I have no problems with 3 of the 4 categorizations you've given. The first one, or "0" is the one that I'm unclear of, which one of those mentioned would approximate your conception of what's real?

"1. Reality" is where every "real X" can be found. There is, after all, nowhere (nothing) else.

:up:

Reality" is where every "real X" can be found. — 180 Proof

But only probabilities can be given, with respect to the objects of physics. And as for ‘X’, that is a symbol, whose reality is only fixed by convention.

:sweat:

What's a legitimate metaphysical question that cannot be solved by language analysis? I'll pick one that stands out to me, roughly randomly: The problem of identity ascribed to objects or persons.

Suppose John is a normal human being. John will still be John even if he becomes obese, goes into a coma or is even cremated and put in an urn. Clearly a person being in a coma is quite different from him being obese which differs enormously from him being put as ash in an urn. Yet I think it's legitimate to consider all these cases as instances in which we speak about John correctly. — Manuel

Identity seems to rely on differentiation. How do we differentiate one thing from another? Take the example you used: John is a human being; how is John differentiated from the environment and from others? Like all humans, animals, trees and other objects, John is visually and tactilely bounded by his external surface; which in John's case is his skin. John also looks more or less the same through all the changes he will undergo from birth to death, and identical from one moment to the next.

Becoming obese will expand the surface of his skin and change its configurations; but John will probably still be recognizable as John. Being in a coma may change his appearance somewhat, but he will still be recognizable as John, as that unique individual different from all others (unless he has an identical twin in which case we may have to rely on John or his twin to do the identifying). If John is terribly burned or otherwise disfigured he may become unrecognizable, but measurements or DNA testing could still establish his unique identity. John's ashes are not really John, but are just John's ashes; the remains of his body after cremation.

This all seems very clear and unproblematic to me so I want to ask where do you think the problem of identity lies?

If John is terribly burned or otherwise disfigured he may become unrecognizable, but measurements or DNA testing could still establish his unique identity. John's ashes are not really John, but are just John's ashes; the remains of his body after cremation. — Janus

I think that we recognize objects via something called "psychic continuity", similar I suppose to object permanence. That is, we have some conception of John, such that it would be true that he can go through several radical changes and still be John.

But a blow to the head may alter his personality and way of behaving in such a manner that although the name of that person is still "John", he is not the "John" we have in mind, when we usually talk about him. His DNA will be the same, but a radical change in behavior will cause us to consider them for all intent and purposes a different person.

Or take the story in which a witch turns a prince into a frog. We still know he's the prince, even if he's a different species. And similar stories. It doesn't matter much what the physical configuration of the person is, it matters that we conceive of them as being John (or Mary), etc.

But a blow to the head may alter his personality and way of behaving in such a manner that although the name of that person is still "John", he is not the "John" we have in mind, when we usually talk about him. His DNA will be the same, but a radical change in behavior will cause us to consider them for all intent and purposes a different person.

Or take the story in which a witch turns a prince into a frog. We still know he's the prince, even if he's a different species. And similar stories. It doesn't matter much what the physical configuration of the person is, it matters that we conceive of them as being John (or Mary), etc. — Manuel

Sure, but we know that it was John who received the blow to the head, so we still think, and speak, of him as being himself in that sense. In another sense, or way of speaking, he is no longer himself, but those different senses do not constitute any contradiction.

The fictional notion that a Prince might be transformed into a frog is another (modal) way of thinking and speaking again; I think it comes down to naming, and it leads to the idea of rigid designators and possible worlds in modern analytic philosophy.

Are you familiar with Kripke? Although I don't wholly agree with his idea of rigid designation (if it is taken to supercede the idea of definite description, since it seems to me that to know what or who we are referring to, we are necessarily reliant on definite descriptions, even if those descriptions are inaccurate) there is, I think, much to be said for the idea.

Sure. I wasn't intending to imply a contradiction. I suppose it's a bit of paradox if you will.

Yes, I'm familiar with Kripke to an extent. I do think rigid designators are true in science if our scientific theories are correct, that is the name we use for the entities postulated match, or form a correspondence. So if I say that Alpha Centauri is 4.36 light years away, the name and the numbers of that statement apply to the world.

Outside of science, I don't think this is the case. That is we can use words to refer, but it's not necessary, we use words all the time without referring to specific things in the world.

At least that's how I think of the topic.

Sure. I wasn't intending to imply a contradiction. I suppose it's a bit of paradox if you will. — Manuel

I'm not sure I'd even see it as a paradox, but just as different ways of thinking.

Outside of science, I don't think this is the case. That is we can use words to refer, but it's not necessary, we use words all the time without referring to specific things in the world. — Manuel

I'm not that sure what you mean here. Do you mean that we often speak in generalities? If proper nouns or names, like John, refer to particular things, then nouns or general terms like 'tree' 'cat' 'mountain' and so on refer to particular kinds of things. So, I don't see why those kinds of names can't be understood as rigid designators of particular kinds in a way analogous to how proper names are seen as rigid designators of particular entities.

It doesn't matter much what the physical configuration of the person is, it matters that we conceive of them as being John (or Mary), etc. — Manuel

True.
What also matters is 'What does it feel like to be 'John, Mary, etc' ?

Following Nagel and his 'What is it like to be a bat ?'.
We can ask:
'What does it feel like to be a...'
...woman, man, laptop, AI robot...?

How do we know the reality...
or best ways to think of and what it means to be human or not-quite-human ?

How can we ever know that it is true when people talk of their 'Love' ?

How can linguistic analysis help; can philosophy of language help resolve these kinds of questions ?

We can look up a dictionary for definitions - is that enough to know the meaning of the feeling ?

I've just finished reading Kazuo Ishiguro's 'Klara and the Sun'.
Set in a futuristic world it explores questions related to the sentience of a non-human, Klara.
This is an AF, an 'artificial' friend...not a 'real' one ? What is it to be a Friend ?
How does one 'become' a friend ?

Other issues - the types of love, Klara's belief about the power of the Sun to heal, the feelings and consequences of being in a different class. Amongst the humans - the 'lifted' apparently being superior to those not.
Compare what it is to be 'gifted'. A natural or 'real' talent v artificial or 'unreal' perfection.
Isn't everything real in some way or another, even in fiction which might just become a future reality.

Linguistic analysis can't resolve this kind of a question - I don't think that is what it is about.
It helps in other ways to drill down on some philosophical density as in Austin's previous example.
Thanks to @Banno for recommending the article:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/544398

When the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel announced impressively to one of Oxford’s philosophical clubs that human freedom was the ‘ontological counterweight to death’, Austin invited him to explain what he meant.
The request, made with his characteristic courtesy, was followed up repeatedly with appeals for further clarification.

Marcel ended up saying he meant that the fact we are going to die makes all our earthly doings ultimately futile, but we carry on in full awareness of this by investing some things with value by an exercise of free will. Was this true?
Maybe, maybe not, but at least that question could now be intelligibly posed. — Aeon essay on J.L. Austin

What does it feel like to be pouring out such thoughts on a laptop at 02.16hrs ?
Bloody crazy. You know what I mean ?

I'm not sure I'd even see it as a paradox, but just as different ways of thinking. — Janus

That's probably more accurate to what happens.

If proper nouns or names, like John, refer to particular things, then nouns or general terms like 'tree' 'cat' 'mountain' and so on refer to particular kinds of things. So, I don't see why those kinds of names can't be understood as rigid designators of particular kinds in a way analogous to how proper names are seen as rigid designators of particular entities. — Janus

I don't think names refer. Nor do words actually. People refer, it's an act that people do. Sometimes people use words to refer, like me referring to the keyboard I'm using to type out these words.

I mean sure, you can say that we speak in generalities many times, if not most of the time. Look at most conversations, both written and spoken. How often do we refer to specific things? Not that it very rare, it's just that referring is a small part of everything else involved in language.

What does it feel like to be pouring out such thoughts on a laptop at 02.16hrs ?
Bloody crazy. You know what I mean ? — Amity

It's not dissimilar to what Hume thought about when he had a psychological breakdown:

"Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? ... I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty.

Most fortunately it happens, that since Reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, Nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends. And when, after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther.”

I think philosophy of language helps to clarify our thinking to others and most importantly, to ourselves. This in itself can be tremendously useful. Beyond that it surely can't resolve the question you pose, I don't think.

When we say words like "love", "hate", "joy", etc. we assume other people "like-me" will take that word and the meanings attached to it and interpret it in a way that approximates what I'm feeling. But we cannot know the other person will feel the way we actually feel. We simply cannot be precise enough to describe our emotions in many occasions.

So absolutely, philosophy of language has clear limits. I (believe) I know what you mean. :)

I don't think names refer. Nor do words actually. People refer, it's an act that people do. Sometimes people use words to refer, like me referring to the keyboard I'm using to type out these words.

I mean sure, you can say that we speak in generalities many times, if not most of the time. Look at most conversations, both written and spoken. How often do we refer to specific things? Not that it very rare, it's just that referring is a small part of everything else involved in language. — Manuel

I think saying that it is people, not names, that refer is again, not a contradiction, but just a different way of speaking. People refer to things, to be sure, and one way they do it is by speaking; and speaking is referring by means of words. They also refer to kinds of things when they speak in generalities, and again I don't see why that should not be thought of as referring too.

The word 'John' by itself does not refer to any particular person, but it could be said to refer to all those who are so called. When the name is spoken with intent to refer to a particular person, then I think it is fair to say that it is the name that refers, or designates, or signifies; all of which amount to the same thing.

I'm not saying it's a contradiction. I think it's a fact that it's people who refer, not words themselves. I think we might be caught in a semantic quibble here.

What do you have in mind when you speak of "referring"?

I take reference in philosophy, a technical term, to mean a relation between the word uttered and a thing in the world.

The key for me, so far as my understanding of reference goes, is that the word I'm using must relate to something in the world. I don't think there has to be something in the world of which the word I'm using must "signal out" as it were.

I can speak of dragons or Planet 1234. There are no dragons in the world and there is no Planet 1234 anywhere, I just made it up. So I don't see a necessary word-object relation.

However, if you mean that by reference you have in mind an intended meaning or something like that. With this, I don't have any problems.

I can speak of dragons or Planet 1234. There are no dragons in the world and there is no Planet 1234 anywhere, I just made it up. So I don't see a necessary word-object relation.

However, if you mean that by reference you have in mind an intended meaning or something like that. With this, I don't have any problems. — Manuel

I think that words, at least nouns, do refer, denote, signify real or imagined things. So 'tree' refers to the conceived kind tree and 'dragon' refers to the mythical or imagined kind dragon. That is to say they are understood to so refer, so I am not suggesting any magical 'arrow' of reference beyond that. If they were not understood to so refer, we would not be able to communicate.

We can communicate with our gestures, our clothing, our way of walking, our facial expressions, our tone, etc.

We can also communicate with paintings, music, architecture, sculptures, etc.

No words are needed.

Wittgenstein said life is lived as the flow and game of life. Language is the game of life. However, he said if lions could talk we couldn't understand them because we are not lions. Humans can't have private languages within the species because everything is open and lived. However he was wrong. Knowing the difference between a lion and human takes philosophy processed as a private language. Wittgenstein was one of those "we can only be saved together" type person. I don't see that as reality and being curious about being and forms is a form of individuality. Witt was a proto-globalist liberal trying to subvert philosophy with stilted paragraphs on order to change the world

We can communicate far more definitely and comprehensively with words than we can with other mediums. In any case, nothing I said entailed ruling out other forms of communication, so I'm not clear on what you are disagreeing with.

Most times yes, sure. I think there are specific circumstances that a song or a movie will communicate with you even more deeply than words ever could. At least that's been my experience on certain occasions.

The way you spoke of reference in your post prior to this one, is not one I have much issues with. So I think we're OK. :up:

That's also look legitimate to me, perhaps even central.

Quine I believe does not like this solution, but we can speak of "real" and "existent" as separate but related concepts. Existence refers to things in the world, real to almost anything. Thus there are real fictional characters, such as Frodo but he doesn't exist in the world. But there can be fake fictional Characters such as Fred, who I just made up and is not in any novel.

On this view, one suggested by Haack, real is to be contrasted with fictional.

Existence is thus slimmed down somewhat, but continues to be very complicated. — Manuel

I made a boo-boo. The corrected version is posted below for your consideration,

In the exchange of arguments between mathematical realists and their opponents (mathematical antirealists), I noticed that when the former claims that numbers exist, they don't mean it in the same sense that stones exist but when the latter rejects the claim that numbers exist they mean it in the sense that stones exist. A textbook case of fallacy of equivocation - ambiguity in the meaning of "exist" is to blame. — TheMadFool

My take on this matter of real, existence, unreal, nonexistence, fact, fiction is that what most philosophers think, assume, infer are mistakes in usage and application of words, products of alleged wooly thinking might infact point to something deeper. So, for instance, when somene and I chat about some "fictional" character such as Hercule Poirot, we do it with the same type and degree of emotions, gravity, interest, as we would if Hercule Poirot were a "real" person. At the moment we converse about Poirot, the lines between "fact" and "fiction" are blurred or even vanish. This, to most philosophers and psychiatrists, would be treated as confusion or delusional respectively. The question is, are they correct?

Just a quickie because I have a gardener coming at 10. ( clean version, honest, unless...)

At the moment we converse about Poirot, the lines between "fact" and "fiction" are blurred or even vanish. This, to most philosophers and psychiatrists, would be treated as confusion or delusional respectively. The question is, are they correct? — TheMadFool

Interesting thoughts and question.
I think most philosophers and psychiatrists ( unless quite mad themselves ) would know the difference between conversing about Poirot as a character - an illusion created by an author - and a delusion.
The only confusion or troublesome aspects would be when the character takes over your life in some extreme way. I think this is similar to those who follow soaps/films and identify the actor portraying e.g. a serial killer as actually being one.

The fact is that non/identification with a character is part and parcel of our own development when reading. This reality allows us to see from a different perspective, and so on...

This differs from academic literary criticism where - apparently - it was/is a taboo to talk about characters as if they are real. I am not sure this is correct:

We must not ask how many children Lady Macbeth had. We must not think of characters as “our friends for life,” or feel that they “remain as real to us as our familiar friends.” We must not talk about the “unconscious feelings of a character,” for that would be to fall into the “trap of the realistic fallacy.” — The Point mag: Literary criticism and the existential turn

I think the act of reading - like listening to music - like doing philosophy - is or can be an immediately satisfying first-hand experience. Unlike the step back - the distance - where a critical analysis takes place. Both are valuable...but yes, it can get a bit 'mad' at times.

Writing a novel whose characters can escape into the real world does feel “a bit like writing software,” Fernyhough continued. “Or laying a minefield for the heart. You want to shape how your readers think and feel – not in prescriptive ways that leave them no room to bring their own experiences and interpretations, but to allow them enter the minds of people they are not, and to have something of their experiences.”

Docx compared the characters whose voices get into readers’ heads to secret friends. “You wish you were great pals with Holden Caulfield, that you could sit around and trade wisecracks with him,” he said. “Obviously it’s a form of madness, but then all fiction is a form of madness.” — Guardian: Fictional characters - Experiential crossings

Gotta go now. Just hoping that my gardener doesn't think he is a 'Hannibal' of the Anthony Hopkins type.
"What's that you got in your hands - it looks sharp..." :scream:
"Not really" :naughty:

Spot on. Mass and mind do not seem to be related in this way. As if we could measure the mass of your love for your mother. — Banno

Not sure. A brain that has encoded information about its mother is obviously different from one that has not, a different configuration of neurons. This configuration is part of the state of the brain. Different states either have different energies (non-degenerate) or the same energies (degenerate). For small systems, it's not difficult to discern between different states in principle unless they are degenerate, and even then there's a means to break that degeneracy and figure out which state is _was_ (at least partly) in.

The brain isn't a small system but it's not obvious that the difference between the brain with a concept of its mother (some particular and ideosyncratic configuration) and without is undetectable *in principle*, even if it's technologically and ethical infeasible to do so.

Ayer argues that metaphysics is about speculation, and that is its limitation. He suggests that he is not trying to say that people should not make speculations, or be discouraged from having certain beliefs, such as believing in God, but that they present difficulties in arguing for them as metaphysical realities because they cannot be spoken of as definite facts. I think that his argument does come into play in the whole process of asking metaphysical questions. — Jack Cummins

That's interesting (as is this whole thread). I think I agree with this. I'm probably biased against metaphysics and theology in part because of the reaction of acolytes of both to science: belief, intuition, preference and upbringing appear to be trying to compete with fact. Or, to put it another way, metaphysics studies the realm outside of physics rather than the realm outside of physical science's reach. I'm maybe guilty of the above too, not taking metaphysics sufficiently seriously because, at its best, it is not generally falsifiable or otherwise amenable to empirical testing.

That said, I'm also a bit biased against it because it tends to pose meaningless questions or questions with implicit unjustifiable assumptions, such as most of the examples given by the OP. (E.g. "Is reality fundamentally mental?" or the free will question, or the continuity of identity question which remains a question about language.)

It's an interesting question. I suppose you'd have to take into consideration the fact that fictional characters are created based on traits that real people have. And novels, for instance, allow you to get into someone else's head for a while, so you live a similar experience to the characters you are reading. But I don't think the difference between fact and fiction is nearly as strong as is sometimes believed.

There's also the curious aspects of many myths. I assume such stories are told more or less accurately, but as hundreds if not thousands of years go on, aspects of the story become exaggerated to the point were there maybe very little if anything is such myths, which is a true description of events. I have in mind national myths and ancient folklore and the like.

A metaphysical speculation that attempts to use the word without such a particular context fails to gain traction. — Banno

The defining context for "metaphysical speculation" is the contrast between Subjective and Objective Reality. Those who label metaphysical topics as "illusion, fake, forgery, toy, hologram, mirage" tend to devalue non-empirical subjective concepts, even though our subjective worldview is all we ever know for sure. Everything else is "physical speculation", based on "appearances". Hence, objective truth is essentially the majority opinion of experts in any field. We know that something exists independently of subjective minds, by popular vote. Most of us don't see ghosts, so they are merely metaphysical, and not real. Don't you agree? :smile:

Does objective reality exist? :
Subjective reality means that something is actual depending on the mind.
Objective reality means that something is actual (so it exists) independent of the mind.
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Does_objective_reality_exist%3F

So You Think Humans Can’t Know Objective Reality :
Our beliefs are based on appearances but are supposed to be about something — reality — that transcends appearances. . . .
Something in us will always influence the resulting picture.
https://medium.com/the-understanding-project/so-you-think-humans-cant-know-objective-reality-e609346c2682

:cool:

How can linguistic analysis help; can philosophy of language help resolve these kinds of questions ? — Amity

Nothing to do with Dennett's "Quining Qualia"

It's so much easier to critique stuff you haven't understood.

There's also the curious aspects of many myths. I assume such stories are told more or less accurately, but as hundreds if not thousands of years go on, aspects of the story become exaggerated to the point were there maybe very little if anything is such myths, which is a true description of events. I have in mind national myths and ancient folklore and the like. — Manuel

Chinese Whispers [No offense intended, Chinese people]

This is probably off-topic and there's a risk that your thread might be derailed but, since you seem to be interested, I'll offer a hypothesis regarding so-called myths and the impression that people have about them being hyperbole.

To the extent that I'm aware, the theory of evolution, vis-à-vis genetics, claims that genotypic and thus phenotypic variation in a species is greater in ancestral populations than in their descendants. In other words, considering myths seem to be about exaggerated abilities (giants, deformities, superstrength, superintelligence, etc. superpowers), there's a small but non-zero probability that such mythological beings were real people, flesh and blood although possessed of exceptional abilities. Over time, populations tend to become homogeneous and I suspect some of the superpowers got diluted and/or lost.

Also, there's an assumption that we make which is that homo sapiens thousands of years ago were more or less like us. This could be wrong. What if people back then were smaller, shorter, weaker, etc. than we are now? If this were true, any one of us, even weaklings [say Steve Rogers before he takes the serum] would be comparatively superhuman.

Another possibility is things might've been more than a little bit different back in the days of Hercules. What if gravity were weaker? A person would be able to leap great heights [Neil Armstrong on the moon], lift immense objects, do things now quite impossible. Of course, this would apply to everybody but just a slight difference in muscle mass could mean the difference between lifting a gigantic boulder and a humble rock.

Continuing along the same trajectory, heroes of the past could've been aliens from a more massive planet. Their bodies adapted to greater gravity would be capable of feats of strength no human could match [Neil Armstrong on the moon].

It's relative and it also depends on variations in the laws of nature.

Just sayin'

Ouch! :smirk:

Well, read what he wrote. I'm trying to be nice, but people say such silly things.