To my knowledge, they all do — Isaac

And yet neither thermodynamics, nor chemistry nor biology are deterministic in nature. They all use probabilities to make predictions. Something does not compute here.

Many people believe that mental life is reduceable to biology, biology reduceable to biochemistry, biochemistry reduceable to chemistry, and chemistry reduceable to physics. As a matter of fact, none of these "jumps" from one level of organization to the next has been actually understood, let alone 'reduced' by science. Each of these levels seems to follow its own set of rules, that one cannot derive (yet) from the rules applying at the lower level. Far more coherence between the sciences is assumed than proven.

If you know of any neuroscientist who consider cell-level interactions to be non-deterministic, I'd be interested in some citations. How would they even go about conducting research? What would they research? — Isaac

Whatever his opinion on the matter, no neuroscientist will ever be able to predict what he will think tomorrow. If he did, he would think it today and no tomorrow.

And yet neither thermodynamics, nor chemistry nor biology are deterministic. They all use probabilities to make predictions. Something does not compute here. — Olivier5

I'm not sure how you're seeing your second statement as anything like a reason to believe the first. The use of probabilities could be down to measurement errors, chaotic systems, accuracy at scale, informational constraints, ...etc. Why would you see it as evidence of those fields not being fundamentally deterministic?

As a matter of fact, none of these "jumps" from one level of organization to the next has been actually understood, let alone 'reduced' by science. — Olivier5

I don't understand what you're saying here. The effect of, say brain damage, on behaviour is quite well understood. Faced with someone suffering from a particular type of brain damage, it's a rare case when the resultant behavioural change will be a complete surprise. You seem to be taking a tiny amount of uncertainty and pretending it means we've no idea what causes what.

Whatever his opinion on the matter, no neuroscientist will ever be able to predict what he will think tomorrow. — Olivier5

Again, I'm not seeing any link here to indeterminism. An inability to carry out some calculation is not the same as randomness.

The use of probabilities could be down to measurement errors, chaotic systems, accuracy at scale, informational constraints, ...etc. Why would you see it as evidence of those fields not being fundamentally deterministic? — Isaac

I'm saying the techniques they use are fit for apprehending a reality that is not fully determined. These sciences don't assume full determination. On the contrary they assume some randomness, measure it, calculate it, etc. Rare are the scientific papers written in those sciences without some statistical annex. Now you can say that this is just a technique and that it says nothing about the underlying reality, but if we are to use empiricism to understand reality, we should not placate on probabilistic sciences some esoteric deterministic metaphysics. We should instead take what these sciences say seriously, and what they say is that reality appears quite messy even at macro levels.

I watched a thing by Jim Al-Khalili about something like that a long while back, but not having much understanding of the basics I didn't really come away with anything more than a very general picture. I didn't get the impression that biochemicals were going to suddenly start reciting Shakespeare or forming an impromptu dance troop any time soon though, so I think we're still safe to presume they'll continue to have the effects we've so far discovered them to have! — Isaac

Yeah, I think it's pretty mundane stuff. Certain quantum phenomena like tunnelling and the exclusion principle have small effects on simple chemicals and atoms. Charge transfer is ultimately a quantum phenomenon.

I haven't caught up on this convo. Is this the usual "<magic thing> is possible because quantum mechanics"?

The use of probabilities could be down to measurement errors, chaotic systems, accuracy at scale, informational constraints, ...etc. Why would you see it as evidence of those fields not being fundamentally deterministic? — Isaac

Ah. Yes, having basically the same conversation with the same person on another thread. I didn't really get anywhere with it, but good luck.

Predestination versus free will is a play on words and a confusion of plans. We can only be predestined from the point of view of divine omniscience. Predestined beings, even a computer programmer can create, but to create unpredictable beings, capable of initiating new causal processes themselves instead of being simple links in a previous causal chain, well, for that it takes a God. Human freedom is an expression of divine freedom itself, which, in a partial and relative way, extends in us.

I haven't caught up on this convo. Is this the usual "<magic thing> is possible because quantum mechanics"? — Kenosha Kid

Yep. Seems to be.

Ah. Yes, having basically the same conversation with the same person on another thread. I didn't really get anywhere with it, but good luck. — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, I've been reading that one to see if any progress could be made.

I had all but given up here too, but then I read the last post (above this one). The argument put forward is so exhaustive, well-reasoned and utterly compelling that I've decided to become a monk and dedicate the rest of my life to the service of God!

Faced with someone suffering from a particular type of brain damage, it's a rare case when the resultant behavioural change will be a complete surprise. You seem to be taking a tiny amount of uncertainty and pretending it means we've no idea what causes what. — Isaac

You seem to take a tiny amount of certainty and make it absolute.

.

. An inability to carry out some calculation is not the same as randomness — Isaac

In the case of the neuroscientist predicting what he will think tomorrow, the impossibility is purely logical: if he can predict his future thoughts, he will think them today and not tomorrow. So if his prediction is correct, it becomes incorrect as a result of being correct.

Yes, the use of probabilities in thermodynamics, biology, chemistry and many other sciences could be down to measurement errors, chaotic systems, accuracy at scale, informational constraints etc. Or it could be down to randomness. It certainly looks closer to the latter.

What intrigues me is the expression "what we've been talking about all this time is not what we thought it was". I'm afraid I can't quite make sense of this. A word has to mean what we (community of language users) think it means doesn't it? Could you perhaps rephrase? — Isaac

I was thinking of folk theories, as in folk physics or folk theory of mind - intuitive or conditioned but unschooled understanding of how some aspect of the world works. Such folk theories have a deeper purchase on how we think and interact than just language (if indeed language is just language). And a name like free will can stand in for such a folk theory.

That's not to say that folk theories are inherently deficient. For example, when it comes to moral responsibility (and, to an extent, free will, although as I noted, here things are more muddled), my position is that a "folk theory" is all there is to it. It is just what we personally and popularly believe it is - there isn't anything deeper or truer than that. (Sure, we could look into psychological, sociological, evolutionary, etc. explanations, but those would be explanations of how we historically came to have these particular beliefs about moral responsibility, rather than a better understanding of what moral responsibility really is or should be.)

But for other things - physics, mind - we can indeed gain a better understanding than what we can learn by consulting our intuitions or popular beliefs.

What really matters morally is the difference between having one's actions driven by desires an thoughts one considers one's own, and having one's hand forced by the unwanted desires of others, or desires and thoughts one does not consider one's own (psycho-pathology). All of this can be dealt with without having to send a single electron through any slits! We just don't need to know, in most cases, anything about ultimate cause, we only need go a few steps back and see if such causes are still within or outside of what we consider ourselves. — Isaac

This is where things get complicated. What we hold an individual to be accountable for vs. what we consider to be an external cause can vary quite a bit. Strawson stakes out an extreme position where everything is caused externally, deprecating personal responsibility. No one (outside of philosophy) actually does that, of course, but there is still a lot of variability and inconsistency here. Answers can vary by culture, by individual, and even by how the question is asked or primed. For example, how much does one's upbringing matter? Life experiences? Genetics? Family, nation, race? Do you leave them outside the personal boundary as external causes/influences or not?

Can one of you guys start a thread on determinism/indeterminism, instead of hijacking other threads? (I have the damnedest time making OPs, but I might contribute if there is one.)

Can one of you guys start a thread on determinism/indeterminism, instead of hijacking other threads? (I have the damnedest time making OPs, but I might contribute if there is one.) — SophistiCat

Excuse me, I did one post on the matter because I was explicitly asked for input. I am not hijacking the thread.

Sorry about that. I think we covered a lot of ground but it's related to free will in a vague way...

I wasn't so much complaining about a derail. It just seems that you (or maybe just Olivier) are itching to have this discussion - so why not have a dedicated topic for it? That would invite wider participation.

I was thinking of folk theories, as in folk physics or folk theory of mind - intuitive or conditioned but unschooled understanding of how some aspect of the world works. — SophistiCat

Ah, that makes sense now, I took the sentence too literally.

This is where things get complicated. What we hold an individual to be accountable for vs. what we consider to be an external cause can vary quite a bit. — SophistiCat

Indeed, and 'complicated' is certainly right, but is it that you think such a notion of free-choice need be abandoned for that reason? Or are you more in favour of rolling up one's sleeves and getting stuck in nonetheless?

I'm sometimes required to help plead for judicial leniency on the grounds of a person's upbringing or environment. The basis for such action is that somewhere in this muddle we (those involved at the time) can agree that such influences were outside of the person's preferred choices.

I'm sometimes required to help plead for judicial leniency on the grounds of a person's upbringing or environment. The basis for such action is that somewhere in this muddle we (those involved at the time) can agree that such influences were outside of the person's preferred choices. — Isaac

The basis for such an action seem more like mercy to me... i.e. the poor fellow couldn't help but turn out that way given his upbringing and has it already bad enough as it is without the extra punishment.

Considering upbringing as something outside of one's preferred choices seems like a strange notion given that, I would assume, one's upbringing is always to some extend part of what determines one's will or preferred choices.

The basis for such an action seem more like mercy to me... i.e. the poor fellow couldn't help but turn out that way given his upbringing and has it already bad enough as it is without the extra punishment. — ChatteringMonkey

I'm not sure mercy is contingent. There's obviously many different understandings (religious and humanist), but in most the act of mercy seems to be one of abstaining from punishment for abstinence's sake, not because the person didn't really deserve it.

Considering upbringing as something outside of one's preferred choices seems like a strange notion given that, I would assume, one's upbringing is always to some extend part of what determines one's will or preferred choices. — ChatteringMonkey

That's the point. Given a full notion of free-choice we would not be able to make such an argument as, upbringing or not, the person was completely free to choose their behaviour and so can be held entirely responsible for it.

It just seems that you (or maybe just Olivier) are itching to have this discussion - so why not have a dedicated topic for it? That would invite wider participation. — SophistiCat

In retrospect, I think you are right that determinism is neither here nor there in the issue of moral responsibility and free will. It's largely a distraction, one that I was proposing to get rid of. The discussion was on Strawson's position "where everything is caused externally, deprecating personal responsibility".

Once one assumes determinism, as Strawson surely does here, then there is no thing which is uncaused. As such 'responsible' becomes a word without a referrent. That, to me, seems silly. Rather, we'd work out what it is we still mean by 'responsible' despite determinism. — Isaac

To which I answered: we can also get rid of (strict) determinism. IOW, it's a non-necessary hypothesis and occam's razor applies.

That would in my view make it easier to think through the issue of moral responsibility. One can ask questions such as "should she have reacted differently, or taken the issue more seriously?" And these questions now have a clear meaning, because we assume that she could indeed have acted differently, unencumbered anymore by the gratuitous, useless idea that she's some determined meat machine that could NEVER have acted any differently...

This said, the circumstances need to be taken into account. If I am very hungry, I will steal food, because there IS a determinism of hunger. There IS a meat machine there that wants to eat, and will do anything for it when really hungry.

I wasn't so much complaining about a derail. It just seems that you (or maybe just Olivier) are itching to have this discussion - so why not have a dedicated topic for it? That would invite wider participation. — SophistiCat

I'm not involved in this thread at all. Stop @ing me in it.

That would in my view make it easier to think through the issue of moral responsibility. One can ask questions such as "should she have reacted differently, or taken the issue more seriously?" And these questions now have a clear meaning, because we assume that she could indeed have acted differently, — Olivier5

Fortunate then that you have no involvement with these troubled individuals, that you would condemn a person on the basis of nothing more than your ad hoc reckoning as to how things are. I sincerely hope you don't ever work with the vulnerable or ostracised.

I sincerely hope you don't ever work with the vulnerable or ostracised. — Isaac

Is this sort of passive aggressiveness par for the course around here?

FYI, I do work with all sorts of people, including people poorer than you can ever imagine.

Is this sort of passive aggressiveness par for the course around here? — Olivier5

It wasn't passive agressive, just plain agressive. There are people for whom the best science we have indicates diminished responsibility on the grounds of a direct link between mental function and behaviour and you would rather hold them entirely responsible for the choices they make on no better basis than that it 'seems that way' to you. Fortunately in this country guilt (including intent and capacity, where relevant to the charge) must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, not on your personal sketchy metaphysics.

You're completely crazy. I never said anything like that.

Edit: Also you are being unfair and unjust, accusing a random stranger (me) of wanting to put innocents in jail just because I believe in moral responsibility.

So what's you excuse for behaving as a board inquisitor? You can't help yourself because Mom and Pop determined you to become the Scourge of God on TPF?

That's the point. Given a full notion of free-choice we would not be able to make such an argument as, upbringing or not, the person was completely free to choose their behaviour and so can be held entirely responsible for it. — Isaac

But my point is that I don't see on what basis you are going make that argument even if we don't assume a full notion of free-choice. What is the argument then? Some parts of our upbringing contribute to our preferred choice, and some parts that seems to influence our choices (in a bad way in this case) can be considered outside of our preferred choice because ...? What does 'preferred' mean?

I never said anything like that. — Olivier5

we assume that she could indeed have acted differently — Olivier5

Since no-one here is arguing that single mental states lead predictably to single behaviours, I can't see how to interpret your disagreements in any way other than advocating full responsibility, because the alternative is that we have some force you're calling 'free-will', but it is acted upon by other mental states. Yet if this is the case, then it's not free, it's constrained. You'd then have to make a separate argument as to why those constraints (on a case by case basis) do not thus constrain 'the will' sufficiently to remove any choice at all. But if this is the case then your statement above is false, we cannot assume she could have done otherwise.

To put it a clearly as possible - either mental states do not constrain our free choice at all (which means no one has any diminished responsibility), or mental states do constrain our free choice, in which case there's no logical problem with those constraints being absolute.

I think my word choice has caused some confusion. I introduced the notion of preferred simply to be clear that there aren't any objective measures of selfhood we can use to distinguish external (non-self) constraints on choice from internal ones (like preference). In some cases it will be obvious (a gun to the head is obviously an external constraint) but in some cases we have to take a clients subjective judgment into account (anything from feeling depressed without cause to actually hearing voices which do not feel part of oneself).

So one's environment creates external constraints in obviously external ways, but also in ways which are subjectively external - mental processes which are not identified with the self, which one would prefer not to have, but are present nonetheless.

either mental states do not constrain our free choice at all (which means no one has any diminished responsibility), or mental states do constrain our free choice, — Isaac

We are our mental states, own them, identify with them. And so whatever degree of freedom we have is just a part of our mental state's ways of working, not something separate from them.

there's no logical problem with those constraints being absolute. — Isaac

There are lots of logical problems linked with thinking of constraints as absolute, especially when they don't look absolute. For instance: if you Isaac are completely and totally determined as you seem to think you are, is what you are saying still philosophy, or is it instead just the product of some molecular machine that can't think otherwise?

We are our mental states, own them, identify with them. — Olivier5

There are many, many people who do not identify with some of their mental states. Depression, anxiety, paranoia, PTSD, schizophrenia, stress... People experience mental constraints which they do not identify as arising from their free choice and which they report having little or no direct control over the initiation of.

We'd commonly consider someone with a gun to their head as having had their choices constrained. Why would we consider any differently someone who uncontrollably experiences a belief that they have a gun to their head?

if you Isaac are completely and totally determined as you seem to think you are, is what you are saying still philosophy, or is it instead just the product of some molecular machine that can't think otherwise? — Olivier5

I don't see a logical issue there. You're just phrasing the conclusion in a way that sounds undesirable. The desirability or otherwise of a conclusion is not a logical issue.

I think my word choice has caused some confusion. I introduced the notion of preferred simply to be clear that there aren't any objective measures of selfhood we can use to distinguish external (non-self) constraints on choice from internal ones (like preference). In some cases it will be obvious (a gun to the head is obviously an external constraint) but in some cases we have to take a clients subjective judgment into account (anything from feeling depressed without cause to actually hearing voices which do not feel part of oneself).

So one's environment creates external constraints in obviously external ways, but also in ways which are subjectively external - mental processes which are not identified with the self, which one would prefer not to have, but are present nonetheless. — Isaac

Thx for the clarification, this makes more sense... though I'm still left wondering why identification with self would be taken as a criterium for being lenient in court, or for attributing responsibility more generally.

It's not that I can't see some arc or rationale behind it, in the sense that the concept of responsibility seems to be tied to some agency necessarily. And so if something can be said to not be caused by the self, the agency is lacking for attributing responsibility... But this all seems build on very shaky grounds, because there is no objective measure for selfhood as you said... but more than that, identity is also ever changing and not entirely disconnected from how the world will react to certain presentations of self.

I mean, it seems one could expect an accused to present himself in court as someone who didn't want to do what he is accused of, and indeed even come to believe and convince himself that he didn't want to do it, after he realizes what the consequences are.

I don't see a logical issue there. — Isaac

Maybe that's because you are predetermined not to see a logical issue here.