Greg,

Have you never hogged the good chair? It's a wonderful fact that humanity is the only creature to go about the world with it's own padding upon which to sit. What does this say of form? Doesn't it make the identity of the form the bottom atop it?

It's just a material object. How it is understood is How is used, depending on culture

Greg,

But how do you weave a coherent pathway between iconography and iconoclasm? Nothing is eternal, nothing is sacred. Any imagined form is bound to tear upon us between shackles of the past and over-zealous expectations for the future. Coherent change is the language of our kindness to both. But it is the substance of which the chair is made that teaches us that kindness that keeps us coherent between enslaving icon and savage iconoclasm. Idealism of the Christian Era imposes a divine design upon the world that through obedience to it we are meant to translate that design into the remaking of the world. But this view proscribes our learning from the matter. The divine plan means to impose heavenly order upon the world through the human mind dedicated to that plan upon a world under the believers hand. As if the carpenter teaches the wood what it can be. That dogma has prevented us from letting the matter teach the mind, through the hand handling it, rather than the other way around. Touch the world and it teaches kindness, beat it into shape and the gods only teach us cruelty.

Best to begin at the beginning. As a matter of fact, if you had no eyes, no ears, no hands to feel, only your mind to think, you could not arrive at an understanding or form of a chair. But chairs are real things, they exist independent of the human mind, this premise is the swift destruction of your position. This is true because all that you say about the chair and its form hinges on the actual existence of a chair, coupled with your sensory ability to detect it. If you remove this premise, if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair. Matter is the substance of mind, remove this and there is nothing left.
   
"To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with matter." -- Metaphysician Undercover

The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being. When I thought of this objection by Hegel, it crossed my mind that perhaps he was just engaging in sophistry, trying to artificially attach difference to identity. But the thing is, identity is actually saying this! Hegel is not making it up. To prove it, look what happens if you deny it, surely you will not say that identity is different from itself? This would destroy identity. 

Hegel is correct, identity contains unity and difference. Back to the symbolic form: A = A is an instance of three different symbols. Taken together (unity) they are said to form the law of identity. Everything you need to prove that Hegel's dialectical clarification is correct is contained right in the symbolic form. When I brought this up before your reply was as follows:

"This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from "a thing is the same as itself"." -- Metaphysician Undercover

The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another?

One can deduce the same properties from the informal articulation: a thing is the same as itself. Here you have multiple different words combined together to construct the law, and here's the vital point, you cannot construct this law without making use of these different terms combined in unity.  

When you try to bring in the predicate to rescue this law all you are doing is going beyond what is actually contained in the identity premise. You must admit that the predicate introduces negation. Well friend, this is not contained in Aristotle's formulation of the law. Once again, your predicate attempt would imply A = -A.

At every turn you are going beyond the premise of this law in order to rescue it from itself, the only difference is that you are claiming that all your actions are still contained within the premise of the law.  

""Same" and "different" are not proper opposites when "same" is used as it is in the law of identity." -- Metaphysician Undercover

The point is not that they are opposites. Same is saying that it is not different from itself, it is also never an isolated word but requires the unity of difference to distinguish itself.

"Difference is included within same, because the same thing has a changing form, and therefore is different from one moment to the next, despite maintaining its identity as the same thing." -- Metaphysician Undercover

It does not actually maintain its identity, this is an ideal we project. But that is a different point. We are here discussing the law of identity. Difference is posited in the same instance as you posit "same." It is already contained within the concept, within the very being of sameness. This is Hegel's point. In dialectics contradiction always emerges from being. 

"This is represented as the difference between subject and predicate which I described earlier. The subject may persist as the same subject, despite having predications negated at different times. So the subject remains the same, as in same subject, despite difference being a part of it, due to changing predications, when the subject represents an object." -- Metaphysician Undercover

This is just an idealistic formulation of reality. In reality the subject is changing, but more importantly, the subject itself is not separated from difference or unity. If it was, it could not distinguish itself, could not determine itself. 

"Therefore "different" is not applicable when referring to the subject itself, because difference is a feature of what is predicated." -- Metaphysician Undercover

This is false, as proven above through the symbolic form, it is already part of the subject's being.

"To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with matter." -- Metaphysician Undercover

It is not to oppose "different" with "same," as from the outside, it is merely to draw out what the premise already contains.

It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it. 

JF,

As On-Mi says, in the movie Cloud Atlas, "I am not genomed to alter reality!" But then she goes on to do just that. You're thinking statically. States of being have no identity. They are quantified, but never qualifying. Only what is qualifying can be itself. And that act of qualifying is neither same nor different. Such static categories are vapid. By the way, analogy, arguably the source of all rational terms, is sameness in difference. That is, it is a comparison of two sets of differences that reveal a sameness in that difference. But identity goes well beyond this. It is differing. It is the act of being itself that alters reality, and all its terms. What is static and unchanging has no identity, because no differing of reality can come through it. This is why there can be no divine creator, because it would be itself unchanging. Whereas change, changing all the terms of reality, is what person is. It does this in the act of not being the one any static form is. And reality becomes real as a response in recognition of the worth of that omission of itself from the count. Of course, since all terms emerge analogically, as a static sameness a static difference reveals, there can never be any one that sameness is, because it is only difference. The worth of time is no 'one'. God, of course, is the universal quantifier, and so quite unreal. But something of its unity must be taken as axiomatic to the count of what would span the ends of time, if time were "one". However, since that founding oneness or unity number would be, if time were one, is contradictory to that count, then the count of time is unreal in relation to that presumed unity. God and science cannot exist in the same universe. And yet, each needs something of the other as axiomatic to its destruction or neglect of identity. Of that identity, that is, that the act of being, and identity, the differing of reality is. Identity is the act of being no one any quantifier is.

I do hope no one here is suggesting that the form of the chair is eternal! Bums on seats tells it all!

Idealism of the Christian Era imposes a divine design upon the world that through obedience to it we are meant to translate that design into the remaking of the world. But this view proscribes our learning from the matter. — Gary M Washburn

:100:
And we already having bit the apple!

I do hope no one here is suggesting that the form of the chair is eternal! — Gary M Washburn

If you've already explained, please point me to it? Or, why not? I do hope you're not implying that being eternal is the same as existing (eternally).

Hi jerseyFlight,
I'm going to apologize right now, in case it offends you, because I'm going to be curt with my reply on most the things you said. It seems like most your points are either repeating a question I've already addressed, or trending toward absurdity. There is however one point where we might have some agreement, so I'll start with that and see if we can find a way to advance.

It does not actually maintain its identity, this is an ideal we project. But that is a different point. We are here discussing the law of identity. — JerseyFlight

Yes, it is an ideal we project, but that's exactly what the law of identity is, an ideal. It is very similar, and closely related to the concept of matter, an ideal. We notice that despite the fact that the world is continually changing, there is consistency. The changes are not random, there is continuity of existence from one moment to the next, so Aristotle posited "matter" to account for this continuity. If the forms of things in the world are changing from one moment to the next, there must be something which dictates the possibility of change, this potential is attributed to matter. Why do some aspects of the world appear to persist while others do not? Whatever it is which answers the reason for this, it must be something substantial, and in modern terms it is expressed as mass or inertia. This concept is employed to answer the question of why do some forms change from one moment to the next, while others persist in time. You can see how "matter" is an ideal.

Likewise, you can see how the law of identity is an ideal. Suppose one were to describe the world (its form) at each moment in time. Each moment it would be a different form. However, we can name a particular aspect, and say that this aspect is not changing. So we might say that this aspect has identity, as a temporally extended thing. But this is just a projected ideal, because parts of this thing (accidentals) are changing, and we must overlook these changing parts in order to say that this thing is not changing. The point is, that we observe consistency, and see very clearly that some aspects of the world are not changing as time passes, but when we try to formalize this, state the form that is not changing, we cannot accurately represent this because there is always aspects of that thing, which the formalized statement refers to, which are changing. So these are said to be accidentals, but we still haven't accurately isolated the thing which is not changing, because we just disregard the accidentals. So Aristotle posited matter, and matter as an ideal, is supposed to account for those temporally extended, unchanging aspects of the world, which we give identity to as existing things.

Having said that, let me proceed to the rest of your points.

Best to begin at the beginning. As a matter of fact, if you had no eyes, no ears, no hands to feel, only your mind to think, you could not arrive at an understanding or form of a chair. But chairs are real things, they exist independent of the human mind, this premise is the swift destruction of your position. This is true because all that you say about the chair and its form hinges on the actual existence of a chair, coupled with your sensory ability to detect it. If you remove this premise, if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair. Matter is the substance of mind, remove this and there is nothing left. — JerseyFlight

This claim is unsupported, and actually sort of absurd. You have no way of saying what type of form a mind with no senses could come up with. So if such a mind created a form, and called it a chair, then just because it's not the same form of a chair that your mind would come up with, does not mean that it's not the form of a chair. What validates your understanding of "a chair" as better than this mind's understanding of "a chair". All you are doing is denying Descartes' "brain in a vat", as incapable of creating forms without sensing, but you have no principles to support such a denial.

The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being. When I thought of this objection by Hegel, it crossed my mind that perhaps he was just engaging in sophistry, trying to artificially attach difference to identity. But the thing is, identity is actually saying this! Hegel is not making it up. To prove it, look what happens if you deny it, surely you will not say that identity is different from itself? This would destroy identity. — JerseyFlight

This is an absurdity as well. We are not talking about whether identity is the same as itself, we are talking about whether a thing is the same as itself. So you just go off on an unintelligible tangent here, assuming that identity is a thing. But identity is not a thing, it is something that we say a thing has, a thing has identity. And, the law of identity states that the thing is the same as itself. We are not saying that the thing's identity is the same as the thing's identity, that would be redundant. We are saying that the thing's identity is such that the thing is the same as itself. The law of identity is something (a law) which is applied to things by human beings. To ask whether identity is the same as itself is to reify identity, making identity the thing rather than something the thing has.

The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another? — JerseyFlight

There is another structure. It's the proposition "A thing is the same as itself". There's more than three different symbols here. The fact that Hegel can represent this as A=A does not mean that A=A is the only way that the law of identity can be represented. I'm sure that other people can think of other ways to represent it. Suppose I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself. Then I've represented the law of identity with one symbol, no different symbols with unity. Hegel's decision to represent the law of identity with three symbols is simply arbitrary. So this argument of Hegel's is against a straw man. And all that babble about difference and unity is just an irrelevant distraction. What needs to be done is to address the meaning of the law, not the symbolization of it. What the law talks about is identity, and it defines identity as a thing being the same as itself. This talk about unity and difference is irrelevant, having no real bearing on the issue.

At every turn you are going beyond the premise of this law in order to rescue it from itself, the only difference is that you are claiming that all your actions are still contained within the premise of the law. — JerseyFlight

Actually, it's you and Hegel who went beyond the premise of the law, by bringing in negation. I only pointed out that negation is relative to predication, not to the subject itself. So I pointed out how Hegel has gone beyond the premise, just like he does in talking about the three symbols, difference and unity. He brings in all sorts of irrelevancies, to cloud the issue, in a ploy of sophistry, instead of addressing the meaning of the proposition itself.

The point is not that they are opposites. Same is saying that it is not different from itself, it is also never an isolated word but requires the unity of difference to distinguish itself. — JerseyFlight

Here you go, beyond the stated proposition. There is nothing within the law of identity which indicates that "different" is opposite to "same". And, as I already explained to you more than once, as "same" is used in the law of identity, "different" is necessarily included within same, and therefore cannot be opposite. A thing is different from how it was, from one minute to the next, therefore it is different from itself. Yet it maintains its identity as being the same as itself. Therefore being different from itself is included within being the same as itself, such that a thing is both different from itself, and the same as itself. It is very clear that different is not opposed to same, as "same" is used in the law of identity.

This is just an idealistic formulation of reality. In reality the subject is changing, but more importantly, the subject itself is not separated from difference or unity. If it was, it could not distinguish itself, could not determine itself. — JerseyFlight

Yes, for sure, it is an idealistic formulation of reality, as explained at the beginning of the post. The problem though, is that we have no other way to account for the consistency and temporal continuity of existence, so we posit ideals such as "matter", and "identity", to fill that void in our understanding of reality.

It is not to oppose "different" with "same," as from the outside, it is merely to draw out what the premise already contains. — JerseyFlight

That's absurd. The premise says nothing about difference. I "draw out" the premise in the way that it was meant to be drawn out, to show that difference is included within the identity of the changing thing. You "draw out" the premise by defining different as opposed to same, with the intent of rejecting the premise. Obviously it is you who draws out the premise in the wrong direction, because opposing same and different is unnecessary. Clearly observation shows us how one thing can be both the same as itself and different from itself, due to the nature of change and temporal extension.

It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it. — JerseyFlight

Right, and this law contains nothing about difference or unity. Therefore your attempt to relate these concepts to that law, in a way which is inconsistent with the law, is nothing but an attempt to reject the law through the use of semantics. But we can define words in such a way so as to make any law or proposition appear as if it ought to be rejected. However, what is at issue here is the law itself, and the meaning of it. And we need to understand its meaning before determining whether we ought or ought not reject it, and then we may proceed to define words consistent with it, to uphold it, or inconsistent with it to uphold the intent to reject it. Defining words with the intent of proving a proposition wrong is a pointless exercise. Understanding the proposition so that you can decide whether it ought or ought not be proven wrong is something more meaningful.

You're whole thesis assumes that stability real. Hegel took Heraclitus seriously but you are not. If your premise is "something must remain stable and we call that matter" , I take the whole premise and nail it from the nearest tree

What Hegel was trying to intimate to us is that time itself is personal. The only act is the discipline motivated change. Change, that is, that alters the terms of duration or continuity. Only space is continuous. That is why it is empty. It is time attenuated of change until there is nothing there at all. Anyone who would present matter as the paradigm of stability just hasn't been paying attention. Electrons can only be 'stable' by so changing that it is only stably there where it is not there at all. And if you don't believe me read some physics. That crazy instability is precisely what makes matter seem so stable!

Is being the case? Is there a case of being? Is there a case for being? Only what is most real not being the case, a case of something, can have identity. John Searle, I think it is, likes to talk about what it is 'like' to be conscious. That phrasing perverts the issue. There is absolutely nothing it is like to be a person, with identity. I am not identical. Not to you, not to a chair, not to dead matter, not to anything at all. That is the whole point. When a person departs this life only the whole history of humanity working as a totality can possibly encompass that loss. But certainly not in the clamor of a world or evolving styles or 'geist'. Something far more personal and intimate.

Why do I feel like I'm trying to release all the mice at a mousetrap symposium? The reason you want to catch the mouse is that you are afraid that time is real, and worth more than we can endure. But duration is not what is real to time, it is the attenuation of it, dehumanizing and devaluing it into something we are more able to endure. Time is the mouse you perennially try, but never can trap. It is unendurably of worth because it is not enduring at all. It is just change. The rest the attenuation of its worth

Tim,

No, I am saying that if you think time is stable duration you want forms to be eternal so as not to suffer the unendurable worth of it. I did take it for granted that others would see the folly that eternal forms impose upon our perceptions, and discussions, of what does exist and of what existing means.

"Yes, it is an ideal we project, but that's exactly what the law of identity is, an ideal." -- Metaphysician Undercover

Even as an ideal the concept is not merely made up of a one-sided determination. In order to make sense of a 'part' one must make use of the concept 'whole.' What, after all, would the 'inner' be without the 'outer'? This is Hegel's reasoning when it comes to identity.    

I said: 'if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair.'

You said: "This claim is unsupported, and actually sort of absurd. You have no way of saying what type of form a mind with no senses could come up with." -- Metaphysician Undercover

My claim is that your concept of a chair presupposes, not only the existence of a chair independent of your mind, but also your senses. I would go even further and claim that this is self-evident, if you went deaf and blind tomorrow your ability to form concepts would immediately be restricted because it would be much harder to take in information. 

I said: 'The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being.'

You replied: "We are not talking about whether identity is the same as itself, we are talking about whether a thing is the same as itself. So you just go off on an unintelligible tangent here, assuming that identity is a thing. But identity is not a thing, it is something that we say a thing has, a thing has identity. And, the law of identity states that the thing is the same as itself. We are not saying that the thing's identity is the same as the thing's identity, that would be redundant. We are saying that the thing's identity is such that the thing is the same as itself. The law of identity is something (a law) which is applied to things by human beings. To ask whether identity is the same as itself is to reify identity, making identity the thing rather than something the thing has." -- Metaphysician Undercover

In the first instance identity is a formal claim. It is a statement about an object. The problem with this statement is that it is very specific and very narrow; the problem is that it negates itself. You are claiming that a thing is not different from itself, which is just the negative side of the identity position. Hegel puts it this way: "It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different. They do not see that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different."

He is correct, the identity position is, and must say this, in order to protect itself from the difference it is saying it is not. When you say a thing is itself you are at the same time saying that it is not different from itself, this is Hegel's masterful point, the contradiction emerges from identity itself.

I said: 'The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another?'

You replied: "There is another structure. It's the proposition "A thing is the same as itself". There's more than three different symbols here. The fact that Hegel can represent this as A=A does not mean that A=A is the only way that the law of identity can be represented. I'm sure that other people can think of other ways to represent it. Suppose I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself. Then I've represented the law of identity with one symbol, no different symbols with unity." -- Metaphysician Undercover  

This is where our exchange finally begins to narrow. Here you failed to comprehend the literalness of Hegel's argument. You, as a matter of fact, cannot bring the law of identity into being with the symbol of Z, this solitary symbol articulates nothing. In order to bring the law of identity into conceptual being you must make use of identity, difference and unity. In every occurrence of identity you must make use of... must identify... different symbols that are taken together in unity. This is a material fact regarding the existence of the concept of identity. Try to articulate the law of identity without making use of unity and difference, you will not be able to do it. I hope you will not kick against this my friend but join me in celebrating the genius of Hegel's discovery. What mind could go up against Aristotle in this sense? No one! He held his ground for two thousand years. But Hegel, how did he do it (!), comes along and breaks down Aristotle's thoughts into their finer dialectical components, not fallaciously, but on Aristotle's own terms. This is truly astounding and it marks a turning point in philosophical history!  

"What needs to be done is to address the meaning of the law, not the symbolization of it." -- Metaphysician Undercover

Of course, but its meaning is derived from its formation. The premise is not supposed to violate itself. Hegel proves that its determination inevitably casts it into negation.

"Actually, it's you and Hegel who went beyond the premise of the law, by bringing in negation." -- Metaphysician Undercover

Hegel is not bringing negation from the outside; he is demonstrating that it is already contained in the law. This is proven by the fact that the Aristotelian formation states that identity and difference are different, that is, a thing is not different from itself.

" Clearly observation shows us how one thing can be both the same as itself and different from itself, due to the nature of change and temporal extension." -- Metaphysician Undercover

As Hegel says: "...the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself."

I said: 'It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it.'

You said: "Right, and this law contains nothing about difference or unity. Therefore your attempt to relate these concepts to that law, in a way which is inconsistent with the law, is nothing but an attempt to reject the law through the use of semantics."

The point I'm about to make is exceedingly important. It was my hunch that Aristotelians would reply to Hegel's position by claiming that it was 'just semantics.' But this doesn't work because the law of identity is itself semantical! There is no way around this, logic is perhaps the most vital part of semantics. One cannot state a semantical law and then complain when it is refuted by semantics. Hegel's genius on essence has yet to be discovered by our species, it's a beautiful, untapped area of philosophy that carries philosophy into the future.

As Hegel said about those who hold to the Aristotelian position on identity: "Thinking that keeps to external reflection and knows of no other thinking but external reflection, fails to attain to a grasp of identity in the form just expounded, or of essence, which is the same thing. Such thinking always has before it only abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it, difference. In its opinion, reason is nothing more than a loom on which it externally combines and interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the woof of difference; or, also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts especially identity and then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness when abstraction is made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing of likeness. These assertions and opinions about what reason does must be completely set aside, since they are in a certain measure merely historical; the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself. The Notion of identity, that it is simple self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection but has come from being itself. Whereas, on the contrary, that identity that is aloof from difference, and difference that is aloof from identity, are products of external reflection and abstraction, which arbitrarily clings to this point of indifferent difference."

My claim is that your concept of a chair presupposes, not only the existence of a chair independent of your mind, but also your senses. I would go even further and claim that this is self-evident, if you went deaf and blind tomorrow your ability to form concepts would immediately be restricted because it would be much harder to take in information. — JerseyFlight

This is a false assumption you make. You could explain what a chair is, to a person who has never sensed a chair, and that person could have a concept of a chair without sensing a chair.. Furthermore, the fact that architects, designers, and creators, produce conceptions prior to the material existence of the thing conceived, indicates that what appears to you as "self-evident", is actually a falsity.

In the first instance identity is a formal claim. It is a statement about an object. The problem with this statement is that it is very specific and very narrow; the problem is that it negates itself. — JerseyFlight

Again, this is a falsity. The law of identity is a universal statement, a generality. It states that a thing is the same as itself. This applies to all things. It is not a statement about an object, it is a statement about all objects.

You are claiming that a thing is not different from itself, which is just the negative side of the identity position. — JerseyFlight

I've already dealt with this objection. A thing is the same as itself, but it is also different from itself. It changes with the passage of time, therefore it is different from how it was. Your proposal, to oppose or negate, "same" with "different" is unjustified in this context. The thrust of your argument seems to be to say that "different" is the opposite of "same", but this is not true in the context of the law of identity. Clearly a thing is both the same as itself, and different from itself, so we have no premise to allow us to say that "same as itself" means "not different from itself". You are just adding this premise, that different is the opposite of same, to create a straw man.

"It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different. They do not see that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different." — JerseyFlight

See, Hegel demonstrates in this passage, that he sort of grasps what you are missing. Difference inheres within identity. To be the same is also to be different. Therefore it is a misrepresentation to represent difference as the negation of same, difference is a part of being the same.

Let me try another approach for you. I'm sure you are aware of the concept of "similar" What does it mean to you, if two things are said to be similar? To me, it means that some aspects of the things are the same, and some aspects are different. We cannot say that the two things are different, in an unqualified or absolute sense, because we need to account for why we are calling them "similar". So in some way, they appear to have aspects which are the same, yet also aspects which are different. This is why difference cannot be used to negate sameness, they are both distinct aspects of the same concept, "similar". They are not the opposites of each other though because the aspects which are same cannot be the aspect which are different. Therefore "same" and "different" represent two distinct categories within the concept "similar".

He is correct, the identity position is, and must say this, in order to protect itself from the difference it is saying it is not. When you say a thing is itself you are at the same time saying that it is not different from itself, this is Hegel's masterful point, the contradiction emerges from identity itself. — JerseyFlight

As I've explained, many times now, this is a false assumption. When someone says that a thing is the same as itself, they are not saying that it is not different from itself. I am a thing, and I am the same as myself. But clearly I am different from the way I was last year, despite being the same person last year and this year. So when I say that I am the same person that I was last year, I am not saying that I am not different from how I was last year. Clearly I am different, yet the same. So it is just your unwarranted, and unjustified straw man, which represents being the same as being not different, this is not consistent with the law of identity.

You, as a matter of fact, cannot bring the law of identity into being with the symbol of Z, this solitary symbol articulates nothing. — JerseyFlight

This again is false. Why can't I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself", just like Hegel says A=A represents "a thing is the same as itself"? The symbols used to represent a proposition can be arbitrary.

In order to bring the law of identity into conceptual being you must make use of identity, difference and unity. In every occurrence of identity you must make use of... must identify... different symbols that are taken together in unity. This is a material fact regarding the existence of the concept of identity. — JerseyFlight

This is not true at all. "A thing is the same as itself" represents one idea which can be represented with one symbol, just like the single word "square" represents "equilateral rectangle". The fact that the idea represented by the symbol is a complex idea does not necessitate that the idea requires more than one symbol to represent it. This is not a matter of me trying to wiggle out of Hegel's criticism, it is simply the way that symbols and ideas relate to each other. One symbol may represent a vast complexity of ideas, structured and existing as one idea represented by that symbol. Take a word (one symbol) which is an acronym, like radar, for example. The one word stands for a whole complexity of ideas, represented as one idea, by that one word. So this whole talk about "different symbols which are taken together in unity" is irrelevant speculation. It's like arguing that each letter within a word must stand for something on its own. Hegel's claims here have no basis in reality, and his insertion of "difference" and "unity" into the concept of identity through an analysis of those symbols which he uses to represent the law of identity, is just unsupported speculation.

Imagine if I represented the law of identity with Z. Then I proceeded to argue that because the law of identity is represented with Z, and Z is the final letter in the alphabet, then there must be finality within the concept. You cannot draw a conclusion about the meaning of the concept represented, by doing a physical analysis of the symbols used to represent it. Plato demonstrated this with an extensive analysis of the sounds of many different words, in one of his dialogues. He tried to show how the sound of the word is correlated to the idea represented by the word. But he didn't get very far, and it was demonstrated that it's very unreliable to attempt to determine anything useful about what is represented by a symbol through a physical analysis of the symbol.

Try to articulate the law of identity without making use of unity and difference, you will not be able to do it. — JerseyFlight

This is blatantly false. "A thing is the same as itself" says nothing about difference or unity. How can you even make such a statement and try to maintain some semblance of honesty?

But Hegel, how did he do it (!), comes along and breaks down Aristotle's thoughts into their finer dialectical components, not fallaciously, but on Aristotle's own terms. — JerseyFlight

Sorry, but unity and difference do not enter into the law of identity, so these are Hegel's terms for identity, and clearly a straw man.

Of course, but its meaning is derived from its formation. — JerseyFlight

The meaning is not derived from the symbolic formation, as you've represented, it is derived from the complex formation of ideas. It is pointless to attack the symbolic structure, rather than the structure of ideas.

Hegel is not bringing negation from the outside; he is demonstrating that it is already contained in the law. This is proven by the fact that the Aristotelian formation states that identity and difference are different, that is, a thing is not different from itself. — JerseyFlight

That two things are different doesn't mean that one is the opposite of the other, they might be different categories. Yes, identity is different from difference, but this does not mean that same is defined as "not different". Colour is different from sound, but this does not mean that colour is defined as "not sound". It is only when you define "same" as "not different", which is a definition not supported by the law of identity, that negation is produced. So, the negation is brought in from outside, with this faulty definition of "same" (as not different), a definition which is inconsistent with the way that "same" is used in the law of identity.

As Hegel says: "...the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself." — JerseyFlight

Nice quote, this is a fine example. Notice, "everything is in its self-sameness different from itself". That's exactly what I've been saying, difference is included within identity, so that the thing is the same as itself and also different from itself. Now, Hegel claims that this is contradiction, but it is not contradictory. It is only contradictory if you define "same" as "not different". But nothing necessitates this definition. In fact it is very clear that this definition is unacceptable, because it would create contradiction in this way. Therefore it is quite evident that Hegel introduces this definition for the purpose of creating contradiction, so that he can refer to the law of identity as "self-contradictory". It is not though, Hegel creates that contradiction by defining "same" as "not-different", when same and different are actually different categories and cannot be directly related to each other in this way.

Hegel might even recognize that same and different belong to distinct categories, as he says " this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other". So he also ought to recognize that to bring same and different into the same category, so that they become contraries, is to make a category mistake.

The point I'm about to make is exceedingly important. It was my hunch that Aristotelians would reply to Hegel's position by claiming that it was 'just semantics.' But this doesn't work because the law of identity is itself semantical! There is no way around this, logic is perhaps the most vital part of semantics. One cannot state a semantical law and then complain when it is refuted by semantics. Hegel's genius on essence has yet to be discovered by our species, it's a beautiful, untapped area of philosophy that carries philosophy into the future. — JerseyFlight

Hegel's argument is not semantics at all. It is a matter of analyzing the physical structure of the proposition, its symbols, and attempting to make a conclusion about the meaning from this physical analysis of the symbols. I'm sure you must recognize the fault here. One cannot take a word like "word", and analyze the constituent parts individually, "w", "o", "r", "d", and their relations to each other within that word expecting to determine something useful about the meaning. Nor can you do as Plato tried, and analyze the individual syllables within a word, expecting to determine the meaning this way. Likewise, you cannot represent a proposition with symbols, then expect to determine something meaningful about the proposition by analyzing the relations between those symbols.

As Hegel said about those who hold to the Aristotelian position on identity: "Thinking that keeps to external reflection and knows of no other thinking but external reflection, fails to attain to a grasp of identity in the form just expounded, or of essence, which is the same thing. Such thinking always has before it only abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it, difference. In its opinion, reason is nothing more than a loom on which it externally combines and interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the woof of difference; or, also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts especially identity and then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness when abstraction is made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing of likeness. These assertions and opinions about what reason does must be completely set aside, since they are in a certain measure merely historical; the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself. The Notion of identity, that it is simple self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection but has come from being itself. Whereas, on the contrary, that identity that is aloof from difference, and difference that is aloof from identity, are products of external reflection and abstraction, which arbitrarily clings to this point of indifferent difference." — JerseyFlight

See Hegel understands the Aristotelian notion of identity. The category mistake he makes though, is to allow difference to move into the category of same, making these two opposite of each other, rather than categorically distinct. This category mistake is what allows the self-sameness which is different from itself to be called self-contradictory.

Hegel does not make fundamental mistakes. It's a mistake to assert otherwise. As JerseyFlight said elsewhere, sometimes a contradiction has to switch up your mind in order to get out of rigidness of thought. At least that's how I understood him

Besides even Aristotle didn't believe a thing was identical to itself. Literally half of an object, in his eyes, is in constant flux. How is it even an object at that point. It can not be because the matter principle remains the same, because this is only half the identity. Be humble and admit I'm right MU. Your cover has been blown

Thomas Aquinas is asserted to be Aristotle's greatest interpreter. Despite, however, the fact that Aquinas treated his pituitary gland as a idol. When he got old and fat, and his glands dried up, the fog came in and he said all his writings were "straw" . The same word MU keeps using!!

Hegel does not make fundamental mistakes. It's a mistake to assert otherwise. As JerseyFlight said elsewhere, sometimes a contradiction has to switch up your mind in order to get out of rigidness of thought. At least that's how I understood him — Gregory

Manufacturing a contradiction with an unwarranted definition is a mistake. And, contrary to your claim that creating this contradiction will "switch up your mind in order to get out of rigidness of thought" it is an attempt to force you into a rigidness of thought. A mistaken rigidness, of course.

Becoming is the sublations of nothing and being. There is no dingy dirt called prime matter hanging around. The movement leads thru Universals to the Absolute. The lesser produces the greater. Do you think this impossible? Of course, you're a Thomist. But this can happen because of Time. Check out the last section of Heidegger's Being and Time to see him rap up succinctly Hegel's view of time

For the reader: sublation means ascending by the type of contradiction that produces a staircase. MU is thinking of contradictions where two opposites meet in a funny infinitesimal and stare at each other pointlessly

Becoming is the sublations of nothing and being. — Gregory

That is what I described earlier as a mistake. Following Aristotle, (and this is not Thomism it is Aristotelianism pure and simple), becoming is incompatible with nothing and being. Attempting to make becoming compatible with being/nothing is a sophistic trick which can be used to make all sorts of absurdities appear as if they must be real.. It was demonstrated by Aristotle, that no activity described with the terminology of this category of being and not-being, could be consistent with becoming. This is why he recommended a violation of the law of excluded middle to account for the reality of becoming. Becoming must be described such that it is neither being nor nothing, it must be expelled from that logical category. The terms which are applicable to the description of becoming are neither terms of being, nor terms of nothing.

As I explained earlier, the Hegelian sublation, allows both being and not-being to be subsumed within the concept of becoming. So after being expelled from that category, becoming turns around and consumes the whole category. But this leads to a violation of the law of noncontradiction because being and not-being are both predicated of becoming, and "becoming" being conceptual is not a temporal being. On the surface, the two positions, Hegel's and Aristotle's, appear be very similar ways for dealing with the reality of temporal existence. But there is a deep difference. Aristotle provides a category separation between becoming, and being/nothing, by demonstrating that the two categories are incompatible and therefore need to be described by different terminology. Hegel dissolves this category separation by making becoming the sublation of being and nothing.

Everything you experience is becoming, so it is related to time. Nothing and being can do nothing without each other, but they can act in unison with nothing playing prime matter and being form. The result is a cosmos which is in total flux. Aristotle's logic laws don't apply anymore. His static world was an illusion

Nothing and being can do nothing without each other, but they can act in unison with nothing playing prime matter and being form. — Gregory

No, nothing and being cannot act in unison because they would negate each other, in an absolute sense, rendering this supposed act as completely unintelligible, such that it would be something we couldn't even talk about in any coherent way..

Finiteness and infinity would seem to negate each other when put "in the same regard" in unison. But that is what an object geometrically is

I would say finiteness and infinity are distinct categories, and therefore cannot be put "in the same regard", without a category mistake.

Does not a segment have an infinity of tiny points and is also finite? Have you heard of Banach-Tarski's paradox?

From the perspective of the Absolute, objects are not unity (1) divided by infinity, but infinity ÷ 1, which would = 0 because it can be done. The attempt would be "spurious" as Hegel says. Therefore Shunyata

Does not a segment have an infinity of tiny points and is also finite? Have you heard of Banach-Tarski's paradox? — Gregory

A line segment being composed of points is a contradiction in terms. The point has no dimension, and the line has dimension. Even an infinity of points could not make anything with dimension, a line. The line segment is what exists between two points.

Are there line segments with no parts between the points and ones with parts?