itself incapable of being dead. This is already enough to show that it is “deathless” or “immortal” (105e), in the strong sense that its death is as impossible as an even trio or a hot snowball …

The point of the argument’s continuation at 105e - 107a … is to establish a strictly supplementary point, one that at last puts to work the ‘retreat or perish’ principle … the snowball can (a) retreat from the heat or (b) stay and melt, but cannot (c) stay and become a hot snowball.

Soul, however, is a special exception. If upon the approach of death it were (b) to perish, it would also (c) take on the opposite property to the one it bears, that is, become a dead soul. Therefore in the special case of soul, perishing is ruled out, and on the approach of death there is only one thing left for it to do: it retreats …

- D. Sedley & A. Long, Meno and Phaedo

Bearing in mind that Socrates and his companions were Greeks living in 4th-century BC Athens, it follows that ‘retreat from death’ means leave the body and go to Hades as explained at 106e - 107a.

I find the most compelling and important argument in The Phaedo is the argument against the soul as a harmony. As a harmony, continues to be the populist view today as emergence; life is something which emerges from properly aligned material parts. But Socrates' argument actually demonstrates that the soul must be prior to the body, being the cause of alignment of the parts, rather than the harmony which is the result of such alignment. This is important because it provides us with the basis for understanding the nature of free will, and other fundamental ontological principles.

So "again and again" is not in the Greek text! — Apollodorus

If you want to quibble over the difference between 'again and again' and 'repeat' then go ahead.

The text simply says "sing to oneself". And the verb used is ἐπαείδω epaeido "sing to" which is the same verb used at 77e in the sense of “sing someone’s fear away”. — Apollodorus

According to Liddell and Scott:

2 sing as an incantation, ἃ αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ X.Mem.2.6.11; χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ Pl.Phd.114d, cf. 77e; ἐ. ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Id.R.608a; ἐ. τινί sing to one so as to charm or soothe him, Id.Phdr.267d, Lg.812c, al.:—Pass., Porph.Chr.35: abs., use charms or incantations, Pl.Tht.157c; ἐπαείδων by means of charms, A.Ag.1021 (lyr.), cf. Pl.Lg.773d, Tht.149d.

Your compulsive obsession with finding some point, however insignificant, to argue against, is, if not pathological, small minded.

Socrates argues that the soul cannot be an attunement if the tuning existed prior to what is tuned. But there is an argument that Socrates neglects to pursue. 'Tuned and Untuned'. The tuning of a lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. It is the same relationship between the Equal and things that are equal, and the Beautiful or Just and things that are beautiful or just. In accord with that argument the Tuning of the Lyre still exists, but the tuning of a particular lyre does not endure once that lyre is destroyed. Why does he neglect this? The consequence would be the death of the soul along with the body.

The Tuning of the Lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. The Tuning is the relationship between frequencies of the strings. It is this relationship of frequencies that is used to tune a particular lyre. Analogously, the Tuning of the body exists apart from any particular body, it is the relationship of bodily parts, but the tuning of any particular body suffers the same fate as the tuning of any particular lyre.

Soul, however, is a special exception. If upon the approach of death it were (b) to perish, it would also (c) take on the opposite property to the one it bears, that is, become a dead soul. Therefore in the special case of soul, perishing is ruled out, and on the approach of death there is only one thing left for it to do: it retreats … — Apollodorus

The claim that the soul is "special" and therefore what applies to other things he gives examples of as snow and three does not apply to it weak. It does not become a "dead soul" any more that snow becomes hot or three things becomes even. Neither the snow nor the three things retreats, they perish. If the soul is not like those examples then the argument still fails because the cases used in the argument are not comparable.