So if I throw a ball in the air I should act as if it may or may not come back down again? — Isaac

You're welcome to, especially if you manage to exceed escape velocity.

Another thing you could do is read about indeterminism. :-)

You're welcome to — Olivier5

I didn't ask your permission, I asked if you think I ought to.

Yes, you ought to, if you can send the ball faster than 11km per second.

Yes, you ought to, if you can send the ball faster than 11km per second. — Olivier5

No, just an ordinary human throw.

Then it would depend where the ball goes, what's its trajectory compared to other stuff out there. Like it could get stuck in a tree branch or something... :-)

it would depend where the ball goes, what's its trajectory compared to other stuff out there. Like it could get stuck in a tree branch or something... :-) — Olivier5

So you're saying that whether the ball comes down or not is determined by factors in the environment?

Not fully determined, no. Indeterminism doesn't deny some causation and determination. It just says that "not everything is predetermined".

Indeterminism doesn't deny some causation and determination. It just says that "not everything is predetermined". — Olivier5

So how do we decide which things are predetermined and which are not (or to what extent)?

Science, anyone?

Science, anyone? — Olivier5

Not sure what you mean.

I mean: by science.

I mean: by science — Olivier5

You mean gathering and analysing evidence, yes?

Yes.

Yes. — Olivier5

So when you said "We can also get rid of determinism" with regards to the causes of our behaviour you presumably mean "...only on the basis of evidence that it can be so discarded in this case"

So what would your evidence be?

I see it differently. Modern science tells us that not every single event can be predicted, and that kinda points to the indeterminist world view. In this context, determinism bears the burden of proof. And determinism is a very hard claim to make and defend based on facts or logic.

Modern science tells us that not every single event can be predicted, and that kinda points to the indeterminist world view. In this context, determinism bears the burden of proof. — Olivier5

This seems like a very odd approach. Scientific theories suggest the some quantum scale events might possibly be not determined and you take that as reason to presume every pairing of cause and effect in the world is indeterminate unless proven otherwise?

Seems something of an overreaction.

Scientific theories suggest the some quantum scale events might possibly be not determined and you take that as reason to presume every pairing of cause and effect in the world is indeterminate unless proven otherwise? — Isaac

Just saying: the scientific evidence so far points to indeterminism.

What's your evidence that the present state of affairs in the universe - our discussion here included -- was fully predetermined as early as a split-second after the Big Bang?

Just saying: the evidence so far points to indeterminism. — Olivier5

But it doesn't, not in the least bit. It points to the fact that there may be (perhaps even more likely than not), indeterminacy at quantum scales. All the evidence we have so far, from classic physics to just plain experience, is that this resolves somehow to almost complete determinism at human scales.

What's your evidence that the present state of affairs in the universe - our discussion here included -- was fully predetermined as early a split-second after the Big Bang? — Olivier5

I've never made such a claim, so I'm not sure why you would think I'd have evidence for it ready to hand.

All the evidence we have so far, from classic physics to just plain experience, is that this resolves somehow to almost complete determinism at human scales. — Isaac

I don't think so. Complex systems -- eg living organisms -- are not fully deterministic. Biology is not fully deterministic in its outlook. It doesn't claim that life is fully determined by chemistry.

Also, the world is one. Your brain is made of quanta. Everytime you see fluorescence, you see a quantic phenomenon. Evolution works through mutations which are mostly due to radioactivity, a quantic phenomenon. Hence mutations can't be predicted. Hence evolution can't be predicted. Etc etc.

I don't think so. Complex systems -- eg living organisms -- are not fully deterministic. — Olivier5

That's not something the evidence points towards at all (as in distinguishing true indeterminism from mere pragmatic uncertainty). Notwithstanding that, it would still be the case that the vast majority of biological processes are considered to be classicly causally determined. The whole of science is based on the principle that one variable is a function of another. How far do you think you'd get in investigating biological systems without the presumption that a change in some variable causes a determinate change in the related one?

Your brain is made of quanta. Everytime you see fluorescence, you see a quantic phenomenon. Evolution works through mutations which are mostly due to radioactivity, a quantic phenomenon. Hence mutations can't be predicted. Etc etc. — Olivier5

None of which has any bearing on the extent to which these effects resolve to determinism at the scale of mental proceses.


You seem to have taken some sketchy and speculative theories at the fringe of very specific fields and decided that their existence should shift the presumption of cause and effect on which our entire interaction with the world is built. I just wonder if it's worth it.

Determinism is a needless hypothesis. It's not proven, and merges on the metaphysical. It also leads to logical contradictions. Hold on to it at your own risk.

You seem to have taken some sketchy and speculative theories at the fringe of very specific fields and decided that their existence should shift the presumption of cause and effect on which our entire interaction with the world is built. I just wonder if it's worth it. — Isaac

QM is a little more than "a sketchy and speculative fringe theory", I think. I would rather integrated QM in my world view than consider it a mere detail, unworthy of my attention... I think it's worth it.

But to each his own. Your philosophy is quite classical, verging on the medieval sometimes. Mine is more current.

QM is a little more than "a sketchy and speculative fringe theory", I think. — Olivier5

We weren't talking about QM. We were talking about theories where it doesn't just resolve into determinism at the scale of biological processes. Theories proposing that kind of effect (the kind that could act as initiators for behaviour, for example) are definitely sketchy and speculative.

Your philosophy is quite classical, verging on the medieval sometimes. Mine is more current. — Olivier5

We are talking here about determinism in the context of behavioural causality or neurological decision-making processes. What 'current' experts use your approach?

Your philosophy is quite classical, verging on the medieval sometimes. Mine is more current. — Olivier5

I thought I was getting a sense of déjà vu from this conversation so I checked back through my posts and indeed I've had virtually this exact discussion before. Anyway, I found this quote from Chris Koch.

Although brains obey quantum mechanics, they do not seem to exploit any of its special features. Molecular machines, such as the light-amplifying components of photoreceptors, pre- and post-synaptic receptors and the voltage- and ligand-gated channel proteins that span cellular membranes and underpin neuronal excitability, are so large that they can be treated as classical objects. — Koch C., Hepp K. (2006). Quantum mechanics in the brain. Nature

Or is 2006 too medieval for you?

Yeah, I can't really stand "...therefore X doesn't exist" conclusions (where X is some common feature of our language). I think, 'well what on earth have we all been talking about all this time then?'. — Isaac

Sometimes you may want to conclude that what we've been talking about all this time is not what we thought it was, or that it's just not a well-formed concept, and we may be better off leaving it alone than trying to precisify it with philosophy. I've been drifting towards such a conclusion with respect to free will, especially after looking at some sociological research.

My previous position was to treat free will as something that is real, insofar as people treat it as real: they refer to it, they evaluate their and other people's behavior based on whether they think they exercised their free will. They even appeal to it in a court of law. But it seems that, going by the actual use, the concept of free will is heterogeneous and inconsistent. More importantly, those aspects of free will that matter to us - responsibility being foremost - can be dealt with on their own, with no reference to free will. That is, if you want to consider whether we are morally responsible in such and such circumstances (e.g. when our actions are physically determined by an earlier state of the universe), why not just talk about that? Why confuse matters by bringing up something that no one is quite sure about?

It should be said that in The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility paper and some other related works Strawson does specifically talk about moral responsibility, rather than free will. And he starts his entry on Free Will in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy with these words:

‘Free will’ is the conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will. It is a topic in metaphysics and ethics as much as in the philosophy of mind. Its central questions are ‘What is it to act (or choose) freely?’, and ‘What is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions (or choices)?’ These two questions are closely connected, for it seems clear that freedom of action is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, even if it is not sufficient. — Strawson, RET

In the rest of the article he mainly talks about the second question, i.e. the question of moral responsibility.

We weren't talking about QM. We were talking about theories where it doesn't just resolve into determinism at the scale of biological processes. — Isaac

I am not aware on any scientific theory saying that the fundamental indeterminism of quantum mechanics resolves somehow into determinism at the biological scale. That makes very little logical sense to me, to start with. What process would be at play, to achieve that?

We are talking here about determinism in the context of behavioural causality or neurological decision-making processes. What 'current' experts use your approach? — Isaac

Modern biologists wouldn't typically pretend that life is fully deterministic. They are more modest than that. More humble. It's a big claim to make when in biology all you can ever measure is a mean and its variance, and the only tool you can use to establish causality is statistics.

Sometimes you may want to conclude that what we've been talking about all this time is not what we thought it was, or that it's just not a well-formed concept, and we may be better off leaving it alone than trying to precisify it with philosophy. — SophistiCat

I've a lot sympathy with that position. 'Not a well-formed concept' I think is something philosophy can often help with, so there's merit in discussing the various ways in which a concept is made use of to see if it can be made more efficacious. Some are, however, lost causes, sure.

What intrigues me is the expression "what we've been talking about all this time is not what we thought it was". I'm afraid I can't quite make sense of this. A word has to mean what we (community of language users) think it means doesn't it? Could you perhaps rephrase?

the concept of free will is heterogeneous and inconsistent. — SophistiCat

Definitely agree with you here. I think, though, it's more of a problem for philosophers and psychologists to make sure they don't equivocate over the various uses than it is for the community of language users to kind of 'get their act together'. Another of my pet hates is philosophers telling other language users what a word 'really' means (not suggesting that's what you're implying).

More importantly, those aspects of free will that matter to us - responsibility being foremost - can be dealt with on their own, with no reference to free will. That is, if you want to consider whether we are morally responsible in such and such circumstances (e.g. when our actions are physically determined by an earlier state of the universe), why not just talk about that? Why confuse matters by bringing up something that no one is quite sure about? — SophistiCat

Absolutely. This thread becomes an example. What really matters morally is the difference between having one's actions driven by desires an thoughts one considers one's own, and having one's hand forced by the unwanted desires of others, or desires and thoughts one does not consider one's own (psycho-pathology). All of this can be dealt with without having to send a single electron through any slits! We just don't need to know, in most cases, anything about ultimate cause, we only need go a few steps back and see if such causes are still within or outside of what we consider ourselves.

What I think does matter, is the opposite. It matters that we can demonstrate a deterministic relationship between mental processes and behaviour, so that we can help people with various psychological or physiological injuries and so that we can have a fair legal system to deal with the challenging behaviour which comes along with such injuries. But you're absolutely right that 'free will' is completely redundant here.

I am not aware on any scientific theory saying that the fundamental indeterminism of quantum mechanics resolves somehow into determinism at the biological scale. — Olivier5

To my knowledge, they all do, but I'm no expert. I may be using the terms incorrectly (@Kenosha Kid could correct me if so). It's my understanding that all the quantum weirdness 'resolves' at the scale of cells, that (like Koch says) all such interactions can be dealt with classically.

If you know of any neuroscientist who consider cell-level interactions to be non-deterministic, I'd be interested in some citations. How would they even go about conducting research? What would they research?

There's been a recent paper in which quantum entanglement between two large (i.e. compared with atoms) objects were entangled over a distance, but yes generally it is thought that large objects have too many degrees of freedom to support coherent superposition. Also, cells are relatively hot, and heat also kills superposition.

But cells are still tiny, and confinement amplifies quantum effects. Quantum biochemistry is a thing but unfortunately not one I know a lot about.

Thanks.

Quantum biochemistry is a thing but unfortunately not one I know a lot about. — Kenosha Kid

I watched a thing by Jim Al-Khalili about something like that a long while back, but not having much understanding of the basics I didn't really come away with anything more than a very general picture. I didn't get the impression that biochemicals were going to suddenly start reciting Shakespeare or forming an impromptu dance troop any time soon though, so I think we're still safe to presume they'll continue to have the effects we've so far discovered them to have!