We were no longer simply a creature, but a creature who could ask ‘what am I?’, and ‘what is this world I find myself in?’ — Wayfarer
It’s because we became independent arbiters of what is good. — Wayfarer
In light of modern knowledge, morality is clearly a consequence of evolution. — counterpunch
Religion, law, philosophy, economics, democratic politics etc - are means by which we agree on moral values, in terms of which objective facts "ought" to be understood. These then become, objective moral facts — counterpunch
What are facts? There are many theories on the subject, but put in deliberately simple language I'd say the defining characteristic of a "fact" is this:
That it reasserts itself even if you are unaware or even actively opposed to it. — Echarmion
A fact is just a true truth-bearer.
A fact is just an obtaining state of affairs.
A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations. — Kevin Mulligan
This changes only if we view morality as a practical question: not an abstract theory of good and bad, but as a set of practical rules under which an end result - a moral world - is achieved. — Echarmion
Says he, against the backdrop of his nice suburban house with cars and pool.Here’s my view of what happened. Of course it’s true that we all passed through the tortuous process of evolution from simian forbears. But what imposes moral necessity on us, is not an instinct, like that by which salmon return to their home stream. It’s because we became independent arbiters of what is good. We could decide, we could judge. We had possessions, things to call our own, and language by which to name it. That is the origin of the moral sense. No doubt, we evolved to the point of developing that sense, but to say it is merely or simply an adaptive necessity is to entirely mistake the existential predicament of the emerging self of h. Sapiens. When we evolved to that point, we also escaped the gravity of biology to some degree. We were no longer simply a creature, but a creature who could ask ‘what am I?’, and ‘what is this world I find myself in?’ — Wayfarer
Are you saying that which is natural (e.g., biological evolution) is moral? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Do they agree? There seems to be some agreement but there is conflict and even controversy both between these domains and within. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
What is an example of an objective moral fact? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Thank you for the reference.
which I grant as true without argument because I do not know better or otherwise, is at the same time an invitation to consider whether his argument as presented is of any value beyond your assertion and beyond the mere fact of being his?Hume did not hold that morality proceeded from god. End of discussion. — Banno
I'm not sure that in the case of a moral statements, there is such a thing... — Banno
What we can drop is an implicit correspondence theory of truth, such that there is a distinct thing that makes the statement true. — Banno
I'm saying that evolution has imbued us with a moral sense, that enables us to derive ought from is. — counterpunch
Religion, law, politics, economics and so on, are objective with respect to individuals, and so are in effect, objective moral facts. Not in the moral realist sense, but in the sense that we agree upon values, via social structures like democratic politics, and invest them with authority. — counterpunch
After spending some time with it, I cannot find any value at all, and find it instead confused. — tim wood
That seems like a fair enough definition. It seems to exclude certain domains such as aesthetics and ethics though. What about a Cartesian fact? Would you not say that it is a fact that you have an experience? Are there not psychological facts obtaining by virtue of the attitudes, beliefs, and feelings you have at this moment?
I think most people define facts similar to the way they define truth: that which comports with reality. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
I think philosophy conventionally subscribes to a correspondence theory of truth and thus takes a realist stance when speaking of facts. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
The objects or entities that form a specific subject matter within an epistemic or alethic domain that are postulated to be true insofar as we can reason from them to draw valid inferences and to make accurate predictions to what else is true. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
But ethics necessarily begins as normative theories and from there we attempt to use the practically within applied ethics. This is what we have been doing. Developing theoretical abstractions such as consequentialism and deontology and applying such principles to practical matters such as abortion or capital punishment. These is a meta ethical inquiry. I'm looking to understand the foundations morality. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
would you say the above about, for instance, an Eskimo? An African bushman? A factory worker in the textile industry in the early 1800's? How about a worker in a warehouse of a big online company who wears a diaper and pees into it so as to not have to take a toilet break? — baker
I have no beef with entomology or evolution, but I refuse to admit that they teach me much about ethics. Consider the fact that human action ranges to the extremes. People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts. Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense. — Richard Polt
What theory do you suggest? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
...and yet they are commonly thought to be so. Further, the basic T-sentence structure holds: "One ought do X" is true IFF one ought do X. From a Davidsonian perspective what is missing is any extensional way of analysing "One ought do X".I'm not sure if we can even say moral statements are true. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
I think philosophy conventionally subscribes to a correspondence theory of truth and thus takes a realist stance when speaking of facts.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets
Eh, maybe, I'm not versed in the sociology of philosophy. But given that this is one of the main topics of contention in philosophy, I wouldn't use it in an assumption, especially not in a discussion of "moral facts", where, by default, correspondence theory must fail / yield an unambigious "no". — Echarmion
The PhilPapers Survey (conducted in 2009; cf. Bourget and Chalmers 2014), more specifically, the part of the survey targeting all regular faculty members in 99 leading departments of philosophy, reports the following responses to the question: “Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?” Accept or lean toward: correspondence 50.8%; deflationary 24.8%; other 17.5%; epistemic 6.9%. The data suggest that correspondence-type theories may enjoy a weak majority among professional philosophers and that the opposition is divided. This fits with the observation that typically, discussions of the nature of truth take some version of the correspondence theory as the default view, the view to be criticized or to be defended against criticism. — Marian David
Would this definition be any different from your definition of "truth" or a "true statement"? — Echarmion
Well, yes. But then empirical knowledge also begins as a descriptive theory and from there we use experience to determine whether or not the theory is true. I think the question of whether or not there are moral facts, whether there is "objective" morality benefits from a comparison with the field where we are most used to speaking about objectivity and facts: Empirical reality. How do we determine the truth of a claim about the empirical world? We apply a specific method, and if that method does not falsify our claim, it has passed said test. If it passes such tests regularly, we are justified in calling it a fact. — Echarmion
I wonder whether lying is wrong. — Banno
(Lifted from the article, excluding the question...) — Banno
So "Lying is not wrong" just means "Boo to lying!", "Fred believes that lying is wrong" just means "Fred believes 'Boo! to lying'", and so on. — Banno
"...including the question..." — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Could they not just be relativized down to the predispositions of the individual subject? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
SO we'd get something like my satiny lying is wrong should be analysed as
'"Lying is wrong" as uttered by Banno at this time is true iff boo to lying!'?
IS that the sort of thing you are suggesting? — Banno
I classify myself as a moral subjectivist. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Language affords one many options for expression, including sentences like "I find onions awful", "I don't like onions" and "I think onions taste awful".So, perhaps it is similar to the case when we state, “Onions taste awful,” that the syntax is configured in such a way to be making a general statement, when in actuality, we are making a particular subjective statement. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
But then how do we explain the differences between people? E.g. some like onions and some don't: does this mean that there is something physiologically or otherwise wrong with one of the groups?Or perhaps it is a realistic truth and our ideas and beliefs are simply streams of synaptic electrochemical nerve signals lighting up the the apparatus of the brain. We just get to interpret them phenomenologically instead of sociologically.
Psychologically and socially, there is potentially a lot at stake in terms of morality. I think that sometimes (often?) it is because of these high stakes that moral statements become artificially elevated to the level of facts.If there are moral facts, how can we know them? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
If we were to dress up a tribe of humans into chimp costumes and have them act the way humans usually do, but speak a language that the observers don't understand (say, Armenian): Would we be able to distinguish the behavior of humans-dressed-as-chimps from the behavior of the real chimps? By what markers?But in short, the moral sense is pre-intellectual, as evidence by chimp tribal morality. — counterpunch
My statement was that philosophers subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth by convention. You may be surprised to find out how popular the correspondence theory is in philosophy. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Truth seems to necessitate existence-conditions upon statements whereby the truth of a statement is contingent upon existing; whereas facts can obtain their truth-making relations with a statement whether or not the facts exist. Facts can be a thing that exists in the world, such as an object; or, on the other hand, facts can exist in a subset of possible worlds, such as an abstract entity. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
How do you propose we formulate, test, or modify a moral hypotheses? The scientific method would require systematic observations, recorded data from measurements, and drawing inferences for experimentation on an "objective moral value." I can't even to get a statement conveying an example of such. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
He further says:I have no beef with entomology or evolution, but I refuse to admit that they teach me much about ethics. — Richard Polt
I disagree.So why have we been tempted for millenniums to explain humanity away? The culprit, I suggest, is our tendency to forget what Edmund Husserl called the “lifeworld” — the pre-scientific world of normal human experience, where science has its roots. — Richard Polt
Do you? Why? I don't understand the need to categorise and name - doing philosophy as if it were entomology. It's as if one reached a conclusion and only then looked for the arguments...
I'll read the substantive part of your post and try to formulate a response. But are you looking for such a critique? — Banno
A similar dehumanization is carried out by psychology/psychiatry, where, once a person is branded with a psychiatric diagnosis, they cease to be relevant as a person and all that matters is that diagnosis, and the doctors and many interested others see that person only through the lens of that diagnosis. — baker
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