I think we should leave a room for fair competition. Eg in business or sports, when you're trying to win but in a fair way.

I think the same applies.

However, when in business or sports one is simply trying to win, and does not have the intention of hurting or helping others, then perhaps it is not a matter of morality.

And if in such a situation one does hurt others (without any intention) it is only a matter of ignorance. Again, potentially just as destructive, but different in its nature.

Come to think of it, I wonder if the definitions I have given could be extended to include actions to hurt or help oneself as well.

Thoughts? — Tzeentch

I think Kant more or less nailed this when he concluded that a) since we are not omnipotent, all that can really be expected from someone is to will good, but b) "willing" is different from hoping or wishing, and includes considering not just the end in question, but the means to that end as well, as an integral part.

Since all human action flows from a maxim, to an end, to the means to that end, the good will is not fully realized unless it encompasses both the end and the means.

Which opens the question of "fair" with respect to the rules, or fair under some extended notion of fairness? Which of course are blended on the palette, but in exclusive or absolute immanence or transcendence are meaningless and impossible.

A truly moral act therefore needs to be made with good intentions, but also with the understanding required to achieve the intended effect. — Tzeentch

I'd like to modify the last clause to just, " but also with requisite understanding." This reflecting the necessary distinction between intending and doing, and actually getting done. "The best laid plans...". And just this distinction is part of the history of morality, of the movement from efficacy to the good. Always a work-in-progress, but with notable progress c. 1500 BC - 300 AD. A much finer focus settling on Socrates and also New Testament Christianity.

A good point, though it seems ignorance may yet encompass such errors. Let's assume they are 'unforeseen circumstances', doesn't that classify as ignorance?

Let's assume they are 'unforeseen circumstances', doesn't that classify as ignorance? — Tzeentch

Doesn't this then reduce to good intentions? What we're really describing here is expectations. Part of making a moral choice is an expectation of an outcome for a given course of action. The actor can only act on likely outcomes based on prior experience and incomplete reason. An expectation of an outcome of one's own actions is an intent.

Doesn't this then reduce to good intentions? What we're really describing here is expectations. Part of making a moral choice is an expectation of an outcome for a given course of action. The actor can only act on likely outcomes based on prior experience and incomplete reason. An expectation of an outcome of one's own actions is an intent. — Kenosha Kid

Another good point. Though I'm not sure it reduces the problem to good intentions, but it does pose a problem.

Since a person can never be said to be completely certain of anything, he is always to a degree ignorant, and therefore is not capable of a perfectly moral act.

Perhaps then such a perfectly moral act should be regarded as a distant ideal?

The concept of agency explains all that's required of a moral person or society. There shouldn't be a confusion as to the intention, understanding, rationality of a moral agent. I think when we describe a rational agent, we do cover all that's necessary for a moral argument. Otherwise, we need to examine our own understanding of what a moral agent is.

If there's a question as to the person's ignorance that potentially could bring so much destruction to others, then we need to ask why this person's ignorance could bring such devastation results. Is this person irrational, as in, mentally incapable of understanding the consequences of his actions? Then what is his society doing to address it?

While he may not be called immoral, his agency is certainly deficient -- a moral society would want to do something about that.

An act of a person is moral if it is done with the intention of helping another. — Tzeentch

The question I see being problematic with this is what if helping one person inadvertently, or perhaps even knowingly, harms someone else?

An act of a person is immoral if it done with the intention of hurting another. — Tzeentch

Again, basically the same point with this. What if intentionally harming someone helps someone else?

And if in such a situation one does hurt others (without any intention) it is only a matter of ignorance. — Tzeentch

What if it is intentional, like when a boxer intentionally inflicts as much damage as possible within the rules in order to win the match? Perhaps the contractual nature of boxing, and sports in general, eliminates morality? If I say it’s ok for you to intentionally harm me, is it actually ok?

Since a person can never be said to be completely certain of anything, he is always to a degree ignorant, and therefore is not capable of a perfectly moral act. — Tzeentch

Just thinking out loud here, but maybe you could argue that a perfectly moral act actually requires some level of ignorance. I find it difficult to think of an act that is essentially vacuous, that only affects one person at one particular time and place. Because of this, it is likely that what helps one person may unknowingly harm someone else. So, if one were omnipotent, and was aware of these unforeseen consequences, would s/he even be capable of only intending to do good? Basically, I think most, perhaps all, moral acts are the type of situation where doing A helps B, but harms C. If we have full understanding, then doing A is intentionally causing both harm and help at the same time, which isn’t perfectly moral.

Which opens the question of "fair" with respect to the rules, or fair under some extended notion of fairness? — tim wood

As you must know, there's the law and then there's the spirit of the law. The two are always a bit askew.

the good will is not fully realized unless it encompasses both the end and the means. — Echarmion

Well said, the ramifications being, 1.) intentionality towards others is moot, subsumed under obligation regardless of others, and 2.) morality is the a priori condition for, but not the determination of, the act that follows from it. Sometimes, the moral thing to do is to do nothing, and sometimes the moral thing to do is not done.

Of course, all that presupposes humanity in general actually seeks a full realization of a good will, and, which usually kicks deontology out of the batter’s box, presupposes that the theoretical tenet given by pure practical reason....

“...Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will.”

.....is worth a damn.

I think a well intentioned person "believes they are being moral, and desires to be moral", but their actions may result in immoral outcomes. Ignorance in this case is causing evil, which is immoral. Thus we credit that if the person's ignorance was erased, they would cease to cause immoral consequences with their actions.

So it is the ignorance that is the root cause of evil in this case. But is the person committing an action which results in an immoral outcome? Yes. Good intentions are wonderful because if we erase the ignorance, we hope the person will not commit evil anymore. But the ignorant person is still committing evil. The difference is that ignorance is what must be stopped, not the person themselves.

As you must know, there's the law and then there's the spirit of the law. The two are always a bit askew. — Olivier5

And those blended on the palette.

I think a well intentioned person "believes they are being moral, and desires to be moral", but their actions may result in immoral outcomes. Ignorance in this case is causing evil, which is immoral. Thus we credit that if the person's ignorance was erased, they would cease to cause immoral consequences with their actions.

So it is the ignorance that is the root cause of evil in this case. But is the person committing an action which results in an immoral outcome? Yes. Good intentions are wonderful because if we erase the ignorance, we hope the person will not commit evil anymore. But the ignorant person is still committing evil. The difference is that ignorance is what must be stopped, not the person themselves. — Philosophim

The idea is that we can determine a moral judgement on the action by evaluating the most probable intentional state - but we need to recognise that the complexity of this state is irreducibly four-dimensional, in the sense that a wavefunction is four-dimensional. The morality judgement of an intentional state is a relational structure consisting of conjugate variables: here described as awareness/ignorance and intention; which aligns in behaviour to attention and effort. If you assign an objective value to one, then your determination is always uncertain relative to the other.

So, it’s not so much a matter of simply stopping the ignorance. It’s more a matter of interacting with others in such a way that we strive to increase awareness, connection and collaboration. When we isolate or exclude others, we invite ignorant intent.

If you assign an objective value to one, then your determination is always uncertain relative to the other. — Possibility

How so?

So, it’s not so much a matter of simply stopping the ignorance. It’s more a matter of interacting with others in such a way that we strive to increase awareness, connection and collaboration. When we isolate or exclude others, we invite ignorant intent. — Possibility

This is not negating the point that ignorance is the problem. You are simply introducing one of many ways to prevent ignorance.

Come to think of it, I wonder if the definitions I have given could be extended to include actions to hurt or help oneself as well. — Tzeentch

Well, this implicates the good will. If I am to help myself, am I allowed to hurt others, and still be moral? Or the other way around.

Well, this implicates the good will. If I am to help myself, am I allowed to hurt others, and still be moral? — god must be atheist

This gave me to deeper thoughts: Why is it good to be moral? Why is it important for us to prove to others we are moral? Why is it that all of us make moral measuring sticks that favour ourselves, our philosophies, our world and political views?

What is it about morality that all winners want it to be by their side?

What's the importance of being ernest, of being moral?

If you assign an objective value to one, then your determination is always uncertain relative to the other.
— Possibility

How so? — Philosophim

In hindsight, this was poorly worded, sorry. We can determine an action to have a good/bad effect only in relation to an observer; we judge the act to be moral/immoral by relating that position to the awareness/intention of the causal agent. So, when we assign an objective value, we define an observer position, to which the other value will always be relative.

When a causal agent is determined to be well-intentioned in relation to a bad action, they are assumed ignorant in relation to this determination; or if ignorance is determined as the cause, then we assume the agent’s intentions were good. Once you determine one, the other is judged relative to that determination, and cannot then be independently determined by the observer with any certainty in itself.

A judgement of ‘immoral’ determines either that one was aware (and perceived themselves capable) of better alternatives to a bad action, or that their intentions were bad. But not both - one judgement is always assumed relative to the other. If you’re convinced that a person’s intentions were evil, they cannot possibly be ignorant of the potential for a better action. Alternatively, if you determine that someone was aware of alternatives to a bad action, their intentions cannot have been good. We don’t even entertain the possibility. But in truth, we cannot be certain of both simultaneously.

It seems there’s a lot of subjectivity concealed in moral judgement - we always bring our relative position to the table. The more affected I am by the outcome, I am less likely to perceive the agent as ignorant. The more evil I judge the outcome, I am less likely to perceive the agent’s intentions as good.

So, it’s not so much a matter of simply stopping the ignorance. It’s more a matter of interacting with others in such a way that we strive to increase awareness, connection and collaboration. When we isolate or exclude others, we invite ignorant intent.
— Possibility

This is not negating the point that ignorance is the problem. You are simply introducing one of many ways to prevent ignorance. — Philosophim

You’re referring to ‘ignorance’ as if it’s an event in itself that must be stopped - but that’s just shifting the ‘problem of evil’. Ignorance/awareness is a property of intention, as is isolation/connection and exclusion/collaboration. The way I see it, it isn’t just one of many ways to prevent ignorance: there IS no other way to reduce it. You either interact with the causal agent to increase mutual awareness, connection, or collaboration, or you interact in the same way with an agent who will. That’s all.

We can determine an action to have a good/bad effect only in relation to an observer; we judge the act to be moral/immoral by relating that position to the awareness/intention of the causal agent. — Possibility

That is one way to attribute it. I believe what I was talking about was moral outcome, not intentions. If in my ignorance I accidently kill a person, my action resulted in an immoral outcome. A repeat of that action, would also result in the same immoral outcome. Moral intentions are nice, but they don't prevent the murder. Ignorance is the true cause in the proposed case, as we're assuming the person would be willing to make a choice that would result in a moral outcome if only they know the consequences of their action.

There's an old saying, "The road to hell is paved with good intentions". What I would attribute to the person though is, "Moral intent". Which, as you stated, if they have all of the information and capability available to make a moral action, we run into the binary result you proposed. However, people are not always aware of the information needed to make a moral outcome. It is tragic when a person has moral intent, but ignorance causes them to do immoral things.

But to add to what you are further saying, I agree that if one realizes the dangers of ignorance, a moral action would be to seek to remove it. If a person is unaware that they are ignorant, or how to solve that ignorance however, it may require others to come into the picture, or a the person to stumble into the result and learn "the hard way".

So in the end, while it is a nice description of moral intentions, that wasn't the point I was addressing. What about moral outcomes? If an ignorant person commits an immoral action with good intentions, what is the true evil here? Is it the person? Is it ignorance? Is it something else?

The question I see being problematic with this is what if helping one person inadvertently, or perhaps even knowingly, harms someone else? — Pinprick

Again, basically the same point with this. What if intentionally harming someone helps someone else? — Pinprick

So in these cases one's intentions do not match the actual results. In other words, despite one's best intentions one was ignorant of what was required to achieve the desired results. This would belong in a category that may be called 'naive morality' or 'naive immorality'. One's actions are moral (or immoral), but one is not able to act in a way that brings these intentions about.

For example:

A friend needs help with a psychological problem, but despite one's best efforts, instead of helping this friend one only makes his problem worse.

That would be an example of 'naive moral' behavior.

What if it is intentional, like when a boxer intentionally inflicts as much damage as possible within the rules in order to win the match? Perhaps the contractual nature of boxing, and sports in general, eliminates morality? If I say it’s ok for you to intentionally harm me, is it actually ok? — Pinprick

That depends.

If the intention of the boxer is to win, and hurting his opponent is an unintended side-effect, then I do not think he is being immoral, but possibly ignorant (if he deals more damage than he intends).

If the intention of the boxer is expressly to hurt his opponent, I would say we are certainly in immoral territory.

There is an added dimension of consent in the fact that both boxers agree to being physically hurt by each other in the practice of their sport. I think in this case there's an agreement between the two parties and ideally both parties are aware of what is 'acceptable' hurt to inflict upon each other.

There is of course a difference between having to intention to bloody someone's nose, or trying to deliver brain damage. The other party would likely consent to the former, but not the latter. So in the former case I'd say the behavior isn't immoral, but in the second case it might be.

Just thinking out loud here, but maybe you could argue that a perfectly moral act actually requires some level of ignorance. I find it difficult to think of an act that is essentially vacuous, that only affects one person at one particular time and place. Because of this, it is likely that what helps one person may unknowingly harm someone else. So, if one were omnipotent, and was aware of these unforeseen consequences, would s/he even be capable of only intending to do good? Basically, I think most, perhaps all, moral acts are the type of situation where doing A helps B, but harms C. If we have full understanding, then doing A is intentionally causing both harm and help at the same time, which isn’t perfectly moral. — Pinprick

Lets take our friend with a psychological problem again. Lets say I want to help him, and I succeed in doing so. Who or what would be the party that is harmed in this example?

I think a well intentioned person "believes they are being moral, and desires to be moral", but their actions may result in immoral outcomes. — Philosophim

The way I view morality is, that only actions performed by moral agents can be said to be either moral or immoral. So an outcome (not being an action) cannot be said to be moral or immoral, as far as my views go.

The way I view morality is, that only moral agents can be said to be either moral or immoral. So an outcome (not being a moral agent itself) cannot be said to be moral or immoral, as far as my views go. — Tzeentch

I agree to an extent. I'll clarify my statement better. Yes, agency is needed to determine morality. We don't consider a comet immoral if it destroys the Earth. Moral intents are that a particular outcome should occur. The outcome of a person's moral intentions would be called moral outcomes. One can have good intentions, but still produce immoral outcomes. Morality is the question of, "If I do this, will the result in X"? So I believe we cannot speak fully about morality if we do not also talk about its outcomes.

Does that make sense?

I find it interesting that you make a distinction between moral/immoral outcomes, actions and intentions, but not persons.

I don’t consider an ‘outcome’ to be moral/immoral - I think this is a misattribution of ‘moral’ judgement. There are good and bad outcomes of an action for you, me, us, or others, just as I mentioned there are good and bad actions relative to the observer. Morality always refers to a behaviour, though, not to the action or its outcome.

If in my ignorance I accidentally kill a person, this outcome says nothing about the value of my intentions - which may have been only to maim, or it may have been to help them. If an ignorant person intends to help someone but instead causes their death, why should any aspect be subject to moral judgement? Must there be ‘true evil’ found here? Something terrible happened, sure. But why are you looking for something to blame it on?

So in these cases one's intentions do not match the actual results. In other words, despite one's best intentions one was ignorant of what was required to achieve the desired results. — Tzeentch

No, the intentions do match. I think you may be misunderstanding me. I intend to help Bill, and in fact do help him, but doing so also harms Tom, either intentionally or not intentionally. The other case is just the inverse of this. I intend to harm Bill, and do so, but doing so also helps Tom, either intentionally or not intentionally.

Lets take our friend with a psychological problem again. Lets say I want to help him, and I succeed in doing so. Who or what would be the party that is harmed in this example? — Tzeentch

Well, it depends on how picky you want to be. Perhaps I could argue that I am harmed in this situation, because you aren’t helping me with my psychological issues. Basically, isn’t it very likely that there is also someone other than this friend that you could have spent your time helping, but didn’t, and that they suffered as a result of that? These types of scenarios seem unavoidable to me since we can’t be everywhere at once. We end up having to choose who we help, and who we don’t help, with the limited amount of time we have. Also, I think there is a case to be made for neglecting oneself in the service of others, or vice versa.

I think I understand what you're saying, but I'm not on board with this. I think it should be argued from a neutral situation, being "No one is helped", so whoever I manage to successfully help it's a net positive.

But that isn’t the case. Someone is helped, it’s just that someone else is also harmed, and the intent doesn’t provide a clear decision on how to judge the act. If you know an act will cause harm and help, can you perform that act without intending to both help and cause harm? I don’t think you can. So if you try to live according to the maxim do (or intend) no harm it will actually cause you to also do no good.

I don’t think intention is enough. I think it should be intention and consent. So if someone tries to “help” me by buying me a brand new suit with my credit card because he thought it would help he’s still in the wrong. As long as there is the “expected harm” (chance of harm x magnitude of harm) of doing something is comparable to the expected harm of not doing it consent should be required regardless of intention. So it’s fine to save someone from being run over for examples because the expected harm of doing so is almost nothing in comparison to the expected harm of not doing so.

Isn't this covered by ignorance, though?

And if someone successfully manages to help someone else, isn't consent implied here?

Isn't this covered by ignorance, though? — Tzeentch

I don't know what "this" is.

And if someone successfully manages to help someone else, isn't consent implied here? — Tzeentch

No I don't think so. If I buy a new suit for you with your credit card without asking and luckily you actually had an interview soon and your suit had been stolen or something, I have helped you, but I didn't do something right, and I still didn't have your consent. The reason being that buying the suit had a higher expected harm than not buying the suit (unless you were looking for a suit I would just be wasting your money) so I shouldn't have bought the suit even though it panned out.

The probem with "helping others" is you don't know if you're being an actual help or if you're harming them in some way, that's why I think "help" without consent is wrong even if it pans out (even if I just saved your interview I still shouldn't have bought that suit without asking)