I assume you mean Kant. I'm surprised that he would say that free will and desire are incompatible. In what sense incompatible? Do you have a reference? — Luke

Let's try one sentence:
"Accordingly, our actions are determined either practically, i.e., in accordance with the laws of freedom, or pathologically, in accordance with the laws of our sensuous nature." From, "The General Principles of Morality" in Lectures on Ethics, 1963, p.14.

You're at one of many entry points into Kant's thinking, and there are many vehicles for entering. Probably in this year of 2020, the easiest and quickest way in is https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/ . Ultimately, however, the only way through Kant's thinking is to do the work of reading Kant. And I find good secondary commentary very useful because I am not the sharpest knife in the drawer.

Small point, that I do not think anyone will disagree with: membership in the community of persons interested in philosophy requires at least some first-hand familiarity with Kant.

Very short list:
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
Metaphysics of Morals (a different book)
Critique of Pure Reason
Lectures on Ethics
All by Kant

And one other, one of thousands,
German Philosophy 1760 - 1860 The Legacy of Idealism, Terry Pinkard.
https://www.amazon.com/German-Philosophy-1760-1860-Legacy-Idealism/dp/0521663814/ref=sr_1_1?crid=5SVTBH71VN80&dchild=1&keywords=german+philosophy+1760-1860+the+legacy+of+idealism&qid=1601392870&sprefix=german+philosophy+1760%2Cstripbooks%2C148&sr=8-1

I assume you mean Kant. I'm surprised that he would say that free will and desire are incompatible. In what sense incompatible? Do you have a reference? — Luke

And this, from and courtesy of @Mww:
"Hence it comes to pass that man claims the possession of a will which takes no account of anything that comes under the head of desires and inclinations and, on the contrary, conceives actions as possible to him, nay, even as necessary which can only be done by disregarding all desires and sensible inclinations."
F.P.M.M., towards the end of Part 3. (Fundamental Principles of a Metaphysics of Morals).

There is obviously no. "free" will. We serve our likes and dislikes but we can't choose them. What is will? Simple: your genetic/biological predispositions and needs set against your environment/ experience, parenting influence, learning, etc. So free will is the same as saying free conditioning. That's just an oxymoron.

But because of language we know all too well what is expected of us. We can change our auto responses and our likes and dislikes through learning and deliberation. Genetics can be changed too, by environment.

We think in language. Because of that we can understand complex concepts. Because of that; unless you are mentally ill, damaged, unable to learn and understand, you are responcible for your actions.

There is something analogous here, but I wouldn't say it's the same thing. Strawson capitalizes on the so-called sourcehood criterion of free will: for a decision to be free, it has to be your decision, you have to be its originator. This is fair, generally speaking; there isn't an inherent fallacy in this criterion (unlike in Stove's Worst Argument). Sociological research shows that this criterion indeed forms part of what people commonly mean by "free will," and philosophers too usually give it its due.

Where Strawson's argument can be criticized is in how he caches out this sourcehood. Strawson in effect identifies sourcehood with causality. His theses is that in order for you to be responsible for your decision, you have to be its ultimate causal source. He then argues that since you are just an intermediate element in the causal chain (this isn't exactly his argument, but it can be restated this way), then you cannot be ultimately responsible.

This identification of responsibility with causality is, again, not entirely unreasonable. What I think makes Strawson's argument bad, and not just flawed or mistaken, is that he takes this framing of sourcehood for granted, without any reflection and argument (at least that was my impression from his oft-cited paper The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility). This also characterizes most free will discussions on the 'net (including this very thread), where people plunge into arguments without bothering to do any philosophical groundwork, without asking questions that need to be asked, and often just talk past each other.

IF you could chose your desire, what would you choose?

Which desire do you desire?

AT some point such talk becomes incoherent.

Having a will is required in order to make a choice. — khaled

Not so fast.

What more is there to having a will than making a choice?

And if that's all there is to it, then how could having a will preceded making a choice?

I have to make a choice. I need a will to make a choice. That will is the thing I chose with. This looks like a story that adds layers while not actually explaining anything. Hence we now have a thread that spends its time discussing the reified will when all that was needed was to talk about choice (, ).

(Bolding seems to be more in fashion than the quieter italics - a sign of the times I thought I might try just to see what happens.)

I didn't think that the issue with Stove's Gem was externality, but perhaps I've misunderstood the argument. — Luke

You might be right.

While it is possible to think one is seeing a tree when one is not - one is mistaken, there is an hallucination or an illusion - it is not possible to be mistaken about being in pain,

What about desire? Can one be mistaken as to what one wants? That's not out of the question - I thought I wanted a mango ice but that vanilla really hit the spot...

I wonder if it is a coincidence that the cultural relativist who "inveighs bitterly against our science-based, white-male cultural perspective" in the quote is a "she". I think the response Stove gave here is what one might expect, were the cantankerous old professor invited by a female student to consider if his perspective was lacking in breadth. Care might be needed that we not use the arguments here to sideline folk who see things differently.

Hmm...

“Alice: Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?
The Cheshire Cat: That depends a good deal on where you want to get to.
Alice: I don't much care where.
The Cheshire Cat: Then it doesn't much matter which way you go.
Alice: ...So long as I get somewhere.
The Cheshire Cat: Oh, you're sure to do that, if only you walk long enough.”

― Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland

when all that was needed was to talk about choice — Banno

And the how of it (not-so-much the why). Unless you're arguing there is no how.

Indeed...

What more is there to having a will than making a choice?

And if that's all there is to it, then how could having a will preceded making a choice? — Banno

I don't understand how the former leads to the latter. If you are choosing between A and B you need some sort of mechanism by which to make the choice. That mechanism is called will. So what if all will is is a mechanism by which people choose. Since you made a choice you must have had the ability to do so beforehand.

I have to make a choice. I need a will to make a choice. That will is the thing I chose with. This looks like a story that adds layers while not actually explaining anything. Hence we now have a thread that spends its time discussing the reified will when all that was needed was to talk about choice — Banno

But I just don't think it makes sense to talk with any fewer layers than this. The concept of "choice" doesn't make sense without someone making said choice. And said someone must have some mechanism by which to make a choice which we called "Will". What would talking about "choice" without someone who makes the choice look like?

To me this reads like "I have to eat. I need a mouth to eat. That mouth is the thing I eat with. This looks like a story that adds layers without explaining anything. Hence we now have a thread that spends its time discussing the reified mouth when all that was needed was to talk about eating"

Maybe I just don't get what you're saying because I'm simultaneously listening to a zoom class.

If you are choosing between A and B you need some sort of mechanism by which to make the choice. That mechanism is called will. — khaled

Well if that's all one is doing, go for it. But take care that one doesn't try to do more... see

Having a will is required in order to make a choice. — khaled

If that says "having a mechanism to make a choice is required in order to make a choice", well and good - nothing untoward has been said. And while that's what you are doing, I'm not so sure about others (named above) here.

"free will" quickly becomes a philosophical fetish. If one views it as merely a mechanism for making a choice it loses its power to mesmerise.

Well if that's all one is doing, go for it. But take care that one doesn't try to do more... see — Banno

Like what?

"the will to power" sounds cool. "The mechanism by which you chose power"... daggy. "Choosing to be an egotistical twat" ofttimes much more accurate.

(Donald Trump as the Ubermensch...)

in descriptions of the self in the psychology I have read and in cognitive science, the will, while it might sometimes feature, does not dominate in the way that would be expected if Schopie and the moustachioed one were right. — Banno

Absolutey right, and for good reason. People can suffer loss of volition in various forms, and woe betide the clinician who then announces that they no longer properly exist!

Just to tack something OP-related to the post, I don't think the concept of free-will even makes sense (other than as literally 'no other person made me do so', or 'neither choice was excessively onerous'). That said, I think @Luke's right about Strawson's argument being an example of Stove's Gem, notwithstanding my dislike of that which he opposes, he didn't do so well.

For some reason that I can't fathom the philosophy of will (at least that I've read) cannot avoid little homunculi dealing, like a miniature post-master, with all the desires, senses and thoughts which arrive, unbidden, on his desk.

In a way, Strawson's argument is the opposite of the Gem: instead of "My will is my will, therefore..." it is "My will is not my will, therefore I am not responsible." Which would actually be reasonable, if he could give a convincing argument. And his argument isn't all bad, but it is too limited and oblivious to reality.

We shouldn't be expected (in philosophical terms) to "get out of them" in order to remake the will as we desire. — Luke

I think yours is a good argument for free will. It's the (or a) compatibilist argument, if not mistaken.

The main issue with Strawson's argument is that he separates 'how one is mentally' from 'one'. Such that there is this 'self' which is other than 'how one is mentally' which could, in theory, be responsible for choices. His coup de grace is that in reality the self is not able to choose actions freely because actions result from 'how one is mentally' and the self has no choice about that.

The massive problem (which is where I see commonalities with Stove's Gem) is that 'the self' is part of 'how one is mentally' - it's not a separate element.

This is because for him the buck doesn't stop at the self. He doesn't actually give an account of personal identity, because it is irrelevant to his concept of will/responsibility. He only refers to 'one' as a shorthand indicating the person qua physical or mental state at some point of time, but he places that state in the middle of a causal chain and says that because of this middle position, it cannot bear the ultimate responsibility.

He only refers to 'one' as a shorthand indicating the person qua physical or mental state at some point of time — SophistiCat

Yes, which is where the similarity to Stove's Gem lies. If his 'self', his 'one', just is some mental state, then to say it cannot be responsible for one's mental state is definitional. This is why Stove's Gem is the 'worst argument in the world' because it tells us nothing. If it were not even possible for 'one', the 'self', to be responsible for one's mental state (because one is one's mental state) then we have not learned anything at all surprising in discovering we're not, there was never any option whereby we were.

I'm not saying we are responsible for our mental state, only that arguing we're not by re-defining 'we' isn't answering the question in the terms it was asked, which I think is what Stove was getting at.

There is something that Strawson is saying with his argument. He apparently believes that the only thing that can bear the "ultimate" responsibility is that which is itself uncaused (but not random/chancy). He considers a person in that role and concludes that the role doesn't fit, because a person is just a transient state in the causal chain. This is an argument, though perhaps not a very good one.

This is an argument, though perhaps not a very good one. — SophistiCat

Fair enough, that's kind of where I'd got to.

He apparently believes that the only thing that can bear the "ultimate" responsibility is that which is itself uncaused (but not random/chancy). — SophistiCat

This I struggle with. It seems to 'define away' responsibility. Once one assumes determinism, as Strawson surely does here, then there is no thing which is uncaused. As such 'responsible' becomes a word without a referrent. That, to me, seems silly. Rather, we'd work out what it is we still mean by 'responsible' despite determinism.

Yeah, he doesn't actually define responsibility, except in a negative way, so this was a bit of extrapolation on my part. I suppose if Strawson was a theist, then he would have to say that God is the only one responsible. Since he is not, his conclusion literally is: The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.

Rather, we'd work out what it is we still mean by 'responsible' despite determinism. — Isaac

That would be a very different approach indeed (and one that I would endorse): start from the commonsense assumption that there is such a thing as moral responsibility, then work out what it is. Strawson, on the contrary, comes with presuppositions of what moral responsibility is, or rather what it cannot be, and then asks whether we can have it.

That would be a very different approach indeed (and one that I would endorse): start from the commonsense assumption that there is such a thing as moral responsibility, then work out what it is. — SophistiCat

Yeah, I can't really stand "...therefore X doesn't exist" conclusions (where X is some common feature of our language). I think, 'well what on earth have we all been talking about all this time then?'.

Rather, we'd work out what it is we still mean by 'responsible' despite determinism. — Isaac

We can also get rid of determinism.

We can also get rid of determinism. — Olivier5

And replace it with...?

Indeterminism?

Good to see reference to Strawson's actual article. I admit to being guilty of replying to the OP and not to the article itself.

SO you raise the question of whether the version of Strawson in the OP is accurate. Ill have re-read the article.

I want to add a bit about the supposed link between free will and ethics. The distinctive characteristic of ethical statements is that they set out what it is we believe other people ought to do. The notion of free will is distinct, only being related to ethics by introducing punishment, which is not something I'd like to see.

That is, even if we did not freely choose, ethical responsibilities remain.

Indeterminism? — Olivier5

So if I throw a ball in the air I should act as if it may or may not come back down again?