But maybe neurons are more than physical. Physical being an abstract description of them.

But maybe neurons are more than physical. Physical being an abstract description of them. — Marchesk

What does "more than physical" mean, though? Does it mean "spiritual" or "ghostly" or "transcendent"? I put those in scare quotes because it's not clear what they mean, what they are pointing to; they seem to be terms without a referent.

Does it mean "spiritual" or "ghostly" or "transcendent"? — Janus

No, it means the natural world is more than the abstract stuff we model it with. Object Oriented Ontology would be another example. So would Aristotle's view of Platonism.

No, it means the natural world is more than the abstract stuff we model it with. Object Oriented Ontology would be another example. So would Aristotle's view of Platonism. — Marchesk

I don't think physicalism claims that the physical is abstract. Of course it is modeled in abstract terms, obviously it must be, since all our concepts are abstract. As I read it, OOO is an attempt to eliminate idealism and restore the idea of the real physical world, so I'm confused by that reference.

OOO is a form of speculative realism where relations exist between all things, not just correlated to humans, and those relations always distort the objects being related. So the objects themselves are more than the relations.

You could fit that on top of physicalism, but it sounds like it's adding something more to things. Might be read as a form of essentialism.

I don't think physicalism claims that the physical is abstract. — Janus

It doesn't. But our saying the world is physical is reifying the abstract models (largely mathematical) we have and saying the world is that structure in some sense. For example, Sean Caroll says the wavefunction is a true description of reality, therefore the Many Worlds Interpretation is true. As opposed to it being a useful model.

In those cases [psycho-somatic] a psychological (mental) cause has a bodily (physical) effect.
— Wayfarer

If what you call "psychological causes" are themselves physical, neuronal processes then your argument fails, and the mystery (or at least the one you're promoting) dissolves. In other words, your argument assumes what it purports to demonstrate. — Janus

No, it doesn’t. The demarcation between physical and mental is obviously a very slippery question, but the placebo effect is well documented. If a patient is given an actual medicine, then that has a physical effect - such as an antibiotic that kills bacterial infection. But if they’re given a placebo, then there is no effectively physical substance. The effect then is purely due to the patient’s belief or expectation of a cure.

Sure, there’s controversy over the efficacy of placebos, but their efficacy is nevertheless established, and it’s an anomaly from a strictly physicalist viewpoint. In other words, if physicalism were true then they ought not to work.

It doesn't. But our saying the world is physical is reifying the abstract models (largely mathematical) we have and saying the world is that structure in some sense. — Marchesk

If the believe world is intelligible and our models are modeling anything real, then why should we not think they reflect the structure of the world "in some sense"?

The effect then is purely due to the patient’s belief or expectation of a cure. — Wayfarer

If the patient's belief is a neuronal process or pattern, which causes physical effects in the body, then where is the mystery, beyond the fact that we haven't fully understood those unimaginably complex physical processes?

....where is the mystery, beyond the fact... — Janus

Now who's begging the question?

One thing I will point out is that whilst the cellular and metabolic processes are amazingly complex, the patient - the subject - is simple. Placebos work, apparently, because patients believe they do. If they stop believing it, then they don’t. Even though the mechanics are complex, the psychology is simple.

It appeared to be what you had written. — Wayfarer

I gave a familiar example. I did not generalise from it in the way you claim.

Physicalism and empiricism are different principles. — Wayfarer

Yes. There's no contradiction there. Empiricism doesn't necessitate physicalism.

Besides there are vast areas of conjecture in current physics which are beyond empircal verification in principle, such as the multiverse conjecture and string theory. — Wayfarer

Yes, and these are frequently cited as unscientific for that reason. String theory might yet yield predictions, although it's not looking good. Multiverses could perhaps be inferred, but I doubt it.

Patients get sick, and are also sometimes cured, by what they believe. Placebos have a measurable affect on patients, even though they're physically inert. In those cases a psychological (mental) cause has a bodily (physical) effect. — Wayfarer

In the second case, the belief has an obvious physical cause. One could postulate, as in my description, that a non-physical mind might have such properties that they couple with physical properties such that it might be tricked by physical events into that belief. And further that it has additional non-physical properties such that that belief can be the non-physical cause of physical effects leading to healing. One again arrives at the problem: we have a supposedly non-physical thing indirectly observed through its physical effects and its physical causes, just like a physical thing. What distinguishes it as non-physical, other than sheer insistence?

. One again arrives at the problem: we have a supposedly non-physical thing indirectly observed through its physical effects and its physical causes, just like a physical thing. What distinguishes it as non-physical, other than sheer insistence? — Kenosha Kid

I can pack and ship penicillin, whereas beliefs can only be imparted by persuasion or impression or something of that kind. And the placebo is only considered an anomaly in medicine because of its apparently non-physical nature.

One again arrives at the problem: we have a supposedly non-physical thing indirectly observed through its physical effects and its physical causes, just like a physical thing. What distinguishes it as non-physical, other than sheer insistence? — Kenosha Kid

The insistence by physicalists, that the supposed non-physical thing is imaginary, is what distinguishes it as non-physical. The supposed thing is incompatible with physicalism, therefore it is non-physical. Take God for example, indirectly observed through His effects (physical existence), yet claimed to be imaginary by physicalists, and so He is necessarily non-physical. By refusing to accept the reality of the supposed non-physical thing, the physicalists force it into the category of non-physical, as incompatible with physicalism.

And the placebo is only considered an anomaly in medicine because of its apparently non-physical nature. — Wayfarer

It doesn't have an apparently non-physical nature. It has an apparently physical one according to the definition of 'physical' in this context. What we have instead is a rigid and irrational *belief* that it is non-physical.

That sure cuts both ways.

Sure, and applies to everything. Everything behaves in this way: it couples to physical properties and is directly or indirectly observable. And since this meets the criteria of the physical, everything is physical, and nothing is non-physical. That is why the postulate of a non-physical thing or property is absurd.

It might be a different story if those who believe in non-physical things could describe them better, explain how we can know they exist, how they can enter into causal chains, etc. But I imagine this would yield the same absurdity: they would find themselves talking about physical things but arbitrarily and incorrectly calling them non-physical.

So what do you think consciousness is? If it's physical, how so? In an emergent sort of way? A non-reductive kind of physical?

That is why the postulate of a non-physical thing or property is absurd. — Kenosha Kid

Which is why psycho-somatic effects ought not to exist. Yet, they do.

If it's physical, how so? — Marchesk

It is physical in the same way everything else is: it can be observed directly or indirectly, and its properties couple to the physical properties of other things. A red ball rolls into my field of vision, and I am conscious of it. I hear someone call my name behind me, and I choose to turn around. What I can't do is put it under a microscope and study it, but that's also true of quarks, Higgs bosons, energy, entropy, spacetime curvature, etc. That's why the claim of non-physical consciousness is both absurd and unjustifiable. It's really a statement about _taste_.

Which is why psycho-somatic effects ought not to exist. — Wayfarer

This is not logically sound. This statement is based on the contradictory premises that there are no non-physical things and that psycho-somatic effects are non-physical. If you take the former seriously, the latter is ruled out and there is no contradiction. And vice versa, of course, although that has its own problems as I described above.

Regarding psychosomatic effects, it's perfectly ordinary for mental states to cause physical states: me changing my attention to a closer or further object can cause my eyes to dilate just as much as drugs could. Fear can cause my heart rate and blood pressure to increase. So it is not at all surprising that mental states of belief should effect physical states of the body in a psychosomatic way too.

All that is evidence for the mind being a physical phenomenon, not to the contrary.

All that is evidence for the mind being a physical phenomenon, not to the contrary. — Pfhorrest

Either that, or it's evidence for the fact that humans are not purely physical beings, but that ideas and impressions, which are mental in nature, can have, in the case of humans, physical effects, which they wouldn't have in the case of inanimate objects or dumb animals.

This is not logically sound. — Kenosha Kid

All we're dealing with is your refusal to believe that there are non-physical effects or things. Because you refuse to believe it, then you must interpret any evidence accordingly. When humans are affected by ideas or beliefs, or they fall ill due to something they believe or think, then the causes aren't physical. If a person ingests a substance or gets hit with something, or is poisoned, there is a physical cause. But there are psycho-somatic illnesses, just as there are psycho-somatic cures, such as the placebo affect. In those cases, the causes are psychological, not physical. All we're discussing here, is that your physicalist framework can't accomodate that, so you must insist it can't be real.

The reason I mentioned psycho-somatic effects, is because there is evidence for them, whereas there's not for more exotic claims, like psycho-kinesis.

All we're dealing with is your refusal to believe that there are non-physical effects or things. — Wayfarer

I didn't read past this first sentence. I have explained my reasoning as to why non-physical things are either contradictory or meaningless (the basis of my belief that non-physical things do not exist) multiple times, rather than just described my beliefs as you do (e.g. that psycho-somatic effects are non-physical, for which you provide no explanation). I anticipated pushback with more argument behind it, but that's not what's happening here. If you're sticking to the approach of repeatedly misrepresenting my position, which you've done four times in as many posts now, then I'm satisfied that said pushback is going to come from elsewhere if at all. I see no worth in repeatedly denying positions or approaches that I haven't taken.

I didn't read past this first sentence. — Kenosha Kid

I did.

I have explained my reasoning as to why non-physical things are either contradictory or meaningless — Kenosha Kid

If you are right, what does it mean to talk of 'physical things', as distinct from just 'things'? It seems to me that for 'physical' to have meaning, it must distinguish itself from something -'mental' or 'theoretical', or 'abstract'. I like to get my ducks in a row. Ordinary physical ducks, three of them, as is traditional. So here they are in a row:

duck duck duck.

Now granting that the ducks are physical, is the row physical? Do I have 4 physical things - 3 ducks and a row? Or 3 physical things - the ducks in a non-physical row?

Now granting that the ducks are physical, is the row physical? Do I have 4 physical things - 3 ducks and a row? Or 3 physical things - the ducks in a non-physical row? — unenlightened

That's a nice easy one. If the row of ducks was a row plus three ducks, then if I remove each duck one by one I should be left with just the row, right? ;)

A row of ducks is a physical thing comprised of other physical things, in the same way you are comprised of cells, cells are comprised of atoms, and atoms are comprised of electrons, protons and neutrons. A hydrogen atom is not an atom plus a proton plus a neutron. That would be double counting a system and its constituents.

What happens if I add a duck? Is it a row of ducks plus a duck, or just a larger row of ducks? Well, what happens if I add a proton to a lithium atom? Is it still an atom? Yes: it is a system of electrons protons and neutrons, which we call atoms. Is it still a lithium atom? No. Why? Because we call atoms with three protons lithium and those with four protons beryllium. So a row of three ducks plus a duck is a different row of ducks.

What do we lose if we use a term without the metphysical baggage of physical in the name. Call it verificationism. Or justificationism. The category of what can be considered physical has been shifting in not only members by the qualities of members. If something is considered real by science then it is called physical even if it is not like anything else that was considered physical before. We could just eliminate what is at best now a metaphor and a misleading one. And then work with the same epistemology. I don't think the word has helped, but the methodologies have been very productive.

Sure, and applies to everything. Everything behaves in this way: it couples to physical properties and is directly or indirectly observable. And since this meets the criteria of the physical, everything is physical, and nothing is non-physical. That is why the postulate of a non-physical thing or property is absurd. — Kenosha Kid

Physical has been an expanding category for a long time. The things that are considered physical are really just the members of what is considered real, regardless of properties. The best case, it seems to me, is the one you are making where if it affects something physical than it is physical. Which ends up, it seems to me replacing properties with relations. That's fine, but then we are using a word with metaphysical property baggage when we are really referring to relations. And it's not just the exotic things like quarks that are exotic since everything is made up of exotic stuff that is not physical in the way we used the word about things like rocks and chairs and as opposed to spiritual or ideal. The problem I have with the word physical it is looks like it is taking a metaphysical stand when it isn't. Further we must assume that all that matters is the impingement on things that we already consider physical (despite whatever we my have found out about their make-up). Which ends up for me circular. Stuff impinges on other stuff. Fine. But real seems more appropriate. If we decide something is real it impinges or affects something else real. Calling this physical sounds like we are taking a stand against other substances. We're not. We are really taking a stand against Rationalism or some other epistemology. Or the idea of knowing purely transcendent stuff.

If you are right, what does it mean to talk of 'physical things', as distinct from just 'things'? — unenlightened

Ultimately it doesn’t mean anything different, because the supposed difference in kinds of things is a false assumption.

But this applies equally to any kind of monism, or any case of claiming that for all x, x is F. What does “F” mean if it applies equally to everything? Are we completely unable to make any universal claims without thereby rendering them meaningless?

But real seems more appropriate. — Coben

To my mind real and physical are as natural synonyms as moral and ethical. One is for description and the other for prescription. (And fun fact: “nature” and “nurture” share the same etymological relationship as “physical” and “ethical” too).

A row of ducks is a physical thing comprised of other physical things, — Kenosha Kid

Cool. I think we agree thus far. Stuff and structure. Rows are always rows of somethings, and thus physical, but they are nothing other than the somethings in a particular arrangement.

duck duck
duck

A non-row of ducks.

So a physical architect's brain and hand produces plans for a house, and the plans are physical, but there is no house. A natural way of talking would be to say that the builders will realise the architect's plans when they build the house that is imagined. And thus we arrive at, as it were, map and territory. real and imagined, physical and mental. Now if you want to deny the sense of all these virtual existences, then it seems to me that you are trying to police a strained and convoluted language to no good purpose. 'Everything is physical' becomes as vacuous as the mystic's 'all is one'.

What do we lose if we use a term without the metphysical baggage of physical in the name. Call it verificationism. Or justificationism. The category of what can be considered physical has been shifting in not only members by the qualities of members. If something is considered real by science then it is called physical even if it is not like anything else that was considered physical before. We could just eliminate what is at best now a metaphor and a misleading one. And then work with the same epistemology. I don't think the word has helped, but the methodologies have been very productive. — Coben

I'd be fine with that. The whole idea of reducing all of reality to a single substance has been somewhat of a misguided quest in philosophy no doubt. In fact, I totally agree with what you wrote in response to another post:

We are really taking a stand against Rationalism or some other epistemology. Or the idea of knowing purely transcendent stuff. — Coben

The last thing I would want to do is make blanket metaphysical statements about the whole of reality. It's more about a method indeed, about the value of testing your ideas against the world.