This makes the reference of God both useless and unnecessary. — JerseyFlight

As supernatural entity, yes. As regulative idea, in the manner of Kant, useful indeed. And to my way of thinking, that means we're all more or less a part of God. And I appreciate "getting to the point."

Hmm.

if one "sees an ethical core" in Christianity one has not seen it because of Christianity. — JerseyFlight

Tackle this, if you're of a mind to, because I don't see it. Why not? My account would be the hermeneutic circle/spiral. Which would be to say that Christianity indeed informs as to its ethical core.

And to my way of thinking, that means we're all more or less a part of God. — tim wood

???

I misspoke. It means we are all to some degree God.

It means we are all to some degree God. — tim wood

I get the point, not my articulation, but man's ethics do come from man, he is not submitting or looking to God, (even when he deceives himself that he is, this is only his deception, and in truth he is still within the domain of man speaking to man). It was the greatest rhetorical device when one figured out that they could claim to speak for God, which essentially means human psychological culture produced dupes that were invulnerable to authoritarianism. Of course, sometimes even the speakers believed it. This truly is the functioning of a backward, primitive species.

If I were to accept your opinion that “God exists” is a nonsense poetic comment…I would have to accept that my take on the question, “I do not know if any gods exist” is also a nonsense poetic comment. — Frank Apisa

I am baffled at how I have said repeatedly over and over multiple times that - with your definition of "god(s)" as being a natural phenomena - I have no problem with your view.

Under your definition of "god(s)" it is hypothetically possible to assert a truth value. It is when you get into the realm of the supernatural that things morph from philosophy into poetry.

No, the usages of words, not words alone, have meaning or not. Read e.g. Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, both by Ludwig Wittgenstein. — 180 Proof

There can be no doubt that early Wittgenstein - circa Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus - would have agreed with my assessment that religious language does not make any logical sense. What can be said at all can be said clearly and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.

Later W modified his views - difficult to summarize in a paragraph or two since he's all over the map - but the short version is that later W considers religious discourse to be a particular language game with it's own internal rules & logic.

Here is a good summary: Wittgenstein on God

If you are interested in W's views on religion, I suggest you open up a new line of discussion. There are many people on this forum who are very knowledgeable & articulate about both early & later W.

Okay. More non sequiturs - you must be a bot - so I'm done.

This truly is the functioning of a backward, primitive species.

The use of religion by politics was constructive in the development of civilisation. It's perversion into nihilist militant extremism is a recent development, one which will be stamped out I expect.

Because it changes life for most of us
you do not have to be religious and living in a religious country and your life will be effected by it
we may try to keep politics and life out of religion sometimes we can sometimes we cant
No god is enough for any of us to provide fulfillment in our lives or to give purpose but the values that comes with the god and the religion makes peoples life better.
remember religions came unto this earth due to illiteracy and poverty and injustice and some way for ruler to emphasize their rule on the people but still does effect most of the people living in poverty on much of the world
may god does not exist but the notion bring people to calm and still is predominantly needed for much of the world society

Enlighten me? Either there is a singularity, or some other fudge (poetry). You still have the same problem. — Punshhh

Well this is a mismatch between the map (model) and the terrain (reality) in which were asking how far can this model be applied before it stops modeling reality correctly. In this case infinities pop up in the mathematics and we're unsure what this is actually supposed to mean nor whether the model even applies here anymore.

Can you account for any opinion that there is no supernatural component in our origin, I can't see one? — Punshhh

Define supernatural? Once you've defined it can you construct a mathematical and loosely ontologically significant scientific theory that matches reality for other aspects of it (makes predictions) and thusly also not only "explains" how the origin came to be but we can investigate whether it's or isn't the case (minimal falsificationism) with this "supernatural" component?

Super natural: a manifestation or event attributed to some force beyond scientific understanding or the laws of nature. (Or maybe start with the mystery of consciousness, that should be easy :snicker: .) — 3017amen

If by supernatural, as implied here, you mean beyond scientific methodology/investigation and thusly beyond our experiences (the true nature of our experiences for example) then yes there is perhaps such a thing (could be anything from god to strings from string theory). We are stuck to our pragmatic empirical methodologies however and thusly cannot answer said question as only questions about experiences themselves as well as their relations can then be taken seriously.

In summary, you haven't explained your conscious existence and how you came to be... , now, you are saying that logic cannot answer the deepest questions of existence. — 3017amen

No philosophy can do what you ask lest Descartes come back from the grave and beat you over the head with ideas of universes that began five minutes ago or clever deceitful demons. Only questions about our experiences or potential experiences can be made sense of.

So can you argue through a pragmatic scientific investigation of your experiences that there was a potential possibility in the past of having held an experience of a human being called Jesus? Imagining talking to an acquaintance and "actually" talking to an acquaintance are two different experiences which we can distinguish. . . which one is Jesus (the purely imagined or the purely "real").

the values that comes with the god and the religion makes peoples life better. — Ibtehal

This is false. Spanking children and burning witches neither makes society or people's lives better. Thinking one has solved the problems of existence because they believe in God does not make human lives better, it makes them more confused and rigid, more full of existential terror. All of the Christians who are alive today would be considered heretics in the world of the past, and Christians have wisely departed from much historical dogmatism, which proves that their real ethic, though they are not aware of it, is humanistic. It is humanistic values coupled with advances in knowledge that makes people's lives better.

It is humanistic values coupled with advances in knowledge that makes people's lives better.
6m — JerseyFlight

Are you making a mutually exclusive declaration?

Have you read the old testament wisdom books?

Have you read the old testament wisdom books? — 3017amen

Indeed I have. Beware lest you discriminate against revelation, for this would imply an external standard, which serves to nullify the authority of the whole. It is always a good day when the theist realizes he is really playing by humanistic rules.

We are stuck to our pragmatic empirical methodologies however and thusly cannot answer said question as only questions about experiences themselves as well as their relations can then be taken seriously. — substantivalism

Yes and no. We know that the laws of the universe are full of paradox and uncertainty. Godel's theorem warns us that the axiomatic method of making logical deductions from given assumptions cannot in general provide a system which is both provably complete and consistent.

It doesn't mean that the universe is absurd or meaningless only that an understanding of its existence and properties lie outside the usual categories of rational human thought. And so if the reason for existence has no explanation in the usual sense (through empirical observation), something beyond the natural laws governing existence is the so-called logical consequence. Hence the concept of super-natural.

So can you argue through a pragmatic scientific investigation of your experiences that there was a potential possibility in the past of having held an experience of a human being called Jesus? Imagining talking to an acquaintance and "actually" talking to an acquaintance are two different experiences which we can distinguish. . . which one is Jesus (the purely imagined or the purely "real"). — substantivalism

I suppose another thought there would be relative to Subjective Idealism. If the concept of consciousness viz Christianity, includes parcing the nature of both mind and God (God's suppose-ed son Jesus), then reading a historical accounting of a historical figure or person wouldn't be a starkly opposing process compared with apperception of anything from our conscious existence.

Yes and no. We know that the laws of the universe are full of paradox and uncertainty. Godel's theorem warns us that the axiomatic method of making logical deductions from given assumptions cannot in general provide a system which is both provably complete and consistent. — 3017amen

Exactly so we can only work with approximations full stop, done.

It doesn't mean that the universe is absurd or meaningless only that an understanding of its existence and properties lie outside the usual categories of rational human thought. And so if the reason for existence has no explanation in the usual sense (through empirical observation), something beyond the natural laws governing existence is the so-called logical consequence. Hence the concept of super-natural. — 3017amen

"Beyond the natural laws", you mean beyond the patterns we see. The patterns are all that matters given they are all we have access to uncover what reality does and how it does it. Though, others have defined natural in such a manner that dealing in the supernatural (using such a term) would be redundant or useless as a distinction.

I suppose another thought there would be relative to Subjective Idealism. If the concept of consciousness viz Christianity, includes parcing the nature of both mind and God (God's suppose-ed son Jesus), then reading a historical accounting of a historical figure or person wouldn't be a starkly opposing process compared with apperception of anything from our conscious existence. — 3017amen

Are you saying that a person talking to another person is equivalent to imagining they are talking to a person? What is that you are trying to say here. . . was Jesus a "real" person or not (not purely a fictional one but a potential "human" experience the same as talking to a friend of yours).

Though, others have defined natural in such a manner that dealing in the supernatural (using such a term) would be redundant or useless as a distinction. — substantivalism

Explain why it's redundant or useless as a distinction (?). I look forward to your response.

you saying that a person talking to another person is equivalent to imagining they are talking to a person? What is that you are trying to say here. . . was Jesus a "real" person or not (not purely a fictional one but a potential "human" experience the same as talking to a friend of yours). — substantivalism

Are you saying that all historical figures were fictional characters?

Explain why it's redundant or useless as a distinction (?). I look forward to your response. — 3017amen

Natural is what exists and either is or gives rise to our experiences.

Are you saying that all historical figures were fictional characters? — 3017amen

Many can be accompanied by evidence that makes it likely among our web of beliefs that potentially you could have had a personal discussion with said person that was distinct from an imagined encounter. . . in other words don't twist my words. If your friend claims he has a friend and he shows you pictures of him (perhaps with footage with them doing something together) it's not to far a stretch to say so this is a potential "real" experience I could have if I met him. If it came to and he was entirely within my friends mind (I didn't see him) we'd be in a much different situation even despite him perhaps claiming he's right in front of me.

Historical figures (assuming were talking about real ones here) = "potential" encounters not unlike other people we've experienced.

Natural is what exists and either is or gives rise to our experiences. — substantivalism

Which is full of paradox and uncertainty, and are provably incomplete and inconsistent (Godel). And so how does your natural experiences help you in your argument?

Let's go full circle and explain your consciousness, shall we? Are the laws of logic outside of a complete explanation of your own existence? The nswer to the question is unequivocally yes.

What argument do you have there, that supports the use of the natural laws of the universe? I anxiously await your response.

Historical figures (assuming were talking about real ones here) = "potential" encounters not unlike other people we've experienced. — substantivalism

I agree. Think of it this way, if someone came to you and said I saw someone performing a miracle, would you believe them? Whose truth is that?

Which is full of paradox and uncertainty, and are provably incomplete and inconsistent (Godel). And so how does your natural experiences help you in your argument? — 3017amen

Not natural experiences but what gives rise to and are experiences (what they do or how they do it) are what is natural.

What argument do you have there, that supports the use of the natural laws of the universe? I anxiously await your response. — 3017amen

Well you keep using the phrase "natural laws" and I think you are implying nomologically necessary laws which dictate how these experiences must arise. Rather i'd use natural laws are they are used by philosophers from the other camp of such a discussion, they (natural laws) are regulative behaviors of nature (experiences in particular and their accompanying relations to each other). Why wouldn't we use models which can cover the regulative behavior of nature to guide our actions or ontologies?

I agree. Think of it this way, if someone came to you and said I saw someone performing a miracle, would you believe them? Whose truth is that? — 3017amen

Depends on his definition of a miracle, whether he was the sole experiencer, if others saw the same exact phenomenon occur as well as come to testify on his behalf without coercion, and most importantly what it's that he was claiming is miraculous to have occurred (details)? Not to mention this experience would have to be replicated and investigated to rule out other possible factors as well as whether it was entirely "psychological". In that if we replicate it with numerous bystanders would he be the sole one experiencing it and all others at a loss?

"Hey joe."

"Yes."

"It's a miracle, the sun rose again today."

natural experiences but what gives rise to and are experiences (what they do or how they do it) are what is natural. — substantivalism

I'm not following that... . How does that explain the inherent flaws from our natural laws of the universe and your conscious existence ? You're not addressing the questions; are you simply not able to, using your experiences?

Not to mention this experience would have to be replicated and investigated to rule out other possible factors as well as whether it was entirely "psychological". In that if we replicate it with numerous bystanders would he be the sole one experiencing it and all others at a loss? — substantivalism

In the end, that sounds like George Berkeley's metaphysical theory of Subjective Idealism. No real exceptions taken there... . :up:

I'm not following that... . How does that explain the inherent flaws from our natural laws of the universe and your conscious existence ? — 3017amen

I was talking about how some may define natural differently in such a manner that they wouldn't require the label supernatural. There I was clarifying that experiences alone aren't what's natural but what is natural is an umbrella term covering those experiences and what gives rise to them. It's just different ways of approaching the definition of the terms here.

For natural laws here or laws of nature i'd take a regulative stance and merely state that certain features of cognitive awareness/connection to insinuating experiences/having said experiences retain many numerous experiential correlations.

You're not addressing the questions; are you simply not able to, using your experiences? — 3017amen

You can only use your own experiences; what else would there be?

In the end, that sounds like George Berkeley's metaphysical theory of Subjective Idealism. No real exceptions taken there... . :up: — 3017amen

Though George Berkeley's thesis is usually given as a metaphysical/ontological one and I cannot in good philosophical conscience conclude with his subjective idealism. I can only conclude to holding a form of epistemological idealism with pragmatic/scientific methodology to guide me from general experiences to other general/abstract conclusions made from them. Again, as i've said numerous times before, we CANNOT know the true nature of our experiences (this includes a sort of Berkley idealism in which experiences in of themselves are all that they are) as we are only aware of the affects that such experiences have on "us" and the abstract conclusions made thereafter.

I was talking about how some may define natural differently in such a manner that they wouldn't require the label supernatural. There I was clarifying that experiences alone aren't what's natural but what is natural is an umbrella term covering those experiences and what gives rise to them. It's just different ways of approaching the definition of the terms here.

For natural laws here or laws of nature i'd take a regulative stance and merely state that certain features of cognitive awareness/connection to insinuating experiences/having said experiences retain many numerous experiential correlations. — substantivalism

...not exactly sure what all that means. I would say to you, don't be afraid to embrace the concept of super-natural. As I said, (in our context) it's just a consequence of temporal-ness and finitude that exists in the world of physics and logic/reason.

You can only use your own experiences; what else would there be? — substantivalism

The concept of super-natural. In the alternative, one could always parse the notion of synthetic a priori knowledge :chin:

I can only conclude to holding a form of epistemological idealism with pragmatic/scientific methodology to guide me from general experiences to other general/abstract conclusions made from them. — substantivalism

What would be an example of that sense of scientific pragmatism relating to (explaining) the nature of your conscious existence?

Again, as i've said numerous times before, we CANNOT know the true nature of our experiences (this includes a sort of Berkley idealism in which experiences in of themselves are all that they are) as we are only aware of the affects that such experiences have on "us" and the abstract conclusions made thereafter. — substantivalism

No exceptions taken.

In summary, looks like we still have paradox and uncertainty, inconsistency and incompleteness.

...not exactly sure what all that means. I would say to you, don't be afraid to embrace the concept of super-natural. As I said, (in our context) it's just a consequence of temporal-ness and finitude that exists in the world of physics and logic/reason. — 3017amen

A lot of that is already contained in even basic understandings (not being insulting here) of scientific methodology. The idea of constructing better abstract models of reality and waiting for them to break. Acknowledging their success but aware that they merely describe a black box and that their time could be up at anytime.

Going back to the actual reply the first thing covered was an explication of semantics. We can or could define natural in such a way that it precludes such supernatural distinctions. The second was just me clarifying the other common philosophical position on natural laws. Not sure you got this or not.

The concept of super-natural. In the alternative, one could always parse the notion of synthetic a priori knowledge :chin: — 3017amen

Did you create your knowledge or gave rise to these foundations? If the answer is more or less univocally no or probably no then it had to come from that which isn't "you". From outside. . . from experience. . . from the reality's interactions with itself or what was to become "you".

What would be an example of that sense of scientific pragmatism relating to (explaining) the nature of your conscious existence? — 3017amen

No explanation in the sense of philosophical certainty on the correct ontology of our world. Only raw experience and the abstract but useful models we construct to predict/describe our experiences. In this case part of the evidence to start would be that I happen to not know I've given rise to myself so what is likely is that the nature of my existence comes from outside (not me). From here come mixtures of native realism as a model and scientific investigations of the way other potential "conscious" beings interact with reality just as you study your own.

No exceptions taken.

In summary, looks like we still have paradox and uncertainty, inconsistency and incompleteness. — 3017amen

Only uncertainty relating to our restrictions and philosophical skeptical challenges to that which is the thing-in-of-itself. I still await to see a full conclusion that it isn't our concepts or abstract models which confuse us (give rise to contradictions) and it's the nature (the thing that's inaccessible) is fundamentally contradictory.

The idea of constructing better abstract models of reality and waiting for them to break. Acknowledging their success but aware that they merely describe a black box and that their time could be up at anytime.

Going back to the actual reply the first thing covered was an explication of semantics. We can or could define natural in such a way that it precludes such supernatural distinctions. The second was just me clarifying the other common philosophical position on natural laws. Not sure you got this or not. — substantivalism

And how would you define it then? What are 'abstract models' in themselves? Is that some form of Platonism? Or is it some incomplete mathematical axiom?

Did you create your knowledge or gave rise to these foundations? If the answer is more or less univocally no or probably no then it had to come from that which isn't "you". From outside. . . from experience. . . from the reality's interactions with itself or what was to become "you". — substantivalism

Is that like the mysterious/metaphysical sense of wonderment? In other words, does consciousness and self-awareness cause higher life forms of life to wonder about things? Or, as you say, does wonderment come from experience?

I've given rise to myself so what is likely is that the nature of my existence comes from outside (not me). — substantivalism

Okay. so something outside yourself caused your self to come into Being. Is that a form of super-natural causation, or something that just is. If it's something that just is, then we're back to where we started.

I still await to see a full conclusion that it isn't our concepts or abstract models which confuse us (give rise to contradictions) and it's the nature (the thing that's inaccessible) is fundamentally contradictory. — substantivalism

As do physicists: ToE.

And how would you define it then? What are 'abstract models' in themselves? — 3017amen

Abstract models merely are further combinations of concepts that we possess now and continue to learn formulated in such a way that they are implied to be certain aspects of our experience. Giving the three letter word red to the experience of seeing such a color.

Is that some form of Platonism? Or is it some incomplete mathematical axiom? — 3017amen

It isn't platonism and it was never meant to be deductive but inductively/abductively strong.

Is that like the mysterious/metaphysical sense of wonderment? In other words, does consciousness and self-awareness cause higher life forms of life to wonder about things? Or, as you say, does wonderment come from experience? — 3017amen

You experience wonderment but I do not have a feeling of creating it directly only one of passive interaction when the right set of experiences arise.

Okay. so something outside yourself caused your self to come into Being. Is that a form of super-natural causation, or something that just is. If it's something that just is, then we're back to where we started. — 3017amen

You'd have to define causation here (whether this concept even fully applies to our experiences) but putting that aside what I am is not clearly (at least to me) of my own doing. If it was then I'd know and the fact that I don't know means there is something beyond me that gives rise to such experiences. Doesn't mean it just is or that it always was only that it is now.

It's not back to where we started but a step forward towards better specificity.

As do physicists: ToE. — 3017amen

Okay.

Abstract models merely are further combinations of concepts that we possess now and continue to learn formulated in such a way that they are implied to be certain aspects of our experience. Giving the three letter word red to the experience of seeing such a color. — substantivalism

So abstract models are natural then, from experience? No exceptions taken, since in our context; Jesus, Platonism, etc. etc. can be abstract models about some other form of consciousness from which the ideas themselves also come from consciousness. Does that sound right?

isn't platonism and it was never meant to be deductive but inductively/abductively strong. — substantivalism

No exceptions. Can you translate that into Revelation in Christianity, as well as the religious experience phenomenon that uses induction?

You experience wonderment but I do not have a feeling of creating it directly only one of passive interaction when the right set of experiences arise. — substantivalism

So you really don't know how, and why, wonder exists, correct?

fact that I don't know means there is something beyond me that gives rise to such experiences. — substantivalism

Okay, so you don't know.

So abstract models are natural then, from experience? — 3017amen

They have to be as at most I have come to be aware of these models or perhaps give rise to them, manipulate them, but in the end given I have not (within knowledge) given rise to myself this leads to that which gives rise to our experiences or what experiences are.

No exceptions taken, since in our context; Jesus, Platonism, etc. etc. can be abstract models about some other form of consciousness from which the ideas themselves also come from consciousness. Does that sound right? — 3017amen

The deceitful demon, the brain in a vat and many other experientially but abstractly distinguishable models of reality from the problem of skepticism are also all possible models to hold onto (no vapid exceptions right). Of course, whatever model you hold onto you most be aware of where that model ends and the experience begins. If where it ends and touches our experiences doesn't match them then it would seem that we would have to abandon it. You would have to reason from our relationship to said experiences to these sort of abstract models of it just as if you wanted to hold onto the universe coming into existence five minutes ago. . . ask yourself why hold it when it's experientially indistinguishable from any other skeptical model without much prior reason to do so. Or if your model allows for us to manipulate reality in such a manner that we ourselves or among past experiences are unaware can be done then again. . . ask yourself why hold onto this model if it contradicts it or postulates the existence of experiences not yet had (nor presently capable of being shown possible).

If you are to fudge a model to allow for your Jesus then you most be truthful about the application of said model to other similar entities while respecting core meanings. Further, it's a wonder of mine of whether what you could say ontologically/metaphysically through your christian existentialism I or anyone else could just as easily translate (language wise or theory wise) into a form of physicalism/panpsychism/objective idealism/subjective idealism/process philosophy/etc. Is metaphysics so conventional?

No exceptions. Can you translate that into Revelation in Christianity, as well as the religious experience phenomenon that uses induction? — 3017amen

If and when revelation in christianity can correctly intermix with the greater web of our naive realism as well as the regularities of our experiences (the conclusions there in) then perhaps you'll have something. . . until then.

So you really don't know how, and why, wonder exists, correct? — 3017amen

Only that it does and correlates with certain experiences (there is no reason to postulate its independency from external factors or its dependency but there are strong correlations).

Okay, so you don't know. — 3017amen

Don't know the true nature of these experiences beyond the experiential but the experiential and the regularities there in I with every other person are fairly familiar with.

Which is full of paradox and uncertainty, and are provably incomplete and inconsistent (Godel). — 3017amen

You persist in mentioning Godel (among other things). However, caveat-warning, based on what you say, you do not understand him or his argument.

ask yourself why hold onto this model if it contradicts it or postulates the existence of experiences not yet had (nor presently capable of being shown possible). — substantivalism

That explanation doesn't seem to square with the laws of nature themselves, nor does it square with the existence of a conscious being known from history as Jesus. For instance, we've already agreed that the laws of nature are paradoxical, contradictory and incomplete. And we also know that the nature of consciousness is outside the parameters of formal logic, thus also paradoxical, contradictory and incomplete (unconsciousness, consciousness and subconsciousness all working together).

And so either Platonism, mathematics, or something that transcends the natural laws of existence must be considered. Otherwise, we are back to simple wonderment, and the physicists questions that help him discover things from asking: 'all events must have a cause' as a means to his end. Accordingly, you said that a similar sense of wonderment is in itself, from consciousness, and thus is mysteriously unknown. So why and how did we get here? Everything seems mysterious or unknown(?). And from what you are telling me, all we have are metaphysical abstracts and ideas (mathematics) which in turn are incomplete and paradoxical.

If you are to fudge a model to allow for your Jesus then you most be truthful about the application of said model to other similar entities while respecting core meanings. Further, it's a wonder of mine of whether what you could say ontologically/metaphysically through your christian existentialism I or anyone else could just as easily translate (language wise or theory wise) into a form of physicalism/panpsychism/objective idealism/subjective idealism/process philosophy/etc. Is metaphysics so conventional? — substantivalism

It's pretty much as conventional as our consciousness would allow. The model would consist of the historical account of Jesus, the mystery of Love and consciousness, and inductive reasoning (the religious experience) to say the least. Most of which includes metaphysics and phenomenology. And of course all of which exists/existed.

Only that it does and correlates with certain experiences (there is no reason to postulate its independency from external factors or its dependency but there are strong correlations). — substantivalism

Okay, you don't know some features or attributes from your own conscious existence. Is self-awarenss something that just is? What about Love and other sentient/metaphysical attributes from consciousness, how do they confer any biological advantages?

Don't know the true nature of these experiences — substantivalism

There seems to be a lot that you don't know that is seemingly natural.

You persist in mentioning Godel (among other things). However, caveat-warning, based on what you say, you do not understand him or his argument. — tim wood

Hi Timmy! Please enlighten us!! Oh wait, you're just trolling again. LOL

I stand corrected, you're back for more punishment!!!!!