:up:

For Plato, and others, there is a something more... a reification fo the use of "equal" — Banno

In my opinion, which is certainly not original, the Forms are themselves images rather than, as he says, what things are images of. But that is a discussion for another time.

A teacher chunks the lesson - building on previous understanding. Learn how to use "red" and "Heavy", then "the same", then "equal". — "Banno

Oh, I see. Previous understanding. :naughty:

But yeah, that's why I was asking, I know you're a teacher and we're talking about inquiry.

Many Platonists today look to Plato for religious and quasi-religious answers, often of the Christian variety. — Fooloso4

I will acknowledge that I have been much influenced by Christian Platonism, in the context of which Socrates and Plato have been described as ‘Christian before Christ’. But as I’ve also been influenced by Indic philosophical teachings, I’m aware of overtones of non-dualism that can sometimes can be discerned (Thomas McEviilly's book The Shape of Ancient Thought is a rich source of insight into those). But in either case, I don’t see those influences as necessarily in invidious. In fact, I think there's a kind of 'anti-Christian' bias that is often at play - the wish to deny the religious or metaphysical dimension in the dialogues so as to project the kind of Plato that is more harmonious with this secular age. (What did he really mean by 'soul'?)

That said, I too am dubious of injecting phrases such as 'cosmic mind' into the discussion or the interpretation. But on the other hand, as I've already stated, I think that the Greek term 'nous' has to be considered throughout, as it has nuances which are completely foreign to the modern use of 'intellect'.

So, to be sure, nous is here translated as soul?

Edit: Wayfarer avoided answering... @Fooloso4?

Plato was like the science of the day around 200 AD. Christianity absorbed it much as the Catholic Church gives pre-approval to what scientists come up with today

Christianity could have been all sorts of things It's Platonic because it has Plato stuck in one of its central columns.

To place Phaedo in the context of religion vs science isn't helpful. Idealism vs realism, yes.

So, to be sure, nous is here translated as soul? — Banno

This is a digression, but I’m very interested in the later conception of ‘the rational soul’. Very briefly - just as the Ideas of things are their real essence, so the capacity of the mind to grasp the ideas is its higher aspect. The bodily senses receive the physical shape, but nous perceives the Idea or the principle, immediately through intellectual apprehension, not through the intermediary of sense. This became much more developed in the scholastic hylomorphism of Aquinas and others, but the seeds of the idea are visible going back to the Parmenides. It is this conception of the rationality of nous that distinguishes the Western philosophical tradition most strongly from the Asiatic (as Russell remarks in his chapter on Pythagoras.)

As I said, a digression or perhaps a footnote, but I really don’t want to sidetrack this thread and henceforth will try and confine my comments to the specific passages under consideration.

In fact, I think there's a kind of 'anti-Christian' bias that is often at play - the wish to deny the religious or metaphysical dimension in the dialogues so as to project the kind of Plato that is more harmonious with this secular age. — Wayfarer

The following from my last posted reading:

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - thoughtfulness. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole are only when accompanied by thoughtfulness, regardless of whether pleasures and terrors and all other such things are added or subtracted … and maybe moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier. (69 b-c)

Socrates demystifies “mystic rites”, “genuine hidden meaning”, “mysteries”, and “purification”. (69c-d) The practice of dying and being dead turns out to be the practice of a life of moderation and justice and courage. — Fooloso4

Idealism vs realism, yes. — frank

I think this is anachronistic.

I think this is anachronistic. — Fooloso4

Why do you say that? Democritus was his elder.

Plato was neither a realist nor idealist. The terms were not used and do not fit. What we take to be the real world was said to be an image of the Forms. The Forms are independent of the human mind.

Socrates demystifies “mystic rites”, “genuine hidden meaning”, “mysteries”, and “purification”. (69c-d) The practice of dying and being dead turns out to be the practice of a life of moderation and justice and courage. — Fooloso4

I don't agree that his intent is to demystify. Typical modernist secular analysis, making Plato safe for the secular academy. (We find exact parallels in the 'naturalisation of Buddhism' which likewise attempts to strip the entire tradition of any suggestion of a life beyond.)

All of the following arguments - the argument from opposites, the cyclical argument, the affinity argument - are arguments for the immortality of the soul.

There are two kinds of existences: (a) the visible world that we perceive with our senses, which is human, mortal, composite, unintelligible, and always changing, and (b) the invisible world of Forms that we can access solely with our minds, which is divine, deathless, intelligible, non-composite, and always the same (78c-79a, 80b).

Which, as I say, is the template for the development of hylomorphic dualism, notwithstanding Aristotle's revision of the nature of the Forms.

So, the rationale for a life of moderation, justice and courage, is so as to act in accordance with the Good. As has already been stated on the section on death, the philosopher has less reason to fear death, because he will find himself in 'the company of good men'. Added to which, the soul is most likely to attain knowledge when apart from the body:

it [the soul] thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality. — Phaedro 65c

Demystify that!

Plato was neither a realist nor idealist. The terms were not used and do not fit. What we take to be the real world was said to be an image of the Forms. The Forms are independent of the human mind. — Fooloso4

Yes, it's ontological idealism.

Philosophy by name-calling.

Philosophy by name-calling. — Banno

It was 2400 years ago. Cut him some slack.

It was 2400 years ago. — frank

Yep, hence the absurdity of applying terms invented in the interim. Like calling a shield a type of anti-missile defence, it's too easy. It's anachronistic.

Yep, hence the absurdity of applying terms invented in the interim. Like calling a shield a type of anti-missile defence, it's too easy. It's anachronistic. — Banno

Is there some impending confusion we're trying to avoid?

Yep; assuming that Plato was an idealist.

Plato was neither a realist nor idealist. — Fooloso4

Let's read the case.

Ok. The SEP says he was an idealist. Let's see if they got it wrong.

The SEP says he was an idealist. — frank

Where? Not in the article on Plato. The idealism article claims him, but with reservations.

Detail.

Where? Not in the article on Plato. The idealism article claims him, but with reservations. — Banno

In the Idealism article.

My point was that his views can be contrasted to those of contemporary materialists like Democritus.

If you don't want to call it idealism when you're considering that contrast, that's fine. Call it what you like.

Yes, it's ontological idealism. — frank

I think it’s better described as objective idealism. That is, Ideas or Forms are real, in that they’re not dependent on your or my mind, but they’re only graspable by a rational intelligence. Consider Pythagoras’ theorem as a paradigmatic example. (In my view, it's the mainstream tradition of Western philosophy.)

I think it’s better described as objective idealism. — Wayfarer

That works.

Think I'll just call him "Plato".

I don't agree that his intent is to demystify. — Wayfarer

Here are the quoted terms from 69c-d in context and bolded, starting with what I quoted above with a break in the paragraph. It is one paragraph though without a break.

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - thoughtfulness. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole are only when accompanied by thoughtfulness, regardless of whether pleasures and terrors and all other such things are added or subtracted … and maybe moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier.

And it looks as if these people who initiated our mythic rites weren't a bunch of bunglers but spoke with a genuine hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever arrives in Hades ignorant of the mysteries and uninitiated will lie in Muck, but he who arrives there purified and initiated will dwell with gods.

The purification is as he identifies it, moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness.

78c-79a, 80b)

In due time.

Demystify that! — Wayfarer

Socrates has done it for me, but I do not want to get ahead of myself.

Yes, it's ontological idealism. — frank

Neither term existed then.

So, what do you mean when you say Socrates 'demystifies' these virtues etc?

I think this section important - his pleasurable release from painful tight chains.
Death might be seen as a welcome release from the physical body with all its discomforts.
The pain of life v the joy of the afterlife ?*
There is a separation. Not here a mingling as felt by Phaedo. — Amity

That release on the last day of his life is important. The inclusion of Xanthippe gives sharp relief to her charge that one last party is planned with his friends. The friends' concern about the subject of death is mixed up with the realization that they won't have Socrates to animate them any longer.

Pardon the lateness of my reply. I am working in meatspace presently so I will participate in a delayed fashion.

Neither term existed then. — Fooloso4

I'm trying to understand why that's significant to you. No one called Plotinus an early Neoplatonist at the time. We call him that for our own convenience. Is there a danger of confusion there? Maybe, but the convenience has proven more significant.

Plato's views are called idealism by professionals. So I'm just curious more than anything. Why the objection?

In the Idealism article. — frank

The article continues:

"Although we have just referred to Plato, the term “idealism” became the name for a whole family of positions in philosophy only in the course of the eighteenth century."