The "parts" and "wholes" are comparisons of views, or a comparison of measuring scales, like comparing millimeters to light-years and nano-seconds to centuries. Each of these measurements "make up" the larger scales, but those smaller measurements just aren't useful on such large scales, and vice versa. So I would reject your use of "fundamental" and instead say that there are certain scales that are useful, depending on what purpose we are trying to achieve. — Harry Hindu

We may be in agreement here, and differ only in semantics. Atomic theory is fundamental to the understanding of molecules. Quantum theory is fundamental to the study of atoms. What is fundamental is what is the directly prior set of rules and causality that arise to the current focus of study. What is fundamental to consciousness is the functioning of the brain.

I think you misunderstood. Brains are not molecular-sized objects. Neurons are. And neurons are made up of atoms, which are made up of quarks. A brain is a part of an organism. Organisms are part of a social group or species, etc. Between which layer does consciousness lie, and how do you explain the causal relationship between the upper and lower (underpinning) layers? — Harry Hindu

I hope the prior explanation answers this as well. Consciousness arises from the brain. No where else. You do not need to be around other people to be conscious. The causal explanation is also the same as you mentioned. Atoms cause molecules by their interaction. Molecules cause neuronal cells by their interaction. Neuronal cells cause a brain. And certain parts of the brain cause consciousness. This is straight forward science.

You said before that I am my brain, but now you say that I am merely one part of my brain. — Harry Hindu

Yes, so prior I was speaking in general terms. As in, mind/brain. The brain is composed of several different functioning sections that serve the body in different way. Sight is located in a different area then sound for example. Higher level thought is in the Neo Cortex, while the most primitive of bodily functions are handled by the brain stem. That is why a person can still breath even though they are in a coma.

Technically, consciousness would be the same. Certain areas of the brain create consciousness, while others do not.

https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/2/eaat7603
Here is a study on human consciousness in which we are mapping the locations of the brain.

Unfortunately, I don't see the contradiction. — Harry Hindu

You seem to be equating a mind as something different from the physical brain. It is not. No mind can exist without a brain. I was pointing out that you noted whether we examine something from a distance or close, its functionally the same thing. Thus brain and mind are the same.

Are choices "physical"? — Harry Hindu

Absolutely. Everything is physical Harry. What is there that is not physical? Do you think that when an ant makes a choice, it is not physical? When a cell chooses to eat another that there is some extra universal essence at play? A dog has a consciousness right? Mice, lizards, etc. We are made up of cells, which are molecules, and atoms. So is every living creature. Its all matter and energy.

Finally, your consciousness is physical. You can prove it right now. Stand up and walk somewhere. Look back. Is your consciousness where you just were? Or is it where you are now? It resides up there with you. You have to feed it and take care of it, or it grows weak, becomes confused, and dies. Make sure to use it well before its expiration date.

So how does the first person proposition "I Dennet feel no consciousness" translate into the bold generality that "Nobody can feel consciousness." ??? — Olivier5

I don't think his conclusions follow from his own introspection. I think he works backward from certain ontological commitments.

But if you notice from the OP, it's not clear whether he understands what Strawson said or not, as if maybe he has something like color-blindness but it's more generalized.

...the very idea of conscious experience itself is, like I said elsewhere, basic and fundamental. — Mr Bee

I'd like to think that most everyone here would agree that conscious experience existed in it's entirety prior to our ever having coined the terms. An idea of something that already existed in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it is not rightly called "basic" or "fundamental". There is more than one idea of conscious experience, and some of them are mutually exclusive and/or negations of one another; they are incommensurate with one another. They cannot all be basic and fundamental. So we find ourselves at a point where we need to be able to perform a comparative analysis between the different notions/ideas of consciousness/conscious experience.

If conscious experience exists in it's entirety prior to our becoming aware of it, then our ideas of it can be wrong about it. That is particularly the case regarding our ideas about what such things consist of. Some people claim that conscious experience consists entirely, or in large part at least, of subjective, personal, and qualitative properties: Qualia are the ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly apprehensible properties of experience; the way things seem to us.

As Dennett says in the beginning of "Quining Qualia"...

As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia. Nothing, it seems, could you know more intimately than your own qualia...

Dennett argues fairly convincingly against the claims of the ineffability, intrinsicality, privacy, and direct apprehensibility of the properties of conscious experience and in doing so effectively grounds his rejecting the conception of qualia. It's worth noting that he does all this by offering physicalist explanations of actual counterexamples that are germane to historical notions of qualia/quale. In doing so, he shows that the properties of personal experience that make personal experience what it is, are not special in the sort of way that proponents of qualia claim.

That's the impression I'm left with after studying that paper for the last day.

Dennett's aim(I'm guessing) was to use a physicalist framework to effectively explain all that quale and qualia are claimed to be the only explanations for, and in doing so show that there is nothing ineffable, intrinsic, private, or directly apprehensible about the properties of conscious experience.

I'd like to think that most everyone here would agree that conscious experience existed in it's entirety prior to our ever having coined the terms. An idea of something that already existed in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it is not rightly called "basic" or "fundamental". — creativesoul

Why is that? Are you suggesting that everything in the distant past was reducible just because they predated conscious beings like us? I'm not sure I understand the connection here.

There is more than one idea of conscious experience, and some of them are mutually exclusive and/or negations of one another; they are incommensurate with one another. They cannot all be basic and fundamental. — creativesoul

Sure there can be multiple ideas of what the term "experience" is, but I take it that most people have a common understanding of what first-person subjectivity refers to. Same with the concept of "red".

I'd like to think that most everyone here would agree that conscious experience existed in it's entirety prior to our ever having coined the terms. An idea of something that already existed in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it is not rightly called "basic" or "fundamental".
— creativesoul

Why is that?... — Mr Bee

Are all ideas/notions/conceptions of conscious experience basic and fundamental?

Given the many different ways one can define "experience", no. The question is whether the things our ideas are referring to can't be irreducible if they pre-exist humanity and I see no reason why that should be the case.

Are all ideas/notions/conceptions of conscious experience basic and fundamental? — creativesoul

Given the many different ways one can define "experience", no. — Mr Bee

Good.

I'm saying that if there is anything basic and fundamental about conscious experience it would be what it consisted of long before we began talking about it; the basic elemental constituency of language less conscious experience.

The question is whether the things our ideas are referring to can't be irreducible if they pre-exist humanity — Mr Bee

I'm not even sure that I understand what you're asking me here...

I'm not fond of the notion of reducibility. If we're talking about amending our accounting practices in a manner that results in adequately explaining something or another, then the simplest version is the best on my view, so long as there is no loss of explanatory power.

However, when we're talking about what things consist of, it's another matter altogether...

All things that exist in their entirety prior to our awareness of them are irreducible in terms of their basic elemental constituency, even those that consist of a combination of more basic elemental constituents and/or emerge as a result thereof. Conscious experiences are exactly such things, on my view. There are basic elemental constituents thereof, all of which are necessary in order for any and all conscious experiences to happen and/or take place. The trick, it seems to me(pardon the pun), is figuring out the minimum that each particular conscious experience requires, for they are not all equal.

For example, while some conscious experience requires language use, not all does. So, given that much... we can confidently say that any and all conscious experience, say, of learning how to use the term "tree", consists - in part at least - of common language use. Language is an elemental constituent of such experience. That experience cannot be further reduced in our imaginings by removing the language use, for what's left is insufficient, clearly. It would be a different experience altogether. Such an experience consists of - in part at least - but, is completely existentially dependent upon, common language use. However, it does not follow that common language use is required for all conscious experience.

Make sense thus far?

Make sense thus far? — creativesoul

For me it does.

All things that exist in their entirety prior to our awareness of them are irreducible in terms of their basic elemental constituency — creativesoul

'Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away.' ~ Philip K. Dick.

Is that what you have in mind?

It seems to me to be something like the Kantian dictate, that if the unconditioned is given, so too must every possible condition also be given. To that which exists In its entirety (the unconditioned) belongs all conditions of its reality (basic elementary constituency), hence, no further reduction to even more basic constituency is possible. Or, which is the same thing, any further reduction admits no new knowledge, or may even invoke contradictions, and is thus either superfluous, or just meaningless.

But I could be mistaken.

I don't think you're mistaken, but it's a difficult idea.

"On the face of it, the study of human consciousness involves phenomena that seem to occupy something rather like another dimension: the private, subjective, ‘first-person’ dimension. Everybody agrees that this is where we start."

The phrase beginning ‘on the face of it...‘ is Daniel Dennett’s own statement of where the argument starts. So you’re saying you don’t agree with Dennett in that respect? — Wayfarer

Right, I don't agree with Dennett in that respect. I think there is only one world (or dimension) but thinking of it in Cartesian terms, whether as 'first-person' or as 'third-person', is a mistake. The latter can be characterized as a 'view from nowhere', which I think is untenable. Whereas the former fails to connect with the world at all, being radically private and subjective.

So if that philosophical distinction is rejected, both in whole and in part, then what are we left with? I think ordinary language serves us just fine here.

Grammatically, "Alice kicks the ball" and "The ball is kicked by Alice" both describe the same event, despite the subject and object being different in each sentence.

Similarly, Alice saying "My tooth hurts" and Bob saying, "Alice's tooth hurts" both describe Alice's toothache, despite them being first-person and third-person expressions.

Note how these grammatical distinctions don't divide up the world like the Cartesian distinctions do. Instead each statement above presupposes both a world being described (which includes toothaches) and a reference point in the world from which it is being described (Alice, or Bob, say). So the seemingly opposite (but actually interconnected) issues I raised above about "a view from nowhere" and "radical privacy and subjectivity" don't even arise.

See this as something akin to Bennett and Hacker's language criticisms in their "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience". If the assumptions that define a research program are flawed, then it's going to be difficult to solve some of the problems.

I think there is only one world (or dimension) but thinking of it in Cartesian terms, whether as 'first-person' or as 'third-person', is a mistake. The latter can be characterized as a 'view from nowhere', which I think is untenable. — Andrew M

But, nevertheless, there is a valid distinction to be made between the first- and third-person perspective. In other words, me seeing Alice kick the ball is completely different to me kicking it. Of course, to you, then both me and Alice are third parties, but the point remains.

I’ve been delving in to P M S Hacker, I’ve discovered a tranche of his papers attached to his Wikipedia page. I’m gratified to learn that he’s a staunch critic of ‘scientism’.

But, nevertheless, there is a valid distinction to be made between the first- and third-person perspective. In other words, me seeing Alice kick the ball is completely different to me kicking it. Of course, to you, then both me and Alice are third parties, but the point remains. — Wayfarer

The theory already accounts for that. Wayfarer kicks the ball, Andrew M kicks the ball and Alice kicks the ball are all different events. The distinction is already made without invoking first and third party distinctions.

. Wayfarer kicks the ball, Andrew M kicks the ball and Alice kicks the ball are all different events. — Isaac

That is all described from the third-person perspective. You won't really know what it is like to kick the ball unless you do it yourself.

You won't really know what it is like to kick the ball unless you do it yourself. — Wayfarer

Why not?

It's something I feel really shouldn't need to be explained. Unless you have an experience, then you can't say you know what it is to have that experience. Yes, the example was a bit tongue-in-cheek, but the point remains. And it goes for everything - seeing something done is not the same as doing it.

That's just a repetition of what you said. I'm asking why. What are the things you know from having an experience which are not knowable without having it?

Ski-ing would be one. Having an orgasm would be another. Getting drunk on vodka would be another. Becoming exhausted while cross country running. Learning to play the jazz altered scale. Shall I go on? It could be a long list.

Those are events. I was asking what the knowledge consists of. After drinking vodka, what us it that I know that cannot be known without drinking vodka. And don't answer 'what it's like to drink vodka' because that's not a thing (there is no single fact of 'what it's like to drink vodka').

Do you know any of the literature around this issue? Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, by Chalmers? What is it like to be a Bat, Thomas Nagel? To mention a couple. If not, the first is readily available online and is worth reading.

Firstly, yes, I've read both, and secondly why are you referring me to literature? I just asked what the nature of this knowledge was. Has that suddenly become impossible for you to say anything at all about without full recourse to literature. It's going to somewhat undermine the purpose of a philosophy forum if philosophy can't be discussed in shorter than book-length format.

I have defended the hypothesis that there is a straightforward, conservative extension of objective science that handsomely covers the ground [of subjective experience]. — Daniel Dennett

I will elaborate an objection to Dennett along Kantian lines. It begins with the claim that ‘experienced reality is a construct or a synthesis’. In Schopenhauer's terminology, it is 'vorstellung', translated as 'representation' or 'idea'. The brain is the most sophisticated object known to science, and this act of synthesis is what its power is deployed in generating. But we can't get outside of that act of synthesis, as it is how the mind works; as Kant says, 'experience, both of the self and its objects, rests on acts of synthesis that, because they are the conditions of any experience, are not themselves experienced.' That is the meaning of 'transcendental' in Kant - 'that which constitutes experience but is not itself given in experience.' An example would be the eye, which is the condition for seeing even though the eye does not see itself. I see this as a fundamental principle.

This doesn't mean experienced reality is only subjective or solipsistic, because we are members of a species, and a linguistic and cultural order, and we can make use of common measures, ideas and models. Our experiences are in that sense aligned (although between divergent cultures and periods of history, this alignement can easily slip.) In any case, experienced reality is known 'inter-subjectively' - a term that also owes its origin to Husserl. In this sense, 'mind' is not your or my individual mind but a collective reality of which our individual minds are instances. (On the level of conscious individuals we are, of course, unique, but our individuality is underpinned by a common core of functionality which operate sub- and unconsciously, both through cultural archetypes and also through the parasympathetic nervous system.)

But I'm not saying that 'the world is all in the mind' (i.e. subjective idealism). That statement attempts to assume a perspective that is outside of both the world and the mind, and to figure out how one relates to the other. But again, we can't actually assume such a perspective, because we can't get 'out of our heads'. As conscious beings, knowledge and speech arises from our situatedness in the world, from a perspective or point of view, without which nothing can be said. That is the sense in which 'mind and world arise together' (a principle in both Buddhism and phenomenology which has been adapted by the 'embodied cognition' approach 1).

What I'm arguing is that the subjective element is intrinsic to any judgement, statement, or thought about the world, even the so-called objective world, or, put another way, the objective world has only an apparent reality as part of this cognitive process (as per Kant).

So my objection to Dennett is that his 'privileging of the objective' cannot provide an account of the faculty of judgement that is at the basis of experience and even of objective judgement. You will notice in Dennett's 'Intentional Stance' and all his talk about 'qualia', he invariably tries to shift the subject of the debate to observing what other beings do; he always has to depict the matter in third-person terms. He doesn't want to reflect on what the subject does because of its intrinsic unknowability - which is why he says it's 'ineffable' and 'vague'. Modern scientific method starts with 'bracketing out the subjective'. Which is perfectly fine as far as it goes - but it doesn't go here.

In other words, Dennett's philosophy contains an innate contradiction, which is that it can't account for the very faculty which enables him to make philosophical judgements in the first place. And why? It is because reason, as such, is internal to the act of judgement. In Dennett's philosophy, 'reason' in the sense of a necessarily implication between ideas, has no innate warrant; our thinking is everywhere and always the product of causes which are largely unconscious and unknown to us, being the product of Darwinian selection in the service of survival. For instance in his Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Dennett uses a series of thought experiments to persuade the reader that meaning is the product of meaningless, algorithmic processes. This is part of what he calls the 'acid' of the 'dangerous idea'.

So the question is, how is Dennett's 'philosophy' exempt from this? Why, if he is correct, is what he writes not a series of meaningless symbols that are the product of the unconscious competence of his neurobiology? If he wants to dissolve everything that has been understood in the name of philosophy in 'acid', how come his is exempt? Or is he, as his philosophy suggests, simply another noisy chimp?

But of course, a lot of people have been saying this about Dennett all of his career - one of his first books was parodied as 'Consciousness Ignored' or 'Consciousness Explained Away'. But as there's nothing which Dennett could consider as 'empirical evidence' for this criticism he will no doubt just keep making the same noises.

We may be in agreement here, and differ only in semantics. Atomic theory is fundamental to the understanding of molecules. Quantum theory is fundamental to the study of atoms. What is fundamental is what is the directly prior set of rules and causality that arise to the current focus of study. What is fundamental to consciousness is the functioning of the brain. — Philosophim

This leads to an infinite regress. You never end up getting at any fundamental understanding if it is always a step lower than your present understanding. Fundamental understanding would be fleeting and unattainable. This leaves us with simply understanding, and some understanding is only useful in a particular domain. Any distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental understanding is incoherent.

I hope the prior explanation answers this as well. Consciousness arises from the brain. No where else. You do not need to be around other people to be conscious. The causal explanation is also the same as you mentioned. Atoms cause molecules by their interaction. Molecules cause neuronal cells by their interaction. Neuronal cells cause a brain. And certain parts of the brain cause consciousness. This is straight forward science. — Philosophim

What exactly do you mean by "arises from the brain"?
What exactly do you mean by "caused by their interaction?

Is it a temporal or spatial change that you are talking about? In other words, does the change occur over time, or over space? For instance, a thrown ball causes the window to break. The broken window was caused by something else interacting with it. In one moment it wasn't broken and in the next it was only after interacting with a ball, which isn't part of the window, but a separate entity. So if this is a temporal change, where is the mind in relation to the brain like the window is in relation to the ball? If this were the type of causation you are talking about then the mind is a separate entity from the brain, like the ball and the window. Temporal change is a relationship between two or more different things interacting to create a new thing that is not the same thing as the things by themselves.

Is it a spatial change, which really is just another change in views (conscious sensory models). There is no such distinction between different spatial-scales outside of our minds. Our minds are what make the distinctions between macro and micro, just as they do about present and past, but they have no ontological reality outside of our minds.

So in essence, spatial causation is really just different conscious sensory models of the same thing used for different purposes. There would be no separate entity of mind and brain. They are one and the same, just from different views. One might say an apple is red, but on the inside it is white. A view is from somewhere, so some view will contain information about the local environment relative to that spatial-temporal point within that environment. My view of your mind includes the visual of a brain. Your view of your mind does not. Why? And what does it mean to say that "you" have a view of "your" mind? Where is the you? You say that you are your brain, or part of it. So does this mean that somewhere in the brain is a view of a mind? Why don't we ever find such a thing when looking deep inside the brain?

Yes, so prior I was speaking in general terms. As in, mind/brain. The brain is composed of several different functioning sections that serve the body in different way. Sight is located in a different area then sound for example. Higher level thought is in the Neo Cortex, while the most primitive of bodily functions are handled by the brain stem. That is why a person can still breath even though they are in a coma.

Technically, consciousness would be the same. Certain areas of the brain create consciousness, while others do not. — Philosophim

Sight and sound are part of consciousness, not part of brains. Neurons are part of brains. Brains and their neurons are what are seen, so what would it mean for the sight of a brain to be in the brain?

Scientists even tell us that color has no ontological reality outside of our minds, yet they exist in minds. How does something that is colorless cause color? And how did camouflage evolve?

And if different aspects of consciousness are in different parts of the brain, then consciousness would entail multiple parts of the brain. There must be somewhere where sound and sight come together into a collective whole because I can both see and hear you at the same conscious instant and in the same conscious space.

You seem to be equating a mind as something different from the physical brain. It is not. No mind can exist without a brain. I was pointing out that you noted whether we examine something from a distance or close, its functionally the same thing. Thus brain and mind are the same. — Philosophim

Then I need an explanation of what you mean by "the brain causes the mind", or "the mind arises from the brain". Some causal events create new entities that are not the same as what caused them. Your mother and father caused you, but you are a separate entity from them both. This is what I was talking about the distinction between temporal causation and spatial causation.

Absolutely. Everything is physical Harry. What is there that is not physical? Do you think that when an ant makes a choice, it is not physical? When a cell chooses to eat another that there is some extra universal essence at play? A dog has a consciousness right? Mice, lizards, etc. We are made up of cells, which are molecules, and atoms. So is every living creature. Its all matter and energy.

Finally, your consciousness is physical. You can prove it right now. Stand up and walk somewhere. Look back. Is your consciousness where you just were? Or is it where you are now? It resides up there with you. You have to feed it and take care of it, or it grows weak, becomes confused, and dies. Make sure to use it well before its expiration date. — Philosophim

Then what does it mean to be "physical"? If everything were "physical" then "physical" seems like a useless term.

The thing that most people tend to forget is any experience or view isn't a direct, clear, unfiltered understanding about the world independent of your body's interaction with it. It always includes information about your body's relation with the world.

When looking at another person's brain, how much of the information, and what part of the information, in your consciousness is only about the brain you are viewing and not about your brain too? How can you separate the information about the observed brain from the information about your brain when looking at another brain?

Think of the sights and sounds that you see and hear on your TV. The image depends not just on what is being viewed, but the quality and settings on the camera obtaining the view and the quality and settings on the TV. Both the camera and the TV together make measurements and then display them. What is displayed is wholly dependent upon what type of measuring device you are using and what device you're using to display the information.

Raw information has no form. It only takes form when needing to be used and how it is used is dependent upon the medium used to represent the raw information (TV sets or minds). Using different senses to observe the same event gives you different forms of the same information. Thunder and lightning are just different forms of the same event - an electrostatic discharge in the atmosphere. Electrostatic discharges have existed well before there were any eyes and ears to measure them. Once eyes and ears evolved, lightning and thunder existed.

Lightning and thunder are even thought of as separate events because based on our location, they can occur at different times, even though it is the same electrostatic charge that caused them both.

I don't know why anyone would say that qualia aren't useful as they contain such useful information about the body's relationships with the world.

First off.....excellent dissertation. Pretty much as I view the human condition as well. That being said, permit me a couple minor caveats, if you will:

This doesn't mean experienced reality is only subjective — Wayfarer

......experience itself, is altogether impossible, in fact has no meaning at all, without a cognitive subject to which it belongs. Thus, while reality in general is not subjective, the particular experienced reality, is;

the objective world has only an apparent reality as part of this cognitive process (as per Kant). — Wayfarer

......the objective world is reality, re: “...the schema of reality is existence in a determined time...”, schema here being the manifold of extant objects in the world. I don’t think the fact we cannot prove with certainty the nature of the objective world, is sufficient to say the reality of the objective world is itself merely apparent to us. So saying, we must admit the existence of objects in a determined time is itself merely apparent, from which follows necessarily knowledge of such objects becomes immediately impossible because we have no means to distinguish whether it is the object or the determined time of that object, that is apparent.

Nevertheless, I would welcome an textual extract supporting your proposition. Or maybe just a clarification, to bring me back from way out in left field where I have this tendency to go sometimes.....
—————

Or is he, as his philosophy suggests, simply another noisy chimp? — Wayfarer

I read “Consciousness Explained” when it first came out, and I thought.....hmmmm, hasn’t it already been explained? It has to my satisfaction, satisfaction being merely a euphemism for intellectual prejudice, so because of it....yep, noisy chimp. But then, I’m stuck in the Enlightenment, for which I offer not the least apology, perfectly exemplified by your “the subjective element is intrinsic to any judgement, statement, or thought about the world”, so even if he turns out to be a noisy chimp who happens to be correct with his “we should explore the default possibilities first. This is the pragmatic policy of naturalism”, I’m not affected.
————-

Dennett's philosophy contains an innate contradiction — Wayfarer

I know what you mean, but I would expand the notion: from 1995, “....Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge...”, we are then presented with 2013’s “Intuition Pumps”. C’mon, man......intuition isn’t something that can be PUMPED!!!

Anyway....thanks for the good talk.

:up:

This leads to an infinite regress. You never end up getting at any fundamental understanding if it is always a step lower than your present understanding. Fundamental understanding would be fleeting and unattainable. This leaves us with simply understanding, and some understanding is only useful in a particular domain. Any distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental understanding is incoherent. — Harry Hindu

Yep, we're just talking semantics. In trying to craft systems you oftentimes limit how far you go. Think of meter stick only recording millimeters. Millimeters are all you need for your purposes, so the fundamental measurement of a meterstick is millimeters. Same thing when we're talking about consciousness versus the brains function that creates consciousness. We can see consciousness as the meter stick, and the brains functions as the fundamental measurement of that consciousness.

Don't overcomplicate it. Water is a group of H20 molecules. The fundamentals of water when speaking on the atomic level are the interactions of atoms. Or whatever particular base you wish to speak about. Fundamental is a word that we used based on our context, nothing more.

What exactly do you mean by "arises from the brain"?
What exactly do you mean by "caused by their interaction?

Is it a temporal or spatial change that you are talking about? In other words, does the change occur over time, or over space? — Harry Hindu

All changes are over space, and space is temporal. You cannot have a change without space or time. An meaningful interaction is when one or more states interact to create a new state. So if a group of neurons fire to produce the conscious experience of feeling happy using dopamine and other technical brain processes, your consciousness feels happy.

Brains and their neurons are what are seen, so what would it mean for the sight of a brain to be in the brain? — Harry Hindu

How you see sight in your brain, is how you see sight in your brain. When the neurons fire as a group passing messages to one another, that entire process within you is what is letting you be conscious. This is internal to the system.

So I code for a living, so let me give you an example from here. Everything in your computer is 1 and 0. If I open up the hard drive, I don't see the game I've saved to my desktop. When I attack an enemy on screen, I can look at the internals of the computer and just see a lot of 1's and zero's all going through logic gates. This then emits into other parts of the system which is interpreted to create new things like the controller input, or the visual on your TV.

The only reason we see a visual representation is because we interpreted the 1's and 0's with something that emits a visual picture. Your brain is not emitting a visual picture. There is no light that emerges for us to "see". Your brain processes and creates your existence within the medium of the brain. Your "picture" is internal to this system.

Now, if we want to see a visual of what we are thinking, we would have to learn what the internal mechanism is doing, then translate it into a medium of sight. Researchers have already begun to do this with reading people's minds when they think of objects. Here is an example. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/functional-magnetic-resonance-imaging-computer-analysis-read-thoughts-60-minutes-2019-11-24/

Above, they were able to locate the place in the brain that lit up when people thought the word, "Screwdriver". This is reading the 1's and 0's. There is a further experiment that found out what numbers people were thinking by reading the brain, then hooked those results up to an audio device that "spoke" the number.

But 1's and 0's are not light emittance. I can't see the visual of what's going on. I can look at the process and see what results in the system. Your "sight" in your brain is not "light". Its not emitting a picture. There's no sound in your brain either. Its the interpretation of sound into a meaningful experience within your brain. If you want it expressed as sound, it has to be emitted as a particular vibration of air.

So, the brain does not emit light or sound. It processes external stimulous like light and vibrating air waves to construct a meaningful picture within itself, or consciousness. From my background, this is readily easy to understand, but if you are not familiar with processes like this, perhaps it is not easy to comprehend. This is not a slight on yourself, I'm just hoping this is a meaningful way of communicating what is going on.

Then what does it mean to be "physical"? If everything were "physical" then "physical" seems like a useless term. — Harry Hindu

Space is not physical. Where there is no matter or energy, we have "emptiness". So the term physical is very useful. If you wish to introduce a different term, feel free, as long as there is evidence for it.

“Intuition Pumps”. — Mww

How do p-zombies define "intuition", by the way?

How do p-zombies define "intuition", by the way? — Olivier5

Damned if I know; theoretically, I wouldn’t be able to distinguish one as such, even if he was standing right in front of me. Still, I imagine I would treat the definition as if it came from a rational agency like me, especially if there was no possibility of ever discovering it didn’t. It doesn’t matter the source of definitions given to me anyway; they must all be met with my judgement as the only permissible criterion for their validity.