materialism is an illusion. — Olivier5

Where's your evidence?

one simply has to take it on faith that exists, like God or UFOs — Kenosha Kid

Hrmmmm. That doesn't seem like a particularly good analogy here. I mean, almost everyone seems to think they have something like a direct experience of, ahem, what they're experiencing. And we have resources for explaining away, if we are so inclined and put in the work, mystical experiences characterized as experiences of divinity, or visual experiences characterized as seeing a UFO or even the weird-ass memories people have of being abducted (I remember Michael Shermer describes having one of these).

Anyway a lot of the usual strategies don't seem to apply, and the conviction strikes me as much more wide spread, for whatever reason. It seems to me that ought to be explained right up front, that the almost universal misconstrual of consciousness, if that's what it is, ought to come from the theory itself.

Does that make sense? I haven't read any Dennett in forever.

"What if I had a brain lesion right there?" Introspection alone cannot answer that, and it is relevant. There are relevant data streams introspection alone cannot access absent experiment. — fdrake

Do you know anything about relevant research? I assume besides building competing models there are psychologists in labs doing fMRIs and such. I would have guessed that self-reports and introspection aren't so much tied to consciousness or even awareness but to attention, and I for one would expect to be able to make some progress seeing what's going on when attention is engaged and when attention is engaged introspectively, etc.

for whatever reason. — Srap Tasmaner

E.g., possibly: our thinking in symbols.

Elementary particles, the fundamental forces of nature, space, time, etc. Anything that we take to be basic in our models is by definition irreducible. None of these things are "magical", it's just that they are what they are as far as we know. — Mr Bee

Right. Or close enough. Basic, simple, not homocentric elements.

Well cars are reducible to smaller elements since we can break them down to their subatomic composition. As for conscious experience, that is a whole other question. — Mr Bee

Are you saying that if you didn't know how a car was put together, you might suspect that it was irreducible? Or, put it this way, if you knew vaguely but not exactly how a car worked, and someone told you that actually carness is irreducible, that it is not the sum of its parts but actually a manifestation of a ubiquitous, elementary carness, would you accept that this was valid on grounds of your own ignorance or would it still sound absolutely absurd?

Consciousness is a whole other question solely because certain people don't like applying that sort of answer to subjective human experience.

Um, I don't think that that was how the quote was meant to be understood. I think the point of what Strawson was saying there was that the very idea of conscious experience itself is, like I said elsewhere, basic and fundamental. — Mr Bee

That's saying the same thing. Strawson's view is that the only way to grasp it is to accept it en tout without question. If you try to look at its moving parts, you lose visibility of the thing itself.

Also if you're implying that panpsychism is homocentric, I'd say it's quite the opposite. Panpsychist views aren't claiming that humanity is somehow special, or even that consciousness is. It's a pretty naturalistic view, which is why some have found it appealing. — Mr Bee

It has to yield human consciousness without being reducible to simpler parts, e.g. the response of an electric charge to an electric field. That makes the whole universe homocentric from the bottom up. After all, no one becomes a panpsychist after really looking hard at rocks.

What is to be taken at face value here? Experience itself? If that is the case, I don't think that that's really a controversial view. — Mr Bee

It's a pro-ignorance view. So yeah not controversial per se. :D

In addition, I would take issue with calling that "faith" as well since it seems like one of the few things we can know with certainty, which is the opposite of faith. — Mr Bee

Irreducible consciousness is not something we "know with certainty". It is something we believe through faith, and protect with anti-scientific argumentation.

The main point that Dennett is making is that consciousness can be fully understood in the third person. — Wayfarer

No, the point he is making in the quote in the OP is that disagreeing with Strawson's conception of what consciousness is is not the same as disagreeing that consciousness exists.

What you've touched on instead is the reason Strawson names him as a Denier: Dennett believes in a scientific, reductionist explanation for consciousness that, to Strawson, is equivalent to saying consciousness doesn't exist.

You're still clinging to the myth of the atom. The 'standard model' itself is a fantastically complex intellectual and mathematical construct. — Wayfarer

How we arrived at it is not a measure of its intrinsic complexity.

Are you saying that if you didn't know how a car was put together, you might suspect that it was irreducible? Or, put it this way, if you knew vaguely but not exactly how a car worked, and someone told you that actually carness is irreducible, that it is not the sum of its parts but actually a manifestation of a ubiquitous, elementary carness, would you accept that this was valid on grounds of your own ignorance or would it still sound absolutely absurd? — Kenosha Kid

Not really cause even if I didn't know how a car works, I can conceive of it being broken down into elements that I don't know about right now. The thing about consciousness is I can't conceive of how that can be the case. It's not like consciousness is a thing that we can measure and cut with a knife or anything. Experience is, well, experience. There is a reason why it's called the Hard Problem after all.

That's saying the same thing. Strawson's view is that the only way to grasp it is to accept it en tout without question. If you try to look at its moving parts, you lose visibility of the thing itself. — Kenosha Kid

Strawson's point is that the only way to grasp experience as a concept is to have it. None of that has anything to do with whether you can question it's nature. The way you seem to represent him he sounds like a closed minded bigot which I don't see at all.

It has to yield human consciousness without being reducible to simpler parts, e.g. the response of an electric charge to an electric field. That makes the whole universe homocentric from the bottom up. After all, no one becomes a panpsychist after really looking hard at rocks. — Kenosha Kid

Not human consciousness. Just consciousness. Animals can be conscious, aliens can be conscious, and robots can be too. At least I don't think Strawson would disagree with that. And being "centric" means that the universe is somehow tailored around consciousness on some metaphysical pedestal which is another thing I think panpsychists would disagree with.

Irreducible consciousness is not something we "know with certainty". It is something we believe through faith, and protect with anti-scientific argumentation. — Kenosha Kid

Consciousness itself though is something we can know with certainty and you'll find few people who will say that it doesn't exist.

Whether or not consciousness is irreducible on the other hand is debatable so I agree with you there. Strawson believes that it is, but people like Dennett would disagree.

Hrmmmm. That doesn't seem like a particularly good analogy here. I mean, almost everyone seems to think they have something like a direct experience of, ahem, what they're experiencing. — Srap Tasmaner

Consciousness isn't in doubt though; irreducible consciousness is. We don't experience the mediators of our experience, but we don't experience the irreducibility of consciousness either, it's just an inference. We can study conscious beings to learn how consciousness works, what it's moving parts are, etc. Irreducible consciousness requires a termination of enquiry and a leap of faith.

It seems to me that ought to be explained right up front, that the almost universal misconstrual of consciousness, if that's what it is, ought to come from the theory itself.

Does that make sense? — Srap Tasmaner

Sure. But the likes of Strawson just respond that whatever studies elucidate, it isn't the thing being studied. And that's the conversation the OP is about.

Not really cause even if I didn't know how a car work, I can conceive of it being broken down into elements that I don't know about right now. — Mr Bee

Exactly. Same goes for anything.

The thing about consciousness is I don't see how that can be the case. It's not like consciousness is a thing that we can measure and cut with a knife or anything. — Mr Bee

Neither can a computer program.

Strawson's point is that the only way to grasp experience as a concept is to have it. None of that has anything to do with whether you can question it's nature. The way you seem to represent him he sounds like a closed minded bigot which I don't see at all. — Mr Bee

I think that's the way he represents himself. I hadn't thought of it in terms of intellectual bigotry, but yes that does seem accurate to me. He has no interest in describing a thing, but builds straw men to misrepresent others who do if it doesn't give the kind of answer he wants.

Not human consciousness. Just consciousness. Animals can be conscious, aliens can be conscious, and robots can be too. At least I don't think Strawson would disagree with that. — Mr Bee

But the reason why people like Strawson need consciousness to be something other than a bunch of more elementary things is precisely that human consciousness is fundamental to subjective experience. They are not in the tizz they are in because of guinea pigs or ravens.

Whether or not consciousness is irreducible on the other hand is debatable so I agree with you there. Strawson believes that it is, but people like Dennett would disagree. — Mr Bee

Right. The question asked in the OP was: what does Dennett mean by his response to Strawson? Strawson argues that Dennett is a consciousness Denier in the grounds that the latter does not believe in an irreducible consciousness. Dennett's response is merely the obvious: that one can believe in consciousness without subscribing to Strawson's conception of it.

The main point that Dennett is making is that consciousness can be fully understood in the third person.
— Wayfarer

No, the point he is making in the quote in the OP is that disagreeing with Strawson's conception of what consciousness is is not the same as disagreeing that consciousness exists. — Kenosha Kid

There's an awful lot of unclarity about what Dennett does and doesn't say, what he does and doesn't deny. That is why I included a lengthy quotation from him, as follows:

On the face of it, the study of human consciousness involves phenomena that seem to occupy something rather like another dimension: the private, subjective, ‘first-person’ dimension. Everybody agrees that this is where we start.

I presume we all agree on that. Then Dennett goes to his main point:

What, then, is the relation between the standard ‘third-person’ objective methodologies for studying meteors or magnets (or human metabolism or bone density), and the methodologies for studying human consciousness? Can the standard methods be extended in such a way as to do justice to the phenomena of human consciousness? Or do we have to find some quite radical or revolutionary alternative sci- ence? I have defended the hypothesis that there is a straightforward, conservative extension of objective science that handsomely covers the ground — all the ground — of human consciousness, doing justice to all the data without ever having to abandon the rules and constraints of the experimental method that have worked so well in the rest of science.

https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/JCSarticle.pdf

To me, this is the entire problem in a nutshell. This is the reason that Daniel Dennett is 'Professor Scientism' - in his view, scientific method must be truly universal in scope, whatever can't be included in it, is either not worth knowing about, or foverer un-knowable

And to put the objection to his attitude even more succinctly than David Chalmers, the fundamental reason that 'consciousness' is different to the other subjects of science is that all the objects of scientific analysis - even human cognition - can be studied as objects. We have a relationship of 'otherness' to them, we study those phenomena (phenomena being 'what appears'.)

But the first person is never in that relationship. That's why the subject (in both senses) eludes objective analysis.

Neither can a computer program. — Kenosha Kid

A computer program is a set of logical operations as far as our understanding goes. It's easy to see how those operations can be conducted by a medium operating based on more fundamental laws, whether it be artificial or biological.

Again as far as conscious experience goes, it's just experience as far as we are concerned. How we go from there to more basic elements is what philosophers have been banging their heads on for centuries.

But the reason why people like Strawson need consciousness to be something other than a bunch of more elementary things is precisely that human consciousness is fundamental to subjective experience. They are not in the tizz they are in because of guinea pigs or ravens. — Kenosha Kid

Human consciousness=regular consciousness=subjective experience. They're all synonyms referring to the same thing and they are all irreducible, according to people like Strawson.

I can't say I really understood your suggestion, maybe because this mostly isn't my thing. I could understand what the confusion you describe would mean for self reports; I think I can see what it might mean for introspection; I'm not sure I understand how it could actually be the phenomenon of consciousness, though the idea of that being a sort of flickering between different functions or different layers is strangely appealing. Like I said, not something I've been devoting time to so not sure I'm the best sounding board.

materialism is an illusion.
— Olivier5

Where's your evidence? — Gregory

The evidence lies in the fact that most forms of materialism are self-contradictory. The theory is a construct of the human mind, and yet it denies that this very same mind exists as an effective process doing actual stuff...

Pfhorrest's points in it were good for a broadly sympathetic construal of the qualia concept in a (reasonably) theory neutral way. — fdrake

Thanks. Though @Olivier5 has already been participating extensively in a more recent thread where I expound on that far more greatly, and generally seems to disagree with me, though I'm not completely clear on in what direction.

This is why an afterlife is possible — Gregory

An afterlife? Which would come after what life, exactly? The life of nothing? Is the afterlife going to be an eternity of Nothingness, too? I can't wait...

generally seems to disagree with me — Pfhorrest

I disagree with pan-psychism. I thinks it's like trying to use a sledgehammer to kill a fly. But I will look at the argument that Drake pointed at.

There's an awful lot of unclarity about what Dennett does and doesn't say, what he does and doesn't deny. That is why I included a lengthy quotation from him, as follows:

"On the face of it, the study of human consciousness involves phenomena that seem to occupy something rather like another dimension: the private, subjective, ‘first-person’ dimension. Everybody agrees that this is where we start."

I presume we all agree on that. — Wayfarer

I don't agree that that is where we start. That is the philosophical subject-object division that is often an unchallenged assumption in these discussions. Do you prefer ghosts (idealism), machines (eliminativism) or both (dualism)? Pick your poison.

The phrase beginning ‘on the face of it...‘ is Daniel Dennett’s own statement of where the argument starts. So you’re saying you don’t agree with Dennett in that respect?

That is the philosophical subject-object division that is often an unchallenged assumption in these discussions... — Andrew M

I agree that it is an 'unchallenged assumption', if you read what said above, and whenever I comment on this subject, then you will see this is what I keep referring to. Dennett and his advocates seem never to understand this, or at any rate, they never respond to it. The article you linked to is relevant, but rather cursory. However I will say that this sentence:

'The sharp distinction between subject and object corresponds to the distinction, in the philosophy of René Descartes, between thought and extension'

is useful in throwing into relief what Cartesian dualism says.

Do you prefer ghosts (idealism), machines (eliminativism) or both (dualism)? — Andrew M

Following on from the point I made above about the resemblance between the hard problem of consciousness and the neural binding problem, I see the issue in terms of the subjective unity of perception. Kant's analysis of it revolved around what he designated 'transcendental apperception'.

I question (4), as I don't see 'the unity of self' as an object of experience, but as an attribute of consciousness.

I think (5) is central to defeating the eliminativist (Dennett's) argument. The 'acts of synthesis' that are referred to, is the synthesis of perception, sensation, and reason that comprises every act of judgement, or of thought, proper. And I say that is not an object of scientific analysis, in the sense that many other subjects are, because it is internal to the act of knowing, and so is not characterised by the subject-object relation that characterises objective knowledge generally (per Husserl's critique below). There is no 'I-it' division in this relationship. This is why 'eliminative materialism' can't admit it, as it simply doesn't fit into the subject-object model which is assumed by naturalism. It can't see what is actually seeing. This is the 'blind spot of science'.

I think Husserl's criticism of naturalism is still cogent.

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness.

He criticizes Descartes and also Kant for treating consciousness as a part of the world:

Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point of departure, for Husserl. Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, though, of course, Husserl believes the Kantian way of articulating the consciousness—world relation was itself distorted since it still postulated the thing in itself.

[Routledge intro to phenomenology p144]

Again as far as conscious experience goes, it's just experience as far as we are concerned. — Mr Bee

And this is the Strawson argument. That because we have experience, somehow we can't study it and understand it more scientifically, as if not having experience of being a computer program is somehow an advantage to understanding computer programs. It's a pitiful argument, a great example of human preciousness.

Meanwhile, science ploughs on, understanding more and more about consciousness, how it works, what constitutes it, and all that the likes of Strawson can do is insist that, while they cannot describe consciousness beyond 'if you got it, you know it', whatever it is that scientists are studying definitely can't be it (begging the question). If this impresses you, okay.

Dennet isn't saying that we can't use observation. We have to observe the underlying mechanical process after all. What he means by "fundamental" is "its small component parts that make up the whole." Its like H2O are elementary (fundamental) parts of water. You can't do science with "water", but you can do science with H20. Water is the "illusion" (Dennet's poor word choice that I personally wouldn't use) and H20 are the fundamental building blocks. Same with your brain and consciousness. I think everyone can accept that. — Philosophim

The "small component parts" would still be part of the "illusion", so Dennett can't ever escape his own visual illusion - even when talking about "fundamental" parts of a whole. His and your explanation sound visual to me. You can only hypothesize about the components by observing the "illusion".

And calling them elementary parts of water while in the same breath calling water an illusion just makes those elementary parts part of the illusion. It makes no sense whatsoever to call them elementary parts when the whole that they are part of is an illusion. That means that the parts aren't parts or components of anything at all, if what they compose is an illusion.

Water is the "illusion" (Dennet's poor word choice that I personally wouldn't use) — Philosophim

That's fine. What word would you choose to use?

Sure, Dennet isn't denying this either. I swim in water, I don't swim in H20. The idea of H20 for my day to day purposes isn't going to matter. But if I'm a scientist, the fundamentals of why I'm able to swim in water deal with the molecular chemistry and forces involved. Dennet is trying to understand how consciousness, "the illusion" functions on a molecular chemistry level so he can understand it at a scientific level. And thank goodness. Can you imagine if we had people denying the idea of chemistry for water? We would never figure it out!

Now does that mean that the "illusion" is useless to study? Not at all. For my purposes, water is great to drink. Its just useless for Dennet's purposes, which is to discover the underlying fundamentals that produce the result. — Philosophim

But what if consciousness doesn't operate at the molecular level? Does studying the solar system give you complete knowledge into how the Milky Way galaxy works?

You seem to think that there are no such things as macro-sized objects, or processes - only microscopic ones, and that these things can't look different depending on which size scale, or distance, we are observing them from.

Observing a process from far away vs close up changes the way the process appears, but it is still the same process. The difference is not based the observed process being different from different vantage points, but our sensory systems' relationship with the process being different from different vantage points.

In other words, people here keep making category errors about what it is that they are talking about. We can only ever talk about anything in the world AFTER it has interacted with our body. In essence what we talk about is this interaction - never some process prior to its interaction with our body or some other measuring device. We can only talk about our measurements of the world, of which consciousness is a type of measurement. This means that brains and their neurons would be our conscious description and measurement of other minds. It's not other brains out there (naive realism), it's other minds, and brains are how some consciousness measures other minds (indirect realism).

The "small component parts" would still be part of the "illusion", so Dennett can't ever escape his own visual illusion - even when talking about "fundamental" parts of a whole. His and your explanation sound visual to me. You can only hypothesize about the components by observing the "illusion" — Harry Hindu

I agree 100%. I am merely trying to break down what Dennet is saying. It doesn't mean I agree with him. I would define things as "Identities for particular purposes". Dennet isn't interested in studying the identity of consciousness as a personal experience, because he's not a psychologist. He's trying to get to the mechanical underpinnings that lead directly to consciousness. Of course, the mechanical underpinnings of the mind have further underpinnings like chemistry and physics. Even the atoms break down into quarks and electrons. Now Dennet may need fundamental chemistry to understand the mechanical processes, but he generally doesn't need that to observe how the mechanical processes work.

Of course, a psychologist or sociologist might be more interested in how consciousnesses work together. At that point, you don't necessarily need to understand the underlying physical workings of consciousness, just its expression. The identification becomes important depending on what you're trying to find out. In Dennets case, he's trying to find the underpinnings behind the personal consciousness we experience. So of course the result is not his concern, but the cause.

In

But what if consciousness doesn't operate at the molecular level? — Harry Hindu

That would need to be proven. So far, all every bit of scientific evidence points to consciousness being a physical process of the mind. You can zap a brain with electricity and change what a person is sensing and feeling. Check out videos and records when people have to have open brain surgery. Look up Phineus Gage https://www.verywellmind.com/phineas-gage-2795244

You are your brain. There is zero evidence that there is something separate from molecules and energy. Beyond Dennet, there is no, "what if" about this. Now if you wish to believe there is a soul or something separate, that's fine. Personally believe what you want to get you through your day and be a good person. But that is a personal belief, and has no basis in fact or reality. This is indisputable at this point in our scientific understanding. Any objection to this has no grounds in reality.

Observing a process from far away vs close up changes the way the process appears, but it is still the same process. The difference is not based the observed process being different from different vantage points, but our sensory systems' relationship with the process being different from different vantage points. — Harry Hindu

It's not other brains out there (naive realism), it's other minds, and brains are how some consciousness measures other minds (indirect realism). — Harry Hindu

Do you see the contradiction you made? You made the same mistake you just warned me about. There is no separation between mind and brain. When we observe it at a particular level, we see a brain. When we measure our personal experience, we observe a mind. But they're really just the same thing, looked at in a different way.

Of course to get TECHNICAL, we could say that the mind is merely one part of the brain. After all, there's a lot going on there that we don't really have any say or control over. So far I haven't been able to control my digestion or fat storage production. That's all regulated by the brain, but not the mind part of my brain.

But the mind part of the brain is a physical real thing. If we understand the mechanics behind it, we could understand how we work a lot better.

Of course to get TECHNICAL, we could say that the mind is merely one part of the brain. After all, there's a lot going on there that we don't really have any say or control over. So far I haven't been able to control my digestion or fat storage production. That's all regulated by the brain, but not the mind part of my brain. — Philosophim

:up:

Do you know anything about relevant research? — Srap Tasmaner

Relevant to what?

You're better off asking @Isaac about neurology things.

Attention reference: I'm sure you've seen this experiment regarding attention and experience before. How much you pay attention to stuff constrains what you see - of all the possible perceptual features formable during a given interaction, the ones that end up having phenomenal character (presence in subjective awareness) vary with how a person's situated and the task they're doing.

Brain damage reference: people with agnosia are interesting, like those who can describe faces in terms of shape, colour, geometry, features... But not recognise who they're looking at. Highlighting that categorisation; seeing x as y; can decouple from experiences of x and being aware that it is y

When referencing the idea that categorisation was a component part of experience, what I had in mind was the theory of constructed emotion.

That "self evident upon introspection" and "correct and informative about the introspected event" are very much distinguished has a long history. Introspection about who we are, what we think, what we feel and explanations thereof are more post-hoc conjecture and revisionary history than the Cartesian immediacy we intuitively feel. "I know how I feel and why I feel it!", yeah, no we don't.

Introspection about who we are, what we think, what we feel and explanations thereof are more post-hoc conjecture and revisionary history than the conception of immediacy which is relied upon to treat awareness of "a quale" as a demonstration that they exist. — fdrake

If a quale is a note and experience is a cohesive symphony, is it that there is something artificial and partially false about breaking experience apart in that way? As opposed to a rejection of experience altogether?

If a quale is a note and experience is a cohesive symphony, is it that there is something artificial and partially false about breaking experience apart in that way? As opposed to a rejection of experience altogether? — frank

There's something here. The concept of qualia may idealize sensations, literally. That is to say, it maps sets of sensations (confused, intermingled, fleeting, complex, diverse) into simple and perhaps simplistic idealized primary sensations, similar to Plato's ideals: "the color red", which is in fact a set of many distinguisable colors and nuances, influenced by other colors near it; "the taste of cabbage", which in fact depends on how you cook it and zillions other factors including the drink (beer is recommended); or the "E note", which covers conceptually an infinity of different sounds.

In this sense, the concept of "qualia" is perhaps a useful simplification to bridge the gap between sensations and concepts. It's an illusion (because idealizations are in the final analysis always too simple to be true) but one that helps us describe our sensations. "His face suddenly turned red". "She ended on a high C."

In this sense, the concept of "qualia" is perhaps a useful simplification to bridge the gap between sensations and concepts. — Olivier5

Or maybe qualia is the source of both. Honestly, I think grappling with the meaning of that word takes us away from what Dennett wants to say. He's denying that we have experiences of any kind in the way most people think of it.

So when a person says that we know about conscious experience by direct introspection, that's really not saying anything startling.

Chalmers suggested that there might really be something odd about Dennett's brain such that he doesn't have experiences like other humans.

Honestly, I think grappling with the meaning of that word takes us away from what Dennett wants to say. He's denying that we have experiences of any kind in the way most people think of it. — frank

So how does he account for experience? Does he try to account for it at all?

I agree 100%. I am merely trying to break down what Dennet is saying. It doesn't mean I agree with him. I would define things as "Identities for particular purposes". — Philosophim

I think that fits with my use of the term, "measurement". Colors, shapes, sounds, tastes, smells and tactile sensations and feelings are all measurements for a particular purpose. I think Outlander was using "sensory data", which I also like. In essence, consciousness is working memory that contains sensory information (measurements) for achieving a particular goal (purpose).

The "personal experience", or the subjective nature of the identities has to do with how the identities present themselves as including information about location relative to the body, or sensory/measuring device.

Dennet isn't interested in studying the identity of consciousness as a personal experience, because he's not a psychologist. He's trying to get to the mechanical underpinnings that lead directly to consciousness. Of course, the mechanical underpinnings of the mind have further underpinnings like chemistry and physics. Even the atoms break down into quarks and electrons. Now Dennet may need fundamental chemistry to understand the mechanical processes, but he generally doesn't need that to observe how the mechanical processes work.

Of course, a psychologist or sociologist might be more interested in how consciousnesses work together. At that point, you don't necessarily need to understand the underlying physical workings of consciousness, just its expression. The identification becomes important depending on what you're trying to find out. In Dennets case, he's trying to find the underpinnings behind the personal consciousness we experience. So of course the result is not his concern, but the cause. — Philosophim

But that's the problem - explaining how "mechanical" processes causally influence, or interacts with, "personal experiences". How can you even get started with providing a good theory if you're just going to deny the existence, or at least the importance, of the very thing that you are trying to explain by observing its underpinnings (underpinnings of what, and for what purpose?)?

How can one even say that they are the causal underpinnings of consciousness when they can't even explain how the cause is causally related with the effect?

You seem to be saying that the "mechanical" processes have further underpinnings what I would assume that you would refer to as "physical". These terms are sensory terms. They could actually mean that what we are talking about are measurements. Everything that is "mechanical" or "physical" is a measurement, or an amalgam of measurements. Coffee is its taste, smell, temperature, visual (black liquid) and sound of being poured or sipped. You might point to coffee's chemistry and atomic structure, as a means of innovating the production of coffee, but it is all ultimately for the "personal experience" of the taste and smell of coffee for which the underpinnings are investigated.

The "parts" and "wholes" are comparisons of views, or a comparison of measuring scales, like comparing millimeters to light-years and nano-seconds to centuries. Each of these measurements "make up" the larger scales, but those smaller measurements just aren't useful on such large scales, and vice versa. So I would reject your use of "fundamental" and instead say that there are certain scales that are useful, depending on what purpose we are trying to achieve.

But what if consciousness doesn't operate at the molecular level? — Harry Hindu

That would need to be proven. So far, all every bit of scientific evidence points to consciousness being a physical process of the mind. You can zap a brain with electricity and change what a person is sensing and feeling. Check out videos and records when people have to have open brain surgery. Look up Phineus Gage https://www.verywellmind.com/phineas-gage-2795244

You are your brain. There is zero evidence that there is something separate from molecules and energy. Beyond Dennet, there is no, "what if" about this. Now if you wish to believe there is a soul or something separate, that's fine. Personally believe what you want to get you through your day and be a good person. But that is a personal belief, and has no basis in fact or reality. This is indisputable at this point in our scientific understanding. Any objection to this has no grounds in reality. — Philosophim

I think you misunderstood. Brains are not molecular-sized objects. Neurons are. And neurons are made up of atoms, which are made up of quarks. A brain is a part of an organism. Organisms are part of a social group or species, etc. Between which layer does consciousness lie, and how do you explain the causal relationship between the upper and lower (underpinning) layers?

Do you see the contradiction you made? You made the same mistake you just warned me about. There is no separation between mind and brain. When we observe it at a particular level, we see a brain. When we measure our personal experience, we observe a mind. But they're really just the same thing, looked at in a different way.

Of course to get TECHNICAL, we could say that the mind is merely one part of the brain. After all, there's a lot going on there that we don't really have any say or control over. So far I haven't been able to control my digestion or fat storage production. That's all regulated by the brain, but not the mind part of my brain.

But the mind part of the brain is a physical real thing. If we understand the mechanics behind it, we could understand how we work a lot better. — Philosophim

Unfortunately, I don't see the contradiction. I need a better explanation. But it does seem that you contradicted yourself. You said before that I am my brain, but now you say that I am merely one part of my brain. Some would argue that they are their body, as a brain isn't very useful without a body.

If your part of the brain doesn't regulate digestion then are you saying that you don't make conscious choices about what and when to eat and then dump the waste? Do you regularly piss and shit your pants with no control? Are choices "physical"? How does a choice causally influence what the stomach digests?

So how does he account for experience? Does he try to account for it at all? — Olivier5

He allows that humans see and hear and so forth, but denies that there is any conscious experience associated with those functions. What is taken for conscious experience is the result of something like verbal streams.

He allows that humans see and hear and so forth, but denies that there is any conscious experience associated with those functions. What is taken for conscious experience is the result of something like verbal streams. — frank

That's very generous of him. But how can he speak for other people than himself, though? These things are eminently personal. How does he know that others think the same way as he does?

He may be unconscious of his own sensations out of some sort of personal mental deficiency. At least that's theoretically possible. So how does the first person proposition "I Dennet feel no consciousness" translate into the bold generality that "Nobody can feel consciousness." ???

Do you prefer ghosts (idealism), machines (eliminativism) or both (dualism)? Pick your poison. — Andrew M

Machines made of ghosts made of machines made of ghosts.