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JerseyFlight
782[This exchange is extracted from another thread. It is impractical to extract every section, so we begin here]:
[This is an informal exchange between Metaphysician Undercover and myself, so it is unlikely I will reply to anyone else on this thread. Metaphysician Undercover will do as he pleases.]
JERSEY FLIGHT:
This exchange started when you made the following claim:
"Actually Plato provides a much more useful dialect than Hegel. After reading Plato and Aristotle, you'll be able to see where Hegel goes wrong in his dialectics, leading people like dialectical materialists into a violation of the law of non-contradiction." — Metaphysician Undercover
This assertion has not been sustained throughout the course of this exchange.
Hegel's position on being, as you seem to use the term, is that it is not only inconsequential, but dangerous insofar as it serves to distort essence: "For here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form, but want to know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By this we understand no more than that things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality to another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and back again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence."
You are free to insist that you are talking about the law of identity. You are also free to insist that your external imposition of negation doesn't imply a violation of the law, but the law of identity is an entirely positive formation. As soon as you bring in the negative you have gone beyond identity. You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being, but it does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is thought suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the creation of abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality.
Hegel commenting on Aristotle's logic: "Now if, according to this point of view, thought is considered on its own account, it does not make its appearance implicitly as knowledge, nor is it without content in and for itself; for it is a formal activity which certainly is exercised, but whose content is one given to it. Thought in this sense becomes something subjective; these judgments and conclusions are in and for themselves quite true, or rather correct – this no one ever doubted; but because content is lacking to them, these judgments and conclusions do not suffice for the knowledge of the truth."
"So long as I maintain the separation between what is said about the object's identity, and the object's real identity, there is no problem." — Metaphysician Undercover
The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless category.
Just because the abstract formation I put forward, describing the identity of the object, is not the object itself, does not mean that there is not an object, with its own identity. — Metaphysician Undercover
My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it distorts our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its movement not its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your categories from the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena. I suppose you could assign multiple abstractions to an object if you so desired, but the danger is always the same: distortion of the comprehension of reality itself.
Yes, you continue to assert that Hegel demonstrated "identity" to be faulty, or contradictory, but you have yet to produce the argument. The argument you have here does nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover
In concise form, you will have to connect the dots through careful contemplation:
"Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical with itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands." Hegel
METAPHYSICIAN UNDERCOVER:
"For here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form, but want to know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By this we understand no more than that things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality to another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and back again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." Hegel
This passage demonstrates how this so-called distortion of essence is a feature of Hegel's misunderstanding of the Aristotelian concept, "essence" and nothing else. As I explained to you already, Aristotle defined two senses of "form". The one is the human abstraction, and this is how we come to know the essence of things. The other is the form of the material thing itself. Each material thing is a particular, an individual with a form proper to itself. This form is distinct from the essence of the thing, which is the form which human beings know in abstraction, because it consists of accidentals, whereas the essence does not. Do you apprehend that difference? The essence does not contain the accidentals which inhere within the form of the material object. Both are "forms", yet "forms" in two distinct senses of the word.
So the following statement reveals Hegel's misunderstanding "The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed...there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing. What is concealed is the independent "form" of the thing, complete with the accidentals which the human being does not necessarily perceive. And this independent form constitutes the identity of the thing. That this is the proper interpretation is evident from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, who did much work expounding on the difference between the forms of human abstraction (essences), and the independent "Forms".
Hegel, with this use of "essence" puts us right back into the confusion of Plato's Timaeus. "Form" as "essence", is a universal. The problem which confronted Plato was the question of how a particular could come into existence from a universal form. He thought it necessary to assume this, because things, like human beings for instance, come into existence as a determinate type. So the human form, as a universal, must be prior to the particular, the individual human being. He was stumped because the medium between the universal and the particular was seen as matter, but the universal form could not account for the existence of the particulars of the material individual. Aristotle got beyond this problem by assigning all such universal forms (essences) as the product of human abstraction, therefore posterior to the things themselves, while also positing a new type of form, the form of the individual. which substantiates a thing's "identity". Hegel, in not upholding this distinction confuses identity with essence.
You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being, but it does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is thought suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the creation of abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality. — JerseyFlight
That's right, formal logic deals with essences, not with actual things. But dialectics is not formal logic. How do you suppose that a person might create useful abstract categories without an appropriate understanding of reality? Creation of suitable abstract categories can only follow from a comprehension of reality.
The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless category. — JerseyFlight
Right, there is a distinction to be upheld, between the form of the thing, within the human mind, the abstraction, and the form of the thing in reality. The "non-real identity" is the identity given to the thing by the human mind, the abstraction, the essence. It is "non-real", because it is lacking in the accidentals which are a part of the identity of the individual thing.
My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it distorts our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its movement not its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your categories from the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena. — JerseyFlight
This is not what Hegel says. The "movement" you refer to here is called by Hegel "becoming". It is not called "the actual being" in Hegel's dialectics. That is the point I'm trying to impress on you, "Being" is subsumed within the category of becoming, "movement". That's how Hegel can argue against Aristotle's concept of identity. There is no such thing as beings in the real, actual world, only becoming, because Hegel has done away with any independent Forms. All forms are dependent on the human mind, as essences, and there is no true form or being concealed behind how the thing appears to us, only movement, becoming. A thing only has being through human apprehension. Other than this it is just a becoming.
Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical with itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. — Hegel
See, this is Hegel's misrepresentation, a straw man. The law of identity says that a thing has an identity unto itself. It says nothing about abstract understanding. It is a law against the abuse of abstraction reasoning. It says nothing about what abstract understanding is, or how it ought proceed, only what it is not, i.e. a thing's identity. It was created by Aristotle as a tool against sophists who claimed that the human abstraction (essence) of a thing is the thing's identity. This sophistic claim denies the possibility of human mistake as to identity. That is why we must uphold a distinction between a thing's true identity, its own particular and unique form, and the identity which we assign to it in abstraction (essence). Without this distinction there can be no such thing as human knowledge being mistaken, because what we say about the thing is what is true about it.
Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. — Hegel
Let's say that the law of identity is an ideal. As such, it is proposed as a limitation, or rule for abstraction. As a proposal, or proposition, it might be judged for truth or falsity and rejected or accepted accordingly. What I am arguing is that Hegel's rejection is unjustified, being based in a faulty dialectic, consisting of a misunderstanding of the Aristotelian conceptions of "form" and "essence", evidenced by Jersey Flight's quotes.
Furthermore, if we reject the law of identity there are consequences which need to be respected. Initially, the assumption that there are particular, determinate individuals, beings or objects, in the real, or actual world, is unsubstantiated, unsupported and unjustified. So it makes no sense, as hypocrisy or self-contradiction, to both deny the law of identity and also talk about "actual being". Without the law of identity, or an adequate replacement, the claim of "actual being" is completely invalid.
The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands. — Hegel
This is another example of Hegel's misrepresentation of Aristotelian principles. A thing, for Aristotle consists of both matter and form. A thing's identity is form alone. Therefore we have the required distinction between subject (the thing as matter and form), and what is predicated of the thing, identity (its form). It is this separation of a thing's true, real form ("identity" rather than human abstraction), from the material thing, which allows Christian theologians to conceive of immaterial Forms, which are prior to, and necessary for, as the cause of existence, of material things. Aristotelian principles disallow matter without form, but not form without matter.
Jersey Flight has the next response: -
Wayfarer
22.8kA few points on hylomorphism. It's an odd compound word but what it means is 'matter (hyle) form (morphe) dualism'. The 'hyle' of Aristotle was the word for timber, signifying the raw material that things are shaped from. The 'form' a thing takes is like 'the impression of a seal on wax'. So until matter 'takes form' or 'receives form' then it is 'inchoate' or formless. (The emergence of order from chaos is of course one of the underlying problems of all philosophy and science.)
In this context the 'esse' means literally the 'is-ness' of a particular - what it is that gives a particular identity. (to ti ên einai, literally “the what it was to be” for a thing - SEP.) Socrates is an instance of the 'substance' (or 'type of subject') 'man', whose features (accidents) include a flat nose and blue eyes. (Note the Aristotelian 'substance' was the Latin translation of the Greek ouisia, which is nearer in meaning to our 'being' than to our 'substance'.)
But overall, I think the basic intuition of hylomorphism is still quite sound.
“EVERYTHING in the cosmic universe is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual.
Now, the process of knowledge is immediately concerned with the separation of form from matter, since a thing is known precisely because its form is received in the knower.
But, whatever is received is 'in the recipient' according to the mode of being that the recipient possesses.
If, then, the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner.
This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. 'To understand' is to free form completely from matter.
Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.
Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known.
But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.
From Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan, O.P.; Macmillan Co., 1941.
So, the idea here is that the rational mind recognises the form (essence, what-is-ness) of a particular, which is a purely intelligible act. The senses 'receive' the impression i.e. the physical signals of sight, sound, smell, etc, through physical means.
These are combined to form the knowledge of particular beings that the rational mind has.
Most likely, moderns will be inclined to reject the 'immaterial' nature of 'the intellect'. This actually is central to the whole scheme, however. According to Lloyd Gerson's reading, Aristotle's basic contention is that reason is inherently universalising, i.e. it operates by recognising the type or universal of particulars. This is what enables reason to compare like with like or contrast like with unlike. Reason is inherently universalising - which is a point that became lost with the advent of nominalism in the late middle ages. WIthout some concept of universals, then reason becomes progressively internal or subjectivised. (This is the subject of a lot of literature).
When it is said that A = A, this is an abstraction. It is nevertheless applicable to real particulars but only because particulars are instances of forms or types. So birds are birds, not bats, because they are of the form 'bird'. Of course this doesn't address the question of what all birds are, or what it is to be a bird. It simply states that, given that we can identify a thing by type, then such principles as 'the principle of identity' can be applied to that type. In that sense, reason is always operating according to universals or generalisations, although again that is nowadays contested because of the influence of nominalism on modern thinking. 1
But, again, in matter-form dualism, there is at least a coherent way to account for the relation of form and matter and the sense in which 'intelligible' forms and 'mindless' matter can be understood as parts of a unified whole.
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1. Compare Jacques Maritain:'For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).'
Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism -
tim wood
9.3k
Not an argument but an observation. To say that a thing is composed of matter seems to me unobjectionable. To say that it is composed of form, at close look, seems if not incoherent, then somehow a whole different meaning of "composed." The observation is that in the Greek, there is not so much form, as form-ing. That is, for example, to make something of wood, we get out some wood from the lumber room. but there is no corresponding form room where forms are stored. Plans to achieve a particular form, maybe, but not the form itself. Thus the Greek traces back to the verb. We turn it upside-down as a noun and then try to make sense of it. Plato's form, example again, of justice isn't anything more, when shorn, than being(-)just.EVERYTHING in the cosmic universe is composed of matter and form.
Form and matter, then, two wildly different things. I express it this way: matter is matter. Form is a function of accordance with an idea. -
Wayfarer
22.8kMakes perfect sense to me. There are many types of artifacts that you can make from various materials - the form can be separated from the material in all of those cases. In fact, I'm inclined to say, this is one of the principle breakthroughs in Western thought, in particular - to recognize the distinction of form and substance.
That is not to say that the form exists separately or apart from matter in some 'ethereal realm'. -
Metaphysician Undercover
13.2kSo until matter 'takes form' or 'receives form' then it is 'inchoate' or formless. (The emergence of order from chaos is of course one of the underlying problems of all philosophy and science.) — Wayfarer
In Aristotle's metaphysics, matter without form is an impossibility demonstrated by his cosmological argument. He also explains why the form of a thing is necessarily prior to its material existence. This is why Aristotelian principles are consistent with Christian theology which posits immaterial Forms in the act of creation.
Furthermore, he argues that if the form of the thing was not prior to the material existence of the thing, then the thing, when it comes into existence, could come into existence as something other than it is. But it's impossible that a thing is something other than the thing that it is. So by this argument, what a thing will be (its form) is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing, in order that the thing is the thing that it is, and not something else.
And by the cosmological argument it is impossible that there ever was matter without form. To posit the reality of matter without form, is to posit something real which is unintelligible, as form is what is intelligible. To assume that there is something which in its very nature is unintelligible, is self-defeating to the philosophical mind, which is the desire to know. So regardless of the cosmological argument, there is no benefit to the assumption of formless matter. This would only postulate something which is impossible to comprehend. Therefore we ought to assume that all matter has form, and so it has identity, and formless matter is a nonsense proposition. -
Gregory
4.7k.
Followers of Duns Scotus thought that prime matter can exist on it's own.
Also, when it comes to arguments for God, Aristotelians try arguments. They try arguments, but they all fail. But at least they have arguments. The bizarre thing is that when it comes to "forms" followers of Aquinas and Aristotle will talk endlessly about it without providing a single argument. Yet in their minds they are "proving" their position . It's weird.
Please provide a real argument that a tree is composed of two principles instead of one. Why not just the treeness principle instantiated? -
JerseyFlight
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There are some from my own school of thought who could call this exchange "a fruitless endeavor," but I do not agree with this, and this is why: it is insufficient to prejudice the accuracy of one's position merely because one has convictions as to the nature of its truth. I reject this, I believe philosophy is best served as honest and diligent minds come into collision with each other. Further, those who say this, not putting forth the effort to defend their own views, are in danger of forfeiting truth to the victory of error. (Of course, this assumes their views are true). It is clear to me that what is required of serious thinkers is not merely to validate the cravings of their own egos, or to bask in their convictions, but to search out the nature of truth, even if its comprehension causes them the greatest psychological distress. It is hard for me to respect thinkers that are not willing to subject their ideas to coarse criticism. This does not mean one should apply themselves to every contrarian under the sun, but that qualitative objections should be discerned, sought out, and engaged. It greatly saddens me that so many dialectical thinkers have retreated to the Ivory Tower of theory. These thinkers do not fail to write books proclaiming the formation of their ideas, but when it comes to defending them, they fly off and hide away or dismiss the seriousness of their opponent's objections through the sheer arrogance of their convictions. Not I dear reader, I will do my best to apply thought where it deserves to be applied. I believe there are few things so valuable to the thinker than the resistance of other minds.
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The first distinction I should like to make is that being is an actual, concrete thing, not a mere concept or word. Words are objects that we create in order to make sense of being. We do not discover them, unless by "discover" one is talking about cultural integration.
"Each material thing is a particular, an individual with a form proper to itself. This form is distinct from the essence of the thing, which is the form which human beings know in abstraction, because it consists of accidentals, whereas the essence does not." - Metaphysician Undercover
Isn't it actually the case that no material thing is a particular? You are in fact the one assigning this abstract identity to the object. Even the concept "particular" is not itself particular. Diversity and movement is found everywhere in being.
"Hegel argues that these three concepts [particular, individual, universal], though they seem quite distinct, are intimately bound up with each other. The understanding, however, does not see this and holds the three strictly separated. The understanding sees universals as externally related to particulars. In its extreme form, this may issue in an ontological separation between them, as in Plato’s philosophy, where universals or ‘forms’ are held to exist in a different reality altogether separate from their particular exemplars. Hegel rejects any such approach, and shows how in a real sense it is quite impossible to think the universal, particular, and individual apart from each other. For instance, if the universal is thought to be absolutely separate from individuals, and unique in its own right, then isn’t the universal an individual? Further, if an individual is understood as absolutely separate from universals, doesn’t it become an empty abstraction (i.e., a kind of universal) without specific quality? Hegel argues that the concepts of universal, particular and individual mutually determine one another." The Hegel Dictionary, Glenn Alexander Magee, Continuum International Publishing Group p.255
"The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing." -- Metaphysician Undercover
It seems to me this is the crux of everything you are saying. How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing? Further, it seems the way you make use of these determinations, extracted images, I will not yet call them "properties," is to wield them as totalities and finalities against the movement and diversity of being. This seems exceedingly problematic to me, but there is more... what the mind apprehends is precisely the immediacy of an object, unless one goes beyond this mere apprehension (which takes one beyond bare identity) one cannot inform essence with totality from the narrow category of identity. Here you are trying to smuggle in content that cannot be furnished by bare identity alone. The fact that you are doing this, and that you must do this, only stands to demonstrate the accuracy of Hegel's critique of Aristotle.
"What is concealed is the independent "form" of the thing, complete with the accidentals which the human being does not necessarily perceive." --Metaphysician Undercover
This seems to contradict your previous premise, when you said "the essence of a thing is not concealed," and while I note the use of a new term to overcome the limitations of your identity position ("accidentals"), I would also note that the actual concretion of what you are doing here seems to contradict your description. I think this is the part that really matters, I think it's the part that exposes the technique of your idealism, which appears to me as a form of sophistry. It seems you are trying to walk two roads at once in an attempt to retain the appearance of consistency for your formal position on identity, but when we actually examine the concrete process of your determination and formation, we find that it negates your description of identity. What you are actually doing, which is to say, what you must do, in order to furnish being with adequate content, forces you to go beyond the so-called law of identity.
"... formal logic deals with essences, not with actual things. But dialectics is not formal logic. How do you suppose that a person might create useful abstract categories without an appropriate understanding of reality? Creation of suitable abstract categories can only follow from a comprehension of reality." --Metaphysician Undercover
The point of dialectics is that you cannot arrive at an accurate essence (understanding of reality) through identity, but must make use of unity and difference, these not only negate the narrow Aristotelian formation of identity, but go beyond it. Just because one produces a formalism, through the method which you are here defending, doesn't make it accurate or comprehensive. One could in fact understand reality in such a way that they extract error from it, thus leading to an erroneous formalism. That is to say, a comprehension of reality can only follow from a dialectical process.
"...if we reject the law of identity there are consequences which need to be respected. Initially, the assumption that there are particular, determinate individuals, beings or objects, in the real, or actual world, is unsubstantiated, unsupported and unjustified." --Metaphysician Undercover
Here your idealism shines through with vibrant colors. It is not a matter of "rejecting," I think this might be the problem in your characterization, it is a matter of incompletion, a lack of totality, Hegel demonstrates that the principle, as Aristotle forms it, is neither conscious nor consistent with itself.
Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is no identity without them, where there is identity, there you already have the negation of Unity and Difference.
You claim that if the Aristotelian formation is rejected that we cannot make sense of objects in reality, but this presupposes that we actually form our concepts through the narrow prism of identity, but we don't, this is the naive idealistic assumption, it is akin to the idealist drinking his own Kool-Aid. Hegel proved that every occurrence of identity is making use of other principles, namely, unity and difference.
I am well aware of the fact that you will likely claim I am attacking a strawman of your position. If this is actually the case then my argument has not made contact with your discourse. However, I think the reason you claim this, is because the thing you are claiming is not the same as what you are doing. You are saying that I am not making contact with your position because I am not validating your description of the process, but like Hegel, I am claiming that your actual process of identity is in tension with your formal description. -
Metaphysician Undercover
13.2kollowers of Duns Scotus thought that prime matter can exist on it's own. — Gregory
As I explained, there is no good reason to take this position. It contravenes the conclusion of the cosmological argument, and, designating a part of reality as unintelligible in such an absolute sense is contrary to the philosophical will to know.
Please provide a real argument that a tree is composed of two principles instead of one. Why not just the treeness principle instantiated? — Gregory
The two principles, matter and form, are required to understand the reality of change, as explained in Aristotle's physics. If a tree was just form, then with every passing moment that the form of the tree changed, it would be a hew object. We could not refer to it as one continuous, existing "tree" because every new moment it becomes something different, with change. So Aristotle posited "matter" as the underlying thing which stays the same, as the form changes, grounding the identity of a changing thing, allowing us to say that the tree continues to be "the same tree" despite changes to its form. If a thing's identity is associated only with its form, then at each moment when it has a new form, due to change, then it must also be identified as a totally distinct object. . -
Gary M Washburn
240By "prime matter" is probably meant "the will of god". The lower case might give a clue what I think of that! -
Gregory
4.7k
Will to know? You just happen to like Aquinas and don't recognize that other people feel just of must truth from other thinkers. He made you dogmatic.
Two principles are not required to explain change. A tree is instantiated treeness. The treeness can change in different ways but remain the same tree. No problem there. This is oh too easy! -
Gregory
4.7kIf a tree was just form, then with every passing moment that the form of the tree changed, it would be a hew object. We could not refer to it as one continuous, existing "tree" because every new moment it becomes something different, with change. So Aristotle posited "matter" as the underlying thing which stays the same, as the form changes, — Metaphysician Undercover
So it's a new form every time a color dims on an object? That's what you are saying. Aristotle got the idea of Plato that any change whatsoever would change the whole object. Plato was scrupulous about change, even thinking it weird to say 6 is big compared to 4 but small compared to 8. Everything had to be exact for him, the Da Vinci of philosophy. Realize that it was this weak system of Plato that Aristotle tried to remedy. Most of us have no problem seeing something as the same even though parts change, without positing an underlying principle under another one that changes. Aquinas argued "One universe, so one God", therefore I say "One tree, so one principle". It's just as valid.
Ideas on this subject are speculation from all sides. We're here to share what we think is cool -
Metaphysician Undercover
13.2kThe first distinction I should like to make is that being is an actual, concrete thing, not a mere concept or word — JerseyFlight
You need to explain your use of "being", because it makes no sense to me. You are not using it as a noun, to talk about "a being", or individual "beings", so I assume that it is used either as a verb, or as an adjective like "existence" is used as an adjective when we say that a thing has existence or being. Either way, you'd be talking about the concept of "being", not a concrete thing which would be a being. If "being" refers to an activity which many things are engaged in, then this is a concept. If "being" refers to a property, like existence, which things have, then again this is a concept. So it really makes no sense for you to use "being" in the way that you do, and insist that you are referring to an actual concrete thing, this would be "a being". And if "being" refers to some activity which things are involved in, then clearly this is conceptual, because each activity of each individual thing is distinct from the activity of every other thing, so to generalize and say that all these distinct activities have something in common which you call "being", is to conceptualize.
I am well aware of the fact that you will likely claim I am attacking a strawman of your position. If this is actually the case then my argument has not made contact with your discourse. — JerseyFlight
Yes, you have not really made contact with my discourse. I have stressed that Aristotle distinguishes two types of "form", one being the abstracted essence of a thing, and the other being the form which a material object has inherent within itself. Until you recognize this distinction, understand it, and either proceed from this, or refute it and offer something better, then you will just be attacking the straw man.
You claim that if the Aristotelian formation is rejected that we cannot make sense of objects in reality, but this presupposes that we actually form our concepts through the narrow prism of identity, but we don't, this is the naive idealistic assumption, it is akin to the idealist drinking his own Kool-Aid. Hegel proved that every occurrence of identity is making use of other principles, namely, unity and difference. — JerseyFlight
This is not the case at all. We do not produce concepts through "identity" as defined by the law of identity. We produce concepts in the mind, through abstractions, essences, logic, and other mental processes. The law of identity just serves to remind us that what we say about things, in conceptualization, may not be the truth about the thing. And if we think that the identity we like to give to the thing is the thing's true identity, then we are making such a mistake. So "identity" is not a principle by which we would construct concepts, rather we would deconstruct, by acknowledging that the so-called reality which we describe in words and meaning, concepts, is just an illusion, grounded in a false identity which recognizes the similarity between things rather than the differences between things.
The point of dialectics is that you cannot arrive at an accurate essence (understanding of reality) through identity, but must make use of unity and difference, these not only negate the narrow Aristotelian formation of identity, but go beyond it. Just because one produces a formalism, through the method which you are here defending, doesn't make it accurate or comprehensive. One could in fact understand reality in such a way that they extract error from it, thus leading to an erroneous formalism. That is to say, a comprehension of reality can only follow from a dialectical process. — JerseyFlight
As I just explained, the law of identity is not a principle by which we arrive at essences. It was formulated as a tool against the mistaken arguments of the sophists. It is a principle by which we demonstrate mistaken conceptualizations, not a principle to be used for the production of concepts. So your reference to unity and difference are not relevant in this context.
Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is no identity without them, where there is identity, there you already have the negation of Unity and Difference. — JerseyFlight
This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from "a thing is the same as itself".
Here your idealism shines through with vibrant colors. It is not a matter of "rejecting," I think this might be the problem in your characterization, it is a matter of incompletion, a lack of totality, Hegel demonstrates that the principle, as Aristotle forms it, is neither conscious nor consistent with itself. — JerseyFlight
I don't see how a principle could be conscious, and I'm still waiting for you to produce the demonstration you've told me Hegel made. So far you've only shown me how Hegel misunderstood the law of identity, and attacked a straw man.
Isn't it actually the case that no material thing is a particular? — JerseyFlight
I don't know what you could possibly mean here. We know material things as particulars, individuals. That chair is a particular, so is the table, and my computer. How could there possibly be a material thing which is something other than a particular thing? Care to explain?
"Hegel argues that these three concepts [particular, individual, universal], though they seem quite distinct, are intimately bound up with each other. The understanding, however, does not see this and holds the three strictly separated. The understanding sees universals as externally related to particulars. In its extreme form, this may issue in an ontological separation between them, as in Plato’s philosophy, where universals or ‘forms’ are held to exist in a different reality altogether separate from their particular exemplars. Hegel rejects any such approach, and shows how in a real sense it is quite impossible to think the universal, particular, and individual apart from each other. For instance, if the universal is thought to be absolutely separate from individuals, and unique in its own right, then isn’t the universal an individual? Further, if an individual is understood as absolutely separate from universals, doesn’t it become an empty abstraction (i.e., a kind of universal) without specific quality? Hegel argues that the concepts of universal, particular and individual mutually determine one another." The Hegel Dictionary, Glenn Alexander Magee, Continuum International Publishing Group p.255 — JerseyFlight
Sure, the concept of particular is related to the concepts of individual, and also universal. But still, we understand material things as particulars, or individuals, and we understand universals as concepts. So this passage does nothing to refute the distinction between particular and universal. Just because we have a concept of what a particular is, and a concept of what a universal is, and these concepts are related as concepts are, doesn't mean that there is not a difference between what is understood by "particular", and what is understood by "universal". One is understood to be a material thing, while the other is understood to be a concept.
It seems to me this is the crux of everything you are saying. How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing? — JerseyFlight
Do you understand the duality of "form" which I described above? Here's an example. When I see a chair in front of me, there is an image in my mind, we can call this the form of the chair. But the form of the chair, which exists within my mind, is not the same as the form which the material object I am seeing has. The material object I am seeing has molecules, atoms, etc., which are not evident in the image in my mind. So the form of the chair, which exists within my mind, is not the same as the form of the material object which I am calling a chair. These are two distinct "forms" of the very same thing. One is the abstraction, from which we might produce, concepts, and essences, the other is the form which is proper to the chair, constituting its identity.
So the essence of a thing is present to a human mind, as the concept of that thing, or type of thing, and is therefore not concealed. What is concealed, is the thing's true form, or identity, due to the deficiencies of our capacities of sense. Nevertheless, through sensation we do determine "a form" of the thing, and we may proceed to produce an essence, we just do not apprehend "the form", in the sense of the thing's true identity.
This seems exceedingly problematic to me, but there is more... what the mind apprehends is precisely the immediacy of an object, unless one goes beyond this mere apprehension (which takes one beyond bare identity) one cannot inform essence with totality from the narrow category of identity. Here you are trying to smuggle in content that cannot be furnished by bare identity alone. The fact that you are doing this, and that you must do this, only stands to demonstrate the accuracy of Hegel's critique of Aristotle. — JerseyFlight
As I said, we do not use identity to produce concepts and essences, we use the appearance of the thing to us, how the thing appears to us, its image etc., to produce such conceptualizations, and this is not "identity". So you are really attacking a straw man here. In no way am I arguing that identity provides the content for conceptualization. I am arguing the exact opposite, an unbridged gap between identity and conceptualization, such that "identity" in the sense defined by the law of identity, does not even enter into conceptualization..
This seems to contradict your previous premise, when you said "the essence of a thing is not concealed," and while I note the use of a new term to overcome the limitations of your identity position ("accidentals"), — JerseyFlight
It only seems like contradiction because you are not recognizing the duality of "form" which I've been talking about, and trying to get you to apprehend.
It seems you are trying to walk two roads at once... — JerseyFlight
There are two roads, two distinct types of "form". When you come to apprehend what I am saying, what Aristotle was saying, then make your point. But don't just keep hitting the straw man.
What you are actually doing, which is to say, what you must do, in order to furnish being with adequate content, forces you to go beyond the so-called law of identity. — JerseyFlight
Of course, being is conceptual, while identity is within the thing itself. So identity doesn't even enter into the content of being, or any such conceptualization. The thing itself cannot get into the content of our minds. But your straw man is to claim that I pretend to use identity as some sort of content or foundation for conceptualization. That's not the case, and that's why it's a straw man.
So it's a new form every time a color dims on an object? — Gregory
Of course, it requires a different description, therefore it's a different form.
Most of us have no problem seeing something as the same even though parts change, without positing an underlying principle under another one that changes. — Gregory
I know, that's why two principles are required, to account for how we can see that the thing is the same despite having changed, and understand that this is true. One aspect of the thing changes while another stays the same. Without this separation making two distinct aspects, we'd have to say that the thing is the same, despite having changed, which is contradictory. -
Gregory
4.7k
Big post, no proofs
So alteration causes half of the object to completely change? New forms every second since QM says everything is changing? You can't see that your stuck in Plato's world and that Aristotle was medicine for that, not objective truth
I don't like Thomistic Aristoteleans because they don't say "here's a neat alternative way of thinking" . Instead they say "I can unfailingly prove this" and they never ever can -
JerseyFlight
782
There is too much sophistry in your reply. You did not answer my question: 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?' -
Gregory
4.7k
He is using the word "essence" to describe thoughts because he thinks the world is literally in his head thru the forms -
Metaphysician Undercover
13.2kThere is too much sophistry in your reply. You did not answer my question: 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?' — JerseyFlight
I didn't say "from the thing". That is just your materialist interpretation,, like saying that the image of the chair in my mind when I see a chair "comes from the chair". It does not. It is created by, and therefore caused by, my mind. You interpret from a perspective completely different from mine, then instead of trying to understand what I am saying, you create a straw man from your faulty interpretation, to knock down. You are not in this discussion to understand, but to discredit names like "idealism". So you represent me with your straw man named "idealist" and knock it down, pretending that you are knocking me down.
You just cannot get out of your determinist/materialist way of seeing things, to be able to understand what I am saying. Do you recognize two distinct types of forms, the form which the object called "chair" has, within itself, and the form of it which exists in my mind when I see it?
If the form in my mind came from the chair, it could not be mistaken. It would be taken necessarily from the chair, and therefore could not be anything but a correct representation of the chair. However, this is not the case, mistakes abound, because the form in the mind is created by my mind, not taken from the chair. And that is why the form in my mind must be understood as distinct from the form in the material object
Do you understand the nature of representation? One thing, like a symbol for example, represents something else. The symbol is not taken from the other thing, nor is it necessarily a facsimile or even a likeness of the thing which is represented.
He is using the word "essence" to describe thoughts because he thinks the world is literally in his head thru the forms — Gregory
I am trying to be consistent with Aristotle in my use of "essence", regardless of how others use it. Jersey is neither consistent with Aristotle, nor Hegel, but is clinging to some idiosyncratic notions which are disabling any proper understanding of either. -
Gregory
4.7k
You speak as if the form in the mind is the same in essence as the outside forms. This is strange.
Also, why don't we turn into different people (a new form) with changes in a human (internal or external)? You'll say the human soul is a unique form, but maybe treeness is like this and therefore there is one principle per object -
Metaphysician Undercover
13.2kYou speak as if the form in the mind is the same in essence as the outside forms. — Gregory
It seems your reading skills are not so good Gregory. I have, for days now been trying to get Jersey to recognize the distinction between the form in the mind, and the form of the material object. "Identity" in the sense of the law of identity, refers to the latter. In Aristotle, "essence" refers to a form in the mind. Therefore essence is not identity. -
Gregory
4.7k.
You've been ambiguous about identity and said that essence is the form in the mind. But you can continue to ignore the fact that I've refuted your position many times, that's up to you. I don't like Thomist so I don't like you -
JerseyFlight
782
So as to remove my own errors from this exchange and promote a healthy environment of discourse. When I said, "there is too much sophistry in your reply." Even if this is true it is not the way to approach the topic. I should not have said this. I will do my best from this point on to respond accordingly.
"You interpret from a perspective completely different from mine, then instead of trying to understand what I am saying, you create a straw man from your faulty interpretation, to knock down." -- Metaphysician Undercover
I am trying to think in terms of your own premises, I am just trying to do it critically as opposed to affirmatively. I am not trying to invent premises to attack.
You said, "The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing." -- Metaphysician Undercover
I asked you, 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?'
You then said, "I didn't say "from the thing"."
This is correct, you said, "of the thing."
The question still remains, from what then are you apprehending and determining properties? If the mind constructs the form of a Snark would this mean a Snark has existence? Further, where does the mind even get the properties to construct the idea of a Snark?
"...the image of the chair in my mind when I see a chair "comes from the chair". It does not. It is created by, and therefore caused by, my mind." -- Metaphysician Undercover
Do you then say that the chair has no existence beyond your mind?
(And I should like to make it clear, this is exactly the position of idealism, of which you are indeed proving yourself to be most consistent. Idealism states that there is no reality beyond the mind, which is to say, even though it tries to posture away from this and violates it repeatedly in the course of action, it is the actual conclusion and solipsism of the position).
Now this seems like a direct contradiction of what is stated above, an example of the posturing I alluded to:
"Do you recognize two distinct types of forms, the form which the object called "chair" has, within itself, and the form of it which exists in my mind when I see it?" -- Metaphysician Undercover
I recognize that objects exist outside my mind. Chairs exist regardless of whether or not I call them chairs. A chair has a form that exists independent of my mind. My mind interacts with my environment in order to comprehend it. Without a concrete, objective world, my mind would not be able to form concepts. If I were to say, "stones have no existence outside my mind," and Socrates decides to pelt me in the head with one, this would be an immediate refutation of my idealism.
"If the form in my mind came from the chair, it could not be mistaken." -- Metaphysician Undercover
I do not understand how you arrived at this conclusion?
"It would be taken necessarily from the chair, and therefore could not be anything but a correct representation of the chair." -- Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you here assume that your act of "taking" would be (and must be) one of perfection?
(It is clear to me that this demonstrates the superiority of Hegel's approach over that of Aristotle, because Hegel did not see this process as an automatic transference of perfection, but that it is mediated by thought, hence, the logic by which thought mediates must be more comprehensive than the narrow categories provided by Aristotle. Further, Hegel saw that an unmediated understanding leads to a distortion of reality).
"However, this is not the case, mistakes abound, because the form in the mind is created by my mind, not taken from the chair. And that is why the form in my mind must be understood as distinct from the form in the material object." -- Metaphysician Undercover
I see a serious dilemma here. If the form of the mind is created by the mind then what is the chair? How can the mind create the form of a chair without the concrete existence of a chair to "apprehend" and "determine" its content? How do you know that it (the chair) doesn't play a role in this process?
Your argument seems to be that the existence of "mistakes" is proof that your idealism is true? This seems very much like a non-sequitur. How can you even determine when something is a "mistake" if there is no difference between your mind's idea of a chair and an actual chair?
It seems to me that by speaking this way you are going beyond your idealist position: "I have, for days now been trying to get Jersey to recognize the distinction between the form in the mind, and the form of the material object."
I do not see how there can be "material objects" from the basis of your position? If you are referring to "forms" your mind produces, then you are neither referring to "material" or "objects" but mental abstractions. You then have no right to use the term, material objects.
It seems very much like you are just asserting these sweeping metaphysical premises into being without a way to substantiate them, like you are constructing your own imaginary world out of abstract premises. If everything is reduced to your mind and objects have no independent being, then wouldn't that leave you trapped in your own mind? If you can't make a distinction between what your "mind creates" and what actually exists, then it seems to me you cannot escape the conclusion that this entire discourse is just a "creation" of your mind.
BACK TO THE ACTUAL TOPIC: THE LAW OF IDENTITY:
I said, 'Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is no identity without them, where there is identity, there you already have the negation of Unity and Difference.'
You replied,
"This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from "a thing is the same as itself"."
The symbolic form is, as a matter of fact, made up of three different symbols. The A to the left is not the same as the A to the right and the = is required to form the concept of the "tautology." Hegel's point is not that the law of identity specifically states these attributes (unity and difference) but that the law not only presupposes them, but makes use of them within the movement of its own being. What Hegel is pointing out in the law of identity is "the lack of awareness of the negative movement..." When you say this "doesn't make sense to you," that is correct, because you're not considering the law of identity as it is in the actual movement of its being, hence you are oblivious to its negation. Dialectic comprehends contradiction as it emerges from the object, it does not try to bring it from the outside, and neither does it see it as coming from the outside. This is how Hegel was able to comprehend the contradictory nature of the law of identity.
What's most interesting is that you have actually validated Hegel's position throughout this exchange because you have admitted that the law is too narrow to deduce content. Hegel says, "This proposition in its positive expression A = A is, in the first instance, nothing more than the expression of an empty tautology. It has therefore been rightly remarked that this law of thought has no content and leads no further." -
Gregory
4.7k
I never said anything about identity to him. He just got mad that I refuted his arguments. The part he "responded" to was just me clarifying that Aristotle and Aquinas believe the "form" in an object has many locations: with the prime matter, and in the heads of humans who abstract it. This is the "idealism" you object to, and I agree it's strange and there is no proof for it. Thomists are so prideful they always, every time to a fault, get mad and make things personal when I refute their arguments. They are a unique breed of people -
Gregory
4.7kI've come to realize today that those who choose to enjoy the writing method of "Saint" Thomas Aquinas invariably become not arrogant but prideful. He is bad voodoo. Consider how the word "dunce" became synonymous with "idiot". I regret that I ever recommended his writings to philosophy readers
-
Metaphysician Undercover
13.2kYou've been ambiguous about identity and said that essence is the form in the mind. — Gregory
I've been very clear about identity, "a thing is the same as itself". Therefore, unless the form in the mind is the very same as the thing itself, it is not the identity of the thing. Where is this claimed ambiguity?
But you can continue to ignore the fact that I've refuted your position many times, that's up to you. — Gregory
That's strange, I don't recall your refutation. Perhaps you could refresh my memory.
I am trying to think in terms of your own premises, I am just trying to do it critically as opposed to affirmatively. I am not trying to invent premises to attack. — JerseyFlight
OK, so I'll repeat the principal premise. Aristotle distinguishes two types of "form", one being the abstracted essence of a thing, an idea, formula, or definition, and the other being the form which a material object has inherent within itself. Whenever you go astray of this premise, I will point it out to you.
The question still remains, from what then are you apprehending and determining properties? If the mind constructs the form of a Snark would this mean a Snark has existence? Further, where does the mind even get the properties to construct the idea of a Snark? — JerseyFlight
I don't see how "existence" is relevant, we haven't defined that term in this discussion, so it appears like you want a digression. I'm sure you are aware that the mind creates things, some imaginary, perhaps like a "Snark". Some might pass from being imaginary, to be material, like when an architect plans and then has a building constructed. I really don't know where a mind gets its creative ideas, but I don't see how the fact that I don't know how a mind can be creative could be used as evidence that a mind is not creative. Obviously minds are creative, whether or not we know how the creative activity works.
Do you then say that the chair has no existence beyond your mind? — JerseyFlight
No, this would be contrary to the principal premise stated above.
(And I should like to make it clear, this is exactly the position of idealism, of which you are indeed proving yourself to be most consistent. Idealism states that there is no reality beyond the mind, which is to say, even though it tries to posture away from this and violates it repeatedly in the course of action, it is the actual conclusion and solipsism of the position). — JerseyFlight
Again, contrary to the principal premise stated above, and so nothing but a straw man.
Now this seems like a direct contradiction of what is stated above, an example of the posturing I alluded to: — JerseyFlight
Correction, it's a direct contradiction of your straw man interpretation.
I recognize that objects exist outside my mind. — JerseyFlight
So do I recognize that objects exist outside my mind,, as is stated in my principal premise, and also is supported by the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself".
I do not understand how you arrived at this conclusion? — JerseyFlight
Let me explain. If the form of the chair comes from the chair and goes into my mind, then what exists in my mind is the same form as what came from the chair. Since the form is the same form, then there can be no mistake. If the form in my mind is different than the form in the chair, then it cannot be true that the form in my mind came from the chair because it is a different form. If there is a form which comes from the chair, and it is mediated, or altered in any way, then this different form comes to be in my mind, and it is not the same form as what came from the chair, so we cannot say that the form in the mind came from the chair, because the mediated form is a different form. This is the nature of "form". Any change in form, constitutes a distinct and different form.
Why do you here assume that your act of "taking" would be (and must be) one of perfection? — JerseyFlight
For the reason stated above. Any difference of form constitutes a different form. If the form of that chair in my mind is not exactly as the form within the material object (chair in this case), I cannot say that the form comes from the object. It is a different form, therefore this particular form must originate from a different source.
(It is clear to me that this demonstrates the superiority of Hegel's approach over that of Aristotle, because Hegel did not see this process as an automatic transference of perfection, but that it is mediated by thought, hence, the logic by which thought mediates must be more — JerseyFlight
Actually Hegel's position is consistent with Aristotle on this point. It is your idiosyncratic perspective (straw man) which creates the difference. If there was a transferal of form from the object to the mind, as you suggest, then perfection would be necessary. Since there is not perfection Hegel sees this perspective or proposition, i.e. unmediated understanding, as a distortion of reality. That there is mediation of thought, indicates that the form in the mind is different from the form in the object, and therefore not the same form. Therefore what I've argued above, that the form does not come from the object, is consistent with Hegel. Neither Hegel's nor Aristotle's approach is superior on this matter, because they both say the same thing in different ways.
I see a serious dilemma here. If the form of the mind is created by the mind then what is the chair? How can the mind create the form of a chair without the concrete existence of a chair to "apprehend" and "determine" its content? — JerseyFlight
I guess you do not recognize that minds create things. Would you think that it's a serious dilemma that an architect can design a building without ever seeing the building? This is one area where Aristotle is far superior to Hegel, his exposition of final cause, which is derived from Plato's dialectics concerning "the good".
How do you know that it (the chair) doesn't play a role in this process? — JerseyFlight
I didn't say that the chair doesn't play a role, I said that the form in the mind doesn't come from the chair, it is created by the mind. This is consistent with Hegel's "mediated" by thought. And, when you recognize that a difference in form implies that the two different forms are not the same form, you will conclude that the form in the mind did not come from the chair, but was created by the mind.
Your argument seems to be that the existence of "mistakes" is proof that your idealism is true? This seems very much like a non-sequitur. How can you even determine when something is a "mistake" if there is no difference between your mind's idea of a chair and an actual chair? — JerseyFlight
Another failure to respect the principal premise for the sake of a straw man.
I do not see how there can be "material objects" from the basis of your position? If you are referring to "forms" your mind produces, then you are neither referring to "material" or "objects" but mental abstractions. You then have no right to use the term, material objects. — JerseyFlight
I have no idea what you're trying to say here but it appears like another failure to respect the principal premise. That premise states that a material object has a form, and the form which the material object has is distinct from the forms which are in my mind. Material objects are taken for granted by the premise, so if you perceive my perspective as denying the possibility of material objects, you need to demonstrate this, not just appeal to your straw man named "idealism", and knock it down as if you were hitting me.
It seems very much like you are just asserting these sweeping metaphysical premises into being without a way to substantiate them, like you are constructing your own imaginary world out of abstract premises. If everything is reduced to your mind and objects have no independent being, then wouldn't that leave you trapped in your own mind? If you can't make a distinction between what your "mind creates" and what actually exists, then it seems to me you cannot escape the conclusion that this entire discourse is just a "creation" of your mind. — JerseyFlight
Failure to respect the principal premise.
When you say this "doesn't make sense to you," that is correct, because you're not considering the law of identity as it is in the actual movement of its being, hence you are oblivious to its negation. — JerseyFlight
I think I've addressed this for you already, in the other thread. A material "thing" is changing as each moment of time passes. Nevertheless, we say that it remains the same thing. This changing activity is what you call "the actual movement of its being". The material thing has a new form at each passing moment, yet it maintains its identity as the same thing. What is negated is certain attributes, not the identity of the material being. Negation, as a dialectic of attributes, what a thing has and has not, does not suffice to refute the law of identity.
Hegel's point is not that the law of identity specifically states these attributes (unity and difference) but that the law not only presupposes them, but makes use of them within the movement of its own being. — JerseyFlight
So this is Hegel's faulty representation of the law of identity; the one which can be struck down with negation, but it's just a straw man. Identity does not presuppose any attributes. The only presuppositions are "a thing", and "same", neither of which is an attribute.. If Hegel introduces "the movement of its own being" here, then he is talking about attributes which are negated, not the thing nor its identity.
What's most interesting is that you have actually validated Hegel's position throughout this exchange because you have admitted that the law is too narrow to deduce content. — JerseyFlight
That's right, the law of identity is not at all intended to produce conceptual content. It is applied as an aid to judging truth and falsity of conceptual content. So it would be better described as a principle of skepticism. The problem though is when people like you, and perhaps Hegel, represent it as if it is supposed to produce conceptual content, then denounce it as inadequate for that endeavour. All this demonstrates is a misunderstanding of it, on your part. -
JerseyFlight
782
Discoursing on the Law of Identity:
Quoting you: "Any difference of form constitutes a different form."
"The material thing has a new form at each passing moment, yet it maintains its identity as the same thing." -- Metaphysician Undercover
If its form has changed, then according to your logic, how can you say "it maintains its identity as the same?" For you have said that any difference constitutes a new form. "New" is not the same as "same."
"I recognize that objects exist outside my mind..." This premise serves as the absolute negation of your idealism, insofar as it must give way to the authority of the material form. This is why consistent idealists must deny the existence of the material world, the admission of the premise ends up nullifying the authority of their abstraction. After this admission abstraction is sublated to the concretion of the object. As soon as one posits a world beyond the mind, one has deferred to an authority beyond the mind.
Is identity different from itself? Identity is saying that it is not different from itself, this is the negative side of the determination of identity. The positive side says that everything is identical to itself. One cannot posit identity without equally positing difference (because one cannot make a determination without negation) there is no such thing as identity without difference, and this is because identity is saying that it is not difference, unless you claim that identity is different from itself? Here it will not work merely to reassert the positive side of identity, because you are already, in the same instance as you posit identity, saying that it is not different from itself, you just don't realize it.
This is why Hegel says, "a determinateness of being is essentially a transition into its opposite..." What you are trying to do is retain a determination, while rejecting the inescapable transition which casts identity into its negation. You have exactly manifested and proven Hegel's point.
"Identity does not presuppose any attributes. The only presuppositions are "a thing", and "same", neither of which is an attribute." -- Metaphysician Undercover
A thing is itself, this is the positive side. A thing is not different from itself, this is the negative side. You do not have identity with only one side of the determination. Both sides taken together, equal unity; identity contains itself as well as unity and difference. The mere positive formation is simply ignorant of itself.
"If Hegel introduces "the movement of its own being" here, then he is talking about attributes which are negated, not the thing nor its identity." -- Metaphysician Undercover
Hegel does not show that identity has contradiction outside itself, but that this contradiction is contained within the nature of identity itself. All of the determinations brought forth by Hegel are instances of the same identity. This thinking is exceedingly difficult for Aristotelians to grasp, precisely because their comprehension has been deluded by idealistic premises which artificially divide and distort the objects of being. Instead of allowing the object to dictate and unfold its properties and attributes, the Aristotelian logic dictates axiomatically how the object should be viewed and divided. This leads to a narrow distortion of reality. "…identificational thinking itself is a tremendous abstraction. We have recently begun to become painfully aware of the artificial world man has constructed and imposed on the natural immediacy of the planet earth by force of identificational thinking in its abstractness and its nihilism— for everything built by reflection is built on negation." "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, A Propaedeutic,” pg.251, Thomas Hoffmann, translated by David Healan, Brill 2015
"Any difference of form constitutes a different form. If the form of that chair in my mind is not exactly as the form within the material object (chair in this case), I cannot say that the form comes from the object." -- Metaphysician Undercover
It seems to me, and I could be wrong, that there is a kind of strawman posited here. You say, "if the form of the chair is not exact..." this seems problematic, why the criteria of exactitude? The answer you give is because of the first part of the syllogism. "Any difference, new form." What I don't understand is why the movement and transition of an object should preclude its influence on our comprehension of it? It is merely your authoritarian and idealistic assumption that perceptual information taken from the chair must equal exactitude. I do not believe you can sustain this, but I am open to your defense.
Isn't the actual conclusion simply that you could not say your ideas of the chair were exact, and not that the information you assess from the physical object, has no bearing on your formation of it?
I confess that the question of subject and object is one of the most difficult areas in all of philosophy. I do not believe you have conquered it with this simple, idealistic syllogism. The latest discoveries in neuroscience are actually informing us that our perception is the result of our social interaction, it is both mind and the world, what amounts to a most astounding discovery, "action comes before perception." But this is not a dualism, to posit such would be to reduce the plurality of mind and world to idealistic categories. -
Gregory
4.7k
You and i believe we see the world. MU thinks he abstracts the world into his soul. He is so convinced he has the correct psychology and that we really abstract without knowing it that he can't see that he created this feeling of abstraction is his mind through lust for a devourment of scholastic books. "Reason is a whore" said Luther (about Aristotle btw) -
Metaphysician Undercover
13.2kIf its form has changed, then according to your logic, how can you say "it maintains its identity as the same?" For you have said that any difference constitutes a new form. "New" is not the same as "same. — JerseyFlight
In Aristotelian physics, temporal continuity is provided for by matter. Matter is the underlying thing which persists through change, as the form of the thing changes. Because the identity of the thing persists, despite changes to its form, we must associate identity with matter, not with form.
This premise serves as the absolute negation of your idealism, insofar as it must give way to the authority of the material form. This is why consistent idealists must deny the existence of the material world, the admission of the premise ends up nullifying the authority of their abstraction. After this admission abstraction is sublated to the concretion of the object. As soon as one posits a world beyond the mind, one has deferred to an authority beyond the mind. — JerseyFlight
When did I say I was idealist? That is your straw man. And since I accept the existence of the material world, which is contrary to your notion of idealism, you now ought to see that it is a straw man. Or, perhaps I really am idealist, and your notion of idealism is a straw man. Choose your poison.
Is identity different from itself? Identity is saying that it is not different from itself, this is the negative side of the determination of identity. — JerseyFlight
We went through this already, perhaps in the other thread. "Same" and "different" are not proper opposites when "same" is used as it is in the law of identity. Difference is included within same, because the same thing has a changing form, and therefore is different from one moment to the next, despite maintaining its identity as the same thing. This is represented as the difference between subject and predicate which I described earlier. The subject may persist as the same subject, despite having predications negated at different times. So the subject remains the same, as in same subject, despite difference being a part of it, due to changing predications, when the subject represents an object.
Therefore "different" is not applicable when referring to the subject itself, because difference is a feature of what is predicated. To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with matter.
This is why Hegel says, "a determinateness of being is essentially a transition into its opposite..." What you are trying to do is retain a determination, while rejecting the inescapable transition which casts identity into its negation. You have exactly manifested and proven Hegel's point. — JerseyFlight
Negation and transition are formal, identity is material. Do you recognize this distinction between form and matter in Aristotle?
Hegel does not show that identity has contradiction outside itself, but that this contradiction is contained within the nature of identity itself. All of the determinations brought forth by Hegel are instances of the same identity. This thinking is exceedingly difficult for Aristotelians to grasp, precisely because their comprehension has been deluded by idealistic premises which artificially divide and distort the objects of being. Instead of allowing the object to dictate and unfold its properties and attributes, the Aristotelian logic dictates axiomatically how the object should be viewed and divided. — JerseyFlight
This very clearly demonstrates a misunderstanding of the law of identity. Identity is given to the object itself, and the object is represented in logic as the subject. All contraries are related to what is predicated of the subject, so it makes no sense to say that contradiction is within identity itself. Contradiction is in what is said about the object, but identity is within the object.
If the law of identity were itself contradictory, then you might demonstrate this. But it's not. So it makes no sense to say that contradiction is within identity, because the law of identity puts identity into the object itself, and contradiction is always within what is said about the object.
It seems to me, and I could be wrong, that there is a kind of strawman posited here. You say, "if the form of the chair is not exact..." this seems problematic, why the criteria of exactitude? — JerseyFlight
The need for "exactitude" is quite clear. Any difference is a difference, hence two distinct forms. Two similar forms are different forms, not one form.
What I don't understand is why the movement and transition of an object should preclude its influence on our comprehension of it? It is merely your authoritarian and idealistic assumption that perceptual information taken from the chair must equal exactitude. I do not believe you can sustain this, but I am open to your defense. — JerseyFlight
I did not preclude influence, that is your straw man. What I insist, is that perceptual information received from, or taken from, the chair, does not mean that the form of the chair in my mind, as an image, is even similar to, let alone the same form, as what inheres within the material chair.
That is the argument. There is a form in the material chair itself, directly related to the chair's identity, and there is a form "of" the chair in my mind, as an image. These two forms, though they might both be called "the form of the chair", are completely distinct. And only the form which inheres within the material chair is directly related to the identity of that object, because the form in my mind "of the chair", is what you called mediated.
Isn't the actual conclusion simply that you could not say your ideas of the chair were exact, and not that the information you assess from the physical object, has no bearing on your formation of it? — JerseyFlight
The point is that these are two distinct forms, the form which inheres within the material chair, and the form of the chair which is in my mind.. We could only call them the same form, and thereby claim that the form in my mind is directly related to the identity of the chair, if there was such exactitude. There is not such exactitude, therefore the identity of the chair remains within the chair, and not in my mind.
I confess that the question of subject and object is one of the most difficult areas in all of philosophy. I do not believe you have conquered it with this simple, idealistic syllogism. The latest discoveries in neuroscience are actually informing us that our perception is the result of our social interaction, it is both mind and the world, what amounts to a most astounding discovery, "action comes before perception." But this is not a dualism, to posit such would be to reduce the plurality of mind and world to idealistic categories. — JerseyFlight
There is though, a duality of form. How else can you account for the form of the chair in your mind, as an image, and the fact that the material chair has a form itself, which makes it the particular thing that it is? For the reasons explained, we cannot say that these two forms are the same form. Therefore we ought to conclude that each perceived object has a duality of form, the form which is proper to the identity of the object, and the form that is proper to the mind which perceives it which we often call the "form of the object" . -
Metaphysician Undercover
13.2kHe is so convinced he has the correct psychology and that we really abstract without knowing it that he can't see that he created this feeling of abstraction is his mind through lust for a devourment of scholastic books. "Reason is a whore" said Luther (about Aristotle btw) — Gregory
If it is true that I "created" this, then my argument is proven.
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