”Discern" presupposes that meaning already exists. — creativesoul

Have a geez at the Wikipedia entry on nous https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nous#Aristotle . I’m sure there’s something in this - something that has been forgotten, not proved to be incorrect.

For folk like me who are working on a computer that is pretty much useless aside from being able to access this particular site, you'll have to provide a different link(compatible to pre chrome days I guess?) or copy and paste the part you want me to review.

:worry:

If you ask me, there's an issue/a problem with that approach - the one where we look for a "cell" - because such a project functions under the assumption that cells are the basic, fundamental, units of life. Of course it's true that current biology makes that claim, the claim that cells are the building blocks of life but one could, without sounding crazy, question that assumption/claim.

Think of it, how convenient and thus unlikely that life should give up its secrets - what it actually is - to a man/woman with just a simple microscope? Cells are microscopic features of living organisms and though they do appear roughly brick-like as if living organisms are like houses built of them, I still question the conclusion that cells are, well, it!

To illustrate my point I offer an analogy and I suppose it'll fulfill its purpose of getting the message across. If you look at the biosphere, most of the action - life - takes place at the boundary between air and the earth i.e. life seems to like the interface between the atmosphere and the lithosphere. The air itself and the ground itself are relatively lifeless. Likewise, I imagine life to be that which is between cells, where cell membranes or cell walls meet and definitely not inside of cells. It's a kinda Buddhist take on biology - we feel a cup is the empty space but the actual "stuff" is the wall of material that surrounds the space. :joke:

I’ll leave it for another thread. It is the Wikipedia article on Nous (Philosophy). I think the browser automatically parsed the URL for a mobile device as I’m writing this on my kitchen table iPad.

Roger that!

But we’re talking about something unmeasurable in principle. — Wayfarer

It is describable though. I’m more familiar with Zahavi’s phenomenologically- based pre-reflective awareness than Nagel’s notion of the feeling of what is is like to be aware. In Zahavi’s case , this subjective felt sense never stands alone but always as one side of a subject’s intentional relation to objects. And thus it is not an essence or category but an aspect or pole. He describes it as like a source of light that , along with illuminating everything that falls within its scope , renders itself visible as well.

I’m wondering , how would you articulate the difference between the religious and the atheistic account of pre-reflective self -awareness , the ‘feeling of what it is like’?

The notion of the subjective and objective being ‘poles of experience’ is one I have often referred to in the past. There is a saying in modern Buddhist philosophy that the world and self ‘co-arise’. I think it’s very close in meaning to the same idea. In fact in some translations of early Buddhist texts, the ‘self’ is described as ‘self-and-world’. It emphasises the primacy of experience, or the experiential nature of knowledge.

There was a remark made in another thread:

In some ways, the history of philosophy has been the quest to deny the existence of the real world independent of our minds — Tom Storm

I would say it is the assumption of modern, post-Enlightenment thought that ‘the world’ is what exists independently of our cognition of it, and that it would persist in much the same way even if mankind were wiped out by a catastrophe. Basically that is simple realism.

What this doesn’t see, is what the mind brings in order to make such judgements, even the judgement of what the world must be in the absence of observers. I say it is meaningless to contemplate a world as if seen from no point-of-view, as the very fabric of time and space itself has a subjective pole. But the ‘subjective pole’ itself is never an object of analysis - obviously - which is why the ultimate tendency of materialism is to deny that the subjective has any reality whatever because it is not disclosed objectively - which is how you get to the view of eliminative materialism.

With your research interests, you will probably know about the confluence of Buddhist philosophy - abhidharma - and phenomenology which is at the basis of the ‘embodied cognition’ approach from the book, The Embodied Mind. One of the current theorists in this approach is Michel Bitbol, who has said:

Body, technology, location: these are some of the components of our situation. By contrast, objectivity aims at stripping away all the elements of the human situation in order to retain a universal residue. You subtract standpoint, you subtract geographical position, you subtract the present time, you subtract the fact that you need to use instruments in order to see the very small and the very large. You want all these things to become mere transparent windows giving access to an unspoiled world. You wish to wipe out your own situation and treat it as if it were made of an invisible sheet of glass through which the things “out there” become known and visible. 1

That is what I’m criticising.

I’m wondering , how would you articulate the difference between the religious and the atheistic account of pre-reflective self -awareness , the ‘feeling of what it is like’? — Joshs

Hard to say. Schopenhauer is often held up as an atheist but he seemed to have a very high regard for religious asceticism and Eastern religions. He was said to read the Upanisads every night. Buddhism itself, particular early Buddhism, is known for its principled atheism, but it nevertheless explicitly rejects materialism as a form of nihilism. There was a character in the early Buddhist texts, a Prince Payasi, who represents the carvakas, the materialists of Buddha’s day - not so different from modern materialists, allowing for the historical context.

I guess what I’m saying is even simple creatures are subjects of experience - they’re beings. And so they can’t be fully understood by the same laws that govern inanimate matter. It’s kind of patronising, in a way. You’re not allowing them the dignity of being, you’re simply assuming that according to your science, you know all about them.

Panpsychism (as he argues in his major work, The Vindication Of Absolute Idealism, 1983), has an ethical upshot - enabling, and requiring, us to empathise with other humans and animals. It "bids us recognise that what looks forth from another's eyes, what feels itself in the writhing of a worm . . . is really that very thing which, when speaking through my lips, calls itself 'I'." — The Guardian, Obituary of Timothy Sprigge, Idealist Philosopher

The Vedantins would agree.

What this doesn’t see, is what the mind brings in order to make such judgements, even the judgement of what the world must be in the absence of observers. I say it is meaningless to contemplate a world as if seen from no point-of-view, as the very fabric of time and space itself has a subjective pole. — Wayfarer

I don't disagree with most of what you say but I don't think it makes an impact on the efficacy of methodological realism as the only useful tool we have for determining the nature of our experience.

I guess what I’m saying is even simple creatures are subjects of experience - they’re beings. And so they can’t be fully understood by the same laws that govern inanimate matter. — Wayfarer

I know that Heidegger would phrase this differently , and I think so would Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. For Heidegger, Being isnt ‘a’ being, a subject, in the Kantian sense of a formal content. It is the in-between of subjectivity and objectivity, so neither the subjective nor the objective pole can be ‘measured’ except in relation to each other. That is why he rejected humanism, which wants to see subjectivity as a kind of standing reserve. For Husserl the self , in the form of the ego, has no substantive content in itself, other than being a kind of zero point of noetic-noematic correlations. It seems to me the religious impulse is to locate a transcendent content or vector or telos in subjectivity, which is associated in some grounding way with the good, while the phenomenologists see the good as a relative subject-object construction.

I don't disagree with most of what you say but I don't think it makes an impact on the efficacy of methodological realism as the only useful tool we have for determining the nature of our experience. — Tom Storm

It depends on what aspect of our experience you have in mind. Our natural sciences don’t seem to suffer from their dependence on realism, but then that’s probably because these fields have yet to produce an alternative to compare it to ( but they will eventually).
As far as the social sciences are concerned it is a different story, especially in psychology. Here we do have post-realist alternatives in hermeneutic, enactivist , constructivist, social constructionist, and phenomenological approaches. These accounts recognize that one can maintain naturalism while jettisoning realism.

we’re talking about something unmeasurable in principle. — Wayfarer

You are. I'm not. I'm asking you why you think it's unmeasurable in principle. Specifically I'm asking you in what way a verbal report that you feel it does not constitute a measurement of it.

As far as the social sciences are concerned it is a different story, especially in psychology. Here we do have post-realist alternatives in hermeneutic, enactivist , constructivist, social constructionist, and phenomenological approaches. These accounts recognize that one can maintain naturalism while jettisoning realism. — Joshs

You will have to provide a simple example. If you're simply talking theory then this is largely inconsequential.

‘Methodological naturalism’ excludes what can't be accounted for or conceived of in scientific (objective, quantifiable) terms. It is a perfectly sound methodological step. Philosophical naturalism goes further by saying that only those factors which can be considered scientifically are real. This is where scientific method tends towards 'scientism'. — Wayfarer

Thanks, Wayfarer, for this further information. I have yet to read up on some of the internet sources.
I am following this thread with more interest than I thought I would, given that I am not always attracted to threads with anything scientific in the title.

In particular, the conversation between yourself and @Tom Storm. Here:

I don't disagree with most of what you say but I don't think it makes an impact on the efficacy of methodological realism as the only useful tool we have for determining the nature of our experience. — Tom Storm

and now @Joshs to Tom:

It depends on what aspect of our experience you have in mind... — Joshs

...As far as the social sciences are concerned it is a different story, especially in psychology. Here we do have post-realist alternatives in hermeneutic, enactivist , constructivist, social constructionist, and phenomenological approaches. These accounts recognize that one can maintain naturalism while jettisoning realism. — Joshs

Tom responds:

You will have to provide a simple example. If you're simply talking theory then this is largely inconsequential. — Tom Storm

I agree that more examples would be useful as to the practical consequences of holding any of the positions previously discussed.

Question:

What would be an example of
: 'the efficacy of methodological realism as the only useful tool we have for determining the nature of our experience' in everyday life ?
With reference to the human experience as it tries to come to terms with what we know today.

I think that recognising the importance of the mind to the self, as it functions and not worrying about how it came to be, is perhaps of more relevance to the development of the self - perhaps even in an evolutionary or revolutionary way ?

I agree with:

However for me what matters is actually how people relate to their fellow creatures. The real test of a belief system is not how much 'metaphysics' or anti-realism it holds, but what it looks like in action in the world. — Tom Storm

So, back to 'naturalism'. I will have to give this, or 'methodological realism' more thought and time, given that it seems to be at the core of it all ?

In regards to this:

I don't disagree with most of what you say but I don't think it makes an impact on the efficacy of methodological realism as the only useful tool we have for determining the nature of our experience. — Tom Storm

I question the conclusion. I think 'scientific realism' is a useful stance in asking scientific questions. But 'the nature of our experience' is another matter altogether. Reflecting on the nature of experience I would take to be more the subject of philosophy. Discovering the nature of phenomena is more the domain of science.

I think that recognising the importance of the mind to the self, as it functions and not worrying about how it came to be, is perhaps of more relevance to the development of the self - perhaps even in an evolutionary or revolutionary way ? — Amity

A point I would make is that the kind of self-knowledge that philosophy wants to impart doesn't necessarily require any special scientific apparatus. I would say that the aim of philosophy, generally, is to attain a state of equilibrium and disinterestedness, to enable you to always act as the situation calls for and to realise your true purpose, whatever that is. That doesn't require any particular science, although your purpose might be in the scientific domain. Aristotle distinguished episteme, which is what we would now call science, from both techne, which is the application of a skill, and phronesis, which is practical wisdom. Sure, science is indispensable, but without self-knowledge and practical wisdom it can be put to diabolical ends. Good people can be good scientists, but being a good scientist doesn't necessarily make you a good person.

So, back to 'naturalism'. I will have to give this, or 'methodological realism' more thought and time, given that it seems to be at the core of it all ? — Amity

I have never heard the expression 'methodological realism' until now. Methodological naturalism is the usual expression. And to recap, where I think that overshoots is when it is extended to grand claims about the nature of existence. I think it's very important to understand intellectual history and the forces that came into play through the Enlightenment, which is a big subject, but indispensable in my view.

In respect of evolutionary biology, this has come to be seen as the kind of scientific rebuttal of religious creation myths. That's obviously true in some ways, but there are many open questions about the meaning of evolution, which actually converge with questions about the meaning of life. That is what I take the last paragraph of the OP to be getting at.

I have never heard the expression 'methodological realism' until now. Methodological naturalism is the usual expression. — Wayfarer

Tom seems to have moved to that instead of his previous 'methodological naturalism' ?

On methodological realism:

Methodological realism accepts the axiological view that truth is one of the essential aims of science. Following Popper and Levi, truthlikeness as the aim of science, combines the goals of truth and information. This chapter discusses the relations between truthlikeness and other epistemic utilities like explanatory power (Hempel), problem‐solving capacity (Laudan), and simplicity (Reichenbach). While rationality in science can be defined relative to the goals accepted within scientific communities at different times, a critical realist defines scientific progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness. It is argued that progress in this sense can be assessed, relative to empirical evidence, by the notion of expected verisimilitude. An abductive argument is formulated to defend realism as the best (and even the only) explanation of the empirical and practical success of science. — Ilkka Niiniluoto

Methodological naturalism is the usual expression. And to recap, where I think that overshoots is when it is extended to grand claims about the nature of existence. I think it's very important to understand intellectual history and the forces that came into play through the Enlightenment, which is a big subject, but indispensable in my view. — Wayfarer

OK. Thanks for that and the general overview.

In respect of evolutionary biology, this has come to be seen as the kind of scientific rebuttal of religious creation myths. That's obviously true in some ways, but there are many open questions about the meaning of evolution, which actually converge with questions about the meaning of life. That is what I take the last paragraph of the OP to be getting at. — Wayfarer

Last paragraph of OP:

1.So the mystery of the origin of life is very real.

2. Even if you could find an alternate mechanism for accurate chemical reproduction - what could give it its sense of direction before life had an in interest in preserving itself.

3. Whatever factor could apply to chemicals alone, to start giving an evolutionary direction in favour of life? — Gary Enfield

1. 'The mystery of the origin of life is very real' - no argument with that from me.
Although some accept it as a result of faith v those who prefer knowledge, even if limited.
Doubt can still be present in both. Sometimes, this troubles the faithful and an amount of guilt is felt.
Whereas, others can see doubt as helpful and a way forward.

As for 2. and 3. that is beyond me !
My only thought, right now, is that energy plays a part...resulting in the eventual energetic pursuits of humans and others to keep on going, or not - as the case might be. Could be seen as trivial in some respects if you think there is something greater out there...
Most try to find reasons to go on, even in the most difficult of circumstances, including real doubt.
And they do this without recourse to studies or theories in philosophy or science...or religion.
Perhaps they are better for it ?

A point I would make is that the kind of self-knowledge that philosophy wants to impart doesn't necessarily require any special scientific apparatus. I would say that the aim of philosophy, generally, is to attain a state of equilibrium and disinterestedness, to enable you to always act as the situation calls for and to realize your true purpose, whatever that is. — Wayfarer

Science is not unquestionable and empiricism does not axiomatically exhaust all that we can call our experience. But at least we are compelled to science by more impeding necessities. I realize that you can claim that the need for purpose and origin are similar to some extent, but science renders their existence suspicious not just by its exploration of the inanimate universe, but also because it conveys to us about our mental fragility and our addiction to self-affirmation. Those higher-order needs might turn out to be vanities. That is why, one needs to be skeptical.

Even if our cerebral motivations to ask the questions are vain, that does automatically mean that the questions are non-sensical,

But there is a wide range of possible answers. And it seems to me that theism is cherry picking them. The "endemic reason" might be just some narrow range of experience and in the grand scheme of things it might mean nothing. That is absurdism. Or the universe might be all the explanation there is. It might be its own reason. But even if you cannot accept absurdism, because it appears counter-anecdotal to any experience that you have with the universe, this still leaves the question - do you accept any ecocentric (i.e. non-antropocentric) or self-denigrating forms of theism - dystheism, panpsychism, pandeism, etc. To me, it appears that most theists are comparatively optimistic. Why? Isn't that indication for bias?

So, the suggestion that living organisms can't be wholly understood through the objective sciences implies 'the supernatural'! — Wayfarer

The need to assume a "supernatural" is produced by the materialist tendency to dissolve the division between the natural and the artificial. When we maintain this division, we see that the artificial is created by intention, and the natural is not, and there is no need to invoke a supernatural. But when the intentional, the artificial, is conceived of as being a feature of the natural (such as emergence), rather than the inverse, which is to see "the natural" as a category created and produced by the intentional human mind, then "the natural" becomes fundamentally unsupported. This produces the need to assume a supernatural to provide substance for the reality of the natural.

I second your view on how there's a enormous gulf between the inanimate and the animate and that our attempt to explain the latter in terms of our knowledge of the former is at best confusion and at worst a delusion.

I like to look at reality as a staircase rather than a ramp. Like a staircase there are "jumps" in the nature of phenomena instead of smooth progressions like on a ramp. I've identified two such "jumps: 1. inanimate to animate and 2. non-human life to humans. The first "jump" is what's been troubling biologists all this time and needs no introduction. The second jump too is well-known and it was recognized very early on in human history as by the likes of Aristotle who defined humans as rational animals.

I say all this only from what I can intuit from my general knowledge which sadly ain't that much. A question to you: what exactly is the difference between the living and the non-living? When I ask this question to myself I draw a blank - nothing springs to mind as if I don't really know the difference between the inanimate and the animate. It seems I'm not alone in this though as the question "what is life?" posed to biologists elicits responses that are marked by an equal degree of ignorance and that's ironic since they've constructed a whole corpus of knowledge which they claim is about life. Perhaps, as it appears to be, we know what life isn't but are uncertain of what life is. That should be good enough for government work.

The next thing I want discuss is what you've labeled as "experience". All I can comment is that the way the non-living and the living encounter the world should be different, that difference being a correlate of the presence/absence of a "life force" if I may be allowed some leeway here to use that phrase.

This difference is, at the human scale, what the hard problem of consciousness is all about. Am I right to interpret your beliefs in this way or am I barking up the wrong tree?

You will have to provide a simple example. If you're simply talking theory then this is largely inconsequential. — Tom Storm

You mean psychoanalytic theory, S-R theory and cognitive behavioral theory are also inconsequential, or did you mean that it would be difficult for you to assess the practical usefulness of a theory you are unfamiliar with without some examples of how it is put into practice? Rogers’a client centered therapy, Gendlin’s focusing and George Kelly’s personal construct therapy are some examples of post-realist psychotherapeutic approaches. Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson have a applied post-realist framework to perceptual and consciousness research, and Matthew Ratcliffe uses this perspective in his model of affectivity and his studies of schizophrenia , depression, ptsd, grief, etc.
You can check out Jan Slaby’s
research group in Germany for a post-realist model of neuroscience. Or look at Shaun Gallagher’s post -realist accounts of thought-insertion and his critique of theory of mind accounts of autism.

From Wiki:

“Enactivism argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment.[1] It claims that the environment of an organism is brought about, or enacted, by the active exercise of that organism's sensorimotor processes."The key point, then, is that the species brings forth and specifies its own domain of problems ...this domain does not exist "out there" in an environment that acts as a landing pad for organisms that somehow drop or parachute into the world. Instead, living beings and their environments stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or codetermination." p 198[2] "Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world."[3] These authors suggest that the increasing emphasis upon enactive terminology presages a new era in thinking about cognitive science.”

Unfortunately, that was what was is being done when Evolutionary Theory is taught as fact in schools. Just filling in a huge hole, the size of the Grand Canyon. — MondoR

Abiogenesis and evolution are entirely different processes. Evolutionary theory says nothing about the origins of life, only how life has changed over time. Abiogenesis describes the mechanisms by which life came from non-living matter.

I think 'scientific realism' is a useful stance in asking scientific questions. But 'the nature of our experience' is another matter altogether. — Wayfarer

A point I would make is that the kind of self-knowledge that philosophy wants to impart doesn't necessarily require any special scientific apparatus. — Wayfarer

I agree that there are important, completely non-scientific ways of understanding consciousness and experience and science that doesn't recognize that is scientism. But when people talk about "the hard problem of consciousness," they are generally talking about consciousness as a scientific issue. It is perfectly possible to study consciousness on a purely scientific basis. Something is lost, left out when you do that.

'The mystery of the origin of life is very real' - no argument with that from me. — Amity

Do you mean "mystery" as in stuff we don't know yet or as in stuff that requires some special way of knowing? Or maybe stuff that is unknowable?

I second your view on how there's a enormous gulf between the inanimate and the animate and that our attempt to explain the latter in terms of our knowledge of the former is at best confusion and at worst a delusion. — TheMadFool

That seems like a much stronger statement than what I understand @Wayfarer to be saying, but I'll let him speak for himself.

It seems I'm not alone in this though as the question "what is life?" posed to biologists elicits responses that are marked by an equal degree of ignorance and that's ironic since they've constructed a whole corpus of knowledge which they claim is about life. — TheMadFool

This is misleading. The classification of what is living and what is not may have some ambiguity in it, e.g. viruses, but that's true of most distinctions. We biologists, and we, generally know what is meant when we say "living."

I agree that there are important, completely non-scientific ways of understanding consciousness and experience and science that doesn't recognize that is scientism. But when people talk about "the hard problem of consciousness," they are generally talking about consciousness as a scientific issue. It is perfectly possible to study consciousness on a purely scientific basis. Something is lost, left out when you do that. — T Clark

That would be the realist position , which starts from the belief that the hard problem really is a problem rather
than a result of a dualist metaphysics. For the realist , all that is lost by studying consciousness is some ineffable subjective quality, like a spice that can be added or removed at will.

As Evan Thompson writes:

“ “Many philosophers have argued that there seems to be a gap between the objective, naturalistic facts of the world and the subjective facts of conscious experience. The hard problem is the conceptual and metaphysical problem of how to bridge this apparent gap. There are many critical things that can be said about the hard problem (see Thompson&Varela, forthcoming), but what I wish to point out here is that it depends for its very formulation on the premise that the embodied mind as a natural entity exists ‘out there' independently of how we configure or constitute it as an object of knowledge through our reciprocal empathic understanding of one other as experiencing subjects. One way of formulating the hard problem is to ask: if we had a complete, canonical, objective, physicalist account of the natural world, including all the physical facts of the brain and the organism, would it conceptually or logically entail the subjective facts of consciousness? If this account would not entail these facts, then consciousness must be an additional, non-natural property of the world.

One problem with this whole way of setting up the issue, however, is that it presupposes we can make sense of the very notion of a single, canonical, physicalist description of the world, which is highly doubtful, and that in arriving (or at any rate approaching) such a description, we are attaining a viewpoint that does not in any way presuppose our own cognition and lived experience. In other words, the hard problem seems to depend for its very formulation on the philosophical position known as transcendental or metaphysical realism. From the phenomenological perspective explored here, however — but also from the perspective of pragmatism à la Charles Saunders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, as well as its contemporary inheritors such as Hilary Putnam (1999) — this transcendental or metaphysical realist position is the paradigm of a nonsensical or incoherent metaphysical viewpoint, for (among other problems) it fails to acknowledge its own reflexive dependence on the intersubjectivity and reciprocal empathy of the human life-world.“

Do you mean "mystery" as in stuff we don't know yet or as in stuff that requires some special way of knowing? Or maybe stuff that is unknowable? — T Clark

Good question.
I don't know what @Gary Enfield meant by it. I should have asked before agreeing !
I had assumed ( sue me ! ) that it was stuff not possible to understand or explain right now.
We don't know.
Is there a likelihood of us gaining that knowledge in the future ?
Qui sait ?
* Gallic shrug *
I suppose I like to think anything is possible but...

What do you think ?

You mean psychoanalytic theory, S-R theory and cognitive behavioral theory are also inconsequential, — Joshs

Just that theories like these, for the most part, are imprecise, interpreted variously and lacking in precision. CBT or DBT has application in some instances to help change behaviour but it is not a robust epistemology.

What would be an example of
: 'the efficacy of methodological realism as the only useful tool we have for determining the nature of our experience' in everyday life ? — Amity

All I am saying is that the scientific method remains the single most reliable pathway to truth. Can you name an alternative that can provide us with reliable knowledge about the world?

Sure, science is indispensable, but without self-knowledge and practical wisdom it can be put to diabolical ends. Good people can be good scientists, but being a good scientist doesn't necessarily make you a good person. — Wayfarer

True. I would never say science is good. Just reliable. I would not say science is certain. Just reliable.

But the question of goodness or virtue is too complex and elusive to ever attach to any particular discipline or activity. It is equally true that being a good believer or philosopher does not necessarily make you a good person.

I would also not make a necessary connection between the pursuit of spirituality or philosophy with self knowledge either. It could just as readily be self-deception.

There are many critical things that can be said about the hard problem (see Thompson&Varela, forthcoming), but what I wish to point out here is that it depends for its very formulation on the premise that the embodied mind as a natural entity exists ‘out there' independently of how we configure or constitute it as an object of knowledge through our reciprocal empathic understanding of one other as experiencing subjects. — Joshs

I like this Thompson guy, even though he's got it all wrong. At least he lays out the problems clearly. As a great philosopher once said - Clarity is so rare and unexpected, it is often mistaken for truth. I'm going to jiggle around with what he says above to make it match the way I see things:

There are many critical things that can be said about [objective reality], but it depends for its very formulation on the premise that [reality] exists ‘out there' independently of how we configure or constitute it as an object of knowledge.

That was fun.

One problem with this whole way of setting up the issue, however, is that it presupposes we can make sense of the very notion of a single, canonical, physicalist description of the world, which is highly doubtful, and that in arriving (or at any rate approaching) such a description, we are attaining a viewpoint that does not in any way presuppose our own cognition and lived experience. — Joshs

Hey, this Thompson guy is ok. Maybe I don't disagree with him after all.

All I am saying is that the scientific method remains the single most reliable pathway to truth. — Tom Storm

"Truth" is generally defined as congruence with objective reality. I will agree that science is very good at identifying the truth in that sense. There's a good argument to be made that objective reality is a human construct which boils down to that which can be perceived, conceived, and understood by humans. That has been discussed many times in the forum. Getting into that would require shanghaiing the original post.

There are ways of knowing the world that do not require an objective reality.