So the moral philosophy you're advocating is one which seems right to you? Yet if other people advocate a different moral philosophy they're not merely of a different opinion, but they are wrong? — Isaac

There is nothing special about me or moral philosophy in that regard. This is just ordinary judgement and disagreement. On every matter, everyone has to work out to the best of their ability what seem like the right answers to them, in light of all the arguments one way or another, and consequently the alternatives that seem wrong to them too. To disagree with someone just is to think that their opinion is wrong.

"Acceptable/unacceptable" is just another kind of judgement/assessment, so I don't see the difference here. — Pfhorrest

"Moral" covers both. It's a difference in criterion and/or taxonomy.

What I was trying to pick apart was the distinction you might make between this "such-and-such moral philosophy seems right to me and so I'm going to go ahead and say it is right", and moral relativism, which essentially says "such-and-such moral behaviour seems right to me so I'm going to go ahead and say that it is right".

You highlighted a need for some systems to arbitrate in the latter case, but no similar need for arbitration in the former?

You highlighted a need for some systems to arbitrate in the latter case, but no similar need for arbitration in the former? — Isaac

No, we need and have a system for arbitration in the former case too. That’s what rational argument is all about. We share our reasons and then together try to come up with something that takes into account all of those reasons. That’s precisely why I came up with something other than all the example methods of moral arbitration you gave: they all have some good reasons some bad reasons and arguments against each other highlighting each other’s bad reasons and their own good reasons, and I try to listen to all of those arguments and then creatively figure out what something that takes all of them into account would look like.

Which is completely analogous to the procedure I advocate for resolving moral disagreements, except in the case of meta-ethical or otherwise entirely philosophical disagreements we’re dealing entirely in pure a priori reason, and contingent phenomenal experiences don’t matter, while on my account of resolving ordinary first-order moral disagreement (and ordinary first-order factual disagreements), experiences matter, so other people’s experiences are reasons that need to be accounted for in whatever solution is come up with.

We share our reasons and then together try to come up with something that takes into account all of those reasons. — Pfhorrest

How? What does 'taking into account' a reason actually consist in? Perhaps you could give me an example of someone else's reason (maybe presented in your recent discussions of meta-ethics) and explain what you did to 'take account of it', how has doing so contributed to the 'something' we come up with together?

they all have some good reasons some bad reasons and arguments against each other highlighting each other’s bad reasons and their own good reasons, and I try to listen to all of those good arguments — Pfhorrest

How are you deciding what is a 'good' argument?

How? What does 'taking into account' a reason actually consist in? Perhaps you could give me an example of someone else's reason (maybe presented in your recent discussions of meta-ethics) and explain what you did to 'take account of it', how has doing so contributed to the 'something' we come up with together? — Isaac

The OP of this very thread is full of them. A chain of reasons to abandon one position and then a new position adopted to account for those reasons and then more reasons that rule that out so some other position adopted to account for those etc. The main point of that OP is “look how there are reasons against all of these conventional meta-ethical views. Let’s discuss what a view that accounts for all of those could be like.”

How are you deciding what is a 'good' argument? — Isaac

A sound argument. One that makes valid inferences from true premises.

Of course the truth of the premises could be open to question which then pushes the argument back further, but that’s just how reasoning works.

The OP of this very thread is full of them. A chain of reasons to abandon one position and then a new position adopted to account for those reasons and then more reasons that rule that out so some other position adopted to account for those etc. The main point of that OP is “look how there are reasons against all of these conventional meta-ethical views. Let’s discuss what a view that accounts for all of those could be like.” — Pfhorrest

But these are all your reasons. You seemed to imply that you undertook some process of incorporating and unifying everyone's reasons. What I'm asking about is how you might take a reason you disagree with and nonetheless incorporate it into a meta-ethical theory which 'takes account of' that reason. At the moment, all I have is that your conclusion as to the right meta-ethical theory is the result of a collection of reason which you personally find compelling. You've not suspended your personal feeling about any of the reasons in order to 'take account of' reasons which other people find compelling, you've rejected all reasons which you do not find to be so.

This sounds like no less complex a position than saying that you strongly (almost 100% it seems) believe what seems to you to be the case, and equally strongly disbelieve what it seems to anyone else to be the case.

If that's a reasonable position to hold about meta-ethics, I'm wondering what you find to be different about normative ethics that makes "what's right is what seems to me to be right" unacceptable.

Do you understand the difference?

:brow:

I'm charging convention, both historical and current, with working from an emaciated notion of what counts as being moral in kind. Moral belief are a kind of belief. Moral claims are statements thereof.

All things moral directly involve that which counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. There are no exceptions. That's the strongest justificatory ground possible. If you disagree, then by all means feel free to offer an example. One is all it takes.

The OP is an account of my journey of changing my views in response to new reasons that challenged those views. I was implicitly a divine command theorist as a kid until I encountered reasons to doubt that there was anything divine or supernatural at all. Then I was an ethical naturalist until I read Moore who convinced me otherwise. But I already had reasons against non-naturalism (the same ones that went against divine command theory), so I looked to what alternatives there were. I tried on a subjectivism (ideal observer theory) and a non-cognitivism (universal prescriptivism), so long as they maintained universalism, since universalism was the main argument I had by then read against those classes if metaethical views. And then I read more and more technical objections to those and started really trying to come up with something new that avoided all of the problems of all of the others.

This hasn’t been a process of rejecting reasons that go against what I already believe, but of adapting my beliefs to account for more and more reasons. Nowadays I don’t change my beliefs much only because it’s rare that any argument is new to me: I’ve already heard them all and the counter-arguments and followed where the sum of reasons from both sides seemed to lead.

All things moral directly involve that which counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. — creativesoul

I don’t disagree with that at all, I’m just not sure where you’re going with it in relation to the OP.

The OP is an account of my journey of changing my views in response to new reasons that challenged those views. — Pfhorrest

Yes, but it's still all about whether you personally find the reasons plausible. What seems to you to be the case. At no point are you taking what seems to someone else to be plausible (but not to you) and saying "well, I'll have to adjust my theory to take account of that, even though it doesn't seem to me to be plausible".

All those reasons that changed your mind did so because they seemed more plausible to you (and that's being as generous as I can to your intellect. We're you an average person, I would be invoking social norms, personal narratives, secondary goals and even mood as additional influences).

What you're suggesting creates an objectively moral 'right' (the right answer to a moral question) is some sort of joint account of what seems to be the case for everyone.

What I'm asking is why you distinguish moral rights for this treatment. It's clearly not the way you handle philosophical rights (the right answer to a philosophical question). Here your judgement is based solely on whether it seems to you to be the case. Others may present their ideas and reasons, but the arbiter of whether you'll consider them objectively 'right' is whether they seem to you to be right.

Extending that approach to morality would indeed lead to normal moral relativism. What's morally right is what seems to you to be right. Others may present reasons for their moral beliefs, but ultimately your sense of credulity is the arbiter.

What I'm asking is why you distinguish moral rights for this treatment. It's clearly not the way you handle philosophical rights (the right answer to a philosophical question). — Isaac

It is exactly the same. I try to account for everyone’s reasons, but that doesn’t mean trying to simultaneously agree with everyone’s conclusions.

If I am unpersuaded by a philosophical argument, it’s because I think I have already accounted for all the reasons they give in support of their conclusion, and either there is just some apparent invalidity to the argument (while I account for their reasons I don’t see how those reasons entail the conclusion), or I am also taking into account other reasons that they aren’t and coming to a conclusion that accounts for all of them. I never just say “that reason doesn’t matter”; I say how I have already accounted for it, and what else I’m accounting for that they’re not.

Likewise with moral reasoning. Some selfish person may think some thing is good because it avoids pain for them or brings them pleasure, and disregard the suffering it may bring to other people. Those other people may do likewise. I try to account for all of their concerns, all of the suffering or enjoyment they’re aiming for or avoiding, but of course I can’t agree with either of their conclusions because to do so I would have to disregard the concerns of the other party like they do.

Figuring out what exactly would account for all their concerns, or all philosophical reasons, may be a hard creative task, but the solution to that challenge is the thing that I take to be objectively correct. Even if I don’t know what it is yet. Whatever it is that satisfies all those reasons, addresses all those concerns, in science whatever model accounts for all observations, that is the thing that is objectively correct, even if we don’t yet know what that is.

This differentiation between reasons and conclusions, experiences and interpretations, etc, seems to be the most important point that I’m not communicating well enough to you.

If I am unpersuaded by a philosophical argument, it’s because I think I have already accounted for all the reasons they give in support of their conclusion, and either there is just some apparent invalidity to the argument (while I account for their reasons I don’t see how those reasons entail the conclusion), or I am also taking into account other reasons that they aren’t and coming to a conclusion that accounts for all of them. I never just say “that reason doesn’t matter”; I say how I have already accounted for it, and what else I’m accounting for that they’re not. — Pfhorrest

Right, so all you've done is kicked the can down the road, now we're talking about your judgement as to whether you've 'accounted' for those reasons or not. It still comes down to your personal judgement. You're still the final arbiter, not any external test. This is what distinguishes ideas about reality from ideas about 'oughts' or metaphysics. I can't believe the wall is not solid, or that I can fly, because it will have such beliefs tested by conflict with reality. You can believe literally any meta-ethical position, literally any moral 'ought' that it is possible for you to imagine and then justify that belief by claiming to have 'taken account of' all the reasons for reaching any contrary conclusion. At no point is your claim to have 'taken account of them' tested or judged externally. You only need to look at this forum as a small example - almost everyone here disagrees with you (this thread, not the forum at large, I wouldn't know about them). The strength of this disagreement has not swayed you in the slightest bit from your position, nor has the strength of the disagreement of literally hundreds of educated and experienced moral philosophers who all disagree with you. So if you're not going to be persuaded by your epistemic peers that you've not 'taken account of' the reason which lead them to alternative conclusions, then the exercise is not remotely comparable to interrogating reality.

I try to account for all of their concerns, all of the suffering or enjoyment they’re aiming for or avoiding, but of course I can’t agree with either of their conclusions because to do so I would have to disregard the concerns of the other party like they do. — Pfhorrest

With all moral choices one is weighing some harms against some benefits. Taking account of them in this way only gives you the full measure of all the harms and benefits involved. How does it then give you any objective answer to which harms outweigh which benefits? We don't all assign them equal value.

This is what distinguishes ideas about reality from ideas about 'oughts' or metaphysics. I can't believe the wall is not solid, or that I can fly, because it will have such beliefs tested by conflict with reality. — Isaac

You can believe those things if you refuse to undergo the experiences that would test them and refuse to believe those who say they have undergone such experiences that have refuted them.

The strength of this disagreement has not swayed you in the slightest bit from your position, nor has the strength of the disagreement of literally hundreds of educated and experienced moral philosophers who all disagree with you — Isaac

It never matters who or how many people agree or disagree with a position, all that matters is the strength of their reasons. All those disagreeing with me are telling me things I already knew and don’t disagree with, so there’s nothing there to change my views. My counter-arguments are presenting what additional reasons I’m also accounting for that they seem not to be. Most of the remaining “arguments” here seem to be about clarifying what exactly is being said, or what the right definitions of words are.

With all moral choices one is weighing some harms against some benefits. Taking account of them in this way only gives you the full measure of all the harms and benefits involved. How does it then give you any objective answer to which harms outweigh which benefits? We don't all assign them equal value. — Isaac

This question is the moral equivalent of epistemology, while what we’ve thus far been discussing is the moral equivalent of ontology. Ontology is about what kinds of things are real, and we’ve thus far been talking about questions of what kinds of things are moral. Epistemology meanwhile is about how to sort out which particular things are most likely to be real given those criteria for what makes something count as real, and this question you’re asking is about how to sort out which particulars things are most likely to be moral given those criteria for what counts as moral. The full answer is long, but the short version is it’s the moral analogue of falsificationism.

You're still the final arbiter, not any external test. This is what distinguishes ideas about reality from ideas about 'oughts' or metaphysics. — Isaac

I am not sure that that distinction works. If we look at the history of natural philosophy, we see that people had all kinds of ideas about reality that were not solidly based on experience.

The idea that experience is the final arbiter for what is real is not itself real. It's an idea that cannot be tested against reality. So ultimately, all such testing requires prior reasoning to establish what does and does not count as evidence.

The idea that experience is the final arbiter for what is real is not itself real. It's an idea that cannot be tested against reality. So ultimately, all such testing requires prior reasoning to establish what does and does not count as evidence. — Echarmion

:up: :clap: :100:

It never matters who or how many people agree or disagree with a position, all that matters is the strength of their reasons. — Pfhorrest

The 'strength of their reasons' just means the extent to which you agree with them. So all you're saying here is "I don't care about what other people think, all that matters is what I think", which is relativism.

you’re asking is about how to sort out which particulars things are most likely to be moral given those criteria for what counts as moral. The full answer is long, but the short version is it’s the moral analogue of falsificationism. — Pfhorrest

Again, you're missing the point. If we agreed on what counts as moral then we could carry out this exercise on any competing claims. The point I'm making here is that we don't agree on what is moral beyond a vague family resemblance sufficient to use the word in day-to-day talk.

You want to say that moral decisions need not be realitivistic. You do so by presenting a moral system which has clear measures of right and wrong. But your choice of measures is relativistic. It's based entirely on reasons seeming to you to be sound, valid and accounted for.

If your meta-ethical position is relativistic, then all moral decisions arising from it are going to be relativistic too.

The idea that experience is the final arbiter for what is real is not itself real. It's an idea that cannot be tested against reality. — Echarmion

Indeed. I'm not sure how you think that impacts on what I said. Normative propositions are always dependent on agreement (otherwise they're commands "you will", not "you should"). There is widespread agreement that experience arbitrates reality, at least so far as negation is concerned (that which is contrary to all experience is not the case). So universal statements from empiricism work - "letting go of that ball will cause it to drop".

Some people disagree with experience as an arbitrator. The extremely religious might, in some circumstances, believe God will hold the ball up and their past experiences are irrelevant compared to their faith. Statements based on empiricism will be useless to these people. But they are extremely rare, so it matters very little.

With hedonism being the arbiter of morality, there's no such widespread agreement, not even close. So universal statements based on such a meta-ethic are useless, they only have any normative force for the group who already agree with the meta-ethical position.

So ultimately, all such testing requires prior reasoning to establish what does and does not count as evidence. — Echarmion

Yes, but we're not new to this. The human race has been at this for millenia. We've already very strongly landed on some form of empiricism to arbitrate everyday reality, we don't have any cause to doubt that.

@Pfhorrest is trying to argue that we can take hedonic experiences to be evidence of moral value in the same way as we take phenomenal experiences to be evidence of physical reality. I'm saying that this is not the case. The widespread agreement about the principle of taking phenomenal experiences to be evidence of physical reality actually matters, it's the reason we can just take it as read. There being no such existing agreement about the relationship between hedonic experience and moral value is what means we cannot make the same presumption.

Indeed. I'm not sure how you think that impacts on what I said. Normative propositions are always dependent on agreement (otherwise they're commands "you will", not "you should"). There is widespread agreement that experience arbitrates reality, at least so far as negation is concerned (that which is contrary to all experience is not the case). So universal statements from empiricism work - "letting go of that ball will cause it to drop".

Some people disagree with experience as an arbitrator. The extremely religious might, in some circumstances, believe God will hold the ball up and their past experiences are irrelevant compared to their faith. Statements based on empiricism will be useless to these people. But they are extremely rare, so it matters very little. — Isaac

There is also widespread agreement that killing babies for fun is wrong. I'd wager even less people disagree with that than disagree with experience as an arbitrator. So if we're going to base our conclusions on how widespread agreement is, there are at least some moral rules that are extremely widespread. On a meta-ethical level, variations on the "golden rule" are also very widespread.

But I don't think it's very convincing in the first place to argue that "as long as less than X% of people disagree with an idea, it can be considered true".

With hedonism being the arbiter of morality, there's no such widespread agreement, not even close. So universal statements based on such a meta-ethic are useless, they only have any normative force for the group who already agree with the meta-ethical position. — Isaac

But of course, the goal of a moral philosophy is to convince, much like the goal of a scientific paper on some subject. Your argument would lead to the conclusion that the only valid moral philosophy is the one everyone already agrees with, in which case there'd be no moral philosophy in the first place.

Yes, but we're not new to this. The human race has been at this for millenia. We've already very strongly landed on some form of empiricism to arbitrate everyday reality, we don't have any cause to doubt that. — Isaac

True, but it did take us thousands of years - until the 18th century - to really figure out how to ask the right questions. And it did not take long for the scientific method to become so obvious that most people can't even imagine there was a time when people didn't know how to "arbitrate reality" based on experience.

What tells you that the same process will not happen to moral philosophy in 100 years?

The widespread agreement about the principle of taking phenomenal experiences to be evidence of physical reality actually matters, it's the reason we can just take it as read. There being no such existing agreement about the relationship between hedonic experience and moral value is what means we cannot make the same presumption. — Isaac

But does this mean that before the argeement existed - i.e. before the 18th century, the scientific method was not the correct way to gain information about phenomenal reality?

Thanks @Echarmion for joining in, you’ve already said most of what I would have said in response.

So all you're saying here is "I don't care about what other people think, all that matters is what I think", which is relativism. — Isaac

Consider the negation of that. “I care about what other people think, that matters, not just what I think.” That’s basically majoritarianism. Whatever a majority thinks is correct? How is that not relativism? By your logic, absolutely everything would be relativism.

But in any case, my position is not “only what I think matters”. I don’t expect anyone to take anything just at my word. I only expect them to honestly consider the reasons I share with them, like I do others’. Then in light of all those shared reasons we’ve all got to make up our own minds. Because the alternative would just be to think what someone says to think just because they say so.

There is also widespread agreement that killing babies for fun is wrong. — Echarmion

Indeed, but this has any bearing on what I'm saying. I was talking about the lack of widespread agreement over the method of reaching moral judgements, not the conclusions.

On a meta-ethical level, variations on the "golden rule" are also very widespread. — Echarmion

I disagree, but even if that were so, it doesn't even approach basic empiricism.

I don't think it's very convincing in the first place to argue that "as long as less than X% of people disagree with an idea, it can be considered true" — Echarmion

Neither do I, I never even mentioned 'truth'.

But of course, the goal of a moral philosophy is to convince, much like the goal of a scientific paper on some subject. — Echarmion

What scientific papers are you reading? The goal of scientific papers is to present the degree to whicha model fits the experimental data. It should have zero to do with convincing (even if it sometimes does). Morality, on the other hand, is all about convincing, it's built in.

it did take us thousands of years - until the 18th century - to really figure out how to ask the right questions. — Echarmion

I'm not talking about the scientific method (the detail of it) I'm talking about devising theories of reality based on the degree to which they conflict with experience. 6 month old babies do it. I didn't take us thousands of years, it's built into our DNA.

Consider the negation of that. “I care about what other people think, that matters, not just what I think.” That’s basically majoritarianism. — Pfhorrest

No it's not, it's humility. It's recognising that others might see things you don't, or in a way you don't understand.

I don’t expect anyone to take anything just at my word. I only expect them to honestly consider the reasons I share with them, like I do others’. Then in light of all those shared reasons we’ve all got to make up our own minds. Because the alternative would just be to think what someone says to think just because they say so. — Pfhorrest

Right, which is where we started. Your approach to judging what is the 'right' meta-ethical position is simply to consider all the reasons for adopting that position which seem to you to be sound.

So back to my original question. If this is a satisfactory approach to determining the right approach to moral judgement, why isn't it equally satisfactory for determining correct behaviour? Simply consider all the reasons for behaving that way which seem to you to be sound. Why suggest some alternative system?

Indeed, but this has any bearing on what I'm saying. I was talking about the lack of widespread agreement over the method of reaching moral judgements, not the conclusions. — Isaac

Most people reach moral conclusions intuitively, the same way that most people use something related to the empiricism intuitively. Otherwise, it'd be hard to explain how humans can live together in societies.

I disagree, but even if that were so, it doesn't even approach basic empiricism. — Isaac

But if we're talking about degrees, we're not establishing some fundamental difference between the two kinds of making judgements.

Neither do I, I never even mentioned 'truth'. — Isaac

But you nevertheless seem to base your distinction on how many people agree with basic empiricsim versus how many people agree with the golden rule.

What scientific papers are you reading? The goal of scientific papers is to present the degree to whicha model fits the experimental data. It should have zero to do with convincing (even if it sometimes does). Morality, on the other hand, is all about convincing, it's built in. — Isaac

No, I think you're applying two different standards here. In theory, a scientific paper needs only present the evidence. In practice, science is a social activity and requires convincing. In the same way it can be argued that, in theory, the correct moral philosophy only needs to present it's arguments. In practice, it too needs to do so convincingly.

I'm not talking about the scientific method (the detail of it) I'm talking about devising theories of reality based on the degree to which they conflict with experience. 6 month old babies do it. I didn't take us thousands of years, it's built into our DNA. — Isaac

It seems to me, though, that this fails to explain why the enlightenment accelerated the speed of scientific advancement as much as it did.

No it's not, it's humility. It's recognising that others might see things you don't, or in a way you don't understand. — Isaac

No, that’s what listening to others’ reasons is, which I advocated and do. You’re talking about whose word is gospel: my own or someone else’s. My actual answer is “nobody’s”, but you caricatured that as “just mine”, so I pointed out that the opposite of that is “everybody else’s”, which is equally absurd.

In a conversation long ago, someone asked me rhetorically “who gets to decide what is objective?” and my answer was “nobody — that’s what makes it objective.”

So back to my original question. If this is a satisfactory approach to determining the right approach to moral judgement, why isn't it equally satisfactory for determining correct behaviour? Simply consider all the reasons for behaving that way which seem to you to be sound. Why suggest some alternative system? — Isaac

To the extent that that is a correct description of my “meta-meta-ethicical” position, it IS also a description of my meta-ethical position itself. The analogue of the reasons are the experiences, and every moral agent has to fairly and honestly consider every experience everyone has (like we have to fairly and honestly consider every else’s reasons), and figure out to the best of their ability what possibilities are compatible with the sum of all of those experiences (like we each have to figure out to the best of our ability what possibilities are compatible with the sum of all the reasons we’ve encountered).

The alternatives are either to take someone’s word for it (possibly just one’s own), or else give up and say there are no answers (so anything goes). My whole philosophy is just what’s left after avoiding either of those options: don’t just take anyone’s word for it, but don’t just give up either. Assume there are some correct answers, and every proposal as to what they are is open to question. So consider the possibility of anything that might be an answer (otherwise you’ll have no choice but to give up), except those that can’t be tested against our experiences (otherwise you’ll have no choice but to take someone’s word for it).

I think pure ethics is not based on what you feel, experience, believe or agree with, but what you want and need, with needs prioritized over wants. If we give someone what they want or need, and it doesn't obstruct either satisfying a greater need or someone's more important wants, it is ethical. If we give someone what they don't want, but its what they need, that can be ethical so long as the consequences turn out how we expect them to. If we don't give individuals what they want or need, and it doesn't refuse anyone their wants or needs, that is not unethical. And of course if we intentionally and avoidably deny someone their wants and needs in a way that individuals concerned deem of destructive consequence, that is unethical.

Obviously a huge gray area exists because of the complexity of cause and effect, but the basic principle to deal with ever present dilemma is reciprocation. If unethical acts are performed on someone from whatever cause, compensation has to be given or one's own wants or needs are revoked, and we have all kinds of ethical norms to regulate this which are organically emerging in each moment as well as traditionalized by larger scale cultural customs and institutional laws.

That's working ethical rationale, but in consort with total psychology it becomes much more...

The issue is in determining nondestructive logistical steps by which to progress the species from an existence of psychological irrationalities towards more peace with ethical rationale.

Most people reach moral conclusions intuitively, the same way that most people use something related to the empiricism intuitively. Otherwise, it'd be hard to explain how humans can live together in societies. — Echarmion

I agree. I'm arguing here against the opposite view, that moral decisions are (or can be) some kind of rational attempt to find what is 'right' by some pseudo-scientific method.

But if we're talking about degrees, we're not establishing some fundamental difference between the two kinds of making judgements. — Echarmion

I didn't say we were. Just s significant one. Virtually every single person in the world from 2 year-olds to senile geriatrics, from psychopaths to saints, all believe in the external reality of the table in front of them, they all believe that it will behave in the same way for you as it does for them, and they all have done since we crawled out of the caves. The only exceptions are the insane and the mystical (possibly the same category).

Any form of communication, or social endeavour relies on these shared concepts. I can communicate with, or share an activity with, almost anyone on the planet at any point in time, based on the fact that there's a stable external world whose properties are not fixed by my mind.

I cannot make even the slightest progress on any communication or joint activity based on the notion that what is morally 'good' is that which feels hedonically 'good', because there is no such shared belief in this association.

Nor can I make any progress meta-ethically assuming that my assessment of 'the reasons' for believing the above position to be best, will be shared by many others - each person's assessment of any given collection of 'reasons' seems to also be different.

So I don't see how this meta-ethical position is anything other than a statement of @Pfhorrest's state of mind. Interesting to a psychologist, but nothing more.

The statement "Sex before marriage is not morally 'bad' because it doesn't feel bad to anyone who imagines what it would feel like" is mostly useless other than as a statement of the speaker's state of mind. It's only compelling to a group of people who already believe in that meta-ethical approach.

The statement "An hedonic-based ethical systems is best because my assessment of the reasons for and against it is such that I find it the most compelling" is also mostly useless other than as a statement of the speaker's state of mind. It is only useful to the small group of people who (for whatever reason) trust that person's judgement for the modification of their own beliefs.

The statement "This bridge can only carry 8 Tons", however, is potentially useful to the entire world. Absolutely everyone would agree that if the limits of the materials tend, in tests, to break after being subjected to more than 8 Tons, that they will not magically act differently for different people, that no amount of belief on my part can make the bridge carry more, that at no point will the bridge suddenly act as if it's made of cheese...

The difference in the utility of different classes of statement may well only be one of degree, but the degree is hugely significant.

No, that’s what listening to others’ reasons is, which I advocated and do. — Pfhorrest

Merely listening isn't sufficient, that still makes the egotistical assumption that you understand, and have the capacity to better judge the quality of those reasons, that your assessment of them is the better one to go on. When I explain to my students some aspect of a theory they don't get, they don't (most of them) go away presuming their professor has gone mad and is expounding a theory which makes no sense, they don't assume that my collection of reasons for reaching that conclusion must be faulty or incomplete because they don't tally with their understanding. They presume they just haven't understood, they ask for clarity. Some never get clarity, they just repeat the reasons I've given to them by rote, pass their finals and never look back. They still don't (generally) assume I'm wrong and the whole subject makes no sense, they walk away thinking "well, I didn't understand a word of that".

I'm not suggesting you should take any alternative approach than go with what seems to you to be right. There's no other option. I'm saying that your personal assessment of the reason has no bearing on the objective 'rightness' of some meta-ethic when there is widespread disagreement among your epistemic peers. If they disagree, and they have no less intellectual capacity and no less data than you, then it is only reasonable to assume that your position is tentative at the very least. The more widespread the disagreement, the more fragile any position within that scope becomes.

consider the possibility of anything that might be an answer (otherwise you’ll have no choice but to give up), except those that can’t be tested against our experiences (otherwise you’ll have no choice but to take someone’s word for it). — Pfhorrest

I think this is quite a reasonable approach, but it's not the aspect I'm disputing. What I'm disputing is that moral statements are the sorts of things which can be tested against our experiences. You've merely declared that they are, and cited, in support of that declaration, the fact that you've 'taken into account' everyone else's reasons for thinking otherwise.

I'm saying that your personal assessment of the reason has no bearing on the objective 'rightness' of some meta-ethic when there is widespread disagreement among your epistemic peers. If they disagree, and they have no less intellectual capacity and no less data than you, then it is only reasonable to assume that your position is tentative at the very least. The more widespread the disagreement, the more fragile any position within that scope becomes. — Isaac

Damn, that's harsh, bullied into herd submission before we even got started lol

I think intersection of ethics and language is a really effective way to frame the issue epistemologically, but its going to be challenging, because what it really amounts to is non b.s. psychology, and that doesn't even exist yet.

....non b.s. psychology, and that doesn't even exist yet. — Enrique

...and you thought I was harsh!

I think intersection of ethics and language is a really effective way to frame the issue — Enrique

Thank you for reminding me that this thread is not supposed to be about me and Isaac yet again arguing about my entire meta-ethical system, but rather about a survey of specifically moral semantic positions and their faults and then (I hoped) a discussion of philosophy of language more generally to explore what moral semantics could be possible to avoid those faults.

The faults of the other views surveyed boil down to failing in some way or another these criteria:

-Holding moral statements to be capable of being true or false, in a way more than just someone agreeing with them, as people usually treat them
-Honoring the is-ought / fact-value divide.
-Independence of any controversial ontology (i.e. compatible with physicalism).

What you end up needing is some kind of non-descriptivist cognitivism.

I’m going to ignore Isaac’s constant harping on that first criterion above and just move on to actual philosophy of language stuff.



The first important thing I think we need to do to make sense of a non-descriptivist cognitivism is to distinguish between what I call "expression" and "impression". I think the best way to illustrate this distinction is to consider a philosophical problem called "Moore's Paradox", put forth by G.E. Moore. The paradox is that while it is clearly possible for someone to disbelieve something that is nevertheless true — all sorts of people hold incorrect beliefs all the time — there seems to be something contradictory in that person themselves stating that fact: "X is true but I don't believe X".

My resolution to this apparent paradox is to distinguish between the speech-acts of "expressing", which is a demonstration of one's own mental state, one's thoughts or feelings, and "impressing", which is attempting to affect a mental state in another person; and to highlight how, if we assume a speaker is being honest and not manipulative, we assume an impression from them upon our minds to imply also an expression of their own mind. That is to say, when they impress upon us that X is true, if we assume that they are honest, we take that to also express their own belief that X is true. If they then impress upon us that they don't believe X is true, that impression contradicts the preceding implied expression of their belief.

It is akin to shouting in a rage "I'M NOT ANGRY!". There is nothing self-contradictory in the content impressed, in either case — it's possible for someone to be non-angry, and it's possible for someone to disbelieve a truth — but just as the raged shouting expresses anger in contradiction to the impressed claim of non-anger, the utterance "X is true" implicitly expresses belief in X, and so contradicts the attendant impression of disbelief.

The more common term "assertion" can, I think, be taken to be equivalent to my term "impression" here, but I like how the linguistic symmetry of "im-" and "ex-" illustrates the distinction: to "express" is literally to "push out", and one may imagine an illustration of expression as little arrows pointing out of the speaker's mind; while to "impress" is literally to "push in", and one may imagine an illustration of impression as an arrow pointing into the listener. Though I've spoken of impressions and expressions thus far only as they apply to statements, pushing thoughts from speaker to listener, the distinction can also be applied equally to questions, where an impressed question is a direct question figuratively pulling something straight from a listener, while an expressed question is a more open-ended wondering, a demonstration of the speaker's own uncertainty and openness to input should anyone have any to offer.

Sentences of the forms "I wonder if X." and "Is it true that X?" clearly illustrate the difference. Since questions "pull" rather than "push", we might continue the clear Latinate verbal illustration by terming the "is it true" type of question an "extraction", meaning literally "pulling-out" of the listener, and the "I wonder" type of question an "intraction" — not "inter-action", but "in-traction" — meaning literally "pulling-in" to the speaker. The difference intended here is like the difference between billing someone for a service, versus putting out a hat so passers-by can donate what they like. The difference between impression and expression is likewise comparable to the difference between sending a product to someone directly, versus setting it out with a "free" or "take one" sign.

The difference between impression and expression is somewhat analogous to, but not literally the same as, the difference between the imperative and indicative linguistic moods, inasmuch as an impressive speech-act is effectively telling someone what to think (or in an impressive question, telling them to tell you something), while an expressive speech-act is effectively showing others what you think (or in an expressive question, showing your uncertainty).

However it is important to stress that I am not saying impressions are literally imperative and expressions are literally indicative, because I hold that the ordinary indicative type of statement that's generally held to be the plainest, most default kind of statement is itself a kind of impressive speech-act: saying "Bob throws the ball" impresses a belief in Bob throwing the ball, implicitly tells the listener to believe that Bob throws the ball, and so is kind of imperative-like in that way, but is still distinct from the literal imperative "Bob, throw the ball!".

Similarly, expressive speech-acts, while they are indicative-like in the manner that they communicate, can be more imperative-like in their contents, such as "I think Bob ought to throw the ball", without impressing that opinion on anyone, much less Bob himself. But, of course, we can also merely express indicative-like, descriptive opinions, ala "I think Bob throws the ball", and most importantly, I hold that we can also impress imperative-like, prescriptive opinions, ala "Bob ought to throw the ball". Expression and impression are about how an opinion is delivered; it's a separate matter as to what the contents of that opinion are.


More to come after we’ve discussed this part.