'Facts' are neither true nor false - statements or propositions are true or false.

'Facts' are neither true nor false - statements or propositions are true or false. — Wayfarer

I'd probably agree.

Although, if something is said to be truthful, is it, therefore, also the truth?

'Speaking truthfully' is to be in accord with the facts. But not every kind of truth-statement can be validated with respect to so-called 'objective matters', as there are many kinds of judgement that require interpretation. Consider jurisprudence or history; even given the same set of facts in respect of an historical or legal issue, there can be room for divergences of interpretation.

This is quite sensible. Where'd you get this from?

Of course it is both a fact and true that Joe believes it is not raining. He hasn't been outside recently. That's one thing. Another thing: Is it raining? If you walk out the door and see that rain is falling, then the fact that it is raining is true. Actual rain can not begin to dissolve the fact of Joe's believing it is not raining until Joe opens the door and sees that it is raining.

If he opens the door, sees that it is raining, closes the door and says it is not raining, he is wrong about the rain. But it remains a fact that he believes it is not raining.

President Donald Trump believes the crowds watching his inauguration were larger than the crowds watching President Barack Obama's inauguration. He has been apprized of the fact that his crowd was smaller. He, however still believes that his were bigger.

For President Trump, it must be true that his crowds were bigger. He says it is a fact that they were bigger. What is true and factual is that President Trump holds a mistaken belief, and that is a fact which is true.

Whether Mr. Trump is demented, obstinate, or just plain stupid, the fact is that he is President. The truthfulness of his having taken the oath of office and now lives in the white house is a fact with which it is difficult to become fully comfortable. That is a fact for people who didn't vote for Frump. For the people who did vote for Slump, it is not true that it is difficult to feel comfortable about his living in the white house, his finger poised above the little red button that will trigger the end of life as we know it. They believe that the Stump is very clever, all wise and good, and will only drop his finger on the little red button if is in the interest of making America great again. Heil Skunk.

There are two kinds of facts: things and events. Only when put into a sentence that takes the form of a judgment (with a subject and a predicate) do they become true or false.

"Can the fact that Joe believes it isn't raining outside, while it is actually raining outside be thought to be true?"

Part of my question has to do with the verification of facts? How do we know that something can be actually true, because what happens when facts contradict each other?

This is quite sensible. Where'd you get this from? — Heister Eggcart

Naturally, you are referencing my sensible post which was about to appear when you mistakenly addressed praise to Wayfarer. People are ignoring my posts again, so I have to seize whatever recognition i can.

The fact of Joe's belief doesn't contradict the fact of rain falling. What is contradictory is Joe seeing rain and continuing to believe that it is not raining.

Joe is entitled to his own beliefs, but he isn't entitled to his own facts.

A lot of epistemological positions are plagued by this matter - is there a fact of the matter whether or not facts are always true? What about that, is there a fact for that meta-fact? Where do we end?

It's not just correspondence theories of truth that suffer from this. Any theory that admits truth-like entities is going to have to deal with this apparent regress.

Where'd you get this from? — Heister Eggcart

I composed it myself X-)

Any theory that admits truth-like entities is going to have to deal with this apparent regress. — darthbarracuda

Heaven forbid. Hard enough to deal with 'alternative facts' in the current climate.

Yes, the counterargument is that 'in reality' something is the fact of the matter. Using such a terms as 'in reality' or 'actually' just shift the problem to another word, namely 'in reality' or 'actually'.

I agree with this. Facts have no truth condition. They just are. Propositions have truth conditions.

So does that make truth relativistic? One can believe something; but, it may actually* not be true.

*Notice how 'actually' keeps on popping up, whether one likes it or not.

2+2=4 is always and everywhere true. 1 gallon of H2O weighs 8 pounds always and everywhere is true here, but it wouldn't be true on Mars. So, a gallon of water weighing 8 pounds is relative to the planet on which it is being weighed. It isn't always and everywhere 8 pounds in weight.

John Keats' concluding line to An Ode on a Grecian urn...

'Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.'

sounds good but as far as I can tell, it isn't true. It depends how you define beauty and truth. As for that being all we know on earth, no -- that is not true either. It certainly isn't true that that is all we need to know. None the less, some people maintain this is all true. So Keats' truth is relative--in my book. (I have very mixed feelings about Keats. It's been a long time since I read him. I suppose I should give him a second chance.)

"Having more than one wife at a time is immoral." Some would say that is true, some would disagree.

Evidently truth is relative.

Facts are just statements that lots of people agree on - always subject to change. They may even believe that they are agreeing on the same facts but after a little discussion may learn that they don't agree. Like everything else in the universe, everything is always changing. The universe is very malleable.

Heaven forbid. Hard enough to deal with 'alternative facts' in the current climate. — Wayfarer

>:O

'It is a fact that' and 'it is true that' are synonymous, so 'a fact' means the same as 'true'. That is one sense of 'fact', facts as true statements. This is the same sense in which the encyclopedia is a compendium of facts.

The other sense is where 'fact' is thought as more akin to 'actuality'.

So 'fact' is an equivocal term. The semantic relationships between truths, facts and actualities as shown by ordinary usages are somewhat ambiguous.

There is a theory of truth called 'correspondence theory of truth'. It says that x is true if and only if x corresponds to the fact. However, many philosophers have objected to correspondence theory of truth for many reasons. Alternative positions are deflationary theory of truth, coherence theory of truth, and so on.

So does that make truth relativistic? One can believe something; but, it may actually not be true. — Question

This speaks for truth not being relative. Something is true whether you believe it or not.

And what BC sees as the relativity of truth is just the ambiguity of his example statements.

1 gallon of H2O weighs 8 pounds always and everywhere is true — Bitter Crank

But it's not, and adding the word "here" shows that you know it. On the other hand, "1 gallon of H2O weighs 8 pounds always and everywhere on Earth" is true. There is no case for the relativity of truth here, unless you just mean that a statement can turn out to be either true or false depending on how clear it is, or depending on your interpretation. Interpretations are relative, but interpretations are implicit reformulations--which is where things get interesting.

It says that x is true if and only if x corresponds to the fact. However, many philosophers have objected to correspondence theory of truth for many reasons. — quine

True! I have a collection of such objections which I have come across on forums over the years. Basically, it comes down to the fact that if a statement and some purported fact are said to correspond, then what does 'correspondence' actually mean?

According to this theory (correspondence), truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view ... seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense.

1- In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison?

2- The making of the comparison is itself a fact about which we have a belief. We have to believe that the belief about the comparison is true. How do we know that our belief in this agreement is "true"? This leads to an infinite regress, leaving us with no assurance of true belief.

Randall, J. & Buchler, J.; Philosophy: An Introduction. p133

Although it seems ... obvious to say, "Truth is correspondence of thought (belief, proposition) to what is actually the case", such an assertion nevertheless involves a metaphysical assumption - that there is a fact, object, or state of affairs, independent of our knowledge to which our knowledge corresponds.

"How, on your principles, could you know you have a true proposition?" ... or ... "How can you use your definition of truth, it being the correspondence between a judgment and its object, as a criterion of truth? How can you know when such correspondence actually holds?"

I cannot step outside my mind to compare a thought in it with something outside it.

Beck, L.W. & Holmes, R.L.; Philosophic Inquiry, p130.

Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognising it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object.

Kant, 1801. The Jasche Logic, in Lectures on Logic.

According to the American Heritage Dictionary,

Since the word fact means "a real occurrence, something demonstrated to exist or known to have existed," the phrases true facts and real facts, as in The true facts of the case may never be known, would seem to be redundant. But fact has a long history of use in the sense of "an allegation of fact" or "something that is believed to be true," [my emphasis] as in this remark by union leader Albert Shanker: "This tract was distributed to thousands of American teachers, but the facts and the reasoning are wrong." This usage has led to the notion of "incorrect facts," which causes qualms among critics who insist that facts must be true. The usages, however, are often helpful in making distinctions or adding emphasis.

This is really just a trivial semantic issue (as most of these discussions are). There are statements, there are (other) things in the world that the former allege to describe, and we might use the word "fact" (and sometimes also "truth") to refer to either these latter things or to the former (either when they actually do describe the latter or – at least in the case of "fact" as mentioned above – even when we only believe that they do).

But perhaps an interesting consideration is the following statements:

1a. It is a fact that the ball is red
1b. "the ball is red" is a fact
1c. The red ball is a fact

2a. It is true that the ball is red
2b. "the ball is red" is true
2c. The red ball is true

3a. It is a truth that the ball is red
3b. "the ball is red" is a truth
3c. The red ball is a truth

Do they all make sense?

So, are facts always true? — Question

Only if you assume that to be is also to be true.

And what are 'facts' exactly? — Question

States of affairs.

Can the fact that Joe believes it isn't raining outside, while it is actually raining outside be thought to be true? — Question

The truth of the two facts is independent from each other. The fact that Joe believes so and so is referring to what his beliefs are. The fact that it is raining outside is referring to what the states of affairs outside are. So yes, surprise surprise, but Joe could actually have wrong beliefs >:O

It is impossible to separate an observation from the observation. It cannot be done. Without the observer there is no memory of the event from which the so-called fact emerges. It is only when many concur, often by repetitive education or indoctrination, does some observation begin to emerge as some general agreement that it is a fact. For example, people turn to a reference book for "facts". That is how facts emerge in a population.

Nothing wrong with general agreement within a population as long as everyone understands that these agreements tend to change over time and writhin different populations. Everyone is educated differently.

Yes, I think you can say that facts are always true. Determining what are the facts is not such a trivial matter in science, and politically at least here in US.

The new administration wants us to believe "alternate facts", that climate change is a myth, that twice the number of people showed up for his administration as reported....the ideological rendering of events... He has ordered all Federal agencies under the executive branch to stop communication with media. He wants all information to be channeled through his command structure.

Trump's press secretary suggested yesterday that Trump is a conspiracy theorist. He is an example of a person who can brush aside demonstrable facts for what he believes and many actually accept his view.

So I guess, at least in politics we need to ask, whose facts.

Facts are just pieces of data that may (or may not be) relevant, however they are not the 'truth'.

Facts' are neither true nor false - statements or propositions are true or false. — Wayfarer

^ This.

(And something else I agree with Wayfarer on.)

There are two kinds of facts: things and events. — Thorongil

Not two different "kinds" in my view: Things are events

If you walk out the door and see that rain is falling, then the fact that it is raining is true. — Bitter Crank

Rather, "If you walk out the door and see that rain is falling, then along with Joe, you'd believe that it's raining, and along with Joe, you'd assign 'T' to 'It is raining.'"

He has been apprized of the fact that his crowd was smaller. He, however still believes that his were bigger. — Bitter Crank

Or, other people have said that they believe that the crowds were smaller, and other people instead assign "T" to "The crowds were smaller, not larger."

We can't escape the fact that no matter what, we're talking about beliefs that we have, things we assign "T" (or "F" or whatever) to.

For President Trump, it must be true that his crowds were bigger. He says it is a fact that they were bigger. What is true and factual is that President Trump holds a mistaken belief, and that is a fact which is true. — Bitter Crank

And for other folks, "it must be true that the crowds were smaller; they say it is a fact that they were smaller." And Trump would say, "What is true and factual is that other people hold a mistaken belief."

Again, it's not the case that some folks only have beliefs and things they assign "T" to whereas other folks aren't operating from beliefs and things that they assign "T" to. That's what everyone is doing, and it's all we can do. We can't escape that fact anymore than we can outrun our shadows.

Part of my question has to do with the verification of facts? How do we know that something can be actually true, because what happens when facts contradict each other? — Question

What you'd be verifying is a claim or a belief, not a fact. Facts do not need verification. They are what they are regardless. "Actually true" is a category error, because it suggests something being true outside of a person judging that it's true. The category error typically arises because people conflate truth and facts. And facts can't contradict each other.

What is contradictory is Joe seeing rain and continuing to believe that it is not raining. — Bitter Crank

That's not clearly contradictory either. In order to have a contradiction, you need something like, "Joe believes that it is raining and Joe believes that it is not raining" (where we're not equivocating re what's being referred to on either side of the conjunction). I say not clearly contradictory, though, because it depends on just what we're talking about when we say that "Joe sees rain." Did Joe say that he saw rain? Or is someone else saying that?


.

So does that make truth relativistic? — Question

Yes. Truth is relative to individuals, who are the persons making the judgments about how propositions relate to facts, or other propositions, or what's useful, etc. (depending on the truth theory they employ).

Facts are relative, too, by the way, in their case, to reference points, for example.

'It is a fact that' and 'it is true that' are synonymous — John

Only colloquially, where someone doesn't understand the standard distinction between facts and truth values.

If we're going to endorse colloquial conventions in that way, then we'd better also limit our metaphysics talk to parapsychology topics.