It looks like Moore maybe didn't compose the anecdote.

It was absurd of whoever did to put those words in MacIntosh's mouth.

Right, but I wouldn't be saying that i know it's raining outside, but believe otherwise! — Marchesk

You can say anything. For example:

Donald Trump is not a criminal but I believe that Donald Trump is a criminal.

The above is true if, despite what I believe, Donald Trump is not a criminal.

While it's true that MacIntosh is saying something true, he's asserting something unknown to him. That's why it's absurd.

Moore's question is tendentious and possibly intentionally misleading. It's not absurd to say something true about oneself. It's just unusual to speak the truth without any basis in knowledge or experience. It has to have happened by pure chance.

While it's true that MacIntosh is saying something true, he's asserting something unknown to him. That's why it's absurd. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It's not absurd. For example:

You had pancakes for breakfast today.

There's nothing absurd about the above statement, even though the fact of the matter is unknown to me. It's sensible and either true or false.

You had pancakes for breakfast today. — Michael

It would be absurd for you to make that assertion if you didn't believe I had pancakes for breakfast. There would be absolutely no reason to say it. Hence, absurd.


In short, you left out the second half:

You had pancakes for breakfast today, but I don't believe you had pancakes for breakfast today.

Absurd.

Why is it absurd for me to say something true about myself?” — Wheatley

A unconscionably misleading question. Moore must have known better.

It's not that it's absurd to say something true about oneself. It's silly to suggest that's absurd.

It's absurd to assert something true without evidence while holding a belief to the contrary.

At some point people have to wake up to the reality that "I do not 'believe' X" IS NOT THE SAME AS "I 'believe' NOT-X."

Here are two things about me that are totally true:

I do not "believe" any gods exist...and I do not "believe" there are no gods.

As you say, it's a silly statement, but also a true statement. That's the puzzle. — Michael

For me, the puzzle is why this is a puzzle, but then I haven't read Moore and know little about him and the context of this puzzle.

Here's the thing: "It's raining, but I don't believe it's raining," isn't necessarily a silly statement. What if we're talking narrative present (present tense for past events) with an intrusive narrate. "It's raining (as I, the narratar), but I (my past self) don't believe it's raining." When speaking, you need to take perspective into account in a way you don't have to if you consider well-defined philosophical propositions. If you ignore perspective, you can create plenty of absurd situations:

Bill: I'm Bill.
Joe: No, I'm not.

Both are correct, and yet B seems to contradict A. What a puzzle! This constructed situation is nonsensical, because it entails that Joe can use "I" correctly but can't parse it when someone else uses it. (Not sure if cognitive impairments exist that make such a situation plausible.)

Similarly, Moore's puzzle is the result of assuming things about Macintosh's knowledge and then decontextualising him so that his knowledge is only partially relevant.

It's just not a puzzle that you can't truthfully speak the truth about whether or not it's raining if you don't know whether or not it's raining. Macintosh could gamble on it, though, if his intention is to speak a true sentence, rather than to speak the truth about rain. Basically, Macintosh would be betting on himself being wrong about rain. That this leads to real-life absurdity doesn't automatically cause a philosophical problem. It depends on what problems you want to explore (and this is where my ignorance of Moore limits me).

I'm not surprised they say this puzzle helped develop pragmatics. It's definitely relevant.

It is akin to shouting in a rage "I'M NOT ANGRY!". There is nothing self-contradictory in the content impressed, in either case — it's possible for someone to be non-angry, and it's possible for someone to disbelieve a truth — but just as the raged shouting expresses anger in contradiction to the impressed claim of non-anger, the utterance "X is true" implicitly expresses belief in X, and so contradicts the attendant impression of disbelief. — Pfhorrest

It would be absurd for you to make that assertion if you didn't believe I had pancakes for breakfast. There would be absolutely no reason to say it. Hence, absurd. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Why do I need a reason to say something? The meaning and truth of a sentence does not depend on my motivation for saying it. "You had pancakes for breakfast" has a sense, whatever I believe, and is either true or false, whatever I believe.

Why do I need a reason to say something? — Michael

Moving into armchair fog-to-pettifoggery here.




You don't "need" a reason to say a thing. You "have" a reason to say a thing.

You said "you had pancakes for breakfast today" because you thought it would support your argument.

Name one thing you've said without a reason for saying it.

You don't "need" a reason to say a thing. You "have" a reason to say a thing.

You said "you had pancakes for breakfast today" because you thought it would support your argument.

Name one thing you've said without a reason for saying it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You're the one who said "It would be absurd for you to make that assertion if you didn't believe I had pancakes for breakfast. There would be absolutely no reason to say it."

Do I or do I not have a reason for saying "You had pancakes for breakfast today"?

The fact is that I did say it, and I also don't know what you had for breakfast today. And it's either true or false.

So where's the absurdity?

I'm the context of the present philosophical argument, yes, you had a reason to say it: to win the argument.

Remove that context and you would not have said it.

Many, many (and I dare say), many absurd things have been said in an attempt to win a philosophical argument.

You're the one who said "It would be absurd for you to make that assertion if you didn't believe I had pancakes for breakfast. There would be absolutely no reason to say it." — Michael

What I meant was: you would not have said it.

So where's the absurdity? — Michael

Do you agree with the below?

It's absurd to assert something true without evidence while holding a belief to the contrary.

Do you agree with the below?

It's absurd to assert something true without evidence while holding a belief to the contrary. — ZzzoneiroCosm

No.

Perhaps I'm ashamed of my virginity and tell my friends that I've had sex before. People lie all the time.

if we assume a speaker is being honest and not manipulative, we assume an impression from them upon our minds to imply also an expression of their own mind. That is to say, when they impress upon us that X is true, if we assume that they are honest, we take that to also express their own belief that X is true. If they then impress upon us that they don't believe X is true, that impression contradicts the preceding implied expression of their belief. — Pfhorrest

No.

Perhaps I'm ashamed of my virginity and tell my friends that I've had sex before. People lie all the time. — Michael

This seems muddled.

Reread my statement.

"without evidence"

This seems muddled.

Reread my statement.

"without evidence" — ZzzoneiroCosm

There is no evidence for my claim that I've had sex if I am in fact a virgin.

Asserting something commits the speaker to believing in the content of the assertion. "It's raining, but I don't think it is" (and its variants) therefore state that the speaker doesn't believe something via one conjunct, and commits them to believing it via the other.

The sentence itself is not contradictory, and it can be true, but the speaker incurs contradictory commitments in uttering it. Therefore, the meaning of a sentence considered in isolation is not the same as the commitments one takes up in uttering that sentence, which are richer. The two can come into conflict where one alone doesn't.

Perhaps I'm ashamed of my virginity and tell my friends that I've had sex before. People lie all the time. — Michael

You're not asserting something true without evidence. You're asserting something false.

Asserting something commits the speaker to believing in the content of the assertion. — Snakes Alive

So when I lie I commit to believing my lie?

You're not asserting something true without evidence. You're asserting something false. — ZzzoneiroCosm

So it's not absurd to assert something false without evidence but it is absurd to assert something true without evidence? Why?

Is it absurd for me to assert that intelligent life exists on other planets despite having no evidence for it? Is it absurd for me to assert that there's a beer in the fridge despite having no evidence for it? I don't think either are absurd, whether they are true or false. They're just either true or false.

So when I lie I commit to believing my lie? — Michael

if we assume a speaker is being honest and not manipulative — Pfhorrest

I was just pointing out that your example doesn't jive with my statement.

Not sure about the rest of your questions.

I was just pointing out that your example doesn't jive with my statement. — ZzzoneiroCosm

And I questioned your statement by asking why it's absurd to assert something true without evidence but not absurd to assert something false without evidence.

But what if I believe that there's a beer in the fridge but assert that there isn't a beer in a fridge. However, unbeknownst to me, someone else has taken the last beer from the fridge (a classic Gettier example). When I assert that there isn't a beer in a fridge (which I intend to be a lie) I'm actually asserting something true (without evidence). Is my attempt at a lie an absurdity?

So when I lie I commit to believing my lie? — Michael

Yes. In fact, otherwise lying wouldn't work! The whole point of lying is publicly committing to believing something you know to be false (well, in the most canonical case of lying).

Such an annoying thread; but, tru.

Because the mind's reflexivity makes it impossible for the self to disagree with its present self that blatantly. Macintosh can't at the same time agree and disagree that it is raining. Not if he wants to make any sense anyway...

One can disagree with one's PAST self of course. Macintosh can say: I USED TO think it wasn't raining but I was wrong.

I don't understand the issue here. Of course it'll be self-contradictory to say something like, "It's raining but I don't believe it is." The reason is when I say, "it's raining..." it means I believe it's raining and then what I say later, "...but I don't believe it is" I'm denying what I said earlier, no?

It would've been mighty convenient if Moore were available to tell us what exactly is the source of, why he thinks the statement is, absurd if not for the self-contradiction in it but then that would imply his belief that the sentence, to him, makes sense is an error. :chin: