My translation (Sedley & Long, 2011) of 85b has:

"Now I believe that I myself am the swans' fellow-slave and sacred to the same god, and have prophecy from my master no less than they do"

There is nothing unclear in the text.

The text includes an unnamed authority after the reference to Apollo.

The Sedley & Long version doesn't. You're using the wrong translation.

Socrates is the dedicated servant of Apollo who is his master and god of prophecy. Hence the gift of prophecy is naturally and logically from his divine master Apollo.

The reference to 'my master' caught my attention because of the suggestion that he was referring to his spiritual master. (In Asiatic traditions, one's guru is not necessarily a person.) Happy to reserve judgement on that pending further reading (however Apollodorus' account seems perfectly reasonable.)

Yes, but especially with reference to prophecy, I think in this case the text refers to Apollo as indicated by the Sedley & Long translation.

'In literature and myth, the swan symbolizes light, purity, transformation, intuition, grace. In Ancient Greece the swan stood for the soul and was linked to Apollo, the god of the Sun,'

In 85B, Socrates likens himself to the followers of Apollo but speaks for himself at the same time.

Here's another translation by Fowler that supports the Sedley & Long one:

85b] but since they are Apollo's birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans; and am consecrated to the same God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sorrow as they. So far as this is concerned, then, speak and ask what ever questions you please, so long as the eleven of the Athenians permit.”

There is nothing unclear that I can see.

I checked a few other translations. I think I misread the one I used:

"I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs ..."

This means prophetic powers that are not less than theirs, that is Apollo, not from some other master.

This means prophetic powers that are not less than theirs, that is Apollo, not from some other master. — Fooloso4

I thought so because the Greek text doesn't have that ambiguity.

[85β] λυπούμενα ᾁδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἅτε οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες, μαντικοί τέ εἰσι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀγαθὰ ᾁδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἐῶσιν ἄνδρες ἕνδεκα.

Anyway, that clarifies it.

In 85B, Socrates likens himself to the followers of Apollo but speaks for himself at the same time. — Valentinus

In the Apology:

"And now I wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. (39c)

He speaks here in his own name.

Agree. Which raises the question, maybe not relevant to this particular passage, why Socrates was accused of atheism, if he saw himself as a disciple of Apollo. But let's park that for now.

There is one other comparison I simply can't help but make with regard to the early Buddhist texts:

he is a weakling who does not test in every way what is said about them and persevere until he is worn out by studying them on every side. For he must do one of two things; either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters, or if that is impossible, he must take whatever human doctrine is best and hardest to disprove and, embarking upon it as upon a raft, sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers, unless he can sail upon some stronger vessel, some divine revelation, and make his voyage more safely and securely. — Phaedrus 85c-d

The Blessed One said: "Suppose a man were traveling along a path. He would see a great expanse of water, with the near shore dubious & risky, the further shore secure & free from risk, but with neither a ferryboat nor a bridge going from this shore to the other. The thought would occur to him, 'Here is this great expanse of water, with the near shore dubious & risky, the further shore secure & free from risk, but with neither a ferryboat nor a bridge going from this shore to the other. What if I were to gather grass, twigs, branches, & leaves and, having bound them together to make a raft, were to cross over to safety on the other shore in dependence on the raft, making an effort with my hands & feet?' — The Simile of the Raft

Very interesting. Maybe we can discuss a few other points as well, once this has come to a conclusion. (Hopefully soon.)

Which raises the question, maybe not relevant to this particular passage, why Socrates was accused of atheism, if he saw himself as a disciple of Apollo. But let's park that for now. — Wayfarer

It would seem that no amount of deference to the gods will free Socrates of the "hatred for logos" that sees him as the corruption of youth.

Perhaps we can discuss that if we move on to The Apology after this (which would seem a logical progression.)

Which raises the question, maybe not relevant to this particular passage, why Socrates was accused of atheism, if he saw himself as a disciple of Apollo. But let's park that for now.
— Wayfarer

It would seem that no amount of deference to the gods will free Socrates of the "hatred for logos" that sees him as the corruption of youth. — Valentinus

Perhaps we can discuss that if we move on to The Apology after this (which would seem a logical progression.) — Wayfarer

Re: Socrates. I step back from the whole debate about what kind of an -ist he is alleged to have been. What particular spirit led him and how - if he had any god, or religion, it was that of philosophy.
To encourage people to think for themselves in a spirited and rational manner; to base their actions on that rather than follow dead dogma.
He lived and died for that. He followed a different god from that of the status quo.

Re: Plato. From what little understanding I have - he was a brilliant writer who muddied the waters of understanding in different dialogues. Clearly, he made his name and here we are - how many words have been spilled in all the many and conflicting interpretations of his writings.

Some here have already made up their mind and follow Plato from their own 'worldview'.
That's fine. I don't care. Some want to move on quickly once they think they have proved a point.
Again, fine. I don't care.
I will take my own time, even if it is away from this particular thread.
If that means stepping back and looking at other resources - or even abandoning ship - so be it.

I appreciate all the time, patience and effort that @Fooloso4 has given to starting and maintaining this thread. It is quite the challenge.
He continues to be open to re-reading and admitting where he might have misread or misinterpreted.
That says a lot.

Plato's Phaedo is about more than arguing over -isms. For me, Socrates was a spiritual thinker who acted on his belief in the power of philosophy. A heady mix of reason and spirit to move.

I am interested enough to look around; head out of the TPF for a while to read and think at my own pace.
I found an Open Yale course on 'Death' - lecturer Prof. Kagan.
https://oyc.yale.edu/NODE/196

Look under 'Sessions', you will see that Lectures 4,6,7,8 and 9 are dedicated to Plato's Phaedo.
Videos, transcripts and audio files are available.
Might be worth a look, I don't know.

Best wishes, everyone :sparkle:

Looks a fascinating course. Amazing, the resources you can find nowadays. Best.

Amazing, the resources you can find nowadays — Wayfarer

So many ways to skin a soul :halo: :sparkle:

Which raises the question, maybe not relevant to this particular passage, why Socrates was accused of atheism, if he saw himself as a disciple of Apollo. — Wayfarer

A major theme of the dialogue is phronesis. If Socrates was an atheist how prudent would it be for him to admit it? His concern is threefold: what this would mean for him, what it would mean for others, and what it would mean for philosophy if he openly professed atheism. We have seen what it meant for Socrates. What it means for philosophy is a perennial problem. There are always those ready to condemn and censor. What it means for others depends on the person. This is something Socrates will address.

f the dialogue is phronesis. If Socrates was an atheist how prudent would it be for him to admit it? — Fooloso4

Socrates didn't tend to care much about prudence. He expressed admiration for Sparta in the middle of a devastating war. He managed to irritate the crap out of most Athenian citizens.

I think it's more likely we're taking in Plato's flair for poetic expression.

A comment made by Valentinus about Cebes got me thinking about why Plato chose to use him to play such an important part in Socrates’ last dialogue with his friends.

Early on Socrates makes a comment that will pr

ove to be ironic:

'There goes Cebes, always hunting down arguments, and not at all willing to accept at once
what anyone may say.' (63a)

As we have seen, this is in part true but in part not. There are things he readily accepts but he keeps returning to the same questions. There is a peculiar mixture of remembering and forgetting. It is Cebes who remembers Socrates’ story of recollection, but he loses the scent of the current argument. He is a lover of philosophy, but not a philosopher. He is like the lover of music who is not musical. He admires what the philosophers have to say, but seems incapable of making the “greatest music”. (61a)

The danger of misologic leads to the question of who will keep Socratic philosophy alive? Put differently, philosophy needs genuine philosophers and not just scholars.

Socrates turns from the problem of sound arguments to the soundness of those who make and judge arguments. He now introduces what is an all too common problem:

I run the risk of being in a mood not to love wisdom but to love victory., as do altogether uneducated people … I won’t put my heart into making what I say seem to be true to those present, except as a side effect, but into making it seem to be the case to me myself as much as possible. (91a).

What Socrates is saying here may not be what he seems to be saying. He is not saying that he is not interested in “making the weaker argument stronger” so as to gain victory. He is not going to try to persuade others, but to persuade himself that what he says seems to be true. Now persuading himself that what he says seems to be true is very different from attempting to say what seems to be true. It appears as if he is taking his own advice when he tells Cebes and Simmias that they themselves might be the most capable of singing their own incantations about death.

If this is correct, then what he is recommending is that sound arguments be put aside and in their place songs to make the soul sound. That something like this is what he has in mind is confirmed by what he goes on to say:

For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death. (91b)

Here, for the first time, Socrates suggests that there might be nothing at all for those who die, that they have met their end. The timing is important, coming immediately after the questioning of the ability of arguments to establish the truth.

Socrates returns to the argument but, following Cebes example of the weaver, introduces a new definition of death:

… this very thing is death - perishing of soul (91d)

Socrates once again returns to recollection, and both Cebes and Simmias agrees that:

… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body (92a)

With this agreement Socrates returns to Simmias’ argument that the soul is a tuning. It is only with this being agreed on that Socrates is able to dispute Simmias’ argument that the soul is an attunement.

But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning
(92c)

Socrates argues that the soul cannot be an attunement if the tuning existed prior to what is tuned. But
there is an argument that Socrates neglects to pursue. 'Tuned and Untuned'. The tuning of a lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. It is the same relationship between the Equal and things that are equal, and the Beautiful or Just and things that are beautiful or just. In accord with that argument the Tuning of the Lyre still exists, but the tuning of a particular lyre does not endure once that lyre is destroyed. Why does he neglect this? The consequence would be the death of the soul along with the body.

Then is this the same with soul? Is one soul, even in the slightest degree, more fully and more so than another, or less fully and less so this very thing - a soul? (93b)

Simmias denies this, but note the shift from ‘soul’ to ‘one soul’ and 'a soul'. If death is the “perishing of soul” then a soul, the one that perishes, is to the greatest degree "less fully a soul".

'Well, but is one soul said to have intelligence and virtue and to be good, while another is said to have thoughtlessness and wickedness and to be bad? And are we right in saying those things?'

'Quite right.'

'Then what will any of those who maintain that soul is attunement say these things are, existing in our souls- virtue and vice? Are they, in turn, a further attunement and non-attunement? And is one soul, the good one, tuned, and does it have within itself, being an attunement, a further attunement, whereas the untuned one is just itself, and lacking a further attunement within it?' (93c)

The proper analogy to good and bad souls would be good and bad tunings. Good and bad, virtue and vice, are not things in the soul, they are conditions of the soul, just as sharp and flat are conditions of an attunement. A good soul would be a well tuned soul and a bad soul a poorly tuned one.

'And moreover, since this is her condition, one soul couldn’t partake of vice or of virtue any more fully than another, if in fact vice is to be lack of tuning and virtue tuning? (93e)

Socrates has intentionally jumbled terms and Simmias is unable to disentangle them. Attunement itself cannot be non-attunement just as Equal itself cannot be unequal, but just as equal things are more or less equal, attuned things are more or less in tune.

Therefore it follows from this argument of ours that all souls of all living beings will similarly be good if in fact it’s similarly the nature of souls to be this very thing - souls. (94a)

The argument is as follows: soul is an attunement, vice is lack of attunement, and so the soul cannot be bad and still be a soul because it would no longer be an attunement. What is missing from the argument is that being in or out of tune is a matter of degree. Vice is not the absence of tuning but bad tuning.

Socrates closes this discussion by citing the authority of Homer, the “Divine Poet” (95a). Homer for the Greeks has been made divine, a god, apotheosis. Socrates appeals to Homer’s divine authority or less gloriously, to the authority of the poet rather than the strength of argument. He uses Homer’s authority in support of his argument against attunement on the grounds of the separation of body and soul, and the rule of the soul over the body. But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger. In an earlier post I discussed the problem of soul’s desire. In both cases the divide between body and soul cannot be maintained.

Homer for the Greeks has been made divine, a god, apotheosis — Fooloso4

Why do you think this?

https://sententiaeantiquae.com/2018/07/05/homer-divine-not-human/

And this article convinced you that the ancient Greeks, in general, believed Homer was divine?

No. That was simply the first thing that came up on search. For a more scholarly source:
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft3f59n8b0&chunk.id=d0e3428&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e3009&brand=ucpress

Per Moses Finley,

"No other poet, no literary figure in all history for that matter, occupied a place in the life of his people such as Homer's. He was their pre-eminent symbol of nationhood, the unimpeachable authority on their earliest history, and a decisive figure in the creation of their pantheon, as well as their most widely quoted poet."

They honored Homer out the wazoo, that's true. They didn't actually think he had been made into a god.

From the article cited:

"The Hellenistic portrait belongs to another category. The heavy, archaizing locks framing the face, the fillet containing the hair rolled up in the back—also an archaizing trait—and the full, heavy beard all conjure up the majestic aura of a god."

Mention is also made in the Archelaos Relief , also known as, "Apotheosis of Homer":
http://www.hellenicaworld.com/Greece/Art/Ancient/en/HomerArchelaos.html

The point that should not be lost is that Socrates called him the "divine poet" in the Phaedo and in the Ion calls him the "best and most divine".

This is not the place to get into the concept of apotheosis. Here is a short quote from Wiki before I move on:

Apotheosis is the glorification of a subject to divine level and most commonly, the treatment of a human like a god.

See pm.

You're in conflict with one of the greatest classicists of the 20th Century.

And how does this relate to my analysis of the Phaedo?

And how does this relate to my analysis of the Phaedo? — Fooloso4

Since you asked, quite frankly it indicates that you don't know much about the setting of the work. You're prone to jumping to odd conclusions, and then you refuse to accept facts when they're presented.