B I guess is closest.

Also as a reminder, you’ve claimed it ridiculous that matter/the physical is of itself purposeful, — javra

When? Quote it.

you're a materialist and for you goal-directed behavior - this, again, being purpose - is not real. — javra

When did I say "goal directed behavior is impossible"?

When? Quote it. — khaled

Please reread what I've written more carefully. From my previous post:

Also as a reminder, you’ve claimed it ridiculous that matter/the physical is of itself purposeful, thereby denying option (b), here (if I’ve misinterpreted, please clarify):

As to the natural arising part: If mater, or the physical, is that which is natural, and if this is in itself purposeful, then you are just expressing that purposeful given X arose from purposeful given Y. So there's no add-on of purpose involved — javra

Yes. That was the point of the sarcastic comment. — khaled — javra

Again, "if I've misinterpreted, please clarify".

I'll again ask from two day's back: Do you find that matter/the physical is in and of itself purposeful, i.e. consists of goal-directed processes?

You've now answered,

[option] B I guess is closest. — khaled

If "closest" then maybe not quite it. In which case do you believe there is a duality between non-purposeful matter and purposeful matter wherein the "purpose sauce" emerges?

This, though, would be a form of dualism, and not monism.

---------

Apropos, you are aware that the vast majority of materialists/physicalists would find it absurd that a subatomic quark, as well as any matter in general, engages in goal-oriented processes. Right?

I'll again ask from two day's back: Do you find that matter/the physical is in and of itself purposeful, i.e. consists of goal-directed processes? — javra

"Goal oriented" is a human construct. Nothing is inherently goal oriented. Humans are what see purposes in things and people. I think we can agree so far.

Now I also think these humans are not any more than matter. So does "matter itself" consist of goal-oriented processes? Yes and no. Some matter (humans) see purpose in other matter. Rocks don't have purpose inherently, but what gives them purpose (humans) is made up no differently from the rocks themselves (IE made up of matter).

There is no ethereal spirit that decides what does or doesn't have purpose. No "second kind of thing" that decides what matter (the first kind of thing) is to be used for. What is doing the deciding is the same type of thing as the thing whose purpose is getting decided. Because I don't see a need to create a split here. And all I've got in support of one is "Oh it's self evident" which it isn't.

If you think there needs to be some split here please explain why. I asked wayfarer and he told me it's because there is a split there.

If "closest" then maybe not quite it. In which case do you believe there is a duality between non-purposeful matter and purposeful matter — javra

No. See above.

Apropos, you are aware that the vast majority of materialists/physicalists would find it absurd that a subatomic quark, as well as any matter in general, engages in goal-oriented processes. Right? — javra

Inherently? Yes. But we say that a self driving car engages in purposeful behavior. Is there any more to the self driving car than the matter that makes it up? Does the self driving car have a mind? Or whatever you want to call the "second sort of thing" that assigns purposes (which I think there is no need for).

"Goal oriented" is a human construct. Nothing is inherently goal oriented. Humans are what see purposes in things and people. I think we can agree so far. — khaled

While I think I can see the commonsense understanding you're likely espousing, I also see an inherent logical contradiction in terms of the monism which is materialism/physicalism. If:

If "closest" then maybe not quite it. In which case do you believe there is a duality between non-purposeful matter and purposeful matter — javra

No — khaled

And, if matter / the physical is of itself purposeful, then purpose would logically be ubiquitous, in which case inherent goal/aim/end/completion-driven processes would obtain for everything.

Again, we're currently working with the premise that purpose is real, and not merely an illusion which we assign to others as well as to ourselves.

Or whatever you want to call the "second sort of thing" that assigns purposes (which I think there is no need for). — khaled

Yes we humans, and other lesser animals, can assign purposes to things. But this is confounding the act of assigning X with the the process itself of being X. Goal/aim/end/completion-driven processes can be assigned to some object, rightly or wrongly, yes. But this is not the same as the given addressed in fact being goal/aim/end/completion-driven in what they do. And no, there is no "second sort of thing" required for there to actually be purpose.

The question is, can materialism in any way account for purpose? So far, not that much, here being very accommodating.

And, if matter / the physical is of itself purposeful, — javra

It isn't inherently. Some matter we assign purpose. Some matter we don't. Which is identical to saying that some matter has purpose and some doesn't, respectively.

Now, we, are also made of matter. I don't see a need to suggest we're different. What's the problem with this?

Again, we're currently working with the premise that purpose is real, and not merely an illusion which we assign to others as well as to ourselves. — javra

I'd say it's real and assigned to others as well as ourselves. Don't know where the "illusion" thing came from. You think it's NOT assigned by us? That purpose is somehow inherent in the matter itself?

But this is confounding the act of assigning X with the the process itself of being X. — javra

How does something having purpose due to assigenment differ from it "itself having purpose". What are you suggesting here?

Something has a purpose when we assign it a purpose.

Goal/aim/end/completion-driven processes can be assigned to some object, rightly or wrongly, yes. But this is not the same as the given addressed in fact being goal/aim/end/completion-driven in what they do. — javra

Ye..Yes it is.

Also how do you "wrongly assign purpose"? If I use rocks to build something have I "misused the rocks" because rocks are "actually" supposed to be used for lighting fires? I don't get this notion of something inherently having purpose. No we assign things purpose, it isn't inherent.

And no, there is no "second sort of thing" required for there to actually be purpose.

The question is, can materialism in any way account for purpose? So far, not that much — javra

?

So you're suggesting some sort of monism in the first sentence. Then asserting that materialism doesn't do it. So idealism? I'm losing you.

It isn't inherently. Some matter we assign purpose. Some matter we don't. Which is identical to saying that some matter has purpose and some doesn't, respectively. — khaled

You are in essence saying that the "we" you're addressing is the "second sort of thing". Does a quark assign purpose? You and I might both agree on a "no". Yet we're built from quarks and such, and we assign purpose.

No, to me you're not getting the difference between assigning X to Y and Y in fact being X. As one difference: The first can be wrong. The second addresses what is factual.

So you're suggesting some sort of monism in the first sentence. Then asserting that materialism doesn't do it. So idealism? I'm losing you. — khaled

I'm not here intending to provide a coherent alternative metaphysics to materialism via the soundbites of of a forum. I'm simply saying that materialism fails to account for the reality of purpose, and that only a non-physicalist metaphysics can do so.

Does a quark assign purpose? You and I might both agree on a "no". Yet we're built from quarks and such, and we assign purpose. — javra

Yes. There is no contradiction here. Quarks aren't at the level of complexity to be thinking about the purposes of things. We are. Now, where's the problem?

Why do you believe that a collection of quarks is incapable of assigning a purpose to something because one quark cannot assign a purpose to something? What is the logical operation being used to go from "Quarks can't assign purposes" to "Humans (a very complicated collection of quarks and such) can't assign purposes". I don't see one. I don't see the need to add any special "purpose assigning powers" to us. The complexity is good enough as an explanation for why we can assign purposes and quarks individually cannot. Just like how a single logic gate cannot drive a car, but a computer can drive a car. Hope I've made it clear now.

You are in essence saying that the "we" you're addressing is the "second sort of thing". — javra

False. You seem to think I need to say this. Again, what's the logical operation you use to come to that conclusion? That if a quark can't assign a purpose then a very complicated collection of quarks and such cannot assign purpose. It doens't follow. I can maintain that a single quark cannot assign purpose, but a very complicated collection of quarks and other subatomic particles put a certain way (humans) can.

No, to me you're not getting the difference between assigning X to Y and Y in fact being X. As one difference: The first can be wrong. The second addresses what is factual. — javra

That difference doesn't exist here. Replace X and Y with what we're actually talking about. You're suggesting a difference between assigning a purpose to a rock and a rock in fact having a purpose. The idea that a rock can "in fact" have a purpose outside of the assigned purpose is absurd. Do you actually defend this idea? You think we can assign the "wrong purpose" to a rock? What's the right purpose of a rock, factually?

I'm simply saying that materialism fails to account for the reality of purpose, and that only a non-physicalist metaphysics can do so. — javra

If by reality of purpose you're suggesting that things inherently have purpose without anyone assigning it to them then, not only is that not even incompataible with materialism (just say that the matter itself has purpose, your original option b) but it's also, again, absurd in my view. If you think things have inherent real purposes then please tell me the "real purpose" of a PC. Is it to chat on forums? Answer emails? Play games? Which is it?

If by reality of purpose you're suggesting that things inherently have purpose without anyone assigning it to them then, not only is that not even incompataible with materialism (just say that the matter itself has purpose, your original option b) but it's also, again, absurd in my view. If you think things have inherent real purposes then please tell me the "real purpose" of a PC. Is it to chat on forums? Answer emails? Play games? Which is it? — khaled

See my answer below:

That difference doesn't exist here. Replace X and Y with what we're actually talking about. You're suggesting a difference between assigning a purpose to a rock and a rock in fact having a purpose. The idea that a rock can "in fact" have a purpose outside of the assigned purpose is absurd. Do you actually defend this idea? — khaled

Was this written material purposely written by you? I'm not asking if your existence has "a purpose". I'm asking if you were purposeful in what you typed. If I'm to assume this text was purposefully written by you, then you were goal-driven in so writing. Were the goal(s) that drove you assigned to you by some other the way you assign purpose to a rock? If not, how was your purpose, your goal-driven behavior, in writing this text not inherent to you? Inherent relative to your brain, if you prefer.

Likewise, is my purpose in replying obtained due to some other assigning purpose to me?

-------

Ah, I won't erase this, even as I recognize there being too many questions in this post. And I'm frankly getting tired.

We disagree. I'll leave it at that.

Were the goal(s) that drove you assigned to you by some other the way you assign purpose to a rock? — javra

No. My goal was assigned to me by me. I decided to respond. No contradiction there either. If you see one point it out.

If not, how was your purpose, your goal-driven behavior, in writing this text not inherent to you? — javra

If I'm to have an inherent purpose I would be very very sad if that inherent purpose was responding to philosophy forum posts :rofl:. Reminds me of the "you pass butter" meme.

Likewise, is my purpose in replying obtained due to some other assigning purpose to me? — javra

I'd assume you assigned it to yourself too, though it's possible you're being forced to type at gunpoint, in whichcase it would be assigned by someone else.

Adjective
inherent (not comparable)
Naturally as part or consequence of something.
Synonyms: inbuilt, ingrained, intrinsic; see also Thesaurus:intrinsic
Antonyms: extrinsic; see also Thesaurus:extrinsic — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/inherent

What definition of inherent are you using?

Then again ...

What definition of inherent are you using? — javra

Not assigned. In the thing in the first place. This one:

Naturally as part or consequence of something. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/inherent

These also do:

inbuilt, ingrained, intrinsic — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/inherent

You are pushing the idea that things have inherent purposes that we can be factually wrong about. But every time I've asked you to name the inherent purpose of this or that object you haven't answered. Why is that? My guess is because things don't actually have inherent purposes and that purpose is assigned, not inherent.

And furthermore, you want to argue that if a bit of matter can't assign purpose, therefore any configuration of matter cannot assign purpose. I don't see how that follows. So I don't see what your problem is with purpose in a materialist metaphysics. You haven't actually shown why a materialist metaphysics cannot support purpose. I keep asking you to show the contradiction you think is there.

@Janus@khaled, @javra

It's direction of fit.

Having an attitude towards stuff comes pretty quickly from being able to move stuff around. Working out what is around you involves changing belief to fit the world. Moving stuff around involves changing the world to suit your belief.

Everything that can be known about the brain ( at least about how it appears to us) can only be known by way of the objective sciences. — Janus

Neuroscience cannot explain logic, rather, you have to use logic to learn brain science. I’m not making this up: one of the articles I’ve been referring to is about the fact that science can find no kind of correspondence between stimuli and neural patterns in mice. The ‘laws of logic’ are such that any being that evolves has to recognise them, not that they’re an output of a meat brain. The idea that you’re going to find ‘neural correlates’ of, say, the law of the excluded middle, is scientistic fantasy. (Yet for all that, we still know what it is!)

Where brain science is useful, is in treating neural disorders, something for which we should all be profoundly grateful. But the idea you can understand philosophy of mind by studying brain science is, well, just the kind of myth that the Dennett’s and Churchlands put about masquerading as ‘philosophy’. (They should be penalised for misuse of science.)

I'm frankly getting tired. — javra

Beat you to it. :-)

I'm frankly getting tired. — javra

Beat you to it. :-) — Wayfarer

:rofl: Yea, point taken.

Interesting read. Thanks for it.

The point I was making was that the materialist position was stronger a a century so ago when we felt we had a good grip on what matter was — Count Timothy von Icarus

But we didn't. You're treating ignorance as a strength.

The problem is in claiming all reality is something, and then being unable to define what that something is. Without a definition for the material you risk falling into a tautology, "everything that exists is matter. What is matter? It's everything that exists." — Count Timothy von Icarus

So your response to the fact that I'm not a materialist is that I need to be because you know how to dismiss that? I'm a physicalist, in the Popper sense. It doesn't matter (haha) whether one considers spacetime or photons to be matter: they are physical.

As to impotence, if results are what matter, the idealists have plenty of those. As the grand father of communism and nationalism, the arch idealist Hegel certainly can't be accused of not getting results; the last two centuries have revolved around the ideas he helped birth. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's clearly not what I had in mind.

It is not physics. It is metaphysics. But because it is associated with physics, then it attracts a kind of scientific imprameteur, which is fallacious, in my opinion. — Wayfarer

No, the wavefunction is physics, not metaphysics. You're mixing up the interpretation with what it's interpreting. MWI describes a single physical reality: the universal wavefunction which doesn't need MWI itself. The branching (superposition) is just ordinary quantum mechanics.

the wavefunction is physics, not metaphysics. — Kenosha Kid

The wave function, also known as the quantum state, is the description of a quantum object and plays a central role in quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, the nature of the wave function is still debated. — Phys.org

I’m not the one mixing up here.

I’m not the one mixing up here. — Wayfarer

If you hold that QM is not a physical theory, then we don't have the same language.

Interesting read, as well. Thanks to you too.

I think this actually the problem. There are multiple ways to define physicalism. I've seen physicists refer to their own experiments on non-local causality as "experimental metaphysics," but perhaps others would say the term doesn't fit.

My beef with some of the definitions of either physicalism or materialism (they get used somewhat interchangeably in many places) are those theories that expand their definition to mean essentially "whatever is shown as true fits the definition." Thus, non-local causality is now "physical." If we were to discover solid support for panpsychism and "phi" at work in the universe (IMO, unlikely), this too would become physical/material. The term becomes a stand in, not for any real hard set of statements about the world, but "whatever ends up supported by science." Again, the problem of nearing tautology.

This can be seen in the fact that materialism died as "everything is material," when physics began identifying things that are non-material, and was forced to accept more components of its monism. Now it seems likely it will have to do a paradigm shift into something new again. If physics has to start accepting things like phi (this is a dot out on the horizon now, not a real challenge) then physicalism might as well become defined as the statement that "real things are reality."

I think this actually the problem. There are multiple ways to define physicalism. I've seen physicists refer to their own experiments on non-local causality as "experimental metaphysics," but perhaps others would say the term doesn't fit. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Never heard of it and sounds like a contradiction, but assuming someone can and does do experimental metaphysics, what impact can that have on the definition of physical? Would you doubt your own steak if someone else ordered pasta?

My beef with some of the definitions of either physicalism or materialism (they get used somewhat interchangeably in many places) are those theories that expand their definition to mean essentially "whatever is shown as true fits the definition." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is the problem with "materialism" and the reason I do not self-identity as a materialist. I think it's also the reason why anti-physicalists insist on keeping the word current.

No such issue with "physical": either it regularly interacts with other physical stuff such that it can be indirectly observed, or it doesn't. If it does, it's also physical. If it doesn't, there's no way of verifying whether it does or does not exist, and can therefore be discarded as an idea.

Mass tells spacetime how to curve; the curvature of spacetime tells mass where to go. If mass is physical, then spacetime is physical. Atoms de-excite and release photons which then excite other atoms. If atoms are physical, then photons are physical. Everything observable is physical (Popper). Follow that along and everything is physical.

What would destroy this definition is finding something observable (directly or indirectly) that was genuinely inexplicable, for instance an uncaused effect or genesis. That would be a dualism: we'd have physical observables that interacted in a regular way, and non-physical observables that did not.

The reason I bring this up is this is effectively a schema for generating of-the-gaps arguments. Creationists, for instance, rarely debate the laws of gravity; they are interested in the big bang and the origins of life because they see the potential for an uncaused, irregular effects there. Likewise dualists like the first/third person gap because they see the potential for non-physical causes and effects.

Now it seems likely it will have to do a paradigm shift into something new again. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why?

Sure. :up:

:up:

No such issue with "physical": either it regularly interacts with other physical stuff such that it can be indirectly observed, or it doesn't. — Kenosha Kid

What is "physical stuff"? I'm assuming some kind of mindless stuff that exists independently of and external to our minds? Do you believe that if all minds in the universe disappeared, the universe would change in any way (except for the fact that there are no more minds)?

What is "physical stuff"? — RogueAI

Stuff that is observable, directly or indirectly, to the senses to behave in a regular, predictable way. Basically something is physical if it can be measured and modelled, hence the name for what does exactly that: the physical sciences.

Isn't your experience observable to you?

But you have to say something about what kind of stuff physical stuff is. It has properties, I assume. Is its existence dependent on mind(s) in any way? Is the stuff conscious? Would the stuff still be around if there was no one to perceive it?

Isn't your experience observable to you? — Manuel

My experience is not observable, no: it is the process, not the object, of observing.

But you have to say something about what kind of stuff physical stuff is. It has properties, I assume. — RogueAI

I have already mentioned several. I could cite the standard model as a starting point, but that is just a model. The above covers whatever exists, not just whatever we think exists. Counterfactual physical things are constrained also to be observable and regular, however there's an interpretive layer. For instance, the gravitational force field was thought to be physical: we could indirectly observed it through it supervening on more directly observable stuff, and it was regular-seeming. But it didn't exist, that is: the model was only a (very good) approximation.

Physical properties (from my above definition) are necessarily properties that dictate what a physical object does. So observing something is the same as seeing it's properties. We see that the boulder takes ten men to shift a little, we see that it has the property of mass, high-valued compared to the cup that a cat alone can knock off the table.

We see the cup, so it has the property of being seeable, which we now know means that it is a configuration of bound charged particles. Further, now we know about the visible range of light, we can also see that that configuration is made up of smaller configurations of bound charged particles (we call those atoms). The physical property of charge is, in part, the capacity to be seen, i.e. to emit light.

Generally, if A supervenes on B, then A has the property of being able to supervene on B, and B has the property of being subject to B. If, in this process, B also supervenes on A, then:
a) B has the property of being able to supervene on A;
b) A has the property of being supervened upon by B;
c) if A or B are directly or indirectly observable, A and B are physical.

Isn't your experience observable to you? — Manuel

My experience is not observable, no: it is the process, not the object, of observing. — Kenosha Kid

Actually, I'll correct myself here. Yes, my experience is observable. For instance, you can watch me experiencing a film (in principle, not a weird invitation). Obviously I can't watch me experiencing a film.