I know he claims that, but I'm saying that it's not the same as the kind of experiences we have with one another. The kind of experiences we have with one another are not the kind that can be sensibly doubted, at least not usually. Whereas these supposedly direct experiences with God are easily doubted for good reason. — Sam26

And then there is the point I made earlier, that didn't seem to strike a chord with anyone. When you see your hand and are prompted to believe that your hand exists, the contents of that belief are an elaboration upon the details of the experience that prompted it. If you look up at a grand starry sky and are thereby prompted to believe that God exists, the contents of that belief, whatever they are (it's not really clear), are different from just an elaboration upon the details of the experience that prompted it, which would instead be something like a belief about astronomical facts.

the point I made earlier, that didn't seem to strike a chord with anyone. When you see your hand and are prompted to believe that your hand exists — Pfhorrest

When I see a rainbow and am prompted to believe the rainbow exists, is this a properly basic belief, that is an elaboration upon the details of the experience that prompted it? Or are rainbows more like God?

When you see your hand and are prompted to believe that your hand exists, the contents of that belief are an elaboration upon the details of the experience that prompted it. — Pfhorrest

I think I understand what you're saying, although it seems like a strange way to say it (using the word "prompt"). I would say that our sensory experiences can justify a belief, i.e., it's one of the epistemological ways we use to justify a belief. For example, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" "I tasted it." Or, "How do you know that Mary shot Joe?" "I was there the night Mary shot Joe, I saw it."

If we want to understand how it is that we know something, then look at how we use the word in ordinary circumstances. There are several ways we justify a belief. For example, testimony, sensory experience, linguistic training, logic (inductive and deductive reason), etc. My point is that there is a better way to talk about how we arrive at a belief without using the word "prompt." At least that is how I see it.

On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his heart, There is no God" (Psalm 53:2). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm

Yes.

I’m just speaking in the way Plantinga does to show that his sensus divinatus is different from ordinary senses in an important way even within his own framework.

↪unenlightened Yes. — Pfhorrest

Yes, rainbows are like God? Yes, the existence of rainbows is properly basic? Yes, rainbows are like hands? Yes, we have no bananas? Help me out a bit.

The meta-analysis of the posters here of foundationalism generally is based upon the laziness of not wishing to read the actual article, but instead just to fall back upon their general philosophy 101 objections to the enterprise of foundationalism. — Hanover

IN truth I was expecting the thread to quickly fall victim to the religious fervour infecting the forums - as . The other danger is the one you cite - and that so gleefully advocates, not reading the article.

So I'm pleased to see the discussion that @Sam26 has induced; that's what I was looking forward to.

Aquinas is not so bad.

For the belief to be bedrock in the Wittgensteinian sense, it must generally (i.e., in most contexts) be the kind of belief that is exempt (again, in most contexts) from doubt. If it is generally not doubted, then it is a statement that is outside of our epistemological language-games in those undoubtable contexts. — Sam26

Thank you, Sam, for participating.

Plantinga wants to treat basic beliefs as part of the epistemological game; he is looking for a suitable analysis, the rules of the game, as it were. But basic beliefs are what make the game possible, and hence are in that sense not a part of the game. They cannot be doubted without throwing out the whole game.

Basic belief... properly basic belief... is prior to language. — creativesoul

You know I will disagree with you one this; it implies that a properly basic belief is could not in principle be stated.

See Sam's argument; seeing a tree is not something that could be doubted, while the tree is before you. But hearing the voice of god while reading the bible is something that could be doubted.

It's an interesting argument, but I'm not convinced that it works.

Sure; can you fill in the gaps, so that we less versed in the Summa might understand what is being claimed, perhaps in the light of the article?

If Aquinas were asked the question of the OP, he might have said, no, the belief in God is not properly basic, since although the belief that there is no God is not dependent on any other proposition, it can be rationally denied.

In the article, he explains that he's not talking about groundless beliefs. A basic belief doesn't rely on other beliefs.

I can doubt that I had breakfast this morning. I believe it based on memory, not on some other belief, so it's basic.

If you can reasonably doubt it, then it is not a basic belief. A basic belief is groundless, in that it is not dependent on, nor justified by, any other belief. Rather a basic belief is one that cannot sensible, rationally, be subject to doubt.

Of course, any belief might, irrationally, unreasonably, be doubted.

You might reasonably doubt your memory of having had breakfast, were there some evidence - the eggs you had planned to use are still there, the plates are in the draw and not the dishwasher, you had some other recent memory lapses. Not just any groundless belief will do.

So if one has no reason to doubt one's religious experiences, then the beliefs grounded in them are basic?

When I see a rainbow and am prompted to believe the rainbow exists, is this a properly basic belief, that is an elaboration upon the details of the experience that prompted it? — unenlightened

Yes.

So if one has no reason to doubt one's religious experiences, then the beliefs grounded in them are basic? — frank

That's the topic here - but for any belief.

Perhaps, Albert has no reason to doubt his experience. So it is basic for Albert. But Benjamin does have reason to doubt Albert's religious belief, so it's not basic for Ben. Ben might say that Albert is mistake, or misguided, or some such.

That's a description of what is going on. Who is right? What ought we believe?

So, there are basic beliefs? Or are you setting out a definition of basic beliefs, which you claim is empty?

Considering

No beliefs are properly basic. — Pfhorrest

I think no beliefs are properly basic, because foundationalism is false; but, even if we were presuming that some beliefs were properly basic, belief in God prompted by seeing a starry sky and getting a feeling of grandeur is importantly different from belief in trees prompted by seeing trees.

Who is right? What ought we believe? — Banno

I think your beliefs are your business, not mine. If you want to discuss them with me, that's cool. If you're religious, I'd be curious.

I think that we should believe in religious tolerance. What's your view?

I think no beliefs are properly basic, because foundationalism is false, — Pfhorrest

You disagree with foundationalism, but do you have any other particular system for evaluating the reasonableness of your beliefs, and the beliefs of others?

Do you think belief in God can be rational? If the answer is yes, then Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology may be irrelevant to you. If no, then please describe your basis for thinking that.

while the tree is before you. But hearing the voice of god while reading the bible is something that could be doubted. — Banno

Why? What lets you distinguish one from the other?

When you see your hand and are prompted to believe that your hand exists, the contents of that belief are an elaboration upon the details of the experience that prompted it. — Pfhorrest

Myth of the Given.

Well, see Sam's posts. Ask him, if you don't follow. It's his argument.

Doubt for doubt's sake.

I don't really buy it. If you're going to make any condition of use sufficient for basicality, if you change the use you change the criteria of basicality. It requires some work to distinguish this from arbitrariness.

If you're going to dismiss the discussion in that way, then his original comment about elaboration on experience isn't necessary to begin with. Analyzing it that way is what invites the Sellarsian response.

If you're going to make any condition of use sufficient for basicality, if you change the use you change the criteria of basicality. — fdrake

I agree that if you change the use you change the criteria of basicality. What is basic depends on what one is doing. So there is a sense in which, say, there being a god is basic to worshiping.

And so i must be misunderstanding @Sam26, since he seems sometimes to claim that there are things that are basic to all or any language games...

The answer must be in there being two sorts of basic beliefs - those that are presumed in order for an activity to occur, like keeping the bishop on its own colour in order to play chess; and those that are somehow universally basic... and "here is a hand" is one of those.

But I don't see that as workable.

But that's exactly what is going on here. Rejecting the myth of the given is presupposed by the article - that's what foundationalism is.

So you might have a point (I doubt it...:razz: ) but it is a point for another discussion.