It's true regarding your belief. It's false regarding the weather. — Michael

This is the issue. How can something be false regarding the weather absent of anyone's beliefs about it. The state of the weather can only be understood in terms of someone's belief about the state of the weather.

It's true regarding your belief. It's false regarding the weather. As a conjunction it's false. — Michael

Doesn't that make your belief false, then?

This is the issue. How can something be false regarding the weather absent of anyone's beliefs about it. The state of the weather can only be understood in terms of someone's belief about the state of the weather. — Isaac

Whether or not it's raining has nothing to do with whether or not I believe that it is raining. I can wrongly believe that it's raining or wrongly believe that it's not raining.

Doesn't that make your belief false, then? — Luke

No. My belief is that it is not raining. It isn't raining. Therefore my belief is true.

Whether or not it's raining has nothing to do with whether or not I believe that it is raining. I can wrongly believe that it's raining or wrongly believe that it's not raining. — Michael

I didn't claim the state of the weather was dependent on anyone's beliefs about it. I said that the state of the weather can only be understood in terms of someone's beliefs about it. The public object "the state of the weather" to which "it's raining" refers is someone's belief about the state of the weather. The actual state of the weather is a hidden variable outside of our Markov blanket.

I didn't claim the state of the weather was dependent on anyone's beliefs about it. I said that the state of the weather can only be understood in terms of someone's beliefs about it. The public object "the state of the weather" to which "it's raining" refers is someone's belief about the state of the weather. The actual state of the weather is a hidden variable outside of our Markov blanket. — Isaac

I don't know what you're trying to say here.

Are you say it's impossible for it to be raining but for me to believe that it's not raining?

Are you say it's impossible for it to be raining but for me to believe that it's not raining? — Michael

I'm saying that for it to 'be raining' is someone's belief that it is raining. That's what it means for it to be raining, there is no more to it raining than that some people believe it is raining. So saying It's raining cannot meaningfully refer to anything other than a belief that it's raining. It might refer to it as a theoretical object (say if I was lying, I'd be referring to an imaginary belief that it's raining, one which I'd like you to imagine I actually held), but there's no proper referent for the mere fact that it's raining, that is a hidden variable, we cannot meaningfully refer to it outside of talk like this (about models we use).

No. My belief is that it is not raining. It isn't raining. Therefore my belief is true. — Michael

Fair enough, perhaps you have found a way out of the paradox by lying about P. What if you don't lie about it?

That's what it means for it to be raining, there is no more to it raining than that some people believe it is raining. — Isaac

It's raining if water falls from the clouds. If I'm in some windowless room and so can't see or hear what's happening outside then I might not believe that it's raining even if in fact water is falling from the clouds and my lawn is getting wet.

Fair enough, perhaps you have found a way out of the paradox by lying about P. What if you don't lie about it? — Luke

If I only say what I believe and if I believe that it is not raining then I won't say "it is raining".

We're talking about the absurdity, incoherence or nonsensical nature of the sentence "It's raining but I don't believe it's raining". So the question is whether we can make any sense of it (and then, if we can't, why not).

To make analytical sense of it we need first to understand what the terms refer to. "It's raining" appears to refer to the state of the weather, "I believe it's raining" appears to refer to the state of my mind. The two could be in different states with regards to rain and so the sentence seems coherent (if a little odd).

But how can one refer to the state of the actual weather? On does not, nor ever can, know the actual state of the weather, so to refer to it would be absurd (outside of pointing out that it cannot be known). So parsing the sentence as referring to the actual state of the weather makes the sentence absurd.

It's raining if water falls from the clouds. If I'm in some windowless room and so can't see or hear what's happening outside then I might not believe that it's raining even if in fact water is falling from the clouds and my lawn is getting wet. — Michael

To what are you referring with "in fact"?

On does not, nor ever can, know the actual state of the weather — Isaac

We can look outside.

On does not, nor ever can, know the actual state of the weather, so to refer to it would be absurd — Isaac

That doesn't follow. We can talk about things even if we can't know if they're true or not.

To what are you referring with "in fact"?

The physical state of affairs outside my head. The actual state of the weather. Whether or not water is falling from the clouds, notwithstanding whether or not it's possible for me to know that it is or isn't.

We can look outside. — Michael

Which would update your beliefs about the weather, you could still be mistaken.

We can talk about things even if we can't know if they're true or not. — Michael

I didn't say we couldn't. I said no sense could be made of it.

The physical state of affairs outside my head. The actual state of the weather. Whether or not water is falling from the clouds, notwithstanding whether or not it's possible for me to know that it is or isn't. — Michael

Right. Which would be a nonsensical referrent.

Which would update your beliefs about the weather, you could still be mistaken. — Isaac

Yes, I could still be mistaken. It might be raining but I might believe that it's not raining.

It might be raining but I might believe that it's not raining. — Michael

It might. But you couldn't talk about it and make any sense. To say "it's raining" requires a referrent for 'raining' to be a property of. To make a claim about the state of a referrent about which you cannot form any form any judgment without it being a belief, and then claim that it differs from a statement about your beliefs, doesn't make any sense.

To make a claim about the state of a referrent about which you cannot form any form any judgment without it being a belief, and then claim that it differs from a statement about your beliefs, doesn't make any sense. — Isaac

It makes perfect sense. "It is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" mean different things. The former refers to the weather -- a physical fact about what the world is doing outside my head -- and the latter refers to my belief.

Just because I might need to believe something about the weather to talk about the weather it doesn't then follow that when I talk about the weather I'm talking about my beliefs.

Just because I might need to believe something about the weather to talk about the weather it doesn't then follow that when I talk about the weather I'm talking about my beliefs. — Michael

It seems to. If you "need to believe something about the weather to talk about the weather", then it certainly seems to follow that you must be talking about those beliefs when talking about the weather. You have no other content in your mind to which to make any reference. Your language has to refer initially to something in your mind otherwise how would your linguistic cortices select the right word?

It seems to. If you "need to believe something about the weather to talk about the weather", then it certainly seems to follow that you must be talking about those beliefs when talking about the weather. You have no other content in your mind to which to make any reference. Your language has to refer initially to something in your mind otherwise how would your linguistic cortices select the right word? — Isaac

Requiring a background understanding of the world to engage in successful communication does not entail that words refer to one's beliefs.

I need to understand the English language to make meaningful use of the phrase "water is H₂O" but such a phrase doesn't refer to the English language; it refers to the chemical composition of a certain kind of liquid.

I need to understand the English language to make meaningful use of the phrase "water is H2O" but such a phrase doesn't refer to the English language; it refers to the chemical composition of a certain kind of liquid. — Michael

Maybe, but that's because you have the referrents relating to words in English and also beliefs about water in your mind, you could refer to either. You do not have the actual weather in you mind, only your beliefs about it, so you cannot refer to properties of the weather, only your beliefs about them. When you select the term 'rain' it applies to your concept of rain, not actual rain. If you construct the sentence "it's raining" I can only refer to a belief about a state of affairs because your brain has no other referent from which to select the appropriate terms.

If you construct the sentence "it's raining" I can only refer to a belief about a state of affairs because your brain has no other referent from which to select the appropriate terms. — Isaac

Then the sentence "it is raining" would mean the same thing as the sentence "I believe that it is raining" and both would be true iff I believe that it is raining, and so mistakes are impossible. Are you willing to commit to this conclusion?

You do not have the actual weather in you mind, only your beliefs about it, so you cannot refer to properties of the weather, only your beliefs about them.

Why must something be in my mind for me to refer to it?

Then the sentence "it is raining" would mean the same thing as the sentence "I believe that it is raining" and both would be true iff I believe that it is raining, and so mistakes are impossible. Are you willing to commit to this conclusion? — Michael

I'm not following you so far as mistakes being impossible. If "it's raining" means the same as "I believe it's raining", a 'mistake' is only possible if other people believe let's not raining or I later come to believe it's not (or wasn't) raining. The actual state of the world is something we can only infer (form beliefs about), so 'mistake' doesn't make any sense there either. We can only dispute or update beliefs.

Why must something be in my mind for me to refer to it? — Michael

You referring to it is a neurological process, some requirements or desire prompts you to form words, the brain searches for the terms to match the referent (in cases like this). It only has concepts in your mind from which to select. It can't select the actual weather, that has no direct neural connection to you language cortices, it can only select from concepts about the weather.

The actual weather causes/updates beliefs which then cause language to be spoken appropriate to them. I can't see any way the actual weather can get through to your language without forming a belief first.

But what is absurd about asserting "it is raining" and "I believe that it is not raining"? You keep saying that it sounds absurd without explaining what about it is absurd. We've already established that the two sentences mean different things, have different truth-conditions, and can both be true. So where exactly does the problem arise? — Michael

In the account of those two belief statements. The problem is the conflation of belief statements and propositions(statements examined in isolation from the speaker).

One cannot believe both that it is raining and that it is not raining. Asserting "it is raining" assuming a sincere speaker, tells the audience that the speaker believes it is raining. Asserting "I believe that it is not raining" directly contradicts that.

A speaker cannot believe them both at the same time. A speaker can assert them both at the same time. Hence, the absurdity and/or self-contradiction.

It makes perfect sense. "it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" mean different things. The former refers to the weather -- a physical fact about what the world is doing outside my head -- and the latter refers to my belief. — Michael

Sincere speakers believe the statements they make. A sincere speaker believes it is raining regardless of whether or not they prefix the statement with "I believe". Given that it is not raining inside your belief, the latter is not just about your belief. "I believe" adds nothing meaningful here.

I'm saying "It is raining and I believe that it is not raining".

There is only one belief; the belief that it is not raining. So where is this contradiction? — Michael

There are two belief statements. The contradiction is there.

There are two belief statements. The contradiction is there. — creativesoul

There's one statement about my belief and one statement about the weather. There aren't two belief statements.

Sincere speakers believe the statements they make. A sincere speaker believes it is raining regardless of whether or not they prefix the statement with "I believe". Given that it is not raining inside your belief, the latter is not just about your belief. "I believe" adds nothing meaningful here.

Why do you keep talking about sincere speakers? The person who says "it is raining and I don't believe that it is raining" isn't being sincere.

The sincerity of the speaker is irrelevant. We're discussing the sentence, not the speaker.

A speaker cannot believe them both at the same time. A speaker can assert them both at the same time. Hence, the absurdity and/or self-contradiction.

It's not absurd to assert something that you don't believe. People do it all the time. They lie, or they misspeak, or they don't understand what they're saying.

As G.E. Moore put it, “Why is it absurd for me to say something true about myself?” — Wheatley

Well, it's absurd for you to think it's not raining when it's raining. It's merely stupid for you to say you think it's not raining when it is. In the first case, you're an idiot. In the second case, you're telling people you're an idiot.

Well, it's absurd for you to think it's not raining when it's raining. It's merely stupid for you to say you think it's not raining when it is. In the first case, you're an idiot. In the second case, you're telling people you're an idiot. — Ciceronianus the White

Moore was envisioning a situation where the speaker (MacInstosh) doesn't know nor does he have any reason to believe that it's raining outside. The speaker is sitting in a windowless room and hasn't heard any meteorological report. What the speaker is saying about himself is the exact same true thing that his friend is saying (knowingly and without any paradox) about him: "It’s raining, but MacIntosh doesn’t believe it is."

@Pfhorrest provided what seems to me the best discussion of Moore's paradox in the first page of this thread.

We are talking about a single speaker's assertions/statements. All statements, when sincerely spoken, are belief statements. The two beliefs in question directly contradict one another.

We're discussing the sentence, not the speaker. — Michael

I'm discussing the belief statements, because that's how the self-contradiction and/or incoherency is found and understood.

There are two belief statements in question here. "It is raining outside" and "I do not believe it is raining outside". They cannot both be believed at the same time.