The articles goes to pains to argue that it's not a justificatory relationship between a basic belief and something else which grounds it, it's something more like a practical one. — fdrake

Indeed, it does; but does it succeed?

Did anyone read the article?

It seemsto me that the error is in thinking...

...that a belief is properly basic only in certain conditions; these conditions are, we might say, the ground of its justification and, by extension, the ground of the belief itself. In this sense, basic beliefs are not, or are not necessarily, groundless beliefs.

There seems to me a contradiction involved in setting out basic beliefs as dependent on anything. — Banno

The articles goes to pains that it's not a justificatory relationship between a basic belief and something else, it's something more like a practical one. If one sees a tree, in normal circumstances one may hold that one sees a tree, and infer that the tree exists. The inference there is not an act of cognition, it is a practical presupposition, like that "I am holding a fork" is true when one is holding a fork. The argument construes belief in "God exists" in precisely the same manner as belief that forks exists while holding them.

While I disagree with the conclusions, I enjoy the conceptual machinery here. Basic beliefs spring from a context of activity, if one has a context involving God, belief in God is basic. The interesting question in my book is the status of being basic; is it a property of a statement, is it a binary relationship between a statement and a context, or is it a ternary relationship between a statement and a context and an event or activity? — fdrake

The claim that properly basic beliefs are not necessarily(always) groundless causes a bit of confusion. Banno is right to point this out. If a belief is grounded, then it's always grounded upon another more basic belief, unless one holds that well grounded belief needs no language(as I do). Plantinga does not seem to work from that though...

However, Platinga is right to focus upon the context involving basic beliefs. Such consideration is imperative to our understanding them.

The bit about the tree may lead somewhere interesting and useful. If one holds that one sees a tree, then what is that holding if not a belief that one sees a tree? I don't think it's helpful to then say that one further infers that the tree exists, and that that inference amounts to some special sort of practical presupposition. To quite the contrary, that's all quite wrong on it's face.

Holding that one sees something(a tree in this case) is a basic belief. At the most basic level of belief, prior to language use, when one sees a tree one cannot help but to believe that they are seeing something. That belief is inevitable, in that such pre-linguistic beliefs cannot possibly be doubted. Such beliefs are required in order to learn the names of things, such as that that is(called) "a tree". Thus, they facilitate language acquisition altogether. Earlier, relativist broached this consideration a bit. It deserves more discussion, for these are the times in which basic beliefs are formed, and they do not consist of statements of belief, whether they be grounded or groundless.

I enjoy the conceptual machinery here. Basic beliefs spring from a context of activity, if one has a context involving God, belief in God is basic. The interesting question in my book is the status of being basic; is it a property of a statement, is it a binary relationship between a statement and a context, or is it a ternary relationship between a statement and a context and an event or activity? — fdrake

I agree that the status of a basic belief is an interesting question. However, knowing that requires knowing what beliefs are. The context of belief formation is imperative for it provides us with the information needed in order to be able to identify the content of the belief(s) in question. I do not think that Plantinga or current convention has belief right to start with, so they're bound to get what counts a properly basic one wrong as well. In OC, Witt struggled with setting out hinge propositions(his notion of basic - bedrock - belief) for the same reasons...

Without God, man dissolves into nature, mind into matter. So God is as real as the distinction between man and nature, or self and world.

And, Planting[a] has to admit, as unreal. — unenlightened

:up:

From the paper on pg.1(41)

Some of my beliefs, however, I accept but don't accept on the basis of any other beliefs. Call these beliefs basic. I believe that 2 + 1 = 3, for example, and don't believe it on the basis of other propositions. I also believe that I am seated at my desk, and that there is a mild pain in my right knee.

This exemplifies this issue I'm pointing out here. The conflation of belief and propositions. Besides that, even if we grant that all beliefs have propositional content, one simply cannot believe that 2+1=3 without first believing that they know what those marks mean. This mark(2) refers to this quantity, etc...

One cannot believe that one is seated at a desk, unless one first knows what a desk is, etc...

One cannot believe that there is a mild pain in one's right knee, unless one knows how to distinguish between the severity of pains... mild, severe, etc...

All of these may be called "basic" or "properly basic" if we allow our search for basic belief to be guided by a gross misunderstanding of belief, such as working from an utterly inadequate criterion for belief to begin with. None of those beliefs are existentially independent from language use. All of them are existentially dependent upon language constructs. Yet, because belief is not properly understood, it is mistakenly believed to be dependent upon language, so no one bats an eye when people say things like Plantinga claimed here.

These are all consequences stemming from having belief wrong to begin with.

Something else occurred to me tonight, largely due to Un's participation...

What if the notion of "basic" amounts to something like being foundational to all other beliefs. In that sense, and under the right sorts of conditions/circumstances, Plantinga offers as good an argument as it gets for belief in God being basic/foundational.

In the context of being raised in religious communities, certain members of that community could very well have a belief in God that is rightfully, sensibly, and positively correctly said to be as basic as it gets... if being basic amounts to being foundational/fundamental to all other operative belief in the candidate's worldview.

The articles goes to pains to argue that it's not a justificatory relationship between a basic belief and something else which grounds it, it's something more like a practical one.
— fdrake

Indeed, it does; but does it succeed? — Banno

Not by my lights.

Although, I agree that basic belief does not have the same sort of justification/grounding as statements of belief that are called "basic". Basic belief... properly basic belief... is prior to language.

Some belief is prior to language. Thus, if we call some of these "basic", then the something that grounds it would be what's happened, and/or is happening... Being a part of the world grounds properly basic belief(the collapse of the distinction between us and nature). Plantinga skirted around this with the bits about sitting at desks and knee pain...

What if the notion of "basic" amounts to something like being foundational to all other beliefs. — creativesoul

That's exactly what a basic belief IS.

Correct, and that's exactly why foundationalism is bullshit (not in the technical sense). "Everything needs a reason", except for these things that obviously don't. Well then why isn't God or the Great Pumpkin or any other nonsense "obvious" enough? If you ever stop to say something is without need of justification, you're saying that it's beyond question, and therefore asking anyone who might disagree just to take your word for it, on faith. Foundationalism is equivalent to fideism, and consequently anti-rationalist. Critical rationalism is the only sound rationalism that doesn't fall either into fideism or an infinite regress to nihilism.

What if the notion of "basic" amounts to something like being foundational to all other beliefs.
— creativesoul
That's exactly what a basic belief IS. — Relativist

Well, that's what's said about them anyway. In what way are they foundational? Is it a matter of existential dependency and elemental constituency, or is it one of value assessment? Belief in God would be a value assessment. That's the most important belief for some. In that way, it would be both basic and grounded upon other more basic beliefs. Belief that one knows what certain words mean comes prior to any and all belief in God. The latter is existentially dependent upon the former.

If you ever stop to say something is without need of justification, you're saying that it's beyond question, and therefore asking anyone who might disagree just to take your word for it, on faith. — Pfhorrest

While I do not entirely disagree... This is about thinking about belief(reporting upon belief), not what belief itself is. Another consequence of getting belief wrong to begin with.

In what way are they foundational? — creativesoul

To be warranted, a belief needs rational justification. Justification means showing how the belief is inferred from other warranted beliefs. Ultimately, there will be beliefs that aren't derived from prior beliefs- these are the basic beliefs, the foundation for one's entire belief structure.

...beliefs that aren't derived from prior beliefs- these are the basic beliefs, the foundation for one's entire belief structure. — Relativist

Although it is quite clear that belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity, and is thus accrued in a way, I do not think that happens in a strictly linear fashion, although belief in God is close when one learns to talk like that from early on.

My name is...

That is a tree. That is a cat. That is a banana.

These are basic... right? Or are they?

Although it is quite clear that belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity, and is thus accrued in a way, I do not think that happens in a strictly linear fashion — creativesoul

I agree, but we can still analyse any specific belief to determine whether or not it is warranted. A belief that is fully wartanted would rely only on other warranted beliefs, so there are layers upon layers - until reaching the foundation. At any rate, that's the theory upon which foundationalism is based.

Are the foundational beliefs warranted? What about justificatory regress?

Are the foundational beliefs warranted? What about justificatory regress? — creativesoul

That is the general problem with foundationalism. Plantinga addresses this by arguing that beliefs that are "basic in the proper way" (i.e. properly basic) have warrant. The "proper way" is that it was produced by a sound mind, in an environment supportive of proper thought in accord with a design plan successfully aimed at truth.

Indeed, it does; but does it succeed? — Banno

I find the argument plausible.

(1) I see a tree.
(2) I heard God speaking to me when I read the Bible.

People exist that have sound mind and normal perceptual faculties that do (1) and (2). I can no more doubt that I saw the tree than that I heard God. Therefore, the tree exists and God exists.

Assuming that you believe in basic beliefs, on what criterion would you distinguish instances of (1) from instances of (2) as basic beliefs?

(1) is clearly rooted in a basic belief (no pun intended)
(2) is rooted in basic belief only if there is a God who speaks to humans and we actually have the faculty to hear it.

I'll stress that Plantinga is not endeavoring to prove God. He's just showing that knowledge of God is possible (in the strict sense of "knowledge"), IF God exists.

(2) is rooted in basic belief only if there is a God who speaks to humans and we actually have the faculty to hear it. — Relativist

(1) is rooted in basic belief only if there was a tree who is seeable by humans and we actually have the faculty to hear it.

I believe the same logic applies to the tree as to God. You can substitute tree for God in the expression, and hearing for sight.

You are doubting that people have a special God faculty, whereas the example only requires hearing.

I should say that I agree that the argument isn't really about God's existence, it's breaking down a bunch of implications.

Basic belief -> groundless belief? Nope.
Reject popular at the time (apparently) foundationalist criterion for basicality -> arbitrary beliefs are basic? Nope.

Then highlighting a pretty hard criterion problem for beliefs being basic.

The only argument for the existence of God in it is that if there's some belief which is properly basic that concerns God, it's reasonable for the person to conclude that God exists on that basis.

I am only vaguely familiar with Plantinga's approach, but the discussion and examples so far remind me of the non-foundationalist pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce. He sometimes preferred to call it "pragmaticism" in order to distinguish his realist version from the more popular nominalism of his good friend William James.

Our direct perception of things and events prompts us to make involuntary perceptual judgments that are quite fallible. We cannot help believing them at first, and they lead us to anticipate certain other things and events going forward. When those predictions are fulfilled in our subsequent experience, the belief--which is really a habit of conduct, even when expressed as a proposition--is corroborated; when they are confounded, it is falsified. In other words, this is just our everyday implementation of the scientific method:

1. Retroduction, formulating a plausible hypothesis.
2. Deduction, working out its necessary consequences.
3. Induction, evaluating whether those outcomes are realized.

Moreover, Peirce held that we have a direct perception of God. He somewhat famously wrote an article near the end of his life that presented "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" as a process of retroduction, rather than deduction as employed in most classical "proofs."

Banno?

I haven't read everything in this thread, so if duplicate some of what's already been mentioned forgive the laziness.

Plantinga's properly basic beliefs are in some ways similar to how I interpret Wittgenstein's bedrock beliefs. I believe, and have argued this extensively in other places, that Wittgenstein's bedrock beliefs are outside the language-game of epistemology, i.e., they are not based on epistemological justifications. One way to understand this, is to consider doubting these kinds of statements. The classic example is Moore's statement, "I know this is my hand." To see how unclear this statement is (according to Wittgenstein) consider its negation, "I don't know this is my hand (but consider this is Moore's context, before a crowd holding up his hand). For the belief to be bedrock in the Wittgensteinian sense, it must generally (i.e., in most contexts) be the kind of belief that is exempt (again, in most contexts) from doubt. If it is generally not doubted, then it is a statement that is outside of our epistemological language-games in those undoubtable contexts.

If a proposition/statement can be sensibly doubted, then it makes sense that it would need to have a justification to support it, or it would need an epistemological justification to overcome the doubt. Knowing and doubting go hand-in-hand, which is why we need good reasons/evidence, or some other kind of justification. Otherwise, we could infer that one knows, simply by one's claim that one knows. Knowing requires an objective justification.

Plantinga's basic beliefs are similar, in that Plantinga believes that his properly basic beliefs, in this case, belief in God, is direct, immediate, and basic. So, in Plantinga's reformed epistemology, belief in God is so basic that support in terms of an epistemological justification is not needed. Belief in God is foundational or basic as Plantinga says. However, I would argue that Plantinga is wrong about this. Why? We can use the Wittgensteinian test, i.e., does it make sense to doubt that God exists? The obvious answer is, yes. The statement that God exists is not the same as "My hand exists." We don't have direct experiences with God, at least not in the sense that we do with our hands, or even our mothers, fathers, siblings, friends, etc. This would be true even if some people did have direct experiences with God. Why? Because most of us don't have direct experiences with God. Belief in God is not the same as a belief that one has a mother or father. Believing that one has a mother or father is properly basic. If you don't believe it, try doubting it.

My conclusion, is that if you have a belief in God, then it requires a good epistemological justification. It's a cop out to think that such a belief doesn't require such a justification.

:up:

Sam!

The statement that God exists is not the same as "My hand exists." We don't have direct experiences with God, at least not in the sense that we do with our hands, or even our mothers, fathers, siblings, friends, etc. This would be true even if some people did have direct experiences with God. Why? Because most of us don't have direct experiences with God — Sam26

On the contrary, Plantinga claims that most people DO have direct exprerience - a sense of divinity that produces beliefs about God:


The sensus divinitatis is a disposition or set of dispositions to form theistic beliefs in various circumstancs, in response to the sorts of conditions or stimuli that trigger the working of this sense of divinity. ...this knowledge of God is not arrived at by inference or argument but in a more immediate way. The deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are not quick and sotto voce inferences from the circumstances that trigger its operation. It isn't that one beholds the night sky, notes that it is grand, and concludes that there must be a God....It s rather that, upon perception of the night sky...these beliefs just arise in us. They are occasioned by the circumstances; they are not conclusions of them. -- Warranted Christian Belief, p173-175

This is analogous to seeing a hand, and this producing the belief "my hand exists".

On the contrary, Plantinga claims that most people DO have direct exprerience - a sense of divinity that produces beliefs about God: — Relativist

I know he claims that, but I'm saying that it's not the same as the kind of experiences we have with one another. The kind of experiences we have with one another are not the kind that can be sensibly doubted, at least not usually. Whereas these supposedly direct experiences with God are easily doubted for good reason.

If they can be doubted, then they are not basic as Plantinga claims. None of the major religions can agree on these experiences. People claim all kinds of things as direct experiences. However, now I'm a bit off topic.

You have a good point but I think Plantinga might argue that a "proper functioning" person cannot sensibly doubt God's existence.

Ya, he would say something like that. Years ago I went to a couple of conferences and listened to Plantinga give lectures on this topic. I think it was around 1979-80 at Wheaton College.