What are you hoping to achieve with objective morality?

killing is condemned in the majority of cultures — Aleph Numbers

And therefore in most countries there are laws preventing it. What else do you want?

There are certain cultural practices that are barbaric to me, such as female genital mutilation, that with cultural relativism I cannot condemn, and that cause real suffering. There would be stronger ground upon which to condemn such things with the morality I propose. But even what I propose isn't objective, just broader. Btw hit the reply button if you want me to be alerted of your response.

Thus, cultural relativism is avoided. Is there a flaw in my thinking? — Aleph Numbers

Does the different resultant moral axioms from different time periods avoid relativism? (I'd say they don't, but perphaps you see "cultural relativism" differently than me.)

Yes, good point. There is an element of temporal relativism. But any change isolated within singular cultures over time does not represent cultural relativism; it's not comparing different cultures. But which moral axioms applied in the past should only have affected what we did in the past, and what we should do in the present should only be affected by the moral axioms that apply in the present. Moral axioms have a tendency to stick around so they could conceivably apply for long enough to be themselves applied in the present. However, yes, cultures and people's beliefs change. Thus the "most of the time" and not "all of the time". I'm thinking it should be changed to "some of the time".

A question that I think might be a problem:

By trying to define a morality based on common use, aren't you not forsaking a logically necessary, a priori definition of morality?

And where does the - even if individual and subjective - logical need and justification for a morality comes from? That is, that which makes individuals to have a morality in first place.

Wouldn't make more sense to extract the principles that give birth to a morality system?

What you described is moral relativism. You’ve just shifted the focus on consensus.
If I understand you, then under your view slavery is moral since most of the cultures in the world at one point agreed it was.
I dont think morality needs to be “objective”, it is sufficient to have an objective standard, a metric that can be used to take moral measurements. The analogy I use is a measuring tape, in inches. An inch is not “objective”, it is arbitrary, a human made it up and started measuring things with it. So its basis is still subjective, but once established it can be used as an objective standard; no matter where you go, how human perceptions makes distances appear different between one person and another, where or when you take a measurement etc an inch will always be an inch. If something is 12 inches long, it doesnt matter what someones opinion is, its always going to be 12 inches long.
I view morality in this way, a metric is chosen and used to make moral “ measurements”.

Slavery would only be justified if one disregarded the views of the slaves. You fall prey to the same objection that Ignoro just laid out. Additionally I literally said I didn't propose an objective morality, I just broadened the consensus.

But, furthermore, once the consensus is taken, via the process I described, it can be used to make objective moral "measurements" anywhere you find humans.

This is going to take some time and thought. I'm thinking my theoretical definition of morality is "what is considered good behavior for most humans some of the time". Is there something wrong with this definition? And I would argue that people need guiding principles to live happy, meaningful lives and flourish and that this is where the need for ethics, even if it is subjective at its base, comes in.

Slavery would only be justified if one disregarded the views of the slaves. You fall prey to the same objection that Ignoro just laid out. Additionally I literally said I didn't propose an objective morality, I just broadened the consensus. — Aleph Numbers

Well the views of the slaves would only matter if they were the ones forming the consensus. This is the problem with morality by consensus, the minority moral positions wouldnt matter.
If consensus is your metric, then you allow for moral validity even to positions that are clearly biased, misguided or irrational.
My mistake on objective morality, I thought you were positing a moral system with the aim of avoiding moral relativism and assumed you were going for something “objective”.

But, furthermore, once the consensus is taken, via the process I described, it can be used to make objective moral "measurements" anywhere you find humans. — Aleph Numbers

Ok, so your view has some similarity to mine but you are positing the metric “consensus” as your “inch” (to stick with the analogy), is that correct?

Is there something wrong with this definition? — Aleph Numbers

I don't think there's anything wrong with it, but it wouldn't answer one need for the participants, that is, sometimes, to find a moral solution that is "universally good". Even if it is not possible, it is goal that people usually have in mind.

Say, for example, that most of the world approves some form of repression of gay people. If we have reason to believe that there's no sense in that, we wouldn't be willing to accept such moral belief, even if it is considered consensus.

Unless I misunderstood you, in case you can correct me.

As an aside that doesn't add much, for me, personally, ethics is even more objective than moral, because while moral makes a rule for "right or wrong", and this rule may have nothing to do with the actual consequences of an act (such as being gay, for example, that doesn't harm other people), ethics is worried with the interpersonal consequences of an act. That is, what is the effect of something on others.

Yes, correct about the consensus bit. And I want to avoid cultural relativism, not all forms of relativism. And I think that using the consensus of all humanity would lead to a stabilizing effect; the status quo would probably succeed more often than not. But yes, you make good points, the minority should not always be wrong.


Yes, you are also making good points. Just because the people in the minority are wrong right now doesn't mean they always have to be wrong; perhaps it would serve an even greater good in the future to defy what is considered right right now. Thus, certain axioms would only be right some of the time. One axiom might be thrown out in favor of another if it would better serve the coming present consensus. This could take the form of accelerating the consensus along to what it will be in the future given enough time. Sorry if that is a copout.

I've struggled with the idea of morality being subjective for quite some time now; I really want some things to be objectively moral - or to at least avoid cultural relativism. I think a good start for moral axioms is to recognize what most people most of the time would consider moral or immoral behavior (I've heard something like this before but I can't remember who said it). This avoids many of the pitfalls of cultural relativism because the "most people most of the time" bit transcends many, if not most cultural barriers. For instance, premeditated killing is condemned in the majority of cultures. One could expand the group of those that believe that one should not engage in premeditated killing to include people in every culture that have this belief and make it the numerator in a ratio. if one then makes the denominator the total number of people in humanity, given the ratio is greater than 0.5, relative to humanity, murder is wrong. Thus, cultural relativism is avoided. Is there a flaw in my thinking? The same thing would apply for determining whether or not something is immoral: the ratio would have to be less than 0.5. — Aleph Numbers

Isn't this the fallacy of appeal to the majority? That more people have a certain belief doesn't make that belief true. There was a time when almost everyone believed the earth was flat. We now know the earth isn't flat.

That said, the very notions of subjectivity and objectivity seem tied to your approach to morality, a probabilistic approach. Although, to me, there's something deeply flawed in how probability is used in making the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity I will simply regurgitate the official position which is that the probability that something is objective increases with the number of people reporting that something. This view fits perfectly with your probabilistic model of objective morality in that if the ratio of number of people believing a certain moral claim as true to the total number of people is greater than 0.5 then this moral claim is objective. :chin:

Point of clarification: just because a group embraces, let's say, cannibalism, wouldn't mean that group was practicing a justified or intelligent morality, it would just mean it was the adopted morality of the group. Here's the real problem, when people in Papua New Guinea would eat people they had a religious belief that justified this action as somehow having significance. The question is whether or not we will let superstition dictate our morals or whether we will use knowledge to craft precepts that are intelligent. With superstition nothing is off the table, all the way to the horror of consuming other humans because it means they become part of your spirit. I vote for a morality based on knowledge, and what is interesting, so does every American Christian, this is why they reject the archaic morality of their ancestors.

You say that abiding by the consensus of the majority is fallacious and then claim that something is true because a rule that proposes something is objective because more people report it to be true is true. :up: I didn't claim that the moral view is objective, but rather that it provides an objective standard by which to measure any human's behavior.

Yes, correct about the consensus bit. And I want to avoid cultural relativism, not all forms of relativism. And I think that using the consensus of all humanity would lead to a stabilizing effect; the status quo would probably succeed more often than not. But yes, you make good points, the minority should not always be wrong. — Aleph Numbers

Ok, in that case I think my criticism stands. Consensus morality is problematic, but that doesnt mean it doesnt have utility. Is there some utility or advantage you feel consensus has over other metrics?
You mentioned a stabilising effect...but stabilising effects come in many forms and not all of them moral in any conventional sense. For exsmple you could have teo warring tribes. Unstable. Genocide of one or both tribes would have a stabilising effect but I would argue thats an immoral utility.

Yes, you are also making good points. Just because the people in the minority are wrong right now doesn't mean they always have to be wrong; perhaps it would serve an even greater good in the future to defy what is considered right right now. Thus, certain axioms would only be right some of the time. One axiom might be thrown out in favor of another if it would better serve the coming present consensus. This could take the form of accelerating the consensus along to what it will be in the future given enough time. Sorry if that is a copout. — Aleph Numbers

Well, I do think thats a bit if a copout if Im being honest. You are making an appeal to the vagaries of how things might play out over time. That seems much to nebulous to serve as an adequate moral metric. I think your idea here is going to need a lot of utility to balance out these flaws and agin if you want me to be honest I think there are many superior metrics one could use over consensus without having to struggle so much to find merit in it. So now I would ask you what it is that moral consensus accomplishes that other more conventional moral metrics do not (or do less well)? You would have to demonstrate the superiority of consensus, and you have my attention and interest sir so lets hear it.

Consensus morality is problematic, but that doesnt mean it doesnt have utility. — DingoJones

I already answered this, see above.

You say that abiding by the consensus of the majority is fallacious and then claim that something is true because a rule that proposes something is objective because more people report it to be true is true. :up: I didn't claim that the moral view is objective, but rather that it provides an objective standard by which to measure any human's behavior. — Aleph Numbers

I agree and the probabilistic model for moral objectivity you propose is true to the way all matters of objectivity are handled in other areas - the more people reporting an observation, the greater the odds of it being true. :up:

Sorry fir the snide thumbs up. I think you're great, Fool.

This will have to wait until tomorrow. Sorry. But I'll definitely get back to it.

As a courtesy Im letting you know I do not like you, have no use for what you write (I ignore it as much as I can) and have no intention of engaging you.
So there is no need to waste your time directing comments at me.

As a courtesy Im letting you know I do not like you — DingoJones

Neither truth or quality can be dictated or restricted on the basis of offense, which is just one's emotive psychology thwarting more objective considerations. See John Stuart Mill, Essay on Liberty Chapter 2. It is a hard lesson but one that every serious thinker must eventually come to terms with.

Sorry fir the snide thumbs up. I think you're great, Fool. — Aleph Numbers

No problem.

I've struggled with the idea of morality being subjective for quite some time now; I really want some things to be objectively moral - or to at least avoid cultural relativism. I think a good start for moral axioms is to recognize what most people most of the time would consider moral or immoral behavior (I've heard something like this before but I can't remember who said it). This avoids many of the pitfalls of cultural relativism because the "most people most of the time" bit transcends many, if not most cultural barriers. For instance, premeditated killing is condemned in the majority of cultures. One could expand the group of those that believe that one should not engage in premeditated killing to include people in every culture that have this belief and make it the numerator in a ratio. if one then makes the denominator the total number of people in humanity, given the ratio is greater than 0.5, relative to humanity, murder is wrong. Thus, cultural relativism is avoided. Is there a flaw in my thinking? The same thing would apply for determining whether or not something is immoral: the ratio would have to be less than 0.5. — Aleph Numbers

Unfortunately you've led yourself right back into cultural relativism I'm afraid. :/ What you would be attempting to describe is our global moral culture. However there is a huge problem when you try to bring numbers into it. Which is fallacy by majority. It's entirely possible for that ratio to not only be above 0.5 for murder but also belief in non-moral matters. Like physics. Just because the ratio might have once been at 0.9 for both deadly blood sports and the Earth being flat, doesn't mean that either were correct in the moral or the physical sense of the word 'correct'.

Now, it can work that way in votes for laws and such. Which you can think of as experimental ethics if that helps. Something being legal doesn't mean it is right amd something being illegal doesn't mean it is wrong. That's not a true global culture though due to our nationalism status quo and disenfranchisement within those nations of potential voting demographic. Not every country is a democracy either.

If you want to go for the Jugular of Cultural Relativism, use Descriptive relativism and focus on the Moral Culture here on this forum.

One thing I think we can all agree on, is that part of our culture here, is we are all freely allowed to question the morals of other cultures. Would you agree with that? This forum wouldn't really exist without us all having this unwritten social rule buried within the forum culture.

Yet Cultural Relativists all over the world, claim it is wrong to question or criticize other people cultures. So occurs a contradiction within the structure of the argument for cultural relativism because it is obvious that not all of us here share the same moral beliefs at all. Yet Cultural relativists would claim that our moral truths are based on our culture. A complete impossibility within the culture of this forum.

The same is true of every culture. Disagreement from within. Untouchables in India probably don't want the Caste system. So it's not a cultural truth of Indian culture that the caste system is just okay, in fact, individuals from every caste have moral objections to the caste system. So even asserted cultural rules about whether or not untouchables even get a say don't matter since individual members of every caste take issue with them having to be called "untouchables" in the first place instead of "Fellow Indian" "Countrymen" "Friend" "Neighbour".

Individual relativism doesn't really work either. I can have the intent to morally help people, yet be indecisive about how, who or why and can still harm even if I intend otherwise. I can have conflict within both inner and external dialogues which makes me look back and say "I was wrong for doing that.". It's not that our beliefs changed and it was right in the past but wrong for you to do now. You say "I was wrong" past tense, meaning you now believe it was wrong both then and now. Unless you only believe it was wrong in that context but may have been right in another. For example punching someone unprovoked = "I was wrong" vs Punching someone trying to stab you = "It isn't wrong to punch someone trying to stab you".

Descriptive Contextual Relativism is a bit harder to deconstruct. The act of punching someone being morally wrong or right is relative to the context in this view and is a form of neo-pragmatic consequentialism.

Descriptive Contextual Relativism is a bit harder to deconstruct. The act of punching someone being morally wrong or right is relative to the context in this view and is a form of neo-pragmatic consequentialism. — MSC

Although I think Educational psychologist William Perry might have coined the term Contextual Relativism but in relation to student cognitive development.

One thing I think we can all agree on, is that part of our culture here, is we are all freely allowed to question the morals of other cultures. Would you agree with that? — MSC

I'm not so sure about this. I think on this forum it eventually comes down to how many people our questions offend, which is backward because the essence of philosophy is negation.

I'm not so sure about this. I think on this forum it eventually comes down to how many people our questions offend, which is backward because the essence of philosophy is negation. — JerseyFlight

I was using this forum as an example of a place where such a belief could be argued to be part of the culture. Would you prefer the culture of an ethics classroom as an example? Or would you say that there are some justifiable taboos in all cultures in general? Including an ethics classroom? Very interested to hear your thoughts.

You'll also need to PM me at some point and explain the Polemic School of thought in more detail. I had a brief look at that and found it fascinating. Are you the organiser for that meetup group? PM soon!

As to "The essence of philosophy is negation" can you explain in more detail what you mean by that and also justify the claim for me? I don't know if I agree with that. I'd say the essence of philosophy is Delineation. Or maybe I mean the purpose of philosophy? What do we even mean by essence? Too far? It's 3 am here, so I'm honestly running on fumes, so I apologise if I've not made sense, especially for that last question, too Meta for this late at night I feel!

Will private message to keep thread on track. :smile:

I really want some things to be objectively moral - or to at least avoid cultural relativism. I think a good start for moral axioms is to recognize what most people most of the time would consider moral or immoral behavior — Aleph Numbers

The problem with popularism is that we often find bygone popular behaviour morally reprehensible.

How much does it matter to you whether there is one rule that all must obey or everyone has their own near-identical rule hewn from a rough template? And why does it matter, if it does?

Most elementary ethics reduces to describing social rather than individualistic behaviour. (Some, written by psychopaths, flip it, while complex ethics arise from complex environments.) We are, genetically, driven toward both. Given that genetically we are much of a muchness and given that genetics is assumed to describe objectively real things, is this objective enough? And given that we are not all exactly the same, is this relativist enough?

there is a huge problem when you try to bring numbers into it. Which is fallacy by majority. It's entirely possible for that ratio to not only be above 0.5 for murder but also belief in non-moral matters. Like physics. Just because the ratio might have once been at 0.9 for both deadly blood sports and the Earth being flat, doesn't mean that either were correct in the moral or the physical sense of the word 'correct'. — MSC

I'm proposing making a subjective consensus can then be used as an objective standard insofar as multiple cultures are concerned, not objective axioms. Furthermore, if one defines "good" or "moral" as "acceptable behavior for most humans some of the time" then the axioms that result from the process I describe are indeed correct morally.

we are much of a muchness — Kenosha Kid

What does this even mean?

Is there some utility or advantage you feel consensus has over other metrics? — DingoJones

Well, there is the example of health care: nobody wants to be denied care or bankrupted by a visit to the hospital. The majority of people, in the US at least, want universal health care to be instituted, but because of garbage neo-liberal politicians this policy has not been passed. The morality I propose would give strong ground upon which to criticize corrupt politicians. Thus, consensus, and the morality I propose, could potentially help overcome a flawed democracy, and, ultimately, result in considerable happiness. Furthermore, certain despicable and backwards practices could be condemned and eliminated, such as fgm. I'll try to think of more ways that consensus has utility.