but that a perceiver is in an active relation with its environment, in which perception depends on both. — jamalrob
It seems to me that in order to say that the brain gets stuff "wrong" is implying that you know what is "right". How did you know what is right or wrong if not using your brain - directly or indirectly? — Harry Hindu
The surface of the apple reflects light at a certain wavelength, that light stimulates the eyes, the eyes send a signal to the brain, the visual cortex of the brain is activated, and we have an experience that we describe as "seeing a red apple". So I suppose I would say that the relationship is simply causal (a term I've seen elsewhere on the topic is "causal covariance"). — Michael
Usually in context of illusions, you investigate further. If you walk five miles through the hot desert to the oasis and it isn't there, then you know your brain tricked you. — Marchesk
Sure, but I don't see how that goes against my point. Fire engines are red to most people, if you like. It doesn't matter. The point is not that red is some transcendent fact of the fire engine, but that a perceiver is in an active relation with its environment, in which perception depends on both. — jamalrob
I can agree with that. What do you think I should disagree with in it? — fdrake
I'm not sure where the "active relation with the environment" fits in with direct realism's certainty versus indirect's reliance on inference. — Marchesk
Color Primitivist Realism is the view that there are in nature colors, as ordinarily understood, i.e., colors are simple intrinsic, non-relational, non-reducible, qualitative properties. They are qualitative features of the sort that stand in the characteristic relations of similarity and difference that mark the colors; they are not micro-structural properties or reflectances, or anything of the sort. There is no radical illusion, error or mistake in color perception (only commonplace illusions): we perceive objects to have the colors that they really have. Such a view has been presented by Hacker 1987 and by J. Campbell 1994, 2005, and has become increasingly popular: McGinn 1996; Watkins 2005; Gert 2006, 2008. This view is sometimes called “The Simple View of Color” and sometimes “The Naive Realist view of Color”. — Color (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
This book develops and defends the view that colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences. This view stands in contrast to the long-standing and wide spread view amongst philosophers and scientists that colours do not really exist—or at any rate, that if they do exist, then they are radically different from the way that they appear. It is argued that a naïve realist theory of colour best explains how colours appear to perceiving subjects, and that this view is not undermined either by reflecting on variations in colour perception between perceivers and across perceptual conditions, or by our modern scientific understanding of the world. The book also illustrates how our understanding of what colours are has far-reaching implications for wider questions about the nature of perceptual experience, the relationship between mind and world, the problem of consciousness, the apparent tension between common-sense and scientific representations of the world, and even the very nature and possibility of philosophical inquiry.
Perhaps what the salient parts of the disagreement are depend on what camp you're in? A difference that looks different from both sides. — fdrake
Perhaps what the salient parts of the disagreement are depend on what camp you're in? A difference that looks different from both sides. — fdrake
Wouldn't that be true for both direct and indirect realists? So when most people see red, that means they have a direct awareness of the object's reflectivity?
Part of the problem is that every time I've seen direct realism introduced, it's stated as seeing objects as they are instead of some mental representation. If we see objects as they are, then knowledge is not a problem.
I'm not sure where the "active relation with the environment" fits in with direct realism's certainty versus indirect's reliance on inference. — Marchesk
(Direct realism) The properties of perceptual content of a perceptual event are identical with those of what the perceptual event is directed towards..
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And this indirect realism:
(Indirect Realism) The properties of perceptual content of a perceptual event are not-identical with those of what the perceptual event is directed towards. — fdrake
Yes, that looks about right. It seems consistent with how naive realism is summarized here: "the character of one’s experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness manifesting itself in experience" (and where such "whiteness" is a property of the external world object).
I don't think that external world properties manifest themselves in experience in this way. I only think that external world properties are causally covariant with the character of one's experience. Sugar doesn't manifest itself in taste-experience; it only elicits a sweet taste (for me, at least). — Michael
Yes, good point, and a good example: was the article even committed to or advocating some positive doctrine called direct or naive realism? I gathered not. — bongo fury
Can't we be questioning mental representations altogether? — bongo fury
Friston even approves of Gibson's theory of perception, which is a form of direct realism, so it's no so clear cut that indirect realism is the only way to be consistent with neuroscience — fdrake
As such I don't think it can be at all right to say that experience does not result from neural activity. It is fairly certain that what we experience is the output of several neural corticies, none of which directly transfer (unmodified) the content of their input. — Isaac
But I would say that an indirect instance of active perception would have its percept as an output of the process of active perception; as if the process of perception produces phenomenal and mental content associated with perceptions; in a diagram, perceptual relation→→phenomenal and mental content of perception. The associated intuition is a sequential ordering of perception to perceptual content (related to post-hoc thematisation/schematisation as jamalrob channeled photographer with in another thread)
Conversely, I would say that a direct instance of active perception would have its percept as a component of the process of active perception; as if the phenomenal and mental content associated with perception is a part of the perceptual modelling relation between body and environment; in a diagram, phenomenal and mental content of perception ⊂⊂ perceptual relation. The associated intuition is that perceptual content (the phenomenal/mental stuff) occurs within a relational event of perception. — fdrake
(Direct realism) The properties of perceptual content of a perceptual event are identical with those of what the perceptual event is directed towards..
(Indirect Realism) The properties of perceptual content of a perceptual event are not-identical with those of what the perceptual event is directed towards. — fdrake
my intuition is a perceptual experience (which I'm guessing we're imbuing with phenomenal and mental content since we're talking about experiences) is a component part of perception. — fdrake
I suppose I would have thought, in my naivety, that the very fact that the aspect of perception we actually experience is filtered, summarised and condensed, would make it de facto indirect. If not, then I'm lost as to what indirect might be referring to. — Isaac
Is there actually a naive position that is somehow corrected by the idea that perception happens from a perspective and in a certain way? — jamalrob
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