But the so-called material world that we actually inhabit is shot-through with meaning, information, none of which is itself material. — Pantagruel

Physically rearranging a configuration of wooden blocks from a straight line to a ring is changing the information stored in that system of blocks without changing any block in its own reference frame. But the state of the block has changed in any fixed frame (position being part of something's state). Each block -- that is, each material constituent of the system -- has changed.

But this is why I prefer to think of things in terms of the "physical" rather than the "material". There seems less ambiguity about whether we're speaking of the inate properties of a thing (which define what that thing is) or the state of the thing.

Everything material must ultimately be mental, since we live inside our minds, and the world we interact with must therefore also be "in here" with us. — Echarmion

Everything material that we experience must have some mental correlate. It doesn't follow that in order for a thing to materially exist, there must be a mental thing to experience it.

The other question is whether in order for a thing to experience anything, must it have a materialist existence. If the answer is Yes, then we're firmly pointed toward the material as having primacy (since an inexperienced material thing is not ruled out while an immaterial experiencer is). If No, then we're looking at dualism.

The likely answer depends heavily on how seriously you take empirical evidence over beliefs. If you believe immaterial consciousnesses exist, and the empirical evidence for the physical basis of consciousness doesn't move you, either dualism is true or material existence is false. If you take seriously the evidence that mental processes are physical, then either you need two qualitatively different ways of making a mind (material and immaterial) or else materialism is likely true.

Physically rearranging a configuration of wooden blocks from a straight line to a ring is changing the information stored in that system of blocks without changing any block in its own reference frame. But the state of the block has changed in any fixed frame (position being part of something's state). Each block -- that is, each material constituent of the system -- has changed. — Kenosha Kid

True. But what renders a certain configuration as "informational" is something external to the configuration itself. Signs are arbitrary.The information content transcends mere physical state. Even if you are talking about physical entropy, some states may be more "improbable" than others, but that is a long way from containing meaningful information.

Everything material that we experience must have some mental correlate. It doesn't follow that in order for a thing to materially exist, there must be a mental thing to experience it. — Kenosha Kid

No, I didn't mean to say that it does. But "experience" itself is already the mental correlate. All experience is mental experience, and does not ever turn into anything but a mental phenomenon.

The other question is whether in order for a thing to experience anything, must it have a materialist existence. If the answer is Yes, then we're firmly pointed toward the material as having primacy (since an inexperienced material thing is not ruled out while an immaterial experiencer is). If No, then we're looking at dualism. — Kenosha Kid

And that's why I was saying there seem to be two contradictory statements which both seem obviously and necessarily true. I did not mean to imply that there are no solutions to this problem, only that it seems at the heart of the philosophical problem.

The likely answer depends heavily on how seriously you take empirical evidence over beliefs. If you believe immaterial consciousnesses exist, and the empirical evidence for the physical basis of consciousness doesn't move you, either dualism is true or material existence is false. If you take seriously the evidence that mental processes are physical, then either you need two qualitatively different ways of making a mind (material and immaterial) or else materialism is likely true. — Kenosha Kid

Sure, I get what you're saying. But I feel like the best way to resolve the dilemma is a compatibilist one. I consider my experience as if it was a true representation of a material world, but at the same time I take seriously my own experience of myself as an acting subject.

Edit: And I should perhaps add that the reason I take these stances is that I consider them pragmatic necessities, which is to say adopting other stances is theoretically possible, but leads to performative contradictions.

True. But what renders a certain configuration as "informational" is something external to the configuration itself. — Pantagruel

I don't think I'd agree with that. I think a more modern take has information physically encoded irrespective of its meaning, that is it is useful to talk about information passed from one system to another without an interpreter. Meaning is the interpretation of information (straight line, ring). I think perhaps this is just a difference of terminology.

Even if you are talking about physical entropy, some states may be more "improbable" than others, but that is a long way from containing meaningful information. — Pantagruel

That is true, entropy alone does not tell you anything about the probability of the state, which reinforces the point that information (number of microstates explored) is distinct from meaning (probability).

No, I didn't mean to say that it does. — Echarmion

I didn't think you did, I was just jumping on for clarity and an excuse to weigh in :) I generally find little to disagree with in your posts. (Really enjoyed your conversation with Isaac btw.)

And that's why I was saying there seem to be two contradictory statements which both seem obviously and necessarily true. I did not mean to imply that there are no solutions to this problem, only that it seems at the heart of the philosophical problem. — Echarmion

For sure.

Sure, I get what you're saying. But I feel like the best way to resolve the dilemma is a compatibilist one. I consider my experience as if it was a true representation of a material world, but at the same time I take seriously my own experience of myself as an acting subject. — Echarmion

Ah, here we may diverge. My evaluation is almost the opposite. The mind seems to me pretty excellent at interpreting everyday sort of phenomena but exceedingly poor when it comes to less localised scopes of enquiry. Philosophy and science naturally lead us away from the everyday and toward what for the mind is quite abstract (and we want to go there). Understanding how the brain and mind work is one of those areas where inevitably we can't rely on everyday reasoning, since we're reasoning about the thing that does everyday reasoning. It's a Plato's cave kind of deal. At some point we have to get behind the capacities with which nature blessed us in order to understand those capacities. An example of where the brain falls short is in comprehending the counter-intuitiveness of quantum theory, for instance. The usual advice is to stop thinking about it and follow the maths and the evidence.

I was interested in your specific point about the way in which you use you say that you prefer the word physical to the word material. At the time when I wrote this post I chose the word material and I think that I was thinking primarily about what is the underlying basis behind existence. So, having reflected and the way in which material possibly is more ambiguous, do you think my question would have been of a different nature, from your point of view if it it has been posed as is the physical world the absolute reality?

So, having reflected and the way in which material possibly is more ambiguous, do you think my question would have been of a different nature, from your point of view if it it has been posed as is the physical world the absolute reality? — Jack Cummins

From the materialist point of view, no, there's not really any difference. Things like energy, space, information are considered part of the material universe. It's just that sometimes you see people use the word in the more traditional sense, which these days equates to massive matter, excluding other ideas of 'state, like position, momentum, etc.

How does this weigh in on the issue of real vs unreal? Well, if one subscribes to some variation of rationalism, ideas, whatever they may be, are real, as real as the apples Kant may have partaken of during one of his meals. If so, everything would be real. — TheMadFool

At least as regards ordinary language use, a dream (which is intra-personal), a language (which is interpersonal), and a physical apple (which is objective) can each be real, but in qualitatively different manners.

“Did you really dream that?” “Yes, that was a real dream I had [and not me telling you a fib]” Though more awkwardly, the same can be expressed of most any idea: “Is that your real idea of a fun time (or: of what a tree looks like), or are trying to pull my leg?”

Even when interpreting most everything to hold the potential to be real - i.e., to be actually occurring, rather than being fictitious - the type of reality implicitly referenced will often significantly differ. Thereby leading into considerations of different reality types: e.g. strictly personal realities (e.g. dreams), interpersonal realities (e.g. cultures), the empirically objective reality (physicality), and, maybe, a singular metaphysical reality (this being where the notion of God or related notions would fit it).

Then again, we implicitly most often address reality as that which is strictly objectively real. This is where we tell ourselves or others that a nightmare was not real. But here, no such thing as real ideas or real languages can occur.

At least as regards ordinary language use, a dream (which is intra-personal), a language (which is interpersonal), and a physical apple (which is objective) can each be real, but in qualitatively different manners. — javra

I suppose we could like at all such experiences, from wet dreams to cold mountain streams, as real in their own way. However, the domains of the mind and physical reality seem not to coincide perfectly. When we have a nightmare of being run over by a vehicle, the fear is as real as being run over by a real vehicle . However you don't get cuts and bruises if it was just a dream. It looks like the mind inhabits a world of its own, quite different from the world of the physical and there are regions of overlap between the two but some experiences are exclusively mental or exclusively physical.

I'm saying that the physical domain lacks instrinsic reality. Put another way: the reality it has is imputed to it, or imposed on it, by the observer. There is nothing in it which is fundamental or self-existent, every phenomenon is dependent on causes and conditions and composed of parts. So it can't possess absolute reality. (That is basically the Buddhist philosophy of śūnyatā, but I believe it conforms with what science has discovered also.)

I agree, because the more I have thought about the nature of reality over the weekend, I come to the conclusion that Eastern philosophy has probably a more synthetic understanding. The split between mind and matter, seems to permeate most viewpoints within Western philosophy,

The question is too large for me to provide a proportional response so I will just make two observations.

In De Anima, Aristotle related being alive to varying capacities to have other things be present to the one who perceives. The range from the limited world of touch to the highest possible capacity of intelligence was related to having what is present becoming actually what was being encountered. There have been many who marked this approach as a break from Plato but I am not convinced. The dialogues that discuss the nuts and bolts of perception don't question the status of actual beings.
Another element in De Anima is the recognition that how one is permitted to have this experience is invisible. It is the withdrawal from experience of the operation as an operation that permits one to perceive the other as other. The bug in the program being reported by others is seen by Aristotle to be a feature.

One of the qualities I appreciate Nietzsche bringing into view is the contrast between Hume and Kant in terms of what they were concerned about. When Hume questioned the limits of what could be said to cause what, he didn't want everybody to run about in a panic that such skepticism meant the end of talking about experience altogether. Hume went on to lay wagers on his billiard games with perfect equanimity.

Yes, I do see that the question I have raised is rather large. I was thinking how it is central to all philosophy and that is why I raised it. But as I read the various angles I felt my head exploding.

I even downloaded a book called 'The Deception of Materialistic Western Philosophy', by Julian Hamer. The font was so small on my Kindle( and enlarging it was not very helpful as I couldn't read a whole sentence properly) and I got a headache.The gist of the book, as much as I read, was that Western philosophy has reduced thinking to science. It suggested that a return to archaic ways of seeing was not helpful, but it did not seem to give a clear alternative in the conclusion.

Another person pointed to the importance of Greek philosophy, so I do plan to go further with that direction of thinking. I did read Hume at one point, but I had not thought of him directly in relation to this area of thought. I do believe that Kant's thinking is also important, but I have to admit I got a bit stuck as to whether Kant sees the transcendent as actually underlying the empirical order.

At this stage, I have not seen a really convincing argument beyond that of the Eastern thinkers, but that doesn't mean that does not mean that I am about to abandon the Western tradition of philosophy. I guess that I just plunged into deep water and have to learn to swim, because the question I have raised is very complex indeed.

The whole thing is pretty darn enormous.
For myself, I am not interested in making the different parts I have worked upon for my own purposes be drawn into a kind of map anyone could use. Earlier versions of myself did do that but my change of view is not a judgement upon myself or anybody else. That would be another map. And saying it that way is also another map. I follow Zhuangzi on this point.
Your results will vary. Scholarship saved my life. I will never betray it.

I created a thread as if it would involve some deep discussion over the weekend. In actual fact, I have probably created a topic that it would take a whole life to answer in any depth. But, it will keep me busy, and I am probably my own worst philosophical enemy in raising the question.

Don't withdraw from your enterprise because others say this or that. Keep going.

Thank you, I will keep reading and thinking it through because I do see it as an important recurrent philosophical issue.

Pick a lane. Is it your issue or one we all have to pay attention to as the result of your results?

Yes, it is a good question whether it is my own question or one of our time. I am going to bed now as it is after 1am but if you or anyone else is interested I think that Kant and Descartes are essential for thinking about this. That is because they have been so central to the development of Western philosophy, but I am sure that this is only a starting point.

The implication is that the mind can survive beyond death as an independent entity in its own right. — Jack Cummins

If we take into account the statement that "philosophically, something must exist after death" without considering the existence of egoism, it is possible to say that yes, something must exist after death in order for existence to continue to be witnessed and "Being" continue to be, for existence needs something or someone to witness it constantly so that it can be.

However, if the concept of egoism is applied to that same thought, consciousness - or mind, as you refer - can indeed have a finite existence thanks to the eternalization of individuality through the ego, - such as, for example, the legacy - even if it be it for some finite time, the influences, therefore, its essence, still endure indefinitely - - and therefore, cease to be.

I affirm: - Many of the issues discussed here will never come to a conclusion if the concept of egoism is not applied to them.

I will have a think about how egoism fits into the picture overnight. It is way of thinking outside of the box of dualism.

I don't think the material world exists. Here's an argument for that:

1. Material objects are, by their very nature, infinitely divisible
2. Nothing that exists is infinitely divisible
3. Therefore material objects do not exist

1 is obviously true. Any material object occupies some space, and any region of space can be divided.

2 is self-evident to reason, at least upon reflection. For if something is divisible then it has parts - those into which it can be divided. And so an infinitely divisible thing will have infinite parts. But there cannot exist any actual infinities. That's precisely why we reject views that generate infinite regresses.

3 just follows as a matter of logic.

Another argument against materialism, this time by George Berkeley.

Let's start by just clarifying what we mean by 'material world'. We mean a world that exists 'objectively'. That is, a world that is not made of mental states - a world that exists outside all minds, then.

What evidence do we have of the existence of such a place? Well, most people are going to appeal to their sensations. That is, they take the 'material world' to be the place that their senses are telling them about.

However, argues Berkeley, the 'sensible world' and the 'material world' cannot be the same place. For the sensible world - the world of shapes, colours, smells, tastes, textures and so on - must resemble our sensations, for otherwise in what sense would they be telling us about it? (they do not have to resemble it perfectly, of course; but they do need to resemble it in some sense)

Yet sensations can only resemble sensations. Smells are like smells and not another thing; tastes are like tastes and not another thing; and so on. So, the sensible world that our sensations give us some insight into must itself be made of sensations.

But sensations are essentially sensed. That is, they exist 'as' states of mind. And so the sensible world - the world that our sensations give us some awareness of - must exist as the states of a mind. Not my mind or your mind - for the world is clearly not a creature of our wills - but the mind whose sensations they are.

Thus, our sensations give us evidence for the existence of a sensible world, but a sensible world is not a material world.

It seems, then, that we have no empirical evidence that the material world exists. That doesn't entail its non existence. However, now that we can see that the material world is not the world our sensations tell us about, it is hard to attach any meaning to the term 'material world'. That is, it looks as if it is an empty idea.

You escape that dualism by being aware that in saying "mental reality precedes physical reality", you aren't stipulating that the mental and the physical are somehow opposites. Unless you believe they are opposites, though I'm not sure why this should be the case.

I understand your point about our epistemology being mental. But if the mental isn't also physical, then I don't see how you can escape idealism, unless you defend dualism. If you defend idealism, then that's fine.

"Real" is an honorific term. If I say this is the "real truth" or the "read deal", I shouldn't be understood as saying that there are two kinds of truth or two kinds of deals, I'm only emphasizing my statement.

We no longer know what bodies are, we used to think we knew what they were back in Descartes' time, but now we don't. The materialism of those times was mechanistic. The only viable alternative to that would be something like Galen Strawson's "Real Materialism" the idea that everything is physical. And we use the term out of convince because we want to talk about the world "out there" as well as the mind.

Bodies were taken to be mechanistic entities that worked by direct contact: one object directly affects another object and so on. It's the way we intuitively understand the world, but it is literally false, the world doesn't work this way. Newton proved it and he could not believe that "bodies" weren't "physical" in the sense of working by direct contact, he said that:

"It is inconceivable, that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else, which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact... [This] is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it."

Now the terms physical or mental are vague terms used to highlight features of certain aspects of reality, without a sharp distinction being made as if they were polar opposites. I think it makes more sense to say that everything is physical, and that the mental is part of physical reality. If you prefer to invert that and say that everything is mental, then you have the extra burden of trying to show that a world absent people (a mind-independent world) exists at all.

It looks like the mind inhabits a world of its own, quite different from the world of the physical and there are regions of overlap between the two but some experiences are exclusively mental or exclusively physical. — TheMadFool

Seems like the Cartesian dualism approach, which isn't to my tastes. To each their own, though. What is an exclusively physical experience? I read it as affirming a non-mental experience - which to me is a contradictory affirmation.

I have wondered at times if the physical world is illusory, as 'maya', described by the Hindus. If anything, it sometimes seems like we are suspended between the opposites of the dense matter. On a few occasions, I experimented with psychedelic substances and this did lead me to question the view that the physical world is the most absolute reality.

In particular, when I was amidst a crowd of people on the dance floor, I had the sensation that I was able to walk through other people's physical bodies as if I was beyond the physical world. I also looked in a mirror and, based on what I had read in others' accounts, expected to see myself as a monster of some kind. What I saw was all my surroundings in the mirror and I was just not there at all, but invisible. It was as if I had left my body completely.

Of course, many people would say, 'Well, you were on drugs", but it did make me perceive reality a bit differently. But, since then, I have worked with people who are psychotic and don't see my experience at face value, but I do feel that I did access an altered state of consciousness, and I have experienced some less intense altered states naturally too. I am not convinced that the physical world is unreal but I do have a certain amount of an openmindedness to thinking about the idealist viewpoint, but want to be careful to avoid philosophical delusion. I do wonder if there are different frequencies ranging from the material to the invisible.

I can say your understanding of the philosophy of egoism to the consideration of the way in which we experience the ego. Even though I have sympathy with Hinduism and Buddhism, I do believe one of the problems of Eastern philosophy, as well as Western forms of religion, is that the ego is underplayed. This is especially true when people think that they are overcome the needs, including the instincts.

Even though I do meditate, using a mixture of methods, including some mindfulness techniques, I do not believe that it's helpful to think in terms of overcoming the ego. I do believe that many people think that they can switch off the ego, but I would say that they are probably deluding themselves.

I would also say that it is at the level of the ego that we experience the way in which mind and body are interconnected in an intricate way. The perspective of ego is one which cannot split the two apart. The physical needs are combined with goals and aspects of social and cultural ones.

It does all come down to perspective and in this respect I bring in the ideas of Nietzsche, who has influenced the development of your own ideas on egoism. During the weekend, I was reading a book called 'Knowledge From a Human Point of View' , by Ana-Maria Cretu, which has a chapter , 'Nietzsche's Epistemic Perspectivism', by Stephen D. Hales. In this, the author includes Nietzsche's emphasis on the role of instincts and pleasure. Also, he describes how Kant and Plato can be seen as placing an emphasis on 'otherworldliness' and,
'Instead of absolute truths and partially objective knowledge of a supra-empirical world, Nietzsche offers a vision of partial, fragmentary, perspectival knowledge.'

I think that this reminds us of our limited human view. Personally, I'm inclined to think that there are higher states of consciousness which we can access, but at the same time do believe that the perspective of realising and affirming the needs of the ego is essential too. I see this as being an important aspect of self awareness.

I would say that I do think that you are correct to physical and mental are vague terms used to highlight features of certain aspects of reality'. This is going beyond the dichotomy of dualism and in the process previous to this, I have been reflecting on the idea of the perspective of the ego, in response to@Gus Lamarchs philosophy of egoism.

As I have been writing today, the thought that I am having is of the way in which consciousness oscillates between the physical and the mental, with the ego spanning the space between, incorporating the fuzzy areas including instincts and emotions. One possible way of seeing through the apparent philosophical problem is to see the physical and mental as a continuum which we can access in our experiences.

I do agree with you in wishing to go beyond the position of Cartesian dualism, as well as the division between the material and the physical and non material realms. At the time of writing I am thinking that perhaps it is better to see these as two poles on a continuum. Of course, my view may alter a bit but, certainly I do think the idea of a continuum works better than dualism.