But if you, MacIntosh, were to say exactly the same thing to McGillicuddy—“It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is”—your friend would rightly think you’d lost your mind. Why, then, is the second sentence absurd? As G.E. Moore put it, “Why is it absurd for me to say something true about myself?” — Wheatley

"Beliefs" are just assertions dressed in unhelpful mental woo. Better and sufficient to deal with,

It's raining, but I don't assert that it is.

Statements are statements of belief, assuming sincerity. Thus, one who thinks, believes, and/or says "It is raining outside" cannot also think, believe, and/or otherwise say "it is not raining outside", or "I do not believe it is raining outside" without self-contradiction.

"I believe" adds nothing to "it is raining outside" during sincere speech acts.

"I believe" adds nothing to "it is raining outside" during sincere speech acts. — creativesoul

Macintosh watches a video his third friend made of the evening showing himself and the window behind him, he exclaims - perfectly coherently - "Look at me getting up to leave without even reaching for my coat. It’s raining outside, but I don’t believe it is”

The statement can be made perfectly coherently narrating in present tense the recollection of a past discrepancy, which is all his friend was doing in the first place.

Macintosh watches a video his third friend made of the evening showing himself and the window behind him, he exclaims - perfectly coherently - "Look at me getting up to leave without even reaching for my coat. It’s raining outside, but I don’t believe it is”

The statement can be made perfectly coherently narrating in present tense the recollection of a past discrepancy, which is all his friend was doing in the first place — Isaac

If one misuses verb tense.

It was raining, but I did not believe that it was.

If one misuses verb tense. — creativesoul

Narrating a film or book in the present tense is not a misuse of tense it's an accepted narrative device, even though it's understood the portrayed events took place in the past.

One can say whatever one wants to say about their own past mental ongoings.

To your point...

One can offer a report of past events captured on video. One can sincerely say "Look, it's raining(in the video), but I do not believe that it is(at that time, again, in the video)" without contradiction.

I would concur.

Statements are statements of belief, assuming sincerity. — creativesoul

What does sincerity have to do with it? I can say "My name is Andrew" which has a meaning and a truth-value that has nothing to do with whether or not I believe it.

Thus, one who thinks, believes, and/or says "It is raining outside" cannot also think, believe, and/or otherwise say "it is not raining outside", or "I do not believe it is raining outside" without self-contradiction.

I can believe one thing but say the opposite. It's called lying.

Indeed. Moore's question was “Why is it absurd for me to say something true about myself?”. My answer is that it isn't absurd at all, as can be seen from the example of narrating a video of oneself. All that's odd here is that "It's raining" does not convey the degree of belief because it doesn't need to, it's just a couple of words which do something within the context of the conversation. they're not somehow bound by some law of nature to represent an accurate report of someone's mental state, they're just words.

Statements are statements of belief, assuming sincerity.
— creativesoul

What does sincerity have to do with it? I can say "My name is Andrew" which has a meaning and a truth-value that has nothing to do with whether or not I believe it. — Michael

Funny you should ask. Remember the struggles I went through coming to acceptable terms with Gettier's paper? The solution is drawing and maintaining the difference between a statement and statement of individual belief. In short, Gettier forgets all about the fact that the statements he's accounting for are Smith's beliefs. Had he kept that in mind, the referent of "the guy with ten coins in his pocket" is Smith himself. The truth conditions remain the same.

Gettier moves from "the guy" referring to Smith, to "the guy" referring to any guy with ten coins in his pocket. The problem, simply put, is that Smith did not believe that anyone else would get the job but himself, yet Gettier needs us to forget that part along with the truth conditions thereof.

Gettier changes the referent, the meaning, and the truth conditions of Smith's belief statement. That's an accounting malpractice.

The problem in a nutshell for Case I.

Thus, one who thinks, believes, and/or says "It is raining outside" cannot also think, believe, and/or otherwise say "it is not raining outside", or "I do not believe it is raining outside" without self-contradiction.

I can believe one thing but say the opposite. It's called lying. — Michael

Yes. That claim needs amended somewhat.

You're conflating the meaning of a sentence with the beliefs of the speaker. They're not the same thing.

If I say one thing but believe another then either I'm lying or I misspoke. It is not a contradiction for "it is raining" to be true and for "I believe that it is not raining" to be true and so it is not a contradiction for "it is raining and I believe that it is not raining" to be true. I may have misspoken, or I may be partially lying, but that's not the same thing as a contradiction.

You're conflating the meaning of a sentence with the beliefs of the speaker. They're not the same thing....

...It is not a contradiction for "it is raining" to be true and for "I believe that it is not raining" to be true and so it is not a contradiction for "it is raining and I believe that it is not raining" to be true. — Michael

I think I agree with the latter part. There are two statements at hand. Each with it's own focus, meaning, and/or truth conditions.

The former statement "it is raining" is about whether or not it is raining. The latter statement "I believe that it is not raining" is about the speaker's own belief. That's how both can be true at the same time.

To combine them into a single sentence however, is to treat two separate claims about completely different things as if it is a single claim with one set of truth conditions.

I'm not conflating the meaning of a sentence with the beliefs of the speaker. I did overlook the fact that one can deliberately misrepresent their own beliefs. One can say whatever one wishes about their own belief.

To combine them into a single sentence however, is to treat two separate claims about completely different things as if it is a single claim with one set of truth conditions. — creativesoul

No it isn't.

My name is Michael and water is H₂O.

When one does not believe that it is raining outside, they cannot also believe themselves if and when they say otherwise, despite the fact that the belief is false while the lie is true(if it is raining, they believe otherwise, but nonetheless state that it is raining).

To combine them into a single sentence however, is to treat two separate claims about completely different things as if it is a single claim with one set of truth conditions.
— creativesoul

No it isn't.

My name is Michael and water is H2O. — Michael

Red herring.

Maybe a better example of Moore's paradox is the one given in the SEP:

(M) I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don’t believe that I did.[...]

The common explanation of Moore’s absurdity is that the speaker has managed to contradict himself without uttering a contradiction. So the sentence is odd because it is a counterexample to the generalization that anyone who contradicts himself utters a contradiction.

Wikipedia provides the following explanation:

The more fundamental way of setting up the problem starts from the following three premises:

It can be true at a particular time both that P, and that I do not believe that P.
I can assert or believe one of the two at a particular time.
It is absurd to assert or believe both of them at the same time.

[Additionally, the absurdity arises only when stated as a first-person, present-tensed belief; e.g.] "It is raining, and I don't believe that it is raining. — Wikipedia

Red herring. — creativesoul

How so?

"It is raining outside but I do not believe that it is raining outside" consists of two completely different claims that have completely different subject matters as well as completely different truth conditions.

"It is raining outside" is true if and only if it is raining outside. "I believe it is not raining outside" is true if and only if I believe it is not raining outside. One cannot believe both that it is raining and that it is not at the same time. Thus, stating "It is raining outside, but I do not believe it" is incoherent in every situation I can think of aside from the example Isaac provided earlier.

"It is raining outside" is true if and only if it is raining outside. "I believe it is not raining outside" is true if and only if I believe it is not raining outside. One cannot believe both that it is raining and that it is not at the same time. Thus, stating "It is raining outside, but I do not believe it" is incoherent in every situation I can think of aside from the example Isaac provided earlier. — creativesoul

As I've already explained, the meaning of a sentence is not the same thing as the belief of the speaker. So why does it matter if "one cannot believe both that it is raining and that it is not at the same time"? We've already established that the meaning and truth-value of "it is raining outside" has nothing to do with what the speaker believes.

So why does it matter if "one cannot believe both that it is raining and that it is not at the same time"? — Michael

It matters when one asserts (e.g.): "It is raining outside, but I believe that it's not raining outside".

It matters when one asserts (e.g.): "It is raining outside, but I believe that it's not raining outside". — Luke

Why?

Because it sounds absurd. Doesn't it?

...why does it matter if "one cannot believe both that it is raining and that it is not at the same time"? — Michael

Because that is what makes it incoherent and/or self contradictory when one claims both at the same time.

Because it sounds absurd. Doesn't it? — Luke

It might sound absurd, but that doesn't mean that it is. The onus here is to explain what about it is absurd. The claim I have made is that the meaning and truth of the sentence "it is raining outside" has nothing to do with the speaker's belief, and that it is possible to believe that it is not raining outside even if it in fact is. Therefore there is no logical contradiction in the sentence "it is raining outside and I believe that it is not raining outside" even if it sounds absurd.

Because that is what makes it incoherent and/or self contradictory when one claims both at the same time. — creativesoul

But I'm not claiming both at the same time. There is a difference between the sentence "It is raining and I believe that it is not raining" and the sentence "I believe that it is raining and I believe that it is not raining". The latter is a contradiction, the former isn't.

The claim I have made is that the meaning and truth of the sentence "it is raining outside" has nothing to do with the speaker's belief, and that it is possible to believe that it is not raining outside even if it in fact is. Therefore there is no logical contradiction in the sentence "it is raining outside but I believe that it is not raining outside". — Michael

That's all true, but the absurdity is when one asserts both together. Even if I were to lie about it raining outside, it still is (and/or sounds) absurd to make that dual assertion.

That's all true, but the absurdity is when one asserts both together. Even if I were to lie about it raining outside, it still is (and/or sounds) absurd to make that dual assertion. — Luke

So why does it sound absurd? Can you show that it actually is absurd? Perhaps the problem here is with your interpretation of the sentence rather than the sentence itself?

The claim I have made is that the meaning and truth of the sentence "it is raining outside" has nothing to do with the speaker's belief... — Michael

"It is raining outside" - when and if spoken sincerely - is spoken by a language user who believes that it is raining outside. When spoken insincerely, it is uttered by one who believes it not.

As given in the Wikipedia article I posted above:

It can be true at a particular time both that P, and that I do not believe that P.
I can assert or believe one of the two at a particular time.
It is absurd to assert or believe both of them at the same time.

Edit: As I also posted above, as given in SEP:

The common explanation of Moore’s absurdity is that the speaker has managed to contradict himself without uttering a contradiction. So the sentence is odd because it is a counterexample to the generalization that anyone who contradicts himself utters a contradiction.

"It is raining outside" - when and if if spoken sincerely - is spoken by a language user who believes that it is raining outside. When spoken insincerely, it is uttered by one who believes it not. — creativesoul

Again, what does sincerity have to do with it? What it means and whether or not it's true has nothing to do with what the speaker believes.